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The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought

Volume Two

by

Carsun Chang

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The Development of
Neo-Confucian Thought

Volume Two

OTHER BOOKS BY CARSUN CHANG

Third Force in China

The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought
Volume One

Preface

Three factors, it seems to me, have contributed to the eclipse of Confucianism in contemporary China. The first is the triumph of communism on the mainland. It is difficult to conceive how, with two views of life so incompatible, the triumph of the one can mean the survival of the other. What appears to me strange is that there are scholars in this country who hold the view that the Chinese Communist dictatorship is related in some way to the Confucian tradition. If a historical root of communism is to be found, it is in Ch'in Shih Huang-ti's absolute monarchy whose objectives are power and conquest through tyranny. Confucius' conception of monarchy is based on the love of the people by the king and the peace and order of the country. To say that Confucianism is in any way related to communism, whose essential elements include class struggle, party control, materialistic dialectics, and world revolution, shows a gross misconception. It is true that Mao Tze-tung has not openly denounced Confucianism; but this is because he has learned a lesson from history. During the T'ai-ping Revolution, Hung Hsiu-chuan became very unpopular among the Chinese intellectuals because he denounced Confucianism. There is no doubt that Mao's attempt to transform Chinese society is entirely in accordance with Marxian ideals.

The second of these factors has been undermining Confucianism for a full century. Starting from about the time of the Opium War, the Christian missionary has consciously or unconsciously tried to replace the Confucian tradition by Christian ideas. It is still too early to make an appraisal of that effort in terms of spiritual values. One may say thus far the apparent results are both negative and positive, but this is not the place to weigh and assess them. Its contribution to the loosening of the sense of identity with his own culture by the individual Chinese, especially among a large section of the educated class, is however a phenomenon not to be lost sight of.

The third factor, one which I shall briefly dwell on in this preface, is the conscious effort on the part of a small band of Chinese intellectuals to destroy the Confucian tradition. Two names in particular are often associated with this movement. One is Mr. Chen Tu-hsiu who inspired the Chinese Communist Party and the other is Dr. Hu Shih, avowedly a disciple of John Dewey. In the early days when the two men were working in close collaboration, Dr. Hu coined a slogan "Down with the house of Confucius" and attained a certain measure of success. His main thesis is that China's cultural heritage should be overthrown to give place to a scientific view of life. That view, he says, should be applied not only to ethics and metaphysics but also to China's social institutions. After World War II, it is true, he began praising the Sung philosophers, but this was largely because the latter fought for the freedom of conscience and not because Hu accepted their philosophical position. That Dr. Hu still holds his point of view at the present time is indicated by a recent paper which he read before the Sino-American Conference on Intellectual Cooperation at Seattle. "Chinese Tradition and Its Future" does not deny the value of Confucian humanism, but it is the value of the philological work of the Ch'ing scholars that Dr. Hu wanted to emphasize in that address. That to him is "evidential investigation" which is in effect the application of the scientific method.

To understand Dr. Hu's position it is necessary to trace back to John Dewey's experimentalism from which it took its rise. Dewey's antagonism to western rationalism is well known. In his *Reconstruction in Philosophy* he said:

"Reason" as a faculty separate from experience, introducing us to a superior region of universal truths begins now to strike us as remote, uninteresting and unimportant. Reason, as a Kantian faculty that introduces generality and regularity into experience, strikes us more and more as superfluous—the unnecessary creation of men addicted to traditional formalism and to elaborate terminology.¹

This seems to explain quite clearly Dewey's attitude towards reason. But when Kant insisted that "knowledge begins with experience," one has a right to ask if Dewey adequately understood him.

Elsewhere in the same book Dewey expressed the view: "Reason as employed by historic rationalism has tended to carelessness, conceit, irresponsibility, and rigidity—in short absolutism."² To maintain that rationalism leads to absolutism is a thesis which, to say the least, is excessive. Neither Kant nor, for that matter, Descartes and Spinoza, who employed rationalism to fight against the citadel of the very absolutism which Dewey justly disapproved, could be so accused. Be that as it may, this low estimation of rationalism by Dewey seems to be the weapon that Dr. Hu used in his evaluation of the Confucian and Neo-Confucian schools of thought. In agreement with Dewey Dr. Hu thinks also that "the methods and conclusions of natural science are "serviceable for moral theory and practice,"³ a point of view the validity of which I categorically deny. This view of the omnipotence of science and scientific method was expressed by Dr. Hu as early as 1923-24 during a heated discussion as to the relative value of science and metaphysics. I excoriated his position then as I still do now. But in all fairness to Dr. Hu the decline of Confucianism had long been felt in China before he began battering it down.

There is however a rhythm in life as there is in human thought. So long as there is in thinking that quality which has a lasting appeal, there will be a resurgence when the appropriate time arrives. Plato was almost completely forgotten and Aristotle ignored throughout the Middle Ages, but they could not be permanently suppressed, however strenuous the effort might be. When their texts were rediscovered in Constantinople and translated, there followed a revival of classical thought which has lasted to the present day.

So also I feel this will be the way of Confucian thought. Already in Hong Kong, under the direction of Mr. Chien Mu and his colleague Mr. Tang Chun-i a center for the reappraisal and revival of Confucianism has been founded. The periodical *Human Life* edited by Mr. Wang Tao in Hong Kong has become an important organ for this movement. The manifesto "The Reappraisal of Western Sinology and the Reconstruction of Chinese Culture" drawn up in Chinese and signed two years ago by Mr. Tang, Mr. Mou Chung-san, Mr. Hsu Fo-kuan and myself, is being prepared for publication in English (included as an appendix to the present volume).

These are some of the indications that Confucianism will gain new recognition and will have its share in shaping the lives and thoughts of the Chinese people and perhaps of the world.⁴

Before concluding let me repeat what I said in the previous volume regarding the impact of the West on Chinese thought. "It is important," I then said, "for us to remember that communism has won followers in China only because the orthodox Western thought has not made the success that it should." The chapter "Chinese Thought under the Impact of the West" in the present volume tries to show just how this failure has come about. "If only the momentous advances in science and technology as well as the evolution of democratic government and administration of the West were made familiar to Chinese thinkers without the bitterness and even the hatred which unfortunately accompanied them in the form of aggression or imperialism, the Chinese situation would have been quite different. If China came to know the West as she came to know Buddhism, there would have been a receptivity of mind, a friendly response, which could have been productive of the highest good. There would then have been no room for the invasion of so heterodox a view as communism. As it was, throughout the 19th century, the impact of the West, in the political and social no less than in the cultural and spiritual sphere, was one of attempted annihilation. It demanded the suspension of China's traditional values or even of its identity. That was why, in the study of China's history, scholars readily acquired the museum method of post-mortem approach, as if the wish was father to the thought. The result was antagonism, frustration, and resistance when there should have been friendly co-operation and willingness to absorb."

It is again my pleasure to express my gratitude to my many friends who helped me in the preparation of this work. None of them who gave so generously of their time are responsible for any views which I have expressed. My thanks are due the staff of the Oriental Division of the Library of Congress, especially Dr. K. T. Wu and his colleagues, for the many kindnesses they extended me. Dr. Rufus Suter gave me constant encouragement for which I feel grateful. His knowledge of Western philosophy and his interest in Chinese culture have proved to be of great value.

My profound thanks I reserve as always for my friend of long

standing, Dr. Chang Hsin-hai, professor of Humanities at Fairleigh Dickinson University, who gave me arduous hours and unstinting effort at every stage in the preparation and writing of this book. His wide and extensive knowledge of both Eastern and Western history and thought, which he placed at my disposal, was a source of much inspiration. Without his assistance all I can say is that it hardly would have been possible for this book to see the light of day. More than this is unnecessary for me to say.

When even, during a crisis, Dr. Chang could jump into the fray and relieve the tension by consenting to write the Chinese characters in the appendices and bibliography, then indeed I am reminded of the words of Marcus Tullius: *Quam multa enim, quae nostra causa numquam faceremus, facimus causa amicorum.** Which goes to show that the world of Confucian values among the Chinese is as alive as ever. Mr. Warner Fan, a talented philosophy student at Stanford University has made available the excellent translation of the manifesto "The Reappraisal of Western Sinology and the Reconstruction of Chinese Culture." To render Chinese philosophical concepts into fluent English is an arduous task; for this I am deeply appreciative. My affectionate thanks are due also to my two daughters, Diana and June, who typed the manuscript and compiled the index.

* For how many things we do for our friends that we never would do for ourselves!

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2. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
3. *Ibid.*, p. xiv.
4. *Vide*, *Within the Four Seas* by Chang Hsin-hai *passim*, which is a vigorous defense of Confucian thought as a corrective to misguided political ideas which are responsible for the present world chaos.

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The Development of
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Volume Two

CHAPTER ONE

General Characteristics of Ming Philosophy

Sung philosophy underwent no perceptible change during the comparatively brief rule of the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368). During the Ming Dynasty however the case is different, for in that period (1368-1644) philosophy was creative and developed with originality. In the early days many Ming scholars followed the teachings of the Ch'eng-Chu school, but after the time of Ch'en Hsien-chang (1428-1500) the thought of the period made genuinely original contributions.

Emperor T'ai-tsu, founder of the Ming Dynasty, reconquered China from the Mongols. His successor, Cheng-tsu, was bent on consolidating his empire on Chinese thought patterns. T'ai-tsu himself ordered that commentaries on the Four Books and the Five Classics made by the Ch'eng-Chu school be used as basic texts from which topics for the state examinations were to be drawn, and the selecting of the successful candidates should be judged on their ability to interpret them. When his successor Cheng-tsu ascended the throne in 1403, T'ai-tsu gave instructions that two works be compiled: the *Great Collection of Commentaries on the Four Books* and the *Great Collection of Commentaries on the Five Classics*. Henceforth, state examination papers were to be judged according to these two officially recognized interpretations of the original texts. Needless to say, these two collections were based upon the philosophical tenets of the Ch'eng brothers, Chu Hsi, and their followers. Since these two collections reestablished basic directions of thought, the influence of the Ch'eng-Chu school became dominant.

According to Huang Tsung-hsi, author of the *Ming-ju Hsüeh-an*

(Philosophical Records of the Ming Scholars), the leading thinkers of this period were Wu Yü-pi, Hsieh Hsuan, and Ch'en Hsien-chang. They made, however, no new contribution to the philosophical ideas of the period. Except for the last named, they were merely exponents of the teachings of Chu Hsi. But it is worth looking briefly into their lives and thoughts.

Wu Yü-pi (1391-1469) was born in Fu-chou, Kiangsi Province. In his nineteenth year he visited his parents in Peking. Under a tutor named Yang P'u he studied the book *Origin of the I-chuan and Lo-yang School* in which Chu Hsi told the story of the Ch'eng brothers and their teachers. So interested did Wu Yü-pi become in their teachings that he abandoned the idea of taking the state examinations or of following a civil service career and buried himself in the study of the Four Books, the Five Classics, and the *Dialogues of the Sung Philosophers*. For several years we are told he scarcely left his room.

Besides being contemplative, Wu's philosophy included the importance of manual labor. He tilled his own lands, and while cultivating the soil discussed the *I-ching* (Book of Changes). He fed his pupils from personally harvested crops. Once when Ch'en Hsien-chang, a pupil from Kwangtung Province, failed to appear at sunrise, the master started to grind the grain himself, crying loudly: "If you are so indolent now, how can you hope to advance later to the position of Ch'eng I or Mencius?"¹

During the reign of Ying-tsung in 1457, Wu Yü-pi was recommended to the throne by Shih Heng and was appointed tutor to the Crown Prince. He declined, however, on the ground that being in his sixty-eighth year he was too old to hold high office. During two months' stay in Peking he was asked what his real reason was for refusing the appointment. His reply was: "I foresaw that Shih Heng [the emperor's favorite d. 1460] was about to be disgraced."²

Thereupon Wu returned to his native district and instructed many disciples like Ch'en Hsien-chang, Hu Chü-jen, and Lou Liang, the teacher of Wang Shou-jen.

Wu's contributions to the development of Chinese thought were not remarkable, but since he left a record of some of his inner experiences together with some thoughts on mental hygiene

these should be quoted. Commenting on one incident with a friend he wrote: "I should tolerate what my neighbor did . . . Indeed, I tried to maintain silence and made no remark on his conduct. But since he did not understand how I felt I had to tell him what I thought was wrong about what he did. That was bad temper on my part, and I regretted having shown it. A gentleman should always be patient and yield to others. To be ready to give in to others is to develop a spirit of tolerance."³

On another occasion Wu Yü-pi wrote: "At night on my sick-bed I worried about my household affairs. My mind was disturbed by many thoughts; it was not calm and clear. I then came to the conclusion that I was far from being a virtuous man and there was much room for improvement. I decided I must exert myself in that direction; everything else would be secondary. The moment I assumed that attitude, my mind was at peace and it seemed as if a cloud had been cleared up."⁴

Again Wu Yü-pi wrote: "Chu Hsi once remarked: 'Li Tung never in his life displayed bad temper, hence his features showed no signs of being ruffled.' Whenever I read this remark I could not help wondering how Li Tung achieved such greatness. I felt I myself could never reach it. 'In the early years of his life,' said Chu Hsi, 'Li Tung was wild and unruly, but through self-control he became a cultivated person.' We learn from this that a man does not become refined by birth but by self-discipline. Those who do not know how to control a violent temper, though they can appreciate serenity of mind and a good disposition, easily exhibit ill humor and vexation. Certainly not all those who came into contact with Li Tung were even tempered. But he reformed himself by not blaming others and by exercising mastery over himself. Then I too arrived at the idea of how to become a sage, that is, by realizing that human nature basically is good and that bad temper can be changed."⁵

We come next to Hsieh Hsuan, the second of the pioneer philosophers of the Ming Dynasty. His kinship with the school of Chu Hsi is plain from his own words. "The *tao*," he wrote, "has been illumined since the time of Chu Hsi, so there is no need to write more books expounding it. All it needs is to be expressed in our personal life."⁶ We are told that at the time of his birth in Shansi

Province, Hsieh Hsuan's body was so pure and transparent that his intestines shone through—a phenomenon that led his grandfather to remark, "This child will be a genius!"⁷ In boyhood his memory was so retentive that anything he read once was never forgotten. His father accordingly set him to work studying the writings of the Ch'eng-Chu school under two tutors. Upon receiving the assigned books he remarked: "This is the proper way for me to occupy myself!"⁸

In 1420 he received the *chin-shih* degree. Upon being appointed censor, he was advised by a minion of those in power to pay them a visit. To this proposal he was heard to say: "As censor my function is to impeach wrong-doers. Why should I cultivate friendship with those in power?"⁹ Later, through a recommendation by a eunuch named Wang Chen he was promoted to a position where he superintended the prosecution of judicial cases. The eunuch, who knew Hsieh Hsuan only by reputation, intimated that the philosopher should come to call upon him. Whereupon Hsieh again retorted caustically: "My appointment was by imperial edict. Why should I express my gratitude in a personal way?"¹⁰ This drew the eunuch's ire and it was not long before he was able to give practical expression to his spleen. A case came up in which a certain man's concubine accused his wife of murdering him. Hsieh Hsuan's verdict was that the concubine's charge was false. The widow was thereupon released from jail. But Wang Chen twisted the evidence until he was able to get the philosopher impeached for wrongly assenting to a criminal act. Hsieh Hsuan was quite composed, and even at the time set for his execution he was so little disturbed by his apparently inevitable fate that he never interrupted his reading of the *I-ching*. It then happened that a fellow villager of Hsieh's, who was a cook in the household of the eunuch, heard about the philosopher's imminent execution and burst into tears. "Why do you weep?" the eunuch asked. The cook replied by telling what he knew of Hsieh Hsuan's life and his keen sensitiveness to injustice. Accordingly his sentence was commuted from death to exile. Indeed, after a few years he was set free and was recalled to head the Department of Justice.

Another judicial case in which Hsieh Hsuan officiated is of interest. During a famine a village community tried to get a loan

of rice from a rich family. When the request was denied, they burned the rich man's home to the ground. Consequently they were condemned as rioters. Hsieh Hsuan, however, presented a memorial to the throne insisting that since the people were hungry the verdict making them out as rioters was unjust. By such robust thinking, Hsieh won renown as a man of character, who maintained a firm stand in the face of bitter opposition.

We are told a travelling eunuch named Chin Ying once passed through Nanking and that all the high officials came out to honor him with a dinner party. Hsieh Hsuan alone made it a point not to appear. When the eunuch returned to Peking he informed the authorities that the only man of integrity in Nanking was Hsieh Hsuan.

Another instance of Hsieh's courageous and discriminating virtue was displayed during an audience with the emperor. Before proceeding to the audience he happened to notice that the emperor was not ceremonially dressed. Thereupon he waited outside the audience chamber until his majesty discovered the reason for the delay and dressed himself properly.

After serving many years in the government, Hsieh Hsuan found that his life did not afford adequate opportunity to put *tao* into practice. So he withdrew from public life and devoted the remainder of his days to educating the younger generation.

He was the author of commentaries on the *Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate*, the *Western Inscription* and the *Correction of Youthful Folly*, in which he adhered closely to the orthodox traditions of the Ch'eng-Chu school.

Lastly we come to Ch'en Hsien-chang who was regarded by the aforementioned Huang Tsung-hsi as the man who sent Ming intellectuals down a philosophically new trail. To be sure, he was a pupil of the relatively conventional Wu Yü-pi, nevertheless he was the pioneer who gave Ming thought its start in originality.

Born in the district of Hsin-hui on the Kwangtung coast, Ch'en Hsien-chang grew to the amazing height of eight feet! His eyes were very bright and he had seven black moles on his right cheek, popularly said to resemble the seven stars of Ursa Major. He won his *chin-shih* degree at the age of twenty, and earned the right to be admitted to the National Academy. Instead he went to study

under Wu Yü-pi, but early becoming dissatisfied with the latter's philosophy, he returned to his native place to shut himself in a room and contemplate. Later he went to Peking and passed an examination at the National Academy. The poem which he wrote on this occasion brought him to public notice as a real scholar. Many times he was recommended, even when he was old, as one qualified to hold a high government post, but he invariably refused to hold office.

We learn from his writings that at the age of twenty-seven he studied under Wu Yü-pi, who urged him to study all the classics; but he was still unable to find *tao* in this way. He alludes also to a life of contemplation during his retirement, and how, after he had discovered the nature of mind, he was able to manage his daily life with the ease "of one riding on horseback." Through discipline he tried to dissolve himself into oneness with the universe and thus impart to his existence the freedom and the joyous experience of the bird that flies in the air or the fish that swims in the water.

A pupil of Ch'en's named Chan Jo-shui, very justly asserted that his master's philosophy is best revealed in his poetry. To illustrate this judgment I quote below parts of a travel diary written by Ch'en in the form of a *fu*, or prose-poem.

"In the autumn of the year *ping-hsü* (1466) I set out, staff in hand, from Nan-hai (Canton) through the mountain passes of northern Kwangtung Province. Crossing Lake Po-yang, I skirted the foot of Lu-shan [Kuling Mountain Range]. From there I made my way to Hsiao-shan in Chekiang. When my boat was moored I gazed intently at the peaks of the great T'ien-t'ai Range. On entering Hangchow I had a view of the West Lake. In all my travels I was impressed by the vastness of the mountain ranges and the boundless rolling waves. In contemplating the universe above and around me I became oblivious of personal existence. My thoughts blended into my surroundings, and I became a part of the infinite. Tranquil and at peace with all creatures, I forgot such matters as life and death; they had no meaning for me. The experience was one of supreme delight.

"Suspending my travels to rub elbows for a while with learned men in the local Academy I seemed to pass beyond the boundaries

that divide the various philosophical schools. The bolts that bar a true understanding of the Six Classics seemed to be lifted. I could saunter about at will. Collected in mind and devoid of preconceptions, my thoughts seemed unstained by even the smallest particle of dust. When the ephemeral and the ornamental are thus stripped away, the genuine and the true come clearly into view. As in the case of Yen Hui and Tseng Tien [disciples of Confucius] in the pleasant springtime of antiquity, we strummed the harp and struck the psaltery. Boundless satisfaction filled our breasts.

"But as I came out from this gathering and observed once more the comings and goings of men, the general contamination that filled the air, the interminable vulgarity of everyday life, the perversity of the human heart, I concluded that not one of these things merited from me even a single smile. Yet how much more dreadful is that fiery furnace of power and influence whose flames leap up to the heavens? Fawning office-seekers jam the courtyards of high officials with their carriages and horses, and when they get what they are after they boast shamelessly to the people in broad daylight. Those who fail in the struggle hang around stealthily until darkness falls and then ask humiliatingly for what they want. I have a deep pity for men who come to such a pass. How true it is that riches and honors can never afford us complete enjoyment! The natural world with its lakes and mountains does often give us a measure of delight, but even this cannot compare with the contentment of man who finds nothing in himself of which to be ashamed.

"A visitor of mine, named Chang Li, on hearing these words, stood up, shook his robes and beat time as he sang the following song:

'Gain and loss, honor and disgrace
May come and go at will.
They concern me not at all.
With a smile I rid myself of such trammels
As though I were merely slipping off my shoes.
Thus at least I have true joy.'

It was my intention to detain this guest for a little conversation, but suddenly he left me and never again returned. He is a true

pupil of that wanderer among rivers and lakes, Lu Kuei-meng (Ninth Century). Tucking up his garments he scales high mountains and bathes his feet in faraway streams. If there were not in the world men of this sort, whom would I ever get to be a companion?"¹¹

Ch'en's theory that book knowledge should not be the philosopher's main goal is expressed in the following poem:

"The ancients discarded the dregs
 Recognizing them to be just that.
 Though one may laboriously work with a ladel,
 Dip up enough water to make a river,
 It is possible for a spring
 That bubbles up naturally
 To become a mighty stream.
 From nothingness, great actions may rise.
 Very ordinary things
 May become extraordinary.
 At the source of everything
 There is hidden an inexhaustible spring,
 And one who holds the key to it
 Need not delve into dusty books.
 One must learn to contemplate,
 To think out all implications.
 If one rests in the formless
 And prizes naturalness,
 One becomes established in the real.
 'Be careful in your solitariness'
 Is a saying not far from the truth.
 Scholars not alert to this fact
 May miss the way by a narrow margin.
 To men of understanding
 I confide this saying:
 Nature's lute
 From the beginning of time
 Had no string."¹²

* No string means that it is infinite and can play the music of heaven.

In this thoughtful poem one cannot help being impressed by Ch'en's devotion to the contemplative life and his disdain for what we have come to call "book learning."

Huang Tsung-hsi characterizes Ch'en's approach to the philosophy of life as follows: "He had emptiness of mind as the foundation, and calmness as the gateway; he linked the past and the present in time and the six directions in space, and made them into a unity. He viewed daily life as a manifestation of these basic principles. He also disciplined himself in the way of neither forgetting nor forcing [i.e., according to Mencius, neither neglecting nor being artificial]. No doubt Ch'en followed in the footsteps of Tseng Tien who liked to bathe in the River Yi, enjoying the breezes among the rain altars, and who returned home singing. Also he followed in the footsteps of Shao Yung [the Sung philosopher whose home was called 'The Nest of Happiness']¹³

Huang Tsung-hsi says of Ch'en: "Through living in the Ming period, it was he who pioneered the way to sagehood; it was Wang Shou-jen who made the way broad and magnificent."¹⁴

There are four general trends in the philosophy of the Ming period. First, the thinkers of the period laid great stress on the inner experiences of the mind, abandoning projects that seemed so important in the Sung period, such as writing commentaries on the classics. Huang Tsung-hsi stresses this point. "In military exploits and in literature the men of the Ming could not rival those of former dynasties, but in the field of philosophy of reason their achievements surpassed those of former times. They dealt with the various problems as if they were sorting out the fine hair of oxen or picking out silk threads from a cocoon. By thus making proper classifications and fine distinctions, they discovered something which had not previously been known. Though the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi tried indeed to refute Buddhism, its specious reasonableness and its confounding of the truth, they never discerned. The refutations which the Ming philosophers made of Buddhism hit the mark and exposed its errors."¹⁵

In short, only a few Ming thinkers wrote commentaries on philological works. They were interested in the inner experiences of their minds. What they wrote were records of their own meditations and reflections on essentials. The theories developed were either a refutation of or a reconciliation with Buddhism.

Secondly, each thinker had a formula to express his approach to *tao*. The following list will give some idea as to how this was done:

- (a) Ch'en Hsien-chang: Calmness as furnishing the milieu for the inception of one's philosophy.
- (b) Wang Shou-jen: The unity of knowing and doing, or realization of *liang-chih*.
- (c) Chan Jo-shui: Contemplation of the heavenly reason behind all things.
- (d) Wang Ch'i: The four nothingnesses.
- (e) Nieh Pao: Return to calmness.
- (f) Wang Ken [a pupil of Wang Shou-jen]: "Investigation of things" as applied by a T-square.
- (g) Tsou Shou-i: Doing what you are told to do in solitude.
- (h) Liu Tsung-chou: Vigilance in solitude.

What precisely was the point of these and other ideas in the thought of the Ming philosophers? Huang Tsung-hsi says in his *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*: "When a philosopher has a formula it means that he has a way of approach and also an intimate knowledge of the thing which he discusses. The principles in this world are so numerous and complicated that they must be reduced to their simplest form if they are to be the object of actual reflection. Without philosophical postulates or axioms or maxims or precepts or aphorisms, thought would appear like a chaotic jumble of threads even though it might be of excellent quality. For the public, a philosophy without a theorem is like an explorer who loses himself in the land he is trying to map out. This book stresses the importance of formulas because they are the lamps which illuminate the reader's path. Tu Mou-chih said: 'A ball made to roll on a round table [with raised edges] may go in a straight line, or in a circle, or crosswise. One cannot predict with certainty which way it will go. But one can know with certainty that it will not roll off the table.' Formulas express this same sort of certainty of knowledge."¹⁶

In other words, the formulas of the Ming philosophers are like the postulates, precepts, etc. of Western thinkers; as for example, the "Prerogative Instances" of Francis Bacon's inductive method,

the *cogito ergo sum* of Descartes' deductive rationalism, the "synthetic judgments *a priori*" of Kant's epistemology. These expressions were invented or, rather, construed by each philosopher in order to give character or a sense of unity to his system in a succinct and effective manner.

A third characteristic of Ming philosophy is its extra-logical and over-speculative nature. The quality of being speculative is something usual to philosophy, but among Ming thinkers it was carried to excess. The Sung philosophers confined their discussions to *ri* [reason], *ch'i* [matter], *hsing* [nature] and *hsin* [mind]; they dared not wander too far from Confucius and Mencius, though their cosmological speculations were genuinely original. Even among Ming philosophers, Wang Shou-jen laid a solid foundation for epistemology and ethics in his theory of the unity of knowing and doing, or realization of *liang-chih*. But Wang's pupil, Wang Ch'i was interested especially in the proposition that "reality is beyond good and evil." He thought that good and evil exist at the level of being only, and that another level above being is the true reality, emptiness, where no evil is to be found and where also there is no place for goodness. This was the kind of doctrine that encouraged Ming philosophy to run wild, to lose itself on a trackless road, or (to change the metaphor) to weigh things on a scale without markings. Another pupil of Wang Shou-jen, Wang Ken, though he did not occupy himself with the problem of whether reality is beyond good and evil, had nevertheless a favorite topic of his own, namely, naturalness, pleasure, or the sense of innocence. When he was asked: "What is naturalness?" one of his pupils, Lo Ju-fang, answered: "Just look at the boy who brought the cup of tea. He has a cup in his hand. He comes from the kitchen where the tea was made. He must go through many rooms and cross many doors because the entrances are numerous. You may see naturalness in the way he does his work."¹⁷ For Wang Ken naturalness meant spontaneity and freedom from worry, the noblest ideal of human life. It also meant that there should be no forcing, no artificiality. Those who followed this perversion of Wang Shou-jen's philosophy stressed the Taoist aspect of naturalness in their search for *tao*, and in the end this naturalness was sometimes indistinguishable from unruliness or

even licentiousness. This is precisely what happened in the life of Li Chih, a disciple of the Wang Ken school.

This alteration in the physiognomy of Wang Shou-jen's teaching was indeed radical, but in justice to the master it must be said that he himself did not anticipate the changes, and cannot be held accountable for them, except perhaps in a very abstract sense. As for Wang Ch'i and Wang Ken, on the other hand, one must acknowledge that they tried to build a metaphysics which lacked discipline.

For the fourth general characteristic of the philosophy of the Ming Dynasty we come to the academies, which though originally intended as places for philosophical discussion, turned out in the end to be centers for mass meetings. The philosophers went around lecturing, and in time audiences included thousands of persons. At the time that Wang Shou-jen lectured, the attendants numbered only a few dozens. But these lecture audiences increased year by year until finally a meeting addressed by Hsü Chieh attracted one thousand, or more than one thousand according to the biography of Han Chên in Huang Tsung-hsi's *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*.¹⁸ In either case these gatherings might properly be called mass meetings or rallies. It was because of these great throngs that the academies became a powerful factor in the political life of the times. For instance, the Tung-ling Academy with its huge membership was a political party which one must study in order to understand politics at the close of the period.

A more detailed description of one of these vast public lectures may interest the reader. On one occasion when Wang Ken held a discourse, there was a woodcutter named Chu Shu in his audience who sang the following song:

"When I go ten miles from the mountain,
The woods are mine.
When I go one mile from the mountain
The woods are still on the mountain!"¹⁹

In reply to this song Wang Ken remarked: "It is the same with *tao*. When one tries to find it one will get it. When one does not try one will not get it."²⁰

After he had cut his wood, Chu Shu occasionally attended one of Wang Ken's lectures. At the conclusion of the lecture he would put his firewood on his shoulder and go home singing. One day a fellow listener of the same surname remarked to Chu: "I should like to lend you some money so that you can carry on the business. Why should you be doing such hard work as cutting wood? Then you can join us every day." But after Chu had received the money he was worried. After pondering the matter for some time he said: "This is a way of expressing your love for me! But actually you make me so busy with calculations of gain and loss that it drives me to worrying."²¹ Thereupon he returned the money and departed.

Han Chên, a maker of chinaware, who first studied under the woodcutter, Chu Shu, later became a pupil of Wang Pi, son of the aforementioned Wang Ken. This chinaware moulder, who could read a little but was so poor that he lost his home to a creditor, sang:

"Though my thatched hut of three rooms belongs to a new landlord, I prefer to make friends with the clouds above me."²²

He did not marry until he was thirty, and then only because Wang Pi generously provided the money. Later the chinaware moulder carried on educational work among farmers, artisans, and traders, until the number of pupils who attended his lectures rose to more than a thousand. He held his discourses in one village after another in his leisure following the autumn harvest. When the magistrate learned of these activities he sent two *piculs* of rice to the pottery-philosopher as well as a small sum of money. The philosopher accepted the rice but returned the money with the remark that his benefactor could help him more by putting a stop to the quarrelsomeness and fondness for litigation among the people.

In Wang Ken's school, philosophy was discussed in plain and commonplace terms so that it attracted the illiterate. Only thus could a woodcutter and a chinaware moulder be converted. The laborer and the artisan in turn exercised influence on farmers, craftsmen, and traders, who in former dynasties never had the opportunity to develop any interest in the discussions of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi.

It is clear that the decline and fall of the once flourishing school of Wang Shou-jen, greatest of the Ming philosophers, resulted from the tendency of the school to run into eccentricity. This development will be sketched in another chapter. Suffice it to say here that some of Wang's disciples misinterpreted his views, reading into them meanings entirely at variance with those which Wang intended. This perversion took the form of a movement called "Mad Ch'anism" (Zen), which became so wild that it eventually caused the school to be discredited. Shortly before the fall of the Ming Dynasty, the famous Tung-ling Academy tried to combat these unhealthy tendencies. After the dynasty fell, the opinion was widely held that this great political catastrophe was attributable to the "empty talk about mind and human nature" indulged in by the school of Wang Shou-jen. Chinese philosophical thinking then took a turn into a more positive and solid direction, which furnished the setting for the special features of the philosophy of the Ch'ing period.

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CHAPTER TWO

Wang Shou-Jen, Monistic Idealist

I. LIFE

Wang Shou-jen was one of the great thinkers not only of China but of the world. He holds an honored place in the history of philosophy, whether of the East or of the West.

His way of thinking gave him a system in which the world became a rational unity. Let us summarize this system provisionally as follows:

(1) The first premise is that mind is reason. While mind is free from selfish motives it is intelligent and clear and embodies right principles.

(2) The external world, which according to common sense consists of things or hard facts, is the object of consciousness. It may be said that Berkeley's argument, *Esse est percipi*, was discovered also by Wang Shou-jen.

(3) Though common sense tells us willing and knowing are separate functions of mind, in his system they are correlated. The mind's working with a directive effort is called willing. Its working in sheer distinctness or clarity is called knowing. For Wang Shou-jen volition is a part of cognition.

(4) The basic factor in his system is *liang-chih*, that is, intuitive knowledge. This term may also be translated moral consciousness, but in the broader sense it covers the logical functions of mind.

Now let me quote a few sentences from Wang to show how he defined his fundamental concepts and how his philosophical edifice is constructed. "What is called *ri* (reason)," he says, "is an integrated system. That in which *ri* is condensed is called human

nature. The master of this condensation is mind. When mind works with a directive effort it is will. When it works in a state of intelligence, in distinctness and clarity, it is cognition. The objects which appear in consciousness are things."¹

These basic ideas were the result of many years of pondering, weighing, and penetrating. That they are interwoven into a single system is the genial art of Wang Shou-jen.

This summary is intended only as a preliminary characterization of his place in the history of Chinese thought. Later I shall return to a more elaborate exposition. For the present let us occupy ourselves with his life.

Wang Shou-jen experienced many ups and downs during his public career. This sharpened his mind and enabled him to build a structure of thought that was possibly an improvement on, or at least a change from the system of Chu Hsi. Wang's life may be understood in the light of Mencius' famous saying: "When heaven is going to confer a great office on any person, it exercises his mind with suffering and his sinews and bones with toil. It exposes his body to hunger and subjects him to extreme poverty. It confounds his undertakings. By all these methods heaven stimulates his mind, hardens his nature, and gives him what he is lacking."²

(A) BOYHOOD AND YOUTH A.D. 1472-1499

Wang Shou-jen, commonly known as Wang Yang-ming, was born in the eighth year of Ch'eng-hua of the Ming Emperor Hsien-tsung, i.e., in A.D. 1472. When he was eleven years old, he was brought to Peking. Thither his father had invited his great-grandfather, who in turn invited a group of friends to attend a banquet at a monastery on the islet of Chin-shan [Kinshan] near Chen-chiang. The guests were asked to write poems, and little Wang, who was playing at the side of the banquet-table, contributed the following verse:

"Chin-shan is a small point resembling a fist
Which breaks the watery bottom of Yang-chou.
After drinking I lean against the pavilion facing the moon
And listen to the tune of a jade flute which suggests
a lullaby for a cave-dragon."³

The guests around the banquet table were astonished by a poem of such maturity coming from a mere boy; thereupon they offered him a new theme for a new verse. After a brief interval, he took up his brush and wrote:

"When the mountain is near and the moon at a great distance, you find that the moon is small.

You express this by saying: 'The mountain is greater than the moon.'

But if a man's eye were as vast as heaven he would feel that the mountain is small and the moon great." ⁴

The following year Wang studied under a family tutor, whom he asked: "What is a first rate accomplishment for a man?" The tutor replied: "To succeed in the state examinations through much practice of reading and writing." The boy said: "I doubt it. Rather than to succeed at the state examinations a really first-rate accomplishment would be to become a sage." When his father heard this story he laughingly said: "So you want to become a sage!" ⁵

While still in his teens, Wang made a trip to the Great Wall where he stayed about a month. Upon his return he dreamt of visiting the temple of Ma Yüan, a general of the Later Han Dynasty who had conquered Annam. Then he composed a poem beginning with the line: "General Ma Yüan came back after accomplishing a military feat." ⁶ I mention this poem because many years later Wang Shou-jen died in this very temple. The poem is supposed to be a prevision of his military success and of his subsequent deathbed.

A curious story is told of how during the ceremony at which Wang's marriage engagement was announced, he absented himself to visit a Taoist monastery to hear a monk talk about longevity. He was not found until the next morning.

In 1489 he brought his wife from Kiangsi to his home in Yü-yao District, Chekiang. En route he visited the philosopher Lou Liang at Kuang-hsin, which would seem to indicate that he was already interested in the Neo-Confucianist thought of the Sung Dynasty.

In this connection it is interesting to note that Wang, still in his teens, tried to discover the meaning of the phrase: "investigation of things," so important in Neo-Confucianist philosophical dis-

cussion. In his grandfather's garden he contemplated bamboos in an endeavor to ferret out their nature—a procedure suggested to him by the dictum of Chu Hsi that each thing has its principle. But though young Wang pondered long and hard he found no satisfactory answer. Still, he did come to appreciate the difficulty of becoming a sage.

Next we find him studying literature, hoping to embark upon a civil service career. But at the outset he failed in the provincial examinations. His colleagues who also failed in the examinations felt ashamed, but Wang consoled them with the remark: "Some consider failure in an examination a disgrace. I consider being perturbed by this failure a disgrace."⁷

Nonetheless, Wang did eventually win his *chin-shih* degree and was appointed a clerk in the ministry of public works. He became interested in incidents along the border of the empire and addressed memorandums to the throne about this subject.

(B) BEGINNING OF PUBLIC CAREER: EXILE A.D. 1500-1508

In 1500 Wang Shou-jen was transferred to the Ministry of Justice and was sent out as inspector of judicial cases. After two years, however, he requested leave of absence and returned to his native place where he found that his interest in literature had begun to decline. At this same time serious doubts clouded his mind as to the truth of both Buddhism and Taoism. In his home-province he asked a meditating Buddhist monk: "Do you think about your parents?" The monk answered: "Yes." This reply, Wang explained to the monk, proved that filial love is part and parcel of the nature of man.⁸

Wang was next appointed examiner for Shantung Province and was transferred to the personnel division of the Ministry of War. But his official duties in 1505 did not interfere with his accepting students and advising them to aspire to sagehood. At this same time he became acquainted with Chan Jo-shui, a philosopher, whose approach to *tao* differed so greatly from his own. The two, nevertheless, remained steadfast friends. Indeed, after Wang's death, Chan wrote a biographical inscription on his tomb celebrating their friendship.

The thirty-fifth year of Wang's age (1506) marked the turning point in his life. Because he had defended two censors who had submitted memorials requesting impeachment of a powerful eunuch named Liu Chin, he was arrested and given forty strokes in the court. This punishment almost killed him, but he had the strength to revive and he lived to be exiled to Kweichow. On his way there he returned to Chekiang, his native province, but was pursued by spies who worked for the eunuch Liu Chin. At one point the philosopher saw that his life was at stake and throwing off his clothes dived into the water, managing to escape his assassins and to reach a boat by which he sailed to Fukien. Landing on the shore of this province he passed the night in a monastery. There a tiger made such a frightful roar that the resident monk, thinking a guest must have been devoured, looked into the room. Seeing only the philosopher resting comfortably, he invited him to his own home. It was there that Wang met a friend of twenty years earlier who advised him to go immediately to Kweichow, otherwise the eunuch might contrive to injure his father. Wang wrote on the wall:

"Unmindful of personal risk or safety—
Which are but floating clouds in the heavens,
I feel as if I were on a vast ocean thirty thousand miles
wide on a quiet night
With a bright moon shining, silver-hued, and a breeze."⁹

The last two lines signify a pure conscience and awareness of duty.

The story of Wang's subsequent journey via Wu-i Mountain has been considered fictional by one of his biographers. I find however that the date of his calling on his father, who was Minister of Civil Service in Nanking, tallies with the facts as recorded elsewhere, and so I believe his return to Nanking cannot be doubted. Thence he proceeded to Po-yang Lake, and arrived finally in Kweichow. In exile he was to work as sub-magistrate in Lung-ch'ang District where the only language spoken was the dialect of the Miao and Yao tribes. Thus he could not mingle with the natives, nor could he find a ready-made dwelling place, but had to cut lumber and build a house for himself. To make matters still worse, he continued to hear rumors that the anger of Liu Chin,

the eunuch, had not yet abated. The philosopher feared harm might come to him at night even in remote Lung-ch'ang. Nevertheless, he recalled the words of Confucius and Mencius that one should feel happy and leave everything to heaven. He tended the students who had followed him into exile, most of whom were ill, and he sought to please them by singing songs to them.

In addition to such practical and humane work Wang Shou-jen buried himself in contemplation, pondering the meaning of the two phrases: "investigation of things," and "realization of knowledge." He learned that according to Chu Hsi *things* and *knowledge* are divided, and there is no unity between them. This question had worried him ever since he contemplated the bamboo at his grandfather's home. Then one night in the year 1508 he awoke and shouted so loudly that the people living nearby were startled. His excitement was caused by the sudden realization that so-called *things* are not entities in the external world, but are objects of consciousness. He reached the conclusion that reason or knowledge exists only in our mind. This theory he attempted to apply to every passage in the Five Classics where the meaning of the phrase "investigation of things" is involved. It seems that during his exile in Lung-ch'ang he wrote a book expounding this application, but all that has survived in his *Collected Works* is a preface and thirteen short items concerning the Classics.

It seems that during this period of his life, Wang Shou-jen was briefly interested in writing a commentary but later abandoned the idea.

While still in exile he coined a new phrase as the key to his philosophy: "unity of knowledge and action." One of the disciples, Hsü Ai, who had followed him to Kweichow, remarked to him in 1509: "I do not understand the meaning of the doctrine of integrating knowledge and action." The master replied: "Please give me an example showing why you do not understand." Then Hsü Ai complied: "Suppose a man knows that a son should be obedient to his father, and that a brother should have fraternal regard for his brothers. Now if such a man cannot carry out this filial obedience or fraternal deference, it is obvious that *knowing* and *doing*, knowledge and action, are two different things." Wang Shou-jen replied: "In the case of this man, the apparent disunity between

knowledge and action arises from his *knowing* and *doing* being separated by selfish motives. This separation is not part of the original nature of cognition. This has been demonstrated clearly in the *Ta-hsüeh* (Great Learning) where it is said: 'Be fond of what is beautiful. Dislike what smells foul.' To see what is beautiful is to *know*; to be fond of, or to like what is beautiful, is to *do*. The liking immediately accompanies the seeing. It is not that after seeing you begin to like. Similarly, to smell a foul stench is to *know*. To dislike it is to *do*. Disliking goes with smelling the unpleasant odor, and the latter does not begin after the former has ended. To describe a man as obedient or brotherly is to imply that this man has already put the idea of filial duty or fraternal love into practice. Such is the original nature of the unity of knowledge and action."

But Hsü Ai was still unsatisfied. "In the olden days," he said, "the very fact that *knowing* and *doing* were dealt with separately indicates that there were steps. One had to proceed gradually." Wang countered: "You missed the meaning of the words of the ancients. According to my interpretation, to *know* is to resolve to *do*; to *do* is to put knowledge into practice. *Knowing* is the initiative of *doing*; *doing* is the realization of *knowing*."¹⁰

In these discussions that took place during Wang Shou-jen's days of exile in Lung-ch'ang we have the foundations of his philosophical system.

After three years' banishment he was promoted to the magistracy of the district of Lu-ling in Kiangsi Province, and with this preferment and transfer his ostracism came to an end.

(C) SUPPRESSION OF BANDITS IN KIANGSI, KWANGTUNG AND
FUKIEN, AND SUPPRESSION OF REBELLION OF
PRINCE CH'EN HAO 1509-1520

When the eunuch Liu Chin was eventually put to death, Wang Shou-jen was granted an audience by Emperor Wu-tsung and was reinstated in the imperial favor. He was given an appointment in the Ministry of Punishments in Nanking and subsequently an appointment to the Ministry of Civil Service in Peking. He continued to gather friends around him to discuss philosophy.

In 1514, on the occasion of his departure for a journey across the Yangtze Valley he composed a poem for his friends:

"The water of Ch'u flows into the Yangtze Valley,
But when the tide rises, the water of the Yangtze Valley flows
back.

Our mutual regard is like this tide flowing back and forth,
without ceasing.

Of what use is our solicitude for one another?

We console one another best by improving our moral character.
In so doing, it is as if we dug a well wherever water was
abundant.

Why should many of us journey a thousand miles to see others
off?

Do we not know that the soup of Emperor Yao and the wall
of Emperor Shun may be found anywhere?

If we fail to do what is good,

Even while we live in the same inn with others

We will miss the good in them, as was the case with Confucius
and the robber Chih.

We know that an inn-keeper is always kind,

But after our departure he and we are strangers."¹¹

Here was an expression of appreciation for the services of friends, and at the same time a word of advice to them to cultivate themselves.

In 1516 Wang Shou-jen became assistant secretary to the board of censors and concurrently governor of an area where three provinces meet: namely Kiangsi, Kwangtung and Fukien. This was an area infested by bandits and Wang's appointment was made with a view to suppressing them. The desperados had their stronghold in the southern, northern and western parts of these three provinces respectively. Whenever the government army came to hunt them down they dispersed in the mountains, and upon the army's withdrawal they reassembled and caused great disturbance.

After Wang Shou-jen assumed the task of suppressing these bandits, he instituted three new practices: (1) He took a census and organized the population into block units of ten families each. Every block unit was to be thoroughly familiar with every other,

and any suspicious-looking stranger who appeared was to be reported to the authorities. (2) He raised a militia from among the people, and organized it along military lines. (3) He arranged for the appointment of a magistrate in P'ing-ho District. This last step was important in Wang's view because it afforded a means of governing the people as well. "Bandits," he said, "are like a disease of the body. Crushing by military force is a kind of surgical operation. The office of magistrate is for the protection of the people—as it were, for nourishing them."¹²

In addition to his work of suppressing bandits he continued to teach thirty disciples. With them he commenced a discussion of the text of the *Ta-hsüeh* (Great Learning). At this time also he finished and had printed a collection of remarks by Chu Hsi entitled *Definite Views of Chu Hsi in his Later Years*.

In 1519 Wang Shou-jen did another great service for the Ming Dynasty. He suppressed the rebellion of Prince Ch'en Hao, uncle of Emperor Wu-tsung. Ch'en Hao held Nan-ch'ang in Kiangsi Province as his fief, and for many years had entertained designs to usurp the throne. Conniving agents assisted him at the imperial court. They were successful, for instance, in withholding memorials addressed to the emperor which gave information about their treasonable master's plans. When Prince Ch'en Hao started to move in the direction of Peking he pleaded the excuse that the Dowager Empress of Wu-tsung had issued him orders to take over the guardianship of the emperor.

As soon as word of these movements reached our philosopher, busy with bandit-suppression in Fukien Province, he became alarmed. He reasoned that there were three courses which Prince Ch'en might follow: (1) He might march to Peking; (2) He might march to Nanking; (3) He might remain in Kiangsi Province. If he chose the first or the second, the result could well be a swelling of his influence until the imperial government would actually be in danger. Wang Shou-jen preferred that the prince take the third alternative, that is, remain at his fief in Kiangsi. To ensure this, the philosopher-strategist put into operation such ruses as forged documents requesting that reinforcements be sent to Kiangsi. When, according to prearranged plans, the prince saw these documents, he was misled as expected.

Meanwhile Wang Shou-jen arrived at Chi-an, memorialized the throne, and raised an army of 180,000 men to take Ch'en Hao's fief in Nan-ch'ang, Kiangsi. At the same time the prince moved his troops toward An-ch'ing, a city in Anhwei Province, with orders that Chi-an be attacked. While Wang awaited imperial orders, he laid the strategic plan to take Nan-ch'ang first, in expectation that Ch'en's army approaching An-ch'ing would wheel around and return. Thus the battlefield would be limited.

While Wang was planning to concentrate his attack on Nan-ch'ang somebody advised him to dispatch an expeditionary force to An-ch'ing. The philosopher decided to attack Nan-ch'ang first, for otherwise he would be flanked from two directions.

His strategic reasoning was that if he took Nan-ch'ang first, part of the prince's army would be sent back from An-ch'ing, and the siege there would be raised. He persisted in these plans and his anticipations were realized. Nan-ch'ang fell. Ch'en Hao was taken prisoner. This military success in suppressing a rebellion by a royal prince in less than forty days made Wang Shou-jen respected not only as a philosopher but also as a strategist. It is worth noting that throughout this campaign he continued his philosophical discussions with his disciples.

After the capture of Ch'en Hao, Emperor Wu-tsung was persuaded by the eunuchs, Chang Yung and Chang Chung, that he personally should take the lead in this campaign and gain some glory for himself. The emperor declared that though his treasonable uncle had been taken prisoner, there might still remain some rebels. He himself would go down into the Yangtze Valley to wipe them out. Interested in putting a stop to this plan, Wang Shou-jen pointed out that his majesty might suffer an accident on the way south. But the emperor would not listen to advice.

Thereupon the eunuchs planned a theatrical performance at which the prince would be set free on Po-yang Lake in Kiangsi and a battle would be fought between him and Emperor Wu-tsung. At this point the eunuch Chang Yung came to Wang Shou-jen and explained that since the people of Kiangsi Province had already suffered so much from war, it was inadvisable to impose a mock-battle on them. "My coming to you," Chang Yung continued, "is to find a compromise. I have no desire to diminish your merit in

the distinguished service you have done. Neither do I wish to see the other eunuchs stage this show of victory for the emperor. But if I am too obvious in frustrating them, they may go off the limit." ¹³

After listening to Chang Yung's words, Wang Shou-jen gave him the captured Prince Ch'en Hao and told him that he might do with the traitor what he liked. The philosopher intended thereupon to resign from his position; but his intention was obstructed by an imperial order appointing him Governor of Kiangsi Province.

At this juncture Wu-tsung had already arrived on the northern bank of the Yangtze River, and Wang Shou-jen would have visited him there, had not somebody diverted the philosopher with instructions to proceed to Nan-ch'ang to assume his duties as governor. However, before he departed, Prince Ch'en Hao was brought to the emperor's headquarters. The eunuch Chang Chung and a man named Hsü T'ai, both of whom had accompanied his highness from Peking, were seized with jealousy of Wang and challenged him to a contest in archery. Each of the three times the philosopher shot he hit the bull's eye, so that Chang Chung and Hsü T'ai filled with mortification acknowledged him their master. Then, while his highness was in Nanking, the two villains again slandered Wang Shou-jen by insinuating that sooner or later he too would become a rebel. When the friendly eunuch, Chang Yung, into whose hands Wang had turned over Prince Ch'en, tried to defend the philosopher, Emperor Wu-tsung asked him: "How do you know that Wang will become a rebel?" The rascal replied: "The proof is that he would not come to you when Your Majesty summoned him." ¹⁴ Chang Chung, apprehensive lest Wang Shou-jen might after all come to Nanking, did whatever he could to delay him. Meanwhile Chang Yung did everything in his power to persuade the emperor that since Wang was a philosopher he would never attempt to rebel. The friendly eunuch advised that a secret agent be dispatched to spy out Wang's doings, and thus prove that he was innocently occupied. The agent's report was that he had seen Wang sitting quietly and meditating. In this way Chang Yung protected Wang.

The emperor remained at Nanking for about a year, during which time the eunuchs busied themselves collecting money and

booty to enrich themselves. They caused Wang Shou-jen no end of trouble, and it was only because of his philosophical attitude that he was able to survive.

About the beginning of 1521 Emperor Wu-tsung returned to Peking and died soon after.

His successor, Emperor Shih-tsung, appointed Wang Minister of Military Affairs. Because of his military achievement, the title Count of *Hsin-chien* was likewise conferred upon him. But before our philosophical tactician assumed his new post he visited his native place to attend the obsequies of his grandmother and to observe the seventieth birthday of his father. Shortly thereafter (1522) his father died, and in accordance with Chinese custom Wang observed at home the three years mourning.

During the years 1520-1524 Wang Shou-jen did much philosophical work, as we can see from his letter of 1520 to Lo Ch'in-shun concerning the restoration of the old text of the *Ta-hsüeh* (Great Learning). In this year Wang mentions accepting Wang Ken as a disciple, and describes it as an event which moved his heart in a way which the capture of Prince Ch'en Hao had never done. In the following year (1521) he simplified his philosophical shibboleth about the integration of knowledge and action, coining a new phrase: "realization of intuitive knowledge," which has the same meaning. During the period of mourning for his father (1522-1524) he engaged frequently in philosophical discussions with his disciples, some of whom remarked to him: "The more distinguished you become, sir, the more you are slandered. This is because the majority of the people are jealous of you." The master answered: "The more convinced I become, the more completely I get rid of the habits of the philistine."¹⁵ What he meant was that once he had learned to act in accordance with intuitive knowledge the less he worried about risk to himself.

At the end of his period of mourning (1524), Wang Shou-jen gathered more than one hundred disciples on the Heaven Fountain Bridge and engaged in philosophical debate. This he did in pursuance of the policy of Confucius who also gathered disciples and encouraged them to express their own views. An excursion was made to the mountains and along the banks of streams in order to cause the seekers-after-truth to feel that discrimination between

this and that and between good and evil was transcended, and that a unity or harmony with Great Nature was preferred.

In 1526, shortly before departing as commander-in-chief to suppress bandits in Ssu-t'ien, Wang gave two favorite disciples, Wang Ch'i and Ch'ien Te-hung, the opportunity to discuss with him a philosophical problem on this same Heaven Fountain Bridge. On the preceding day, it seems, the two disciples had engaged in private discussion in a boat. Wang Ch'i had said to Ch'ien Te-hung: "According to our teacher's idea, knowledge of good and evil is *intuitive knowledge*. Seeking the good and struggling to eliminate the bad is *investigation of things*. But I do not believe that this is the final word concerning reality." Ch'ien Te-hung countered: "Why?" Thereupon Wang Ch'i continued: "If mind in its original nature is beyond good and evil, then the same will hold true of volition, cognition, and physical objects. All will be beyond good and evil." Ch'ien Te-hung tried to explain. "True, mind in its original nature is beyond good and evil, but when it becomes involved in bad habits, knowledge of good and evil comes into its ken. To do good and to avoid evil is a way to recover the original nature of mind. As soon as reality is known, this discipline of doing good and avoiding evil is no longer needed. If, in the state of reality, mind is beyond good and evil, why should there be the labor of discipline?"

Then the two students found themselves at an impasse and hoped for a decision from their master. Such was the background of the discussion between Wang Shou-jen, Wang Ch'i, and Ch'ien Te-hung on Heaven Fountain Bridge. After each disciple stated his point of view, Wang replied: "Ch'ien Te-hung is correct in his understanding of the work of discipline. Wang Ch'i is correct in what he says about ultimate reality."

The master added: "Ultimate reality is the great void. In the great void are suns, stars, winds, rains, and many other things. Which of these can screen or blind it?"

He also warned Wang Ch'i not to talk too much about ultimate reality, because that subject can be understood only by the genius. "And, as it is, there are so few geniuses in the world that it is best to be chary about discussing ultimate reality."

Wang Shou-jen concluded his remarks to Wang Ch'i by advising that a seeker-after-truth, instead of indulging much in ontological speculation, should emphasize discipline in accordance with four aphorisms:

- (1) Mind in its original nature is beyond good and evil.
- (2) Good and evil exist in the motivation of the will.
- (3) Knowledge of good and evil is *intuitive knowledge*.
- (4) Doing good and shunning evil are what is meant by the phrase: "investigation of things."¹⁶

This conversation is peculiarly important because some of Wang Shou-jen's disciples at the end of the Ming Dynasty taught the foolish doctrine that Wang's phrase, "beyond good and evil" was the last word in his philosophy. This misinterpretation of the master led to a confused mental state which in those days was called "mad Ch'anism." These disciples, by not following an empirical and positive way, did much to bring disrepute on the spiritual descendants of their master.

But let us return to the outline of Wang Shou-jen's biography. In 1526, after considerable deliberation, he accepted appointment as under-secretary to the board of censors as well as commander-in-chief in charge of suppressing rebels in Ssu-t'ien District. He would gladly have rejected the appointment, but the emperor would not heed his request for resignation. Proceeding from Chekiang via Kiangsi, Wang arrived in Kwangsi. There he put into operation a policy of appeasement, and persuaded the bandits to disband. The turmoil and unrest subsided completely within a few months. There followed an educational program through which many schools were established for training the people of Ssu-t'ien.

In the winter of the ensuing year (1528) Wang Shou-jen suffered from the hot weather and from diarrhea. But he undertook, nonetheless, to visit the temple of Ma Yüan, conqueror of Annam in the Eastern Han Dynasty. At this temple, in Nan-ning, Kwangsi Province, he understood at last the dream he had had in his fifteenth year—that he would come upon Ma Yüan after a great military victory. The prophecy was now fulfilled. Wang wrote two odes about his dream, one of which runs:

"Forty years ago I wrote a poem about a dream
 Which meant that this journey was preordained
 In heaven and not determined by man.
 Though my battles may be compared to a campaign of
 wind and cloud,
 Wherever I have gone I have been applauded like rain
 after the dry season.
 Though the people have surrendered themselves to me,
 I have had no way to lighten their sufferings.
 Since my achievements are attributed to the emperor
 I am ashamed to speak of suppression of barbarians by
 the sword." ¹⁷

On January 9, 1529 Wang Shou-jen died at Nan-an, Kwangtung Province. His coffin was brought back to his native town where he was buried.

II. SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

The fundamental conviction of Wang Shou-jen is the intelligibility of the world in which we live. In addition to the summary already given (at the beginning of Section I in the present chapter) we may analyse his doctrine as follows:

- (1) Man's mind is the mind of the universe.
- (2) Mind's knowing is the core of reality; that is to say, reality is comprised in consciousness.
- (3) Through knowing, the principles of everything can be found. Things are not external to us, but are objects of consciousness.
- (4) The universe is a unity in which man is the mind or center. Men constitute a brotherhood, and physical things show spiritual affinity with mind.
- (5) If there were no mind or intuitive knowledge, the universe would not operate.
- (6) Matter or the world of nature is material for mind to work with.

In his metaphysics Wang Shou-jen reveals an affinity to Hegel's

philosophy of spirit. Nature furnishes the plastic material for the self-expression of spirit.

He starts with this Hegelian type of metaphysics, according to which knowing and evaluating by the human mind are the nucleus of reality. But he also is close to the principle of Berkeleyan idealism: *Esse est percipi*. However, Wang should not be understood as recommending an egocentric epistemology. Since, for him, knowing is ontologically the essence of the universe, or the core of reality, knowing is consequently *trans-subjective*, not limited to the human mind.

Wang Shou-jen's system also shows interesting divergencies from Kant's "critical" position. The Chinese philosopher, because of his thoroughgoing ontological idealism, does not recognize the Kantian distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. Nor does he break knowledge down into the factors of *the given* (sensation) and the *organizational* (the forms of sensibility and understanding). For Wang, the act or process of knowing, and what is known in mind, are part and parcel of one reality.

Though this Chinese philosopher argued very much after the manner of the Western rationalists, at the same time some of the arguments of Berkeley and Kant played an important role in his scheme. Reason is the fundamental essence. Reason is known through the activities of mind.

A. METAPHYSICS: THE UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE

Wang Shou-jen's premise is the intelligibility of the world. Intuitive knowledge or knowing is not restricted to men and women, but extends to all inanimate beings and even to physical objects. "Man's intuitive knowledge," says Wang, "is shared by grass and trees, stones and tiles. Grass and trees (suggestive of botany), stones and tiles (representing physics) could not function if they did not possess the capacity to know. The universe itself would be incapable of running or operating if it were not for man's intuitive knowledge."¹⁸

Elsewhere our philosopher comments: "Intelligibility fills the universe. Man, imprisoned in his physical body, is sometimes separated from intelligibility. Nonetheless, his intuitive knowledge is

the controlling power of the cosmos and of the gods. If there were in the universe no intellect, who would study the mysteries of the heavens? If there were on earth no human intellect, who would study the profundities of terra firma? If the gods had no knowledge of mankind how could they reveal themselves in fortune and misfortune? Heaven, earth, and deities would be non-existent if they were separated from the human intellect. On the other hand, if man's intellect were divorced from heaven, earth and deities, how could it exercise its functions?"¹⁹

I am not prepared to say that Wang believed in hylozoism, the doctrine that all nature is alive. But something of the sort is implicit in his remark that because animals and grains are nourishment for men, and because herb and mineral medicines cure disease, there must be a spiritual affinity between the biological and physical worlds on the one hand, and mankind on the other hand.

That intelligibility exists at the core of the universe was our philosopher's prime conviction. At this core is man, intimately related to the supersensible world above and the world of nature below. The universe is a unity with man at its center.

Wang liked to quote from the *Chung-yung* (Doctrine of the Golden Mean). For instance: "It is said in the *Shih-ching* (Book of Poetry) that the hawk flies up to heaven, fish leap into the deep. This is an allusion to how the way is seen from above and below."²⁰ What is visible are birds flying in the heavens, fish swimming in the deep sea; but beyond that is mystery. One fact emerges clearly: the entire universe is a single integrated unity.

In this passage, as well as others I have quoted, Wang sounds like a philosophical mystic, and finds a clear echo in the words of Giordano Bruno. The following quotation, for example, which was written by Bruno, might have been written by Wang: "It is not reasonable to believe that any part of the world is without a soul life, sensation, and organic structure. From this Infinite All, full of beauty and splendor, from the vast worlds which circle above us to the sparkling dust beyond, the conclusion is drawn that there is an infinity of creatures, or a vast multitude, which mirrors forth the splendor, wisdom and excellence of the divine beauty each in its degree."²¹

Such passages, whether from Eastern or Western thinkers, tell us that the universe is a whole with man at the center. The Chinese philosopher goes further, and tells us not only what man *is*, but also what he *should be*. Wang Shou-jen concludes that "The great man is one who has the sense of unity with the universe. The great man thinks that the whole world is one family, or that the whole world is one man. While a man imprisoned in his physical body differentiates between 'thee' and 'me,' his feeling is that of the petty man. The doctrine that human beings have a sense of unity with the universe is not in the least the product of imagination. Rather it comes from the instinct of *jen*. Indeed, this nobility is not only characteristic of the great man, but also holds true to some extent of the petty man. When one sees a child about to fall into a well one is aroused by a sense of commiseration. This sense of commiseration makes one feel a unity with the child, who belongs to the same species as one's self.

"This feeling of commiseration goes further. When a man hears or sees an animal or bird crying or frightened, he also feels its misery. His *jen* leads him to a consciousness of unity with living beings. Further still, when he beholds a great tree falling he feels 'What a pity!'—which means that his sense of integration reaches to inanimate objects. This instinct of integration or *jen* is rooted in man's nature. At the same time it is the intelligence of man and the quality which renders man intelligible; it is also the illustrious virtue of man."²²

Somebody asked Wang why, if this world is under the rule of love or *jen*, the *Ta-hsüeh* (Great Learning) finds it necessary to discuss the question of what should be done first and what should be done afterwards. The philosopher answered: "What is discussed here is the natural order of reason. For example, in regard to the human body the function of the hands and feet is to protect one's head. But this does not mean that one should let one's hands and feet give one's head leisure by doing its work for it. Nevertheless, the natural order of reason should be so. Animals and plants, as previously mentioned, should be cared for by man, yet according to the natural order plants should be given to animals as food. Animals and men alike should be loved, yet it is proper under certain circumstance to kill animals, especially for parents, guests,

and sacrificial offerings. Such is the natural order. Both relatives and strangers should be treated with solicitude, but when only one dish of meal is left, and when the case has to do with saving a life, the natural order requires that the dish should be given first to the relative, not to the stranger. This is the natural order revealed in intuitive knowledge; it is what is right." ²³

Wang Shou-jen's world is a community of conscious or moral beings living with animals and plants which possess spiritual kinship with it. This universe is teleological, for in it consciousness rules and moral values dominate.

Let us proceed now to study Wang Shou-jen's teaching that *jen* is the root of all other virtues. One of his disciples, referring to Ch'eng Hao's words that a man of *jen* has a sense of unity with the cosmos, asked: "If this remark of Ch'eng Hao is correct, why was Mo Ti's theory of universal love refuted by Mencius?" The master replied: "This is a difficult question, and the solution depends upon one's understanding everything that is involved. *Jen* is the expression of the principle of production and reproduction of living beings. Though the impulse to create is universal, its growth is gradual, only step by step. After the winter solstice the first *yang* comes forth, until in summer the *yang* is full. Because this impulse to create is gradual it must have a beginning and then develop further. The process is like that of a tree which originally appears as a shoot, the first fruit of the creative urge. The trunk follows the shoot, and from the trunk emerge twigs and branches. If there were no shoot, there would be no trunk nor any of the rest of the tree. Below the shoot, moreover, must be a root which can grow. In the root is life. Without the root the tree would die. Love between parents and children, and mutual regard between brothers are the first beginnings of humanity, and are analogous to the young shoots of the vegetable world. These first awakenings of love will later extend to embrace the love of all one's fellow creatures, who are, as it were, the twigs and branches." ²⁴

The sense of *jen* is, in other words, of the same nature as the root from which all beings have sprung. It is spiritual, yet also empirical. It is metaphysical and at the same time physical. This doctrine is an excellent illustration of how deeply embedded the Chi-

nese metaphysical theory of moral value is in the practical life of mankind.

Wang's conception of the oneness of reality is nowhere more vividly expressed than in the following passage which has to do with the universal function of the human senses. "The eye of a man," he says, "cannot stand by itself, but must have the colors and shapes of all things of the world as its objects. The ear cannot stand by itself, but must have all the kinds of sounds in the universe to listen to. The nose cannot stand by itself but must perceive all the odors in the world. The mouth cannot do otherwise than taste whatever is tasteful among all things. The function of mind is to know right and wrong concerning challenges and responses between all things and itself."²⁵ Thus, the human mind is not only specialized in its various avenues to knowledge, but is also opened far and wide to all the phenomena of the universe.

B. PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY: MIND, INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE, WILL AND THINGS

Let me begin with our philosopher's theory of mind, which he discusses from two points of view: First, mind in the naturalistic sense; second, mind in the normative sense. Often he combines these two views, starting naturalistically and ending normatively.

The disciple Hsiao Hui complained: "I have the idea to better myself. Why can I not do it?" His master suggested: "Explain in detail what your idea to better yourself is." Hsiao Hui continued: "My idea is to be a good man. Perhaps what I do is more for my physical than my true self." Wang Shou-jen interposed: "The true self cannot be separated from the physical self. I suppose that what you have done is not even good enough for your physical self. The physical self or body consists of the five senses and four limbs." Said the disciple: "I agree with what you have said. The eyes are fond of beauty. The ears delight in beautiful voices. The mouth craves delicious tastes. The four limbs take delight in comfort. These pleasures make me unable to control myself." Wang Shou-jen continued: "Beautiful colors blind the eyes. Beautiful sounds

deafen the ears. Delicious tastes stop up the mouth with too much flavor. Racing and hunting drive one mad. All these delights are harmful to the eyes, ears, mouth, nose, and four limbs. They do no good to the senses nor to the arms or legs. If you care for your senses and limbs, do not give first thought to how your ears should listen, or to how your eyes should see, or to how your mouth should speak, or to how your arms and legs should move. If you can control your senses and bodily parts to conform to the Confucian rule that seeing, hearing, speaking, and motion should abide by the principle of decency, you will understand well enough what is good for your senses and limbs. But to bring your seeing, hearing, speaking, and physical movements into conformity with the principle of decency requires more than merely to leave them to your body. This accomplishment depends completely on mind. Seeing, listening, speaking, and motion are the work of mind. To be sure, your mind-directed vision operates through the organ of your ears, your mind-directed speech issues from your mouth, your mind-directed movements are put into effect by your four limbs. But each of these functions is mind-directed. Otherwise—that is, if you had no mind—your senses and limbs would be unable to operate. Your mind, moreover, is not a nervous system of flesh and blood, and would continue to see, hear, speak, etc. I say that mind is the organ which directs seeing, listening, speaking, and motion, because mind consists of human nature, i.e., of heavenly reason. Since mind is so constituted, it has its essence, part of which is the virtue of *jen*. When the essence of mind—constituted as it is of human nature—works in the eyes, the function of seeing is operative. When it works in the ears, hearing takes place. When it works in the mouth, speech occurs. When it works in the limbs, movement ensues. All these are the operations of heavenly reason, which works in mind as master of the physical body. Mind in its essential nature is heavenly reason in the form of decent manners. This is your true self, controller of your physical body. This true self knows self-control even when nobody else is present, knows caution even when eavesdropping is impossible.”²⁶

In this discourse, Wang starts his discussion of mind at, first, the naturalistic level previously mentioned; and ends it at, second, the normative level. He concludes his remarks, in other words, with

suggestions of what mind *ought* to be, rather than with what mind actually is. Normatively, mind is reason.

May I quote a few descriptive definitions of mind from Wang Shou-jen's writings?

"The intrinsic quality of mind is nature, which is reason." ²⁷

"There is no reason apart from mind." ²⁸

"The essence of mind is goodness." ²⁹

May I quote next a few illustrations from Wang about the nature of mind?

"Mind is reason. How can you find reason apart from mind? How can you find so-called *things* outside of mind? Suppose we talk about service to your parents. How can you find the reason for filial duty in the body of your parents? The reason for filial duty can only be found in your own mind. Suppose we discuss the sense of loyalty. How can you find the reason for loyalty in the body of the king? The reason for loyalty can only be found in your own mind. Or suppose we talk about friendship or the people's ruler. How can you find the principle of honesty in your friend's body, or the principle of benevolence in the people's body? The principles of honesty and benevolence can only be found in mind. When mind is clear, in the right, and unblinded by selfish motives, it acts towards parents in accordance with filial duty, it acts towards the king in accordance with loyalty, and it behaves towards friends and people-at-large in accordance with honesty and benevolence." ³⁰

Such is the meaning of Wang's maxim: "Mind is reason," a maxim, the reader may recall which originated with the philosopher Lu Chiu-yüan. Wang Shou-jen thus followed in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessor, and in doing so, moreover, deviated from the orthodox tradition of the school of the brothers Ch'eng and Chu Hsi. According to this older tradition *hsing* (human nature) is reason. As has already been explained in detail, the Ch'eng-Chu school held tenaciously to the two-level theory of mind which regarded the upper level, where reason is stored, as *hsing* (human nature), and the lower level, occupied with awareness and consciousness, *hsin* (mind in the naturalistic sense). It would be wrong to assert that Lu Chiu-yüan and Wang Shou-jen abandoned this two-level theory *in toto*, suggesting so interestingly the

Kantian doctrine of the forms of thought. Rather, they fused the two levels into a single unit, because reason must be expressed through mind—in particular, through the thinking process of mind.

It is no exaggeration to call Wang Shou-jen a follower of Lu Chiu-yüan. In the doctrine that mind is reason the theories of the two philosophers are identical. However it should be emphasized that Wang's system as a whole is more comprehensive and more perfect than his predecessor's, and in this sense it can be rightly called original. The theory that mind is reason was developed by Wang to a richer fullness of meaning than we find in the system of Lu.

The term, intuitive knowledge, has occurred several times in this exposition of Wang Shou-jen's teachings. Perhaps it is appropriate now to explain its meaning. The Chinese words for intuitive knowledge are *liang-chih*, and they signify the innate faculty of knowing. For our Chinese philosopher, the terms knowing, moral consciousness, and intuitive knowledge coincide in meaning. "*Liang-chih*," comments Wang, "whether by an ordinary man or by a sage, is the same."³¹ It means conscience or the concomitant knowledge. "*Liang-chih* through past and future ages has remained and ever will remain the same."³² "*Liang-chih* exists always. If you do not take care to preserve it, you will lose it. In itself it is bright and clear, despite ignorance and blindness. If you do not know enough to keep it clean, it will become beclouded, but though it may remain thus beclouded for a long time, it nevertheless is essentially brilliant, limpid, and distinct."³³

In Wang's view *liang-chih* is part of reason or reality. "Knowing," he said, "is the spiritual part of reason. *Liang-chih* is what is intelligent, clear, and distinct in heavenly reason."³⁴

Elsewhere: "*Liang-chih* is heavenly reason."³⁵

Again: "When there is motivation it is known to *liang-chih*. Regardless of whether motivation is for good or evil it is known to *liang-chih*."³⁶

"*Liang-chih* is your personal criterion. When your will works in a certain direction, *liang-chih* knows whether it is inclined towards right or wrong."³⁷

Thus far our quotations from Wang Shou-jen about *liang-chih* show it as working out the functions of pure and practical reason.

But if we look at *liang-chih* from another angle, we shall find that it is just as aptly described by a very different quotation from Wang Shou-jen.

Thus: "When your mind is full of wicked motives and they are known to *liang-chih* it can stop them. In other words, when you entertain a good motive, *liang-chih* can develop it. When you entertain an evil motive, *liang-chih* can block it." ³⁸ The reader will observe that in this passage, *liang-chih* appears as will.

Wang Shou-jen also presents *liang-chih* as an emotional factor. "*Liang-chih* is a truly good heart," he says. Also: "When you see a child about to fall into a well, you feel pity and try to save the child. This is *liang-chih*." "The universe is a unity. The sufferings of the people are the same as disease in your own body. If you do not feel discomfort from disease in your own body it is as if you had lost your ability to discriminate between right and wrong." ³⁹

And now a word about the origin of the Chinese expression *liang-chih* which I have translated "intuitive knowledge." Wang Shou-jen borrowed this technical term from the *Meng-tzu* (Book of Mencius). Indeed, the passage where it occurs is well worth quoting, for it throws additional light on its meaning. "The ability," says the famed Second Sage, "possessed by men without having been acquired by learning is intuitive ability. Babies-in-arms all know enough to love their parents. When they have grown up a little, they all know how to love their elder brothers. Filial affection is the working of *jen*. Respect for elders is the working of *i* (righteousness). There is no other reason for these feelings. They belong to all under heaven." ⁴⁰

Liang-neng (intuitive ability) or *liang-chih* (intuitive knowledge) might be interpreted by some modern schools of psychology as instinct. In Wang Shou-jen's system it is a philosophical concept covering the three aspects of conscious life: intellect, will, and emotion.

It is no secret that many a philosopher, like Locke or Hume, has built up a system out of knowing or understanding or cognition. More rarely has a system been constructed out of will. Yet Schopenhauer, because he was greatly influenced by Buddhism, did just this. Wang Shou-jen, though he placed much emphasis

on intuitive knowledge, as is obvious from the passages quoted above, was scarcely less emphatic about the role of will.

This will which he stresses is "true" or "real will," and by "true" or "real will" he means much the same as Kant meant by "good will." With his usual clarity, Wang says that whenever there is any movement or prompting in the mind, it is will. The way to control will is to entertain virtuous motives and to eliminate wicked ones. This results in the creation of "true" or "real will."

One implication of this theory of the "true" or "real will" is correlated with knowing. Any prompting of will is known to *liang-chih* (intuitive knowledge). Wang elucidates his position skillfully: "When," he says, "the will is on the move, and such-and-such a motive is bad, most people will not attempt to stop it, because they suppose that since the motive has not yet been put into practice, it has no consequence. According to my doctrine of the unity of knowing and doing, even a prompting of will is a doing, so it should be stopped at once."⁴¹

The point Wang is making is that if a vicious motive can be cleared away thoroughly, then will, while still at the early stage of motive, can be put on the right track before it has realized itself in action.

To this subject of will Wang has more to contribute. In his *Answers to Questions Concerning the Book Ta-hsüeh* (Great Learning), he says: "Mind in its original nature is pure and good, but when it is agitated by motivation it can be either good or bad. So-called 'rectification of mind' embraces the idea that when motivation begins to stir, it should be controlled in the interests of steering towards the right track. When motivation is good, one should embrace it in the same way that one loves beauty. When motivation is evil, one should hate it as one abhors a foul smell. Then motivation will be pure and virtuous and mind will be rectified."⁴²

The difference between the doctrines of Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen will already have become plain to the observant reader from what has been quoted. The earlier philosopher, the pillar of Confucian orthodoxy, stressed the aspect of seeking knowledge with reason. Only after one has acquired so much knowledge, does one learn how to distinguish between right and wrong. But the

later philosopher-strategist, Wang Shou-jen, followed Mencius's doctrine of *liang-chih* in asserting that when one applies *liang-chih*, i.e., conscience, to one's motives and will, one knows the difference between right and wrong, and the mind is *ipso facto* rectified.

In Wang's system emphasis is placed upon the close connection between willing and knowing—a nuance of philosophical doctrine not to be found elsewhere except in the practical reason of Kant, who as much as said that practical reason is will. Wang explained: "When motivation is known to *liang-chih* as good, but someone rejecting it embraces the contrary evil instead, this means that one takes the bad as substitute for the good and is deaf to the dictates of *liang-chih*. On the other hand, when motivation is known to *liang-chih* as bad, and one not wishing to avoid it puts the bad into practice, this again means that one takes the bad as substitute for the good and is deaf to the dictates of *liang-chih*. *Liang-chih*, of course, recognizes what is evil. In these two cases, what is called knowing turns out to be ignorance or deception. The proper way to begin is to make the will real or true."⁴³

Our philosopher's meaning is that if you act in conformity with *liang-chih*, your will is true. Otherwise your will is untrue.

Wang thinks further that when *liang-chih's* dictates are followed, it means there has been no deception in regard to *liang-chih*, and the making of a "true" will has been accomplished.

The reader can thus clearly perceive the intimate connection Wang Shou-jen places between *liang-chih* and volition.

Let us now leave the theme of will, to which our philosopher had so much of value to contribute, and delve into his theory of knowledge. Here we find Wang Shou-jen in full possession of the epistemological problem. The key to his system is the thesis that things are objects of consciousness. As long, he says, as we consider entities to exist outside of ourselves and to occupy positions in space, the physical world and mind are separated, and their unity is inconceivable. When, on that memorable night in Lung-ch'ang, Wang Shou-jen made the discovery that all so-called things are objects of consciousness, he dug a channel between mind and its object, and laid the epistemological foundation for his philosophical system.

Just as Berkeley and Kant inquired "How is scientific knowledge of the external world possible?" so Wang asked: "How are cognition and moral values possible?" And it happened that the Chinese philosopher discovered that any knowledge whatever, whether of the external world or of moral values, in order to be knowledge at all, must first exist as consciousness in mind and pass through the process of being thought about.

In order to clarify Wang's theory that things are objects of consciousness, consider the following from a letter he wrote to Ku Tung-ch'iao: "Chu Hsi's exposition of the phrase 'investigation of things' is that principles should be studied as embodied in things. If this were so, principles can be found only in things themselves. Then mind would be at one end and the principles of things at the other end. There would be a disunity between mind and things. Let us assume for the sake of argument, that Chu Hsi's doctrine is sound, namely that principles are only to be found *within* things, and let us then consider the principle of filial duty. Is this principle to be found in the bodies of your parents or is it to be found in your own mind? If the principle exists in their bodies, it will disappear after their death. Or let us consider the principle of commiseration. In the case of the child falling into the well, does this principle exist in the child's body or in my mind? Shall I save the child by my hand? Ought I to follow the child to the well? These examples—the principles of filial duty and commiseration—are only two, but any number of other principles may be analyzed in the same way. Thus, to take the view that a disunity obtains between mind and things is to err . . . According to my teaching, 'realization of knowledge' and 'investigation of things' mean that I myself apply my own *liang-chih* to different entities. My *liang-chih* knows what reason is, knows what is right and what is wrong. When I apply my *liang-chih* to different entities, they become adjusted in a proper manner. Application of *liang-chih* to different objects means 'realization of knowledge.' When different things become adjusted in the sense that they function in their proper way, this is the work of the 'investigation of things.'" 44

Here is another interestingly relevant comment of Wang Shou-jen in answer to somebody who questioned his doctrine that things

are objects of consciousness. Once when the philosopher was on an excursion to Nan-chen a friend said, "According to your theory, existence is impossible outside of mind. But consider a flower which blooms and withers by itself in the valley. What has it to do with mind?" Wang replied: "Before you see the flower, both you and the flower are in a state of isolation. When you see the flower its color and shape become clearer to you—which means that knowledge of the flower cannot exist apart from mind."⁴⁵

The reader should remember that for Wang Shou-jen the importance of the knowledge which consciousness or mind provides does not lie in its being subjective, but rather in its having metaphysical significance. This is obvious from the following conversation:

Chu Pen-ssu remarked: "Man is intelligent because he has *liang-chih*." But inquired Chu Pen-ssu: "Do plants, stones and bricks have *liang-chih*?" Wang Shou-jen answered: "Man's *liang-chih* is one with the *liang-chih* of plants and stones. Without man's *liang-chih*, plants and stones would not work as plants and stones. Not only is this the case in regard to plants and stones, but the universe itself would not function save for man's *liang-chih*."⁴⁶

This last remark tells us clearly that our knowledge of the world is an actual construct of our minds, a formation brought into being by our thinking process.

In this connection I should like to emphasize again the difference of opinion between Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen. Though the older philosopher, being true to Chinese tradition, concerned himself almost exclusively with moral values, he nonetheless took a scientific attitude toward the world, studying nature critically. His approach, moreover, like that of Descartes, who dichotomized reality into thought and extension, led him to separate mind from the physical world in space. Wang Shou-jen, in the first period of his intellectual development, followed his predecessor in so far as his contemplation of bamboo seems to have presupposed this duality between mind and its object. Later he realized that this method could lead nowhere. After much pondering, he reached the conclusion while in exile in Lung-ch'ang that since things must come to the mind as objects of consciousness first, whither they are constituted by our conceptual forms, it follows that so-called principles

lie in our mind, not in the external world. This remarkable conclusion was called by Wang "the unity of mind and the principles of things." It is another version of the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception.

I trust the foregoing pages have made the main points of Wang's doctrine clear. Since it is not enough to present his ideas in a discontinuous way, I should now like to give some examples of Wang philosophizing, taking his ideas together in a combined and systematic manner. This is his monism.

To be sure, his monism is doubtless idealistic in the metaphysical sense; but the term as applied to his doctrine has a wider and more general significance than this merely specialized meaning. His interpretations are also monistic when he resolves such dualisms or bifurcations as are involved in the problems of (a) the individual versus the universe, (b) mind versus the physical world, (c) mind versus body, (d) desire versus reason, (e) knowing versus doing, (f) internal versus external, (g) book knowledge versus cultivation of mind.

Let us take up each of these dualisms or bifurcations in turn, seeing how our philosopher overcomes them with his monism.

(a) The individual versus the universe:

This problem has already been solved in our discussion of Wang's metaphysics. However, another quotation is worth citing. An inquirer after truth pointed out: "My body as an organ is made of flesh and blood. Thus it is a unit. But such is not the case with the bodies of two persons. The separation between men and animals and plants is even more drastic."⁴⁷ He continued: "How can we say that these are one?" For Wang Shou-jen's reply let me quote again from his *Questions concerning the Book Ta-hsüeh* (Great Learning). "A great man," says Wang, "is one who feels that he belongs to a unity which includes the universe and the different kinds of beings . . . When a man sees a child about to fall into a well he has the instinct of commiseration. This is his sense of human-heartedness, and this it is which makes him and the child one. Still someone may say that a man and a child constitute a unity only because they belong to the same species. Nonetheless when a man sees trembling and frightened birds and animals and hears their cries, he has a sense of pity, and it is

this which makes him one with them. Or someone may say that this unity exists only because birds and animals, in common with men, have feeling and sense. Nevertheless even when a man beholds falling trees he knows pity—and this it is which makes him one with plants. Someone may say again that this unity derives only from the fact that plants, like men, are living organisms. In answer to this we may point out that even when a man sees stones and bricks being broken up he also feels pity—this it is that constitutes his oneness with physical objects. This sense of oneness with the universe is a gift of nature, and is conferred by heaven. It is in itself bright and intelligent.”⁴⁸

(b) Mind versus the physical world:

Wang Shou-jen is not interested in discovering whether knowledge is based on sensation, or forms of understanding, or on both. Such an inquiry has no place in his thought because as a Chinese he is primarily concerned with moral values. He believes that reason positively is constituted by the inborn virtues of *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih*. These are the *forms* of moral judgment or valuation. He believes that negatively reason can be clouded only by desire and selfish motives. As long as mind is kept free of these obscuring agencies, it will be as bright as a mirror, and will show correct principles.

Wang stresses the idea that there is no reason outside of mind, because reason, to be a conscious reality, must pass through mind. Just as in Europe, the school championing forms of thought fights against psychologism (for instance, Kant vs. Hume), so also in China, the school identifying mind with reason, opposes the school of knowledge-seeking; that is, it opposes the school of Chu Hsi, which emphasizes the acquisition of knowledge from outside. For Wang Shou-jen, the reason that is inborn with mind is the foundation of all. When mind is clear and unselfish there is reason.

(c) Mind versus body:

It is interesting to hear what Wang says about the relationship between body and mind.

One day the master told a disciple that body, mind, will, knowing, and things were identical. The perplexed pupil asked: “Why?” Whereupon Wang Shou-jen gave the following explanation: “Ears, eyes, mouth, nose, and the four limbs make up the body. If there

were no mind, how could the functions of hearing, seeing, speaking, and moving take place? Suppose that mind wished to hear, see, speak, and move? How could it do so if there were no senses or limbs, that is, if there were no means for exercising these functions? Consequently, no mind, no body; and conversely, no body, no mind. What occupies space is called *body*. The power that controls is named *mind*. Mind operating by motivation is *will*. When will works in an intelligent, clear and distinct manner, or when its state is that of intelligence, clarity, and distinctness, mind is then said to *know*. That to which will is directed is an *object* or *thing*. These different kinds of mental activity: willing, knowing, objects of consciousness, merge into one.”⁴⁹

Elsewhere Wang expresses the same thought in different form. “Rectification of mind, making the will real, realization of knowledge, investigation of things, all aim at the cultivation of the person. The last of these steps, i.e. investigation of things, covers the whole field of self-discipline, which can be worked out in all psychological activities. In my understanding, ‘investigation of things’ means examination of objects in your own consciousness: examination of objects to which will is directed, and examination of objects being known. ‘Rectification of mind’ means correcting mind in regard to objects of consciousness. ‘To make will real’ means to be true in will with respect to the objects to which volition is directed. ‘Realization of knowledge’ is attainment of knowledge of an object in one’s consciousness. Speaking psychologically I should say that there is no division between what is inside and what is outside. Reason is one and the same, though it passes through many stages. Where reason is collected it is called *Hsing* (nature). As master of such collectedness it is called *Hsin* (mind). When the master operates by directing himself, there is will. When the operation is clear and distinct, intelligible, there is knowing or cognition. The target at which the intellectual process aims is an object.”⁵⁰

(d) Desire versus reason:

For ages Chinese thinkers had assumed a division between human desire and heavenly reason, between the human mind and the mind of *tao*. Wang Shou-jen, however, opposed this classification, and maintained that there is but one mind. When pure and on the right track, it is the mind of *tao*. Otherwise—that is, when

beclouded by desire—it is the human mind. He interpreted “human mind” as desire, and “mind of *tao*” as heavenly reason, and he held that these two phases of mind are mutually exclusive. His conviction is that desire shackles and blinds mind, making it ignorant. This was the supposition of Descartes when he described men as trapped inside the narrow confines of their separate egos. The way to be free of desire is to purify mind and to attain the mind of *tao*.

Discussions of this sort between Wang Shou-jen and his students—expositions of the different kinds of psychological activity—reveal clearly his monistic point of view and how at variance he was with his great predecessor, Chu Hsi, whose thought always proceeded on a dualistic basis: e.g., “realization of knowledge” and “investigation of things,” “advancement of learning” and “spiritual nurture,” etc. Though Wang’s method of overcoming these dualisms is perhaps clear to the reader, I should like nevertheless to quote another brief passage, at the expense of possibly being prolix. A pupil of Wang, citing Chu Hsi—“The master key to a man’s learning is mind and reason,”—asked his teacher, “What do you think of this statement?” Wang replied, “The conjunction ‘and’ is a mark of Chu Hsi’s theory of bifurcation.”⁵¹

Thus Wang Shou-jen is opposed to even so small a detail as the conjunction ‘and.’ But in this opposition he is very deep, because the ‘and’ of Chu Hsi implies that what it connects are two things unidentifiable with each other and consequently irreducible to unity. Wang, on the other hand, held precisely the opposite view.

Our philosopher-strategist’s attack on the Chu School is illustrated by another conversation. One of his disciples quoted the phrase of Chu Hsi’s teacher, Li Tung or Li Yen-p’ing, “in conformity with reason and unselfish,” and asked his master “How can one make a distinction between the two phrases, ‘in conformity with reason’ and ‘unselfish’?” Wang replied, “Mind is reason. If it is unselfish it is in conformity with reason. Not to be in conformity with reason is to be selfish. So there should be no disunity between mind and reason.”⁵²

In short, Wang Shou-jen’s philosophy is a reaction against Chu Hsi’s dualism.

(e) Knowing versus doing:

This theory of the unity of knowing and doing does not necessarily have anything to do with monism. It has a value in its own right, and a thinker who opposes monism may still believe in it.

First advocated by Wang Shou-jen during his exile in Lung-ch'ang, the theory was later reframed by him in the new formula, "realization of *liang-chih*," which he took to be the same, but expressed in a simpler and more direct way. Since this formula is the key that unlocks Wang's philosophy, it is worth our while to investigate its meaning.

Our philosopher's conversation with his disciple Hsü Ai has already been set forth in the biographical sketch. A section from a letter by Wang to Ku Tung-ch'iao, which forms a vital part of the book *Records of Instructions and Practices*, treats of the same subject but in a different form. In this work, the correspondent Ku is made to say: "You advocate in your letter a parallelism between knowing and doing without giving priority to one or the other. Your meaning is the same as that found in the chapter on the supremacy of moral virtue and seeking after knowledge in the *Chung-yung* (Doctrine of the Golden Mean), where virtue and knowledge are represented as interpenetrating each other. Yet there must be some order in which the steps are taken. You must know how to eat before you can eat. You must know how to drink before you can drink. You must know about clothes before you can dress yourself. You must first know about roads, then you can walk. You must first know things and then you can act. I do not mean to say that I should *know* to-day then *do* tomorrow."⁵³

This passage, which obviously contains an implied criticism of Wang's doctrine of the unity of knowing and doing, brought forth from the master the following rebuttal: "You admit the parallel way and mutual interpenetration, yet you make mention of a proper order of steps to be taken. Herein you manifest a conflict in your own mind. Let me take your example of eating and explain that to you. You are laboring under the customary way of thinking. In my view, one must first have the intention of eating, and then knowing how to eat will follow. This intention to eat is will, which is the beginning of doing. The taste of food is knowable only after it has been placed in the mouth. How can you possibly know

whether something is tasteful or not until you have tasted it? Similarly, there must come first the intention to walk and then knowledge of roads will follow. The intention to walk is will, which is the beginning of doing. After you have plodded on some distance you will know whether the road is safe or not. How can you possibly know the character of the road until you have walked it? This same type of analysis is applicable to drinking and dressing. Your argument amounts only to what you say it is; namely, 'You must first know things and then you can act.'"

Ku Tung-ch'iao, however, was still dissatisfied with his master's elucidation. "Real knowing," says Ku, "is for the sake of doing. Without doing there is no knowing. As a piece of advice to students that they should know the importance of putting knowledge into practice, your dicta are sound. If, however, you mean to say that doing is knowing, I fear that this superabundant emphasis on mind will consequently lead to overlooking the principles in things and to incompleteness of knowledge. And such an interpretation is contrary to the theory of the unity of knowing and doing as entertained by the Confucian school."

Undaunted, Wang Shou-jen presented his second rebuttal: "What is true, intimate, serious, and substantial within knowing is doing. What is intelligent, alert, analytic, and discriminating within doing is knowing. Knowing and doing according to their original nature are inseparable from one another. In these later days they have become disconnected because they have lost their primal significance. Therefore, I advocate the parallel ways of knowing and doing, which means that true knowing constitutes doing, and that without doing there is no knowing. This may be proved by the example of eating, as discussed by us previously. Of course, this is advice for students. But the advice is such in the original sense of the terms 'knowing' and 'doing.' It is not mere fabrication on my part in order to get immediate results. In your letter you said that overabundant emphasis on mind would lead to overlooking the principles in things. In my view, however, the principles in things cannot be found outside of mind. The attempt to find the principles in things outside of mind issues in one result only, namely, finding no principles. On the other hand, if you advocate putting aside the principles in things in order to find

To understand thoroughly is called 'to think.' To make fine distinctions is called 'analyse.' To reach what is actual is called 'to practice.' Although these steps are divided into five, they may also be regarded collectively, in which case they constitute one and the same step only. In short, this is my doctrine: *Mind is identical with reason, or the unity of knowing and doing.*"⁵⁵

In connection with Wang's exposition of his doctrine I should not omit his theory of realization of *liang-chih*, which is another formulation of the principle that knowing and doing are one. He proposes that the term "realization" may be understood as including the sense of "carrying out," so that the term covers "doing." In Wang's own words "*Liang-chih* is the compass, the square, and the measure. All things have their individual details, items, contingencies, and changes—just as there are all kinds of circles, squares, and lengths, which are testable by the compass, the square and the measure. The details, items, contingencies, and changes cannot themselves be standardized, precisely as the inexhaustible variety of circles, squares, and lengths cannot themselves be standardized. But let the compass and the square once be established, then all kinds of geometrical figures will be testable, and you can have as many kinds as you like. Let the measure once be established, then you will no more be deceived by the multitude of different lengths, and you can have as many varieties of longness and shortness as you wish. Similarly, let *liang-chih* be established, and you will no more feel uneasy among the vast throng of details, items, contingencies, and changes. You will be equipped to receive as many kinds as you please. A proverb says 'A difference of one millimeter may make a difference of one thousand miles.' On the basis of the subtle stirrings of *liang-chih*, one can discover whether one is headed towards the right or the wrong, and it is in paying heed to these small warnings that one should be most strict with one's self. On the contrary, if one wishes, as it were, to test a circle or a parallelogram without making use of a compass or a T-square, or if one wishes to determine a length without a measure, one is free to do so, but the results will be nonsense."⁵⁶

Still speaking of intuition or conscience Wang Shou-chen says again, "*Liang-chih* is a bright mirror in which all images are reflected. Beauty and ugliness will be seen in it and, after appearing,

whether something is tasteful or not until you have tasted it? Similarly, there must come first the intention to walk and then knowledge of roads will follow. The intention to walk is will, which is the beginning of doing. After you have plodded on some distance you will know whether the road is safe or not. How can you possibly know the character of the road until you have walked it? This same type of analysis is applicable to drinking and dressing. Your argument amounts only to what you say it is; namely, 'You must first know things and then you can act.'

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mind, then I do not know what remains to constitute mind . . .

"The intrinsic quality of mind is nature, which is nothing other than reason. When one possesses a mind exhibiting love to one's parents, there also is the principle of love. Otherwise, if there were no such mind, the principle of love would be nonexistent. When one possesses a mind showing loyalty to the king, there also is the principle of loyalty. Otherwise, there not being such a mind, would entail the nonexistence of the principle of loyalty. Thus, reason or principle cannot be found apart from mind.

"Chu Hsi's formulation was that the key to a man's learning is mind *and* reason. According to my view, though one's mind is confined to one's self, it is nonetheless the key to all principles. Principles are distributed throughout all things in the universe, yet they are comprised in one's mind. Chu Hsi's formula bifurcates mind and reason, as is shown by his use of the little word 'and'. . .

"The search for reason conceived as apart from mind leads to incomplete knowledge. In olden times Kao-tzu taught that *i* (righteousness) can only be found externally. [Kao-tzu's doctrine was an ancient version of the theory of the externality of relations.] Mencius then proceeded to criticize him, saying that Kao-tzu did not understand the nature of righteousness. Mind is one. It is *jen* when it shows true commiseration. It is *i* when it exhibits honor and rectitude. It is *ri* (reason) when it reveals tracings or lines in systematic arrangement. If human-heartedness and righteousness cannot be found outside mind, how can reason be found there? The expectation to find reason outside mind is based upon the assumption that knowledge is separate from action. If, on the other hand, you seek reason in your own mind this will lead you to perceive the unity of knowledge and action, the oneness of knowing and doing, which is the true way of the Confucian school." ⁵⁴

Wang Shou-jen tried to apply his doctrine that mind *is* reason to every aspect of his philosophy in order to prove it was the master key. But Ku Tung-ch'iao was so bound up in the conventional way of thinking that he was utterly blind to the possibility of synthesizing knowing with doing. Ku could do no more than remember the five steps in the *Chung-yung* (Book of the Golden Mean), viz., (a) study widely, (b) question carefully, (c) think

thoroughly, (d) analyse clearly, (e) put into practice earnestly. And in his correspondence with Wang he quoted the first four of these steps, but omitted the fifth, which has to do with doing or action. His reason for this omission was, of course, that from his point of view practice belongs to action, and as such is irrelevant to the process of knowing.

"The mind of man," wrote Ku in a letter to Wang, "is originally distinct and clear. Nonetheless, it is sometimes beclouded and blind because it is imprisoned in the physical world and is enthralled by human desires. The steps: studying, questioning, thinking, and analysing are necessarily preparatory to the clear understanding of reason, with which comprehension comes the discovery of good and bad, true and false."

To this comment, which implied a criticism of Wang's teaching, our philosopher-strategist made the following reply: "Questioning, thinking, analysing, and putting into practice are all necessary to the pursuance of study. Without practice there can be no study. If one is to learn the duties of filial piety one must know how to serve one's parents, and the only way to gain this knowledge is to do the labor one's self. Filial piety cannot be learned by mere talk. Again, if one wishes to learn archery one must have a bow in one's hand, and one must actually shoot an arrow to hit the mark. Or if one wants to learn calligraphy, one must have paper on the table, one must hold a brush and dip it into the inkstone. Whatsoever the nature of the learning, one cannot acquire it without somehow combining it with practice. Therefore, the initiative of learning is practice or doing. Such is the meaning of the dictum: 'Put into practice earnestly.'

"Why does learning include these steps? During the process of learning one has doubts. Hence one questions. Questioning, then, is a phase of learning and practice. But going along with questioning is thinking. Thus thinking is also a phase of learning and practice. After questioning one will analyse. Hence, analysis is a phase of learning and practice. Whether one questions, thinks, or analyses, one *works* ceaselessly with the subject. This is to 'put into practice earnestly.' The point is not that practice comes after these three steps. To gain knowledge of a profession is called 'to learn.' To raise a doubt for the purpose of solving it is called 'to question.'

To understand thoroughly is called 'to think.' To make fine distinctions is called 'analyse.' To reach what is actual is called 'to practice.' Although these steps are divided into five, they may also be regarded collectively, in which case they constitute one and the same step only. In short, this is my doctrine: *Mind is identical with reason, or the unity of knowing and doing.*"⁵⁵

In connection with Wang's exposition of his doctrine I should not omit his theory of realization of *liang-chih*, which is another formulation of the principle that knowing and doing are one. He proposes that the term "realization" may be understood as including the sense of "carrying out," so that the term covers "doing." In Wang's own words "*Liang-chih* is the compass, the square, and the measure. All things have their individual details, items, contingencies, and changes—just as there are all kinds of circles, squares, and lengths, which are testable by the compass, the square and the measure. The details, items, contingencies, and changes cannot themselves be standardized, precisely as the inexhaustible variety of circles, squares, and lengths cannot themselves be standardized. But let the compass and the square once be established, then all kinds of geometrical figures will be testable, and you can have as many kinds as you like. Let the measure once be established, then you will no more be deceived by the multitude of different lengths, and you can have as many varieties of longness and shortness as you wish. Similarly, let *liang-chih* be established, and you will no more feel uneasy among the vast throng of details, items, contingencies, and changes. You will be equipped to receive as many kinds as you please. A proverb says 'A difference of one millimeter may make a difference of one thousand miles.' On the basis of the subtle stirrings of *liang-chih*, one can discover whether one is headed towards the right or the wrong, and it is in paying heed to these small warnings that one should be most strict with one's self. On the contrary, if one wishes, as it were, to test a circle or a parallelogram without making use of a compass or a T-square, or if one wishes to determine a length without a measure, one is free to do so, but the results will be nonsense."⁵⁶

Still speaking of intuition or conscience Wang Shou-jen says again, "*Liang-chih* is a bright mirror in which all images are reflected. Beauty and ugliness will be seen in it and, after appearing,

each will pass. Thus the mirror is forever luminous and shining. The advice derived from Buddhism that mind should be developed without any attachments is in itself sound, for the fact that all images, whether beautiful or ugly, are indiscriminately reflected in the mirror of the mind, is in accordance with the proper development of the mind; and the fact that every image, whether beautiful or ugly, after being reflected does not remain, is a sign of non-attachment.”⁵⁷

Such, for Wang Shou-jen, is the nature of *liang-chih*, which is conscious, bright, just, and objective. If one can keep it in its pristine condition it will be a compass and a measure in all emergencies, for it is the storehouse of heavenly reason.

Our philosopher-strategist after his bitter experience with the eunuchs came to the conclusion that the only proper way to conduct one's life is to follow *liang-chih*—a formula he discovered when he was fifty years old. There is a record in Wang's chronological biography which says: “After Emperor Wu-tsung returned to Peking, and after the intrigues of Chang Chung and Hsü T'ai, I discovered at last that *liang-chih* is the fundamental factor that makes one willing to risk anything, even death. *Liang-chih* is a criterion by which one may dare to testify before the Three Emperors, heaven and earth, the deities, and the sages of generations to come.”⁵⁸

In a letter written this same year to Tsou Shou-i, Wang wrote “Recently I discovered that realization of *liang-chih* is the true essence of Confucianism. Formerly I had hesitations on this point, but after many years of bitter experience I have reached the conclusion that *liang-chih* is that which is self-sufficient in ourselves. It is like the helm on a boat whereby one can steer one's course in calm water or in rapids. When one holds the helm one is equipped to guide one's bark to safety and to avoid sinking.”⁵⁹

A disciple of Wang named Ch'en Chiu-ch'uan, on hearing the master sigh, remarked “Why do you sigh like that?” He replied, “This idea [the fundamental character of *liang-chih*] is so simple, yet it was buried for so many ages!”⁶⁰

The disciple Ch'en continued: “Because the Sung philosophers were busy with their methods of knowledge seeking they achieved great erudition, but they also became more and more biased. Now

that you, Master, have discovered *liang-chih* you have unfolded the truth for mankind."

Wang, the master, added: "It is just like a man who claims to be the descendant of a family after many years' separation. The question can only be settled by a blood test, which will determine the actual relationship between the man and his alleged ancestors. I believe that *liang-chih* is the drop of blood which determines descendancy of the Confucian school."⁶¹

How much importance Wang Shou-jen attached to this doctrine of *liang-chih* is shown by the passage just quoted. Yet he feared that the idea might become crystallized in a catchword and so lose its usefulness for the people. In this anxiety he showed himself to be remarkably farsighted, for after his death the *liang-chih* formula was in fact instrumental in discrediting his philosophy towards the end of the Ming Dynasty.

Before concluding this chapter I must bring the reader's attention to one other matter, which though purely textual is no less interesting on that account, for it reveals another phase of the difference between Wang Shou-jen and Chu Hsi. This concluding matter concerns the problem of the restoration of the old text of the *Ta-hsüeh*. Wang's way of restoring the text not only reflects his interpretation of its meaning, but also betrays his antagonism towards his great predecessor.

In China the deep-rooted power of tradition makes it essential that a thinker be backed by old texts such as the Classics of Confucius and the later Commentaries of Chu Hsi. Even if a thinker originates a new idea he dare not say so, but must find covering in the classics. Wang's restoration of the *Ta-hsüeh* was a case in point. There have, however, also been instances where originality in a theory was conceded. Thus Chu Hsi himself alludes to Chou Tun-i's *Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate* with these words: "As the former sages did not confine themselves to a repetition of each other's words, so Chou Tun-i has the right to coin a new term, 'the Ultimate of Nothingness.'" ⁶² Lu Chiu-yüan went further: "What kind of books," he exclaims, "did Yao and Shun study?" ⁶³ A remark, of course, which means that at the beginning of a culture one cannot depend upon any authoritative text, but must create one's own "classics."

On the whole, however, the creative work of thinking in China was carried on in the name of authority. Thus the Sung philosophy started with a profound sense of returning to Confucius. Afterwards, when Chu Hsi became established as the official commentator, he was the authority with whom nobody dared differ. It was for this reason that Wang Shou-jen, who *did* disagree with him, compiled a work entitled *The Definite Views of Chu Hsi in his Later Years*, which he wrote in self-protection.

On the other hand, Wang Shou-jen also followed a policy antithetical with his compilation of *The Definite views of Chu Hsi in his Later Years*. He attempted to restore, in other words, the ancient text of the *Ta-hsüeh*. But the significance of this bold feat will not be intelligible to the reader unless he first understands what Chu Hsi had done previously to this text. Chu Hsi, it seems, had divided the *Ta-hsüeh* into ten chapters. Then, when he had come to Chapter Five he made the guess that this section, which was supposed to have dealt with the meaning of "investigation of things," had been lost. Accordingly he interpolated a new chapter in explanation of this concept as well as of the concept "realization of knowledge."

But Wang Shou-jen was certain that Chu Hsi's supposition about the loss of Chapter Five was mistaken. He also thought that his predecessor's division of the *Ta hsiieh* into ten chapters was unnecessary. In Wang's reading, the text was continuous and unbroken from beginning to end. As for the allegedly lost Chapter Five, he believed that a section of the *Ta-hsüeh* which dealt with making will real was sufficient to account for this hypothetical chapter; thus he was confident that Chu Hsi's supplement was superfluous. But the reader should note that Wang's procedure rather ingeniously fits the text of the work into his own philosophical system.

Our philosopher-strategist's announcement of a return to the original scripture of the *Ta-hsüeh* was a great shock to academic circles, and stirred up much antagonism towards him.

In connection with these textual labors of Wang Shou-jen, let me quote from correspondence between him and Lo Ch'in-shun. Lo wrote, "According to your [Wang] restoration of the old text, the main study of this work has to do with internal reflection. On

the other hand, Ch'eng and Chu's theory of 'investigation of things' is, from your point of view, excessively concerned with the outside world. Because their way fails to conform to what you conceive to be the way of the sages, you reject Chu Hsi's division of the text into chapters as well as his supplementary chapter. Your action is, indeed, bold and daring. But from my point of view the type of education which was actually recommended by the Sage paid attention to both personal conduct and literary knowledge. Confucius taught his disciple Yen Hui to study literature widely. Thus it is clear that there is no difference between so-called 'inside' and 'outside.' If in study one should care nothing about the 'outside,' but should be exclusively occupied with inner contemplation, then the steps characterized as 'rectification of mind' and 'making will real' would be sufficient. Why should there be the additional steps 'investigation of things'? But there was such a phrase as this last in the text. And you [Wang] could not ignore it. Therefore, you tried to interpret it in such a way that it involved only the object to which will is directed, or the object of consciousness. By this subterfuge you could interpret the expression 'investigation of things' as meaning merely correcting wrong ideas."⁶⁴

This quotation, I believe, presents Lo Ch'in-shun as a partisan of Chu Hsi because he, like his master, obviously holds to the theory that things and ideas are two distinct realities, incapable of identification with one another. Most of the later philosophers who fought against Wang took this same attitude. I shall deal with them hereafter.

Lo's letter gives an inkling of how a new and original point of view in philosophy was embattled by conservative thinkers. And as always in China, the new theory was attacked or defended in terms of protection of texts and commentaries. Wang reverted to the old text of the *Ta-hsüeh* and fought against Chu Hsi's division into chapters and his supplementary chapter. The bold innovator was condemned because Chu Hsi's prestige as a commentator had long since become established and return to an old, pre-Chu text was considered eccentric.

If I were to speak frankly, I most certainly would say that it was Wang's discovery of a new theory which was important and that the involvement of the text was secondary. But in those days

the textual question was hopelessly confused with the question of the truth or falsity of the idea contained in the text. Any competent scholar would have uncritically assumed that he need only attack Wang for reverting to the old text of the *Ta-hsüeh* to pull down the foundations of his system. There is hardly need of my emphasizing today that if Wang's philosophy stands at all it stands by itself, and the textual question is irrelevant.

In conclusion I should like to say a few words about Wang Shou-jen's position in the world-history of philosophy. Not only was he the greatest thinker of China, but also he was comparable to the greatest philosophers of the West.

In his system, the universe is a rational unity. Yet it was not necessary for him to appeal to Platonic Ideas for a pattern of life. Rather, the rational beings down on solid earth were his ideals. He agreed with Kant that forms of thought are in mind: he called them *hsing* or *ri* (reason). Ordinarily his system has nothing in common with the absolute philosophy of Hegel in which the unfolding of reason is presented in the form of Dialectic. Yet he would have been quite ready to agree with Hegel that the world of experience is a progressive embodiment of spirit. He anticipated the Bergsonians in France and the Pragmatists in the United States by emphasizing action, though there is the difference that Wang's demand for action is justified on a rational basis whereas their demand rests on anti-intellectualistic grounds. One cannot doubt that in this Chinese thinker's system essences of Western idealism and pragmatism are contained, and that Wang Shou-jen will forever hold an honored place among the philosophers of the world.

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CHAPTER THREE

Debate of Wang Shou-Jen With Lo Ch'in-Shun and Chan Jo-Shui

The most influential school of philosophy in the Ming Dynasty undoubtedly was that of Wang Shou-jen. He had followers in all the provinces and his influence was felt everywhere. Since each developed the master's teaching in his own way, the physiognomy of the school took various forms, some of them fanciful to the extreme, thus causing decline and eventual collapse.

Before discussing the development of the school let me outline the thought of two contemporaries, both of whom throw light on Wang's own theories and on the reason for the school's eventual downfall. The two men are Lo Ch'in-shun and Chan Jo-shui. Both differed from Wang on some points, though in others they followed him. Chan, who was a disciple of Ch'en Hsien-chang, devised the following formula: "Everywhere and in everything let there be contemplation of the heavenly reason." Lo, on the other hand, consistently adhered to the Ch'eng-Chu school. He remained close to Chu Hsi's formula: "Unity in reason, but manifoldness in manifestation." ¹

Lo Ch'in-shun was born in the first year of Ch'eng-hua of the reign of Emperor Hsien-tsung of the Ming Dynasty (A.D. 1465). When he was fourteen years old, much to the astonishment of his relatives, he posted in his room the motto: "Work hard to walk along the path of *jen* and *i*." In due time he won the coveted *chin-shih* degree and an editorship in the Hanlin Academy. So engrossed was he in study that he abstained from social intercourse even to the point of declining requests of admirers to be-

come his pupils. Lo knew nothing of Buddhism. But he was curious enough to want to know from a monk how to become a Buddhist. On being told that, "Buddha is on the pine tree in the courtyard," he began reflecting and reached the conclusion that the reply agreed perfectly with a song about experiencing *tao* which he had read in a work of the Ch'an sect. For a time Lo was thus drawn to Buddhism, though he later abandoned it for Confucianism.

In 1502 Lo was appointed a teacher in the government academy. From then on he concerned himself exclusively with the Four Books, the Five Classics and the writings of the Sung philosophers. "The two Ch'eng brothers, Chang Tsai, and Chu Hsi," he once said, "all tried to study Buddhism, but when they understood Confucianism thoroughly they discovered the errors of Buddhism and left it."

During the reign of Emperor Wu-tsung when the eunuch Liu Chin was very powerful, Lo was deprived of his office and rank on the ground that he had used vacation leave illegally. Advised that a courtesy call upon the eunuch might save him from dismissal, he replied that to abase himself thus would violate all he had learned from Confucianism. The eunuch was subsequently executed and Lo's office and rank were restored to him.

After serving for a time as Minister of the Imperial Household, Lo was in 1515 transferred to be Vice Minister of the Civil Service Ministry in Nanking. Some six years later he was transferred to the corresponding position in Peking. While in this office Lo was strict about the promotion of career men. When, for example, any person came to ask for promotion on the strength of a letter from a eunuch, he would be handed over to the Ministry of Justice for punishment. In 1522 Lo was promoted to the post of First Minister in the Ministry of Civil Service, but he asked for permission to retire because his father had reached his eightieth year. When the father died he went into mourning. Though he was called back to his post at the end of the period of mourning, he declined so persistently that his request was granted. He died in 1547. As an opponent of Wang Shou-jen, Lo may be classified as belonging to the Ch'eng-Chu school. Since his works were incorporated in the series of orthodox works known as the *Cheng-i-t'ang Ch'uan-shu*, it is clear that Chang Po-hsing (1652-1725), the

editor of that series, regarded him as a member of that school.

A more careful analysis shows, however, that Lo did not agree entirely with all aspects of Chu's philosophy. The great Sung philosopher was a dualist, or advaitist in Indian terminology, who held that *ch'i* (matter) and *ri* (form) are two primordial factors. He believed even that in principle *ri* is prior to *ch'i*. Lo Ch'in-shun, on the contrary, held that *ch'i* in fact constitutes the universe. In this respect he was more in agreement with Chang Tsai than with Chu Hsi, as the following quotation will show: "In all that we know of the world both past and present," said Lo, "it is constituted by *ch'i*. *Ch'i* is the sole factor. But it has two modes: rest and motion, going forth and coming back, expanding and receding, rising and falling. These two modes are in operation ceaselessly, sometimes manifesting themselves after being hidden, sometimes hiding after having been made manifest. The four seasons, the budding and growing of crops, the storing of products, human lives and their relations, success and failure, gain and loss in human affairs, though appearing complicated, yet submit themselves to an orderly progress which cannot be disturbed. This is the unchangeable law which we know exists even though its inner meaning may be mystery. This is the reason; it is not something *other* than what goes with or is attached to *ch'i*." ² In this passage we have solid evidence that for Lo, *ch'i* is the primordial factor constituting the universe.

When Lo expresses agreement with the passage in the *I-ching* which says, "At one time *yin*, at another time *yang*, constitutes *tao*," he throws further light on his cosmology. He means to say that *tao* is the phenomena, not outside them. He means also that universals are to be found in particulars only and not elsewhere.

Lo brings his cosmology down to earth, as it were, by applying it to man. He asks the question whether reason is something separate and distinct from the physical nature of man. If *ch'i* is the sole primordial factor in the world, it is difficult to maintain the existence of reason in human life conceived as transcendental. Lo tries to circumvent this difficulty by asserting that *hsing* (human nature) is bestowed upon man at birth, whereas consciousness comes into activity only after birth. Consciousness as the work of *hsin* (mind) is different from *hsing*.

Huang Tsung-hsi, author of *Ming-ju Hsieh-an* which I have so often quoted, takes up the cudgels for Lo Ch'in-shun in this analysis. "If," says Huang, "the aforementioned is the view of Lo, then it is clear that *hsing* (human nature) is the intrinsic quality and that *hsin* (mind) is its operation. It is clear also that *hsing* comes prior to birth and that its essence is the state of calmness. *Hsin*, on the other hand, is a machine which responds after stimulation."³ Huang means here that *hsing* (human nature), in the sense in which Lo understands it, is reason, corresponding to the universals and standing as a criterion; whereas individual *hsin* (minds), since they belong to persons, cannot but be partial and subjective. But the point which Huang emphasizes is that this differentiation by Lo between *hsing* and *hsin* is dualistic. Lo presupposed that human nature and reason are identical and thus attributed to human nature the power of directing mind. Lo is not, in Huang's interpretation of him, so remote from Chu Hsi as he may at first have seemed, at least in so far as the Sung philosopher's doctrine of the priority of *ri* over *ch'i* is concerned. But, according to Huang's view, Lo is inconsistent with himself in holding that *ch'i* is the sole primordial factor in the universe.

In spite of this point of difference between Lo Ch'in-shun and Chu Hsi, the former stressed the importance of knowledge-seeking, and so differed markedly from Wang Shou-jen who held that because mind is reason, the main work of man must be purification of mind. Lo, on the other hand, clung to Chu Hsi's formula of the unity in reason and manifoldness in manifestation. "The wonder of cosmology," he writes, "lies in the principle that while reason is one, manifestations are many. Anything which comes into the world is endowed with a nature that derives itself from monistic reason. Once it has a physical shape it becomes a particular possessed of its own peculiarities. Even these peculiarities possessed by particulars stand in a natural order. Monistic reason exists in the midst of manifold phenomenal manifestations."⁴

Elsewhere Lo writes, "The endowment of all men is the same, i.e., human nature where reason is stored. As a man, one may be a sage, or a fool, which means there is variety in the world of phenomena."⁵

From Lo's discussion of human nature we see at once that he

held the two-level theory according to which the higher level is *hsing*, where reason is stored, and the lower level is the *locus* where mind is active. According to this two-level theory, reason or forms of thought occupy a superior rung in the ladder of being; and consciousness, the work of mind, occupies an inferior rung.

From Lu Chiu-yuan's time onward the two-level theory underwent a transformation, taking the form "Mind is reason." But according to the two-level theory man is equipped with reason since birth, so he need never be uncertain about how to make an ethical judgment; but, at the same time, his mind remains at a natural level so that it can be active only in a subjective sense. What is in his consciousness may not be the right thing to do; but he cannot know this unless he has the advice of reason stored in *hsing* or human nature.

The opposition between these two schools, one holding that *hsing* (human nature) is reason, the other maintaining that *hsin* (mind) is reason, underlies the great controversy in Chinese philosophy corresponding to the conflict between rationalism and empiricism in Western thought.

Lo Ch'in-shun traced back to its origin the distinction between *hsing* and *hsin*, emphasizing that they should not be confused. "*Hsin*," he says, "is the consciousness of man. *Hsing* is the reason of human life. Where *ri* is stored is *hsing*; the intrinsic quality of mind is *hsing*. Let them not be confounded. According to the *Counsels of the Great Yu* in the *Shu-ching* (Book of History), 'The mind of man is adventurous, the mind of *tao* is subtle.' Confucius said in the *Lun-yu*, 'At seventy I could follow the will of my mind without transgressing the right,' and of Yen Hui he said: 'For three months together his mind did not go contrary to the principles of *jen*.' Mencius said: 'The nature of a noble man consists of *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih*, which are rooted in mind.' From this it should be clear how the line of demarcation should be drawn between *hsing* and *hsin*. They are inseparable. At the same time, however, they should not be mixed. When one distinguishes clearly between them one can find the real nature of each. If one confuses mind with *hsing* this will mean that 'a millimeter's difference can lead to a difference of a thousand miles.'"⁶

Lo Ch'in-shun also has something of interest to say about the

difference that separated Buddhists from Confucianists. Both were concerned with questions of mind and nature, but in the end they were divided by an unbridgeable gap. "Sensitiveness, alertness, awareness, and consciousness," he writes, "are the work of mind. Discreetness, subtleness, and singleness are the essence of *hsing*. The first step in their (i.e., Buddhist) teaching is to instruct the people to depart from the phenomenal world and to understand the meaning of emptiness. The next step is to perceive the emptiness of the phenomenal world. The third step is to keep the mind awake to the interchangeability of the phenomenal world and the idea of emptiness. The theory of Buddhism consists exclusively of these three steps. But these are operations of mind only and have nothing to do with *hsing*."⁷

It is clear from this passage that in Lo's interpretation of the two-level theory there is a level called *hsing*, analogous to the forms of thought or the conceptual forms of Western philosophy; and also a level called *hsin* where lies awareness and sensitiveness, considered on a level with sensation.

Lo, like many Chinese philosophers since the revival of Confucianism in the Sung Dynasty, stressed the role of "investigation of things." "According to the Ch'eng school," he wrote, "'investigation of things' should begin with the cultivation of the self. What emerges from self-cultivation will be intimately connected with one's self. This was the remark of Ch'eng I. But Ch'eng I also said: 'There are as many principles which should be studied as there are grasses or trees.' At this time Ch'anism prevailed everywhere. Scholars indulged in theorizing about the clarification of mind and seeing nature, but they forgot the principles of things, so that they were biased in their views. They were blind to the *tao* of Yao and Shun. The Ch'eng brothers were worried about this situation and consequently emphasized the importance of *Ta-hsüeh* and the role of 'investigation of things.' The Ch'eng brothers taught that both the object and the subject, the outside and the inside, should be studied and harmonized. This was their way of counteracting Ch'anism and bringing the world back to the golden mean. This so-called principle of things, which is one and yet manifold in its manifestations, is not artificial. Nor is the reduction from this manifold to primeval unity something which can be manipulated,

Study or investigation should begin with *hsing*, and should extend to the different kinds of things. When self-consistent and complete understanding fails to result then the principle is not a true principle. And again, though the principle should be found to apply to all things—birds, animals, trees, and grass—yet if upon reflection it is discovered not rightly to belong to mind then this principle also cannot be a true principle. A genuine, thoroughgoing principle should include, without conflict between them, both unity of reason and the manifoldness of phenomena. Such would be the climax of the work of ‘investigation of things’ and it is attainable only through cumulative and unremitting effort over a long period.”⁸

Lo Ch'in-shun attached great weight to the philosophical position of Lu Chiu-yuan—an attitude which was at the same time a refutation by proxy, as it were, of Wang Shou-jen. Lo's evaluation of Lu's philosophy is worth quoting: “After reading all of Lu Chiu-yuan's writings I find that his work is mainly concerned with the theory of clarification of mind. Lu tells us that he derived his teaching from Mencius. He himself informs us that apart from the assertion of Mencius that a man should stand firm on the supremacy of the nobler part of his nature, he has nothing to add. However, I must say that there is, nevertheless, a great difference between Lu Chiu-yuan and Mencius. Mencius said: ‘The senses of hearing and seeing have nothing to do with thinking and are obscured by things. When one thing comes into contact with another, the one, as a matter of course, leads the other away. The office of thinking belongs to the mind. By thinking, the mind gets the right view of things. By neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These (the senses and mind) are what heaven has given us. Let a man stand firm on the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him.’ From this passage it is clear that the ‘nobler part’ is the ‘office of thinking.’ But what is ‘thinking’? Through thinking one finds reason in human nature. Mencius recognized the importance of the role of thinking in man, for elsewhere he said: ‘*Jen, i, li, and chih* are not things imparted from the outside. We are born with them. Any view that differs from this results from want of thinking.’”⁹

“The teaching of Lu Chiu-yuan,” continues Lo, “is otherwise.

His doctrine is that if you keep your mind on guard, your reasoning will be clear as a matter of course. The sense of commiseration will come when pity should be expressed. The sense of shame will come when you should feel ashamed. The sense of modesty will come when you feel that you should yield. In Lu's view (that these various senses express themselves as a matter of course whenever occasion demands) it becomes unnecessary for 'thinking' to play a role. But Mencius' doctrine was that the nobler part of one's constitution should be established, that if one tries to learn without 'thinking' one will not be able to grasp the nature of reason; that what ought to be may sometimes be expressed naturally, but only as the outcome of consciousness and sensitiveness of mind, which have nothing to do with the proper mean, the latter being attainable only after reflection, deliberation, weighing, and balancing. Lu Chiu-yuan's Ch'anism consists precisely in his taking consciousness as reason; his formula 'mind is reason' betrays his ignorance of the essence of *hsing*. Because of this ignorance he cannot do otherwise than mistake consciousness for reason, which is what the Ch'anist does. Lu occasionally seems to refute Ch'anism, but in such cases he only camouflages the substance (i.e., his real meaning)."¹⁰

Until now I have been trying to make clear the philosophical position of Lo Ch'in-shun, because a knowledge of his thought is necessary if one is to understand the controversy between him and Wang Shou-jen. Assuming that the reader has acquired this knowledge to some extent, I shall now proceed to the controversy itself. There is no need to translate the letters that Wang sent to Lo, but a translation of a portion of one of them which Lo addressed to Wang will make their differences clear.

"After having read your letter," Lo wrote, "I have received the two books, the old text of the *Ta-hsueh* and *The Definite Views of Chu Hsi in His Later Life*. I am grateful to you for sending them. I was benefited by what you told me in Nanking, but at the same time, my health being poor, I do not feel sufficiently strong to discuss matters fully with you in order to arrive at the truth. For this I am very sorry. Last year somebody brought me a text of your *Instructions and Practices*, which contains all that I had heard previously, and in addition some things which I had not heard. I

am fortunate to receive these books from you, but after much pondering I must admit that I do not know what your basic principle is. Indeed, these doubts, as well as those long standing ones that have never been cleared up, seem now to have increased. I shall write them down in the hope of getting some clarification from you. Surely you will show a tolerant attitude to what I shall do.

"As regards the restoration of the old text of the *Ta-hsueh*, your idea is that the way to find *tao* is to look within the mind and not outside. In your view, the correct interpretation of the words, 'investigation of things,' according to the Ch'eng-Chu school, is to seek what is right outside the mind. For you, the way of thinking of the Ch'eng-Chu school differs from that of the former sages. That is why you do away with the divisions into chapters of the *Ta-hsueh* and why you take out Chu Hsi's supplementary chapter. You characterize Chu Hsi's way of thinking as 'bifurcation' and call it useless. I must confess that you take a very bold step here; you bring to mind that saying of Confucius: 'Let every man consider *jen* as something that devolves upon himself. He may not yield the performance of it even to his teacher.' (That is to say, for any creative act one should make oneself responsible and not refer even to the teacher, who ordinarily would be respected.)

"In my view, the teaching of Confucius centers upon two subjects: literature and character. It is said in the old books: 'Read literature widely!' Yen Hui, in speaking about the excellence of Confucius' method of teaching, said that the master caused him to be widely interested in literature. Is literature something inside or outside? This is easy to know. The theories of Ch'eng and Chu never contradicted the teachings of Confucius.

"According to your view, one should only engage in reflection; one should not seek what is outside. If this were the correct interpretation then the *Ta-hsueh* should have ended with the remark about the rectification of mind and making the will true. Why should it have concerned itself with the 'investigation of things' as a first step?

"However, there *is* such a text in the *Ta-hsueh*, which no one can help but observe. One has to construe it in one's own way, which is to explain 'thing' as an object of consciousness, and to

explain 'investigation' as rectification, namely, *reshaping* what is wrong into what is right. Such an interpretation turns the way from outside to inside. In the case of serving parents, for example, your view is that one should abolish wrong conduct by changing it into right conduct, by bringing it into conformity with heavenly reason. You stand at the stage of the first two steps: rectifying mind and making the will true, but you have not yet reached the further stage of realizing knowledge. Your argument thus seems very much twisted and perverted. If your view is correct, the *Ta-hsueh* should be satisfied with transforming wrong into right. When agreement with heavenly reason has been reached, then the mind should be regarded as rectified and the will as made true. If these aims have been attained, why should the items 'realization of knowledge' and 'investigation of things' still be listed, for they would then seem to be superfluous.

"Great, indeed is *ch'ien* (heaven) to which everything owes its beginning. Fine, indeed, is *k'un* (earth) to which everything owes its growth. My body and thousands of things in the universe derive from *ch'ien* and *k'un*. If there is reason, this reason lies in *ch'ien* and *k'un*. Seen from my standpoint, a thing is merely a thing. But seen from the standpoint of reason, I myself am also an object. I myself and myriads of objects are on the same footing, so there can be no distinction between inside and outside. 'Investigation of things' refers to the finding of unity of reason in the manifoldness of things. When these two aspects of the same question are understood with completeness and consistency, and without anything being omitted, then knowledge has reached its climax: the so-called 'halting-place' of knowing has been reached. Thus, a strong foundation is laid and a great *tao* is found. There is thus a pervading unity from the first step of rectification of mind to the last step of establishing peace in the world. But inasmuch as the accomplishment of different scholars cannot be alike, so the degree to which mind is rectified or is not rectified, whether mind is deep or shallow or proceeds slowly or quickly, must vary. It is the method of teaching in conformity with the precepts of the sages that should remain the same whatever line the mind follows.

"There are many paths to learning. One man boasts of his versatility in knowledge, indulging in the outside but forgetting

the inside. Another, being disgusted with the complicated way and being fond of the simple road, limits himself to the inside and tries to forget the outside. The first step is the school of vulgarity, the second is the school of Ch'anism. The aim of the latter is clarification of mind, seeing nature as emptiness. The result is bifurcation of the heavenly and human, the mental and physical. There is no truth in this bifurcation. If there were any soundness in the findings of the Ch'anists how could they abandon their emperor, their parents, and their wives, thus behaving in a manner contrary to the doctrine of oneness of the whole vast universe? Now in your case you want to put a stop to the school of vulgarity yet you cannot prevent the spread of the Ch'an sect. There will be serious damage to the cause of sagehood and more confusion among scholars. This should be carefully considered."¹¹

The rest of this letter of Lo Ch'in-shun, dealing with Wang Shou-jen's book, *The Definite Views of Chu Hsi in His Later Life*, has been summarized in my chapter about Wang, and need not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that at the close of the letter, where he ascertained the dates of Chu Hsi's writings, Lo gives evidence of much careful research into the texts of the great Sung philosopher.

Lo Ch'in-shun's second letter to Wang contains discussions of fundamental philosophical problems. "I know," he wrote, "that according to your view things are objects of consciousness towards which volition is directed. 'Investigation' is rectification whereby a change from wrong to right is effected. In another of your letters you said: 'Investigation of things' means investigation of objects in your mind, investigation of objects of your will, investigation of objects of which you are conscious in your acts of knowing. 'Rectification of mind' means rectification of the mind in which objects of consciousness exist. 'Making true the will' means making true the will in its being directed to ends. 'Realization of knowledge' means actualization of the knowledge of things. Such views have not been heard since they appeared in the *Ta-hsueh*. Here something original has come from you which it is hard for me to understand. But since you advise it I shall ponder it without fail. You often repeat expressions like these: 'investigation of a thing as an object of mind,' 'investigation of a thing as an object at which

volition is directed,' 'investigation of a thing as an object of which you are aware in an act of knowledge'—and thus you have led us to understand that there are three entities according as they are related to mind, volition, or cognition respectively. But again you have expressions like these: 'rectifying the mind in which a thing is thought of as an object,' 'making true the will which is directed to a thing,' and 'realizing knowledge in which a thing exists in consciousness.' These three expressions lead one to suppose that the three entities to which you refer are really one and the same thing. In the former case the interpretation that Ch'eng I gave to 'investigation of things' is applicable and its meaning is intelligible. But your interpretation, if you understand by 'investigation of things' change from wrong to right, is hard to apply and incomprehensible. Then, in regard to your 'one and the same thing,' your interpretation that a thing is that to which volition is directed is the product of a clever manipulation and is scarcely intelligible to me. This is the first point which I doubt.

"In remarking 'When will is directed to the service of parents, service to parents is a thing. When will is directed to loyalty to an emperor, loyalty to an emperor is a thing,' your interpretation is plausible. There are other cases, however, such as the sigh of Confucius on the river bank (standing there the master observed: 'It passes on just like this, not ceasing day or night.'), the flight of the hawk to heaven, and the leaping of the fishes in the deep, as reported in the *Chung-yung*. These are vital for an ethical interpretation of human life, and must be thoroughly grasped by pupils if they are to be regarded as having real scholarship. But if in your sense the will is directed to the flowing of the stream, the flight of the hawk, or the leaping of the fishes, how is your rule of changing the wrong into the right to be applied? This is the second point of my doubt.

"Again, in a letter to a friend you wrote: 'The *liang-chih* of one's mind is heavenly reason. Realization of heavenly reason in the *liang-chih* of one's mind will bring all things and all affairs along the right path. To elicit *liang-chih* is realization of knowledge. To conduct things and affairs along the right path is investigation of things.

"In your view the *Ta-hsueh* should be rewritten in the follow-

ing way: 'Investigation of things lies in realization of knowledge,' not in the reverse way: 'Realization of knowledge lies in investigation of things.' The other sentence of the text, 'When things have been investigated knowledge is attained,' should be changed to 'When knowledge has been attained things are investigated.' Your remark, 'by realizing *liang-chih* to discover carefully where heavenly reason is,' indicates that heavenly reason and *liang-chih* are two things, not one. The word 'discover' or 'realize' also tells us that there is priority between the two entities. This is the third point of my doubt."¹²

Lo Ch'in-shun's criticism of Wang Shou-jen is attributable to the freshness and strangeness of the latter's theory. Wang's reduction of mind, willing, and knowing to a common denominator; and his discovery that a thing is an object of consciousness or the terminus of a volition constitute a new theory which Lo found hard to understand. As a follower of the old text and the old interpretation he naturally was opposed to the innovation.

Lo's criticism, however, had its value. It lay in his perception that Wang's advocacy of inner reflection and mental clarification would lead his pupils along the road of Ch'anism. Though this conclusion does not apply to Wang himself, who, as a great statesman, cared for purity of mind in order to be ready for action, it does apply to many of Wang's students, who after their master's death fell into Ch'anism and discredited the philosophy of their gifted teacher. In short, Lo's prediction of the situation that would arise was substantially correct.

In concluding this section on Lo Ch'in-shun I would state that he was the first Chinese philosopher to write at length about Buddhism. He quoted from the sutras and refuted them. Most Chinese philosophers did not include quotations from Buddhist sutras in their writings because they feared that others might criticize them as being influenced by them. Lo did so openly, but accompanied his quotations by refutations.

I come now to the second of Wang Shou-jen's critical contemporaries, Chan Jo-shui, who like Lo Ch'in-shun disagreed and argued with this greatest of the Ming thinkers. Chan's dispute was unlike that of Lo; for while the latter was a member of the Ch'eng-Chu school, the former resembled the Ming scholar-speculative in

his thinking and possessing his own formula. Lo differed from Wang openly, whereas Chan held that his formula "contemplation of heavenly reason" was the same as Wang's "realization of *liang-chih*" and that the disagreement between them lay only in their interpretation of "investigation of things."

Let us first take up Chan's life, then his philosophical position. Born in the second year of Hsien-tsung, sixth emperor of the Ming Dynasty (A.D. 1466), he received his *chü-jen* degree at the age of twenty-six. Then, after burning his diploma in order to prove his determination to study the doctrine of sagehood, he became a pupil of Ch'en Hsien-chang (1428-1500), who admired him greatly and considered him worthy to become his intellectual heir.

Ch'en wrote the following poem for his disciple:

"Though emperors, kings and warlords have gone and are extinct,
Songs about wind, flowers, the snow, and the moon never end.
Do not suppose that the golden needle (secrets of the teacher)
is withheld from you.

The fishing-station of Chiang-men (Ch'en Hsien-chang's native town) is full of moonlight."¹⁸

This verse was the signal of his presenting the philosopher's stone to Chan. After Ch'en's death the disciple lived near his master's tomb for three years, giving ample testimony of his love for and faithfulness to him. But after Ch'en's death Chan's mother insisted that he take the state examination. Two of the examiners, when they read his paper, exclaimed: "This must have been written by a pupil of Ch'en Hsien-chang!" He was second on the list of candidates and was appointed a member of the Hanlin Academy.

At that time Wang Shou-jen was working in the Ministry of Civil Service in Peking and he and Chan were on good terms. The latter was appointed an examiner and editor of the Imperial Record. He was also sent once to Annam to deliver a "certificate of kingship" to the ruler of that country.

When Chan's mother died in Peking he took her coffin back to his native place and mourned for her in accordance with Chinese custom.

After the accession to the throne of Shih-tsung, ninth emperor of the Ming Dynasty, Chan Jo-shui submitted memorials request-

ing his majesty to attend lectures on the principles of sagehood. Whereupon he was appointed Dean of the National Academy in Nanking.


Chan wrote a book entitled *A Comprehensive Study of 'Investigation of Things' for the Use of Emperors*. He served as secretary of three ministries, viz., Civil Service, Ceremonies, and Defense. In his seventy-fourth year (1540), while secretary of the last mentioned ministry, he resigned and returned home. In his ninetieth year he wrote an essay *The Nature of Government* to warn the emperor against waging war with the Annamese, who had rebelled. Also in his ninetieth year he journeyed to Nan-yao, the highest mountain in Hunan Province. He died in his ninety-fifth year (1560).

Let us now consider Chan's philosophy. His basic idea, "contemplation of heavenly reason," may be best understood from an analytical summary of his doctrine. (1) Like Lo Ch'in-shun he believed that the universe is constituted of the primordial factor *ch'i*. (2) For him mind is coterminous with the cosmos. It reaches everywhere, hence there is no borderline between what is within and what is without. (3) One's moral duty is to find the proper mean, or heavenly reason, which is discoverable whether one is in a state of tranquillity or in action.

The core of Chan's theory is expressed in his Diagram of Nature and Mind. Of this diagram he gives the following exposition: "Nature or essence is what is common to the manifold things in the universe. The world of time and space as a whole is constituted by *ch'i*. The function of mind is to contemplate the order of things in the universe without omitting any item.

"Human nature or human essence is the *form* of thought. Human nature and mind cannot be considered as separate from one another. Human nature is like a grain which before its budding contains an innate quality which is invisible. When the seed bursts, it is like a man who suddenly has his senses opened, i.e., his senses of pity, shame, modesty, and right and wrong. Hence the virtues of *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih* are named and differentiated. These are called the four beginnings, because they are the initial expressions of conscience. Concentration of mind in the initial stage is watchfulness and devotion in times of solitariness in order to make certain

CHAN JO-SHUI'S DIAGRAM OF NATURE AND MIND



that the proper mean is preserved in the mind. When the proper mean is established one can develop harmony with the outside world. Diversification and varieties are produced. This means that a happy order will prevail in the universe and that all things will be nourished and flourish. With happy order and prosperity the whole reaches its full development. Concentration of mind in the final stage is a continuation of the initial stage.

"Why are there small circles within the large one? These are a symbol of the penetration of mind everywhere. Why is there a large

circle? This means that mind included everything in the world. Inclusion and penetration, however, are not two things. Mind contains the whole of the universe, yet it also goes through it. The within and the without are inseparable. The universe knows no difference between within and without. The same is true of mind, which knows no difference between within and without. Herein we attain the limit, which is ineffable. The view that mind is inside and that the universe is outside underrates the function of mind.”¹⁴

Despite his being a pupil of Ch'en Hsien-chang, who advocated union with nature, Chan Jo-shui adopted many principles of the Sung philosophers, such as *ch'i* being the primordial factor of the world, the unity of reason and the manifoldness of things, action rather than serenity as the approach to *tao*, and the two wheels of spiritual nursing and advancement of learning. This common background of Chan and the Sung philosophers indicates that the former belonged on the side of the Ch'eng-Chu school, though his concept “contemplation of heavenly reason” echoes the other Ming thinkers. Yet Chan Jo-shui declared that his concept had the same meaning as Wang Shou-jen's “realization of *liang-chih*.” If we consider Chan from the point of view of his attitude towards the principles of Sung philosophy, we find that there is a world of difference between him and his contemporary.

Nonetheless, Chan seems in many respects to be in agreement with Wang. This is seen in his restoration of the old texts of the *Ta-hsueh* and in his interpretation of the compound-term “investigation of things” as meaning to reach *tao*. But despite appearances, agreement between these two philosophers is only superficial. The inner significance of Wang's thought, i.e., the merging of mind and things into one, was as little understood by Chan Jo-shui as by Lo Ch'in-shun.

With these considerations in our mind as being the reason why our two philosophers were unable to agree, let us pass on to the debate between them. There was much correspondence, but I shall translate only the first part of one letter, in which Chan explains to Wang his meaning of the celebrated words: “investigation of things.”

“I have received,” writes Chan, “two letters from you in which you set forth the significance of the expression ‘investigation of

things.' But I have many doubts. I find it hard to decide whether to argue or not to argue. If one has doubts, then not to argue is not to do right. On the other hand, to argue is to waste one's energy. After careful thought I came to the conclusion that not to argue is really not the way to make *tao* clear to the people. Mr. Wang I-hsueh has told me that it is my responsibility to search for right principles. Mr. Fang So-hsien has told me that no person but myself can argue with you. However, I fear that since you are fond of those who agree with you, and dislike those who differ with you, you may be one of those who are given to self-assertion only, and studiously neglect the views of an opponent. Yet I am persuaded that you are not a self-glorifying man. Hence I have decided to argue with you, even if I run the risk of displeasing you.

"Following are four points on which I cannot agree with your interpretation of 'investigation of things.' (1) The main objective of the former sages was to find out where heavenly reason is. This goal is attainable only in the life of knowing and doing. But according to you 'investigation' means rectification, and 'thing' means an object to which volition is directed. Elsewhere in the *Ta-hsueh* the compound-term 'to make the will true' expresses what should be done with the object to which volition is directed, and in this same book the compound-term 'rectification of mind' occurs. In your interpretation, the meaning of 'investigation of things' as putting things right is merely a repetition of the meaning of two other expressions which signify precisely what you say is the meaning of 'investigation of things.' This is the first point of my disagreement.

"(2) Your interpretation omits all mention of the former section (Chapter I of the *Ta-hsueh*) where it is said that when the point of rest is known, attainment of the desired end is possible. Again, in your interpretation there can be no clarification of the connection between personal cultivation and 'investigation of things.' This is the second point of my disagreement.

"(3) The meaning which your interpretation gives to the words 'investigation of things' is, in your subjective sense, changing from wrong to right. Now may I ask, what is the criterion of wrong and right? According to the Buddhistic theory of the void, mind should work with complete detachment. Also the Buddhists ignore all

efforts to discriminate between different kinds of phenomena and seek to eliminate the roots of desire. They believe that their view is the correct one. The same may be said of the schools of Yang Chu and Mo Ti, who considered their views correct. The confused thought of the Buddhists, of Yang Chu, and of Mo Ti is and was the result of lack of thorough understanding or 'investigation.' Such is the reason for their mistaking erroneous opinions for truth . . . Thus, your interpretation in terms of changing from wrong to right, in your subjective sense, is untrustworthy. This is my third point of disagreement with you.

"(4) The earliest person to mention the importance of learning and study was Fu Yueh. In the chapter "Yueh-ming" of the *Shu-ching* (Book of History) it is said: 'One will be benefited when one studies the instructions of the early days.' In the *Book of Chou* there is the following remark: 'After one reads the ancients one may serve in the government.' In *The Instruction from Shun to Yu* it is said: 'Be profound and be single.' Yen Hui was advised by Confucius to 'Read literature widely and restrain yourself by the principle of *li*.' Also Confucius told the Duke of Ai, 'Study widely, think carefully, analyse thoroughly, and put into practice earnestly.' These words of the master mean that knowing and doing should parallel each other. If your doctrine about having right volition is correct, Confucius should have confined his teaching to improving virtue and need not have mentioned advancement of learning. He should also have been satisfied with saying that tacit understanding is important without going on to assert that scholarship is necessary and that inclination towards the classics and the spirit of research are commendable. Tzu-ssu, the grandson of Confucius, should have taught that only the supremacy of virtue need be taken care of, without mentioning the work of knowledge-seeking. Reading, learning, inclination, and research all mean that knowledge should be sought. This is the fourth point of my disagreement with you."¹⁵

This fourth point shows clearly that Chan Jo-shui, although a Ming scholar and a pupil of Ch'en Hsien-chang, followed in the footsteps of Chu Hsi. His thought, "contemplation of heavenly reason," sounds idealistic, but his bifurcation of mind and things

is so deep-rooted that it is impossible for him to view the world monistically.

In his *Diagram of Nature and Mind* his comment that mind knows no difference between inside and outside does not imply that he recognized the unity of these two aspects. It means only that one should take equal care of both sides. In other words, it was impossible for Chan to have a monistic conception of the world like that of Wang Shou-jen.

In spite of Chan Jo-shui's four points of disagreement, which indicate the radical difference between him and his great contemporary, the former repeated many times that his theory "contemplation of heavenly reason" was the same as Wang's "realization of *liang-chih*."

In this connection some conversations between Chan and his pupils are instructive. A pupil once remarked: "Everybody has a sense of right and wrong. This is *liang-chih*, this is 'heavenly reason.' Even a robber, if somebody calls him a robber, will become angry. An official who takes a bribe fears that his criminal act will be divulged, or if someone compliments him on integrity he will feel inwardly ashamed. This shows that his sense of right and wrong was never beclouded by his selfish motives. It also reveals that the mind which knows heavenly reason can never be spoiled. A man interested in inquiring into *tao* should conduct himself according to the sense of right and wrong and should develop this sense to the utmost. This is 'realization of *liang-chih*.' This is 'contemplation of heavenly reason.'" ¹⁶ Chan Jo-shui expressed agreement.

Another pupil asked, "What is 'realization of *liang-chih*'?" And he offered this suggestion: "Probably *liang-chih* is the intrinsic nature of knowing, is 'heavenly reason.' *Liang-chih* is not knowing at the natural level." Whereupon Chan Jo-shui continued: "Knowledge of what is right and proper is the essential quality of 'heavenly reason.' It is called *liang-chih* (intuitive knowledge) because it occurs in the child's love and respect for its parents and elder brothers [The *Meng-tzu* (Book of Mencius), Book VII, Part I, chapter 15]. It is not knowledge at the level of sensation." ¹⁷

In an essay which Chan wrote as a farewell address for Ch'ien

Te-hung, a serious pupil of Wang Shou-jen, Chan said: "Yang-ming [Wang Shou-jen] teaches *liang-chih*. If you have studied under him why should you ask advice from me when I advocate heavenly reason as my teaching? I should like to raise the question: Can there be two kinds of knowing? Can there be two heavens? Can there be two kinds of heavenly reason? If there were two heavens, there could be two kinds of reason. If there were two kinds of reason, there could be two kinds of knowing. When nothing of man-made work is involved, the resultant knowledge is called 'intuitive.' When no human work at all is involved it is called 'heavenly.' Therefore, *liang-chih* is heavenly reason. According to Mencius, the same may be said of the love of children towards their parents . . . *Liang-chih* must seek heavenly reason. Heavenly reason can only be found out by *liang-chih*. One without the other is inoperative. If *liang-chih* is based upon heavenly reason it is not mere knowing. If heavenly reason is based upon *liang-chih* it cannot be discovered on the outside. Since it is no mere knowing and since it cannot be discovered without, it is the work of mind and of the reason of heaven."¹⁸ Chan Jo-shui concluded his essay with the comment that mind, reason, and heaven are one.

This farewell address sounds as if it had been composed by Wang Shou-jen himself. However, Chan Jo-shui's theory of unity is a disguise. His words, "Mind knows no difference between inside and outside," mean, as has already been explained, that one should neglect neither aspect. Chan really belonged to the Ch'eng-Chu school of knowledge-seeking and was fundamentally opposed to Wang's monism.

Chan worked further in this direction by emulating Lo Ch'in-shun in the attempt to refute Buddhism and the teaching of Lao-tzu. Lo was strong in his opposition to Buddhism and in particular to Ch'anism, while Chan Jo-shui was opposed to both Lao-tzu and Ch'anism. Indeed, the latter wrote an essay against the *Tao-te-ching*, and from this polemical work I shall quote a few lines:

"Hsiao Shih-chung said: 'Mencius tried to refute Yang Chu and Mo Ti.' But then asked Hsiao: 'Why did Mencius not refer to Lao-tzu in his book?' Chan Jo-shui answered: 'Mencius' failure to refer to Lao-tzu was because Lao-tzu's book, at that time, had not yet been forged.'

"According to Ho Kun: 'Lao-tzu said:

Nature is unkind.

She treats creatures like sacrificial dogs.

The sage is unkind.

He treats people like sacrificial dogs.

Now if this word "unkind" is really applicable to nature and the sage then the situation is horrible indeed! Whereupon Chan Jo-shui explained: 'The sage shows his affection to his parents, his *jen* to fellow countrymen, and lastly his love to creatures, because he has the sense of commiseration. Lao-tzu's teaching, affection towards parents, human-heartedness towards one's fellow countrymen, and love towards creatures are all considered essentially the same as killing sacrificial dogs. For Lao-tzu these sentiments are without moral value. They are merely means for the attainment of certain ends. Lao-tzu was cynical and merciless. How can an ethical sense be built upon such a foundation?'¹⁹

"Someone commented:

'It is written in the *Tao-te-ching*:

Though there be boats and carriages,

None be there to ride them.

Though there be armor and weapons,

There be no occasion to display them.

Let the people again tie rope for reckoning.

Does this mean, inquired the quoter from the *Tao-te-ching*, that Lao-tzu would have us return to the primitive life? Chan Jo-shui answered: 'A person living to-day who longs to go back to the primitive period; who, unhappy with written words and numbers, wishes to reckon by tying knots in ropes, teaches a doctrine which does not recognize the progress made in human history. He fails to work in accordance with time. His efforts are contrary to the natural order.'"²⁰

Like Lo Ch'in-shun, Chan Jo-shui was alive to the evil effects which the Ch'an sect exerted on the Neo-Confucianist school. Both attacked Lu Chiu-yuan though they differed slightly in their strategy. Lo plainly dubbed Lu a Ch'anist while Chan avoided labelling him anything and, instead, came to grips with his young disciple,

Yang Chien. Here are a few excerpts from Chan's polemical work *Correction of the Philosopher Yang*:

"The key," wrote our critic, "to Yang Chien's philosophy is his remark: 'Sagehood lies in consciousness [which, from the point of view of the Ch'eng-Chu school, occupies the natural level]. This is heterodox and has nothing to do with Confucianism. Yang Chien also said that volition ought not to be [Yang's teaching was that volition is the cause of mental obscurity], and this doctrine he derived from the Buddhist dogma of annihilation of will.'" Quoting the words of Yu to Shun, "Be calm at the place where you can stop," Yang Chien explained them as recommendations of thoughtlessness and willlessness; and Chan Jo-shui, in turn, charged Yang with borrowing this interpretation from the Buddhist idea of *Samdhi*. Again, Yang quoted a text from the *I-ching*: "What need has nature of thought and deliberation?"²¹ Chan attacked him even for making this quotation, since, alleged the critic, his only purpose is to read into the Confucianist books the Buddhist notions of annihilation of will and non-discrimination.

Chan Jo-shui outlived Wang Shou-jen by twenty-two years. He must have had opportunity to observe at first hand the effects of the teachings of the school of Wang Ch'i, whom he survived by more than two decades, and of the teachings of the school of Wang Ken, whom he outlived by a score of years. Chan's motives in attacking Yang Chien were the same as those of Lo Ch'in-shun in his opposition to Lu Chiu-yuan, that is, the lack of discipline of both schools was attributed to Ch'anism. Why the efforts of the champions did not succeed in saving the spiritual descendants of Wang Shou-jen from deterioration will be explained in the coming chapter.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Conflicts Within the School of Wang Shou-Jen

It is hard to find a parallel in Chinese history to the powerful domination which Wang Shou-jen's school of philosophy wielded throughout China. It built up a great system of thought which attracted and strongly appealed to the people. But there were other reasons for its strength besides its sheer philosophical merit. Wang Shou-jen's life and military achievements, for example, made him a hero whom the people loved to follow.

According to Huang Tsung-hsi's *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*, Wang's adherents were spread through various provinces. They may be divided into eight geographical sections: (1) The Chekiang group, (2) the Kiangsi group, (3) the Kiangsu and Anhwei group, (4) the Hupeh and Hunan group, (5) the north China group, (6) the Kwangtung and Fukien group, (7) the group of Li Ts'ai who rebelled, and (8) the T'ai-chou group, the leader of which was Wang Ken.

Except for the philosophical rebel, Li Ts'ai, all of these groups followed the banner of *liang-chih*, but each interpreted it in its own way—just as in Germany New Kantianism, though it carried one name, was divided into the Marburg school, the Southwest school, et al. Why should there have been such differences between the interpretations of the various branches of the school of Wang Shou-jen? For an answer we may turn again to our much quoted *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*. Huang Tsung-hsi explains it this way: "The master was no doubt an extraordinary man. His awakening in the night at Lung-ch'ang was truly a revelation. He said that his doctrine was confirmed by the Five Classics. Certainly his way led to sagehood. However, he was

too much in a hurry to spread his teaching, so he was not sufficiently weighty in divulging its most profound and speculative part to his pupils. This made them skip over certain essential and required steps and talk too far away from the mark. Had the master's life been longer, he might have become more mellow and brought his speculation to a firm and tangible basis. He might have written his own *Definite Views in Later Life*. [An allusion to a work which Wang attributed to Chu Hsi]. Then he might have been a perfect sage and brought Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yuan to their proper positions. On his deathbed he complained that he had only explored a small corner of the philosophical world. He said he was sorry he could not bring his studies with his pupils to their final stage."¹

As the reader can readily see, these remarks of Huang Tsung-hsi are an attempt to explain why the school of Wang Shou-jen split up after his death. But the author of the *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars* has something even more important to say on the matter. "The theory of the realization of *liang-chih*," he comments, "was formulated in his [Wang Shou-jen's] last years. There was no time for him to make a profound study of this doctrine with his pupils. Thus, each pupil later on interpreted it in his own way and in the light of his own subjective views. The students discussed it in as speculative a manner as one might at a gaming table. The result was that these discussions had little to do with Wang Shou-jen's original ideas or with his original intentions."²

Just how varied these students' interpretations were of Wang Shou-jen's theory of *liang-chih* may be seen from an essay by Wang Ch'i who wrote, "The idea *liang-chih*, was followed by every one of us. Who dared depart from it? However, we have unavoidably allowed our personal opinions to play on it. Some of us say '*Liang-chih* should remain in a state of utter calmness, neither shining with its light nor displaying it. Like a mirror, it is itself brightness which remains quiet, and when things are brought in front of it, it simply reflects their beauty or ugliness. If a mirror were busy emitting light, it would become clouded.' There are others among us who say: 'There is no ready made *liang-chih*, but only a *liang-chih* which needs cultivation, as gold ore in the mine needs melting,

purifying, and beating before the gold can show its lustre. Still others say: '*Liang-chih* starts only with operation. It cannot be found prior to activity. It has nothing to do with a so-called stage of pre-activity.' Some of us even say: '*Liang-chih* is in its essence desireless. If it does its work according to its nature it will agree with *tao*, and will not have to eliminate desire.' Another group says: 'The knowledge of *tao* is divided into two parts. There is (1) the part of essence, which is to perfect one's nature; there is (2) the part of operation, which is to put it into practice. Thus *liang-chih* has its essence and its operation.' Finally, there are those among us who say: 'The steps of learning must follow a natural order. The way to seek it is to begin with the root and to end with the branch. Once knowledge is acquired there will be no difference between internal and external. But realization of knowledge has a beginning and an end.' Such are the different shades of meaning under which *liang-chih* has been understood, thereby providing a basis for classification."³

After giving this list of interpretations of *liang-chih*, Wang Ch'i proceeds to expound his own view. Since this view throws much light on the problem as a whole it is worth quoting. "Calmness," he writes, "is the essential nature of mind. Its calmness lies in its light-giving service. If one keeps one's knowledge to one's self and neglects to give light, the knowledge will lose its use."⁴ In this passage Wang Ch'i means to express the idea that besides the static aspect of calmness there is a dynamic aspect, which also should be cultivated. He goes on to say: "The sense of pity is aroused when one sees a child falling into a well. The instinct of shame appears when one gives food to a beggar and at the same time yells at him to get out of the way. The mind of *jen* and *i* is sufficient unto itself so that it is responsive without learning. That *liang-chih* should be cultivated is a notion which arises from ignorance of its nature.

"*Liang-chih* is the proper mean at its stage of pre-activity. It appears as if it knew nothing. But it knows everything. If one seeks *liang-chih* in its stage of pre-activity, one will acquire an empty and too speculative idea of it. The teaching of the olden days aimed at prevention of desire. The way to achieve this state is to go back to the essential nature of desirelessness. It does not need

a later or supplementary development. Essence is the reality of operation; operation is the use of essence. These two are mutually inseparable. To seek is the cause of acquiring. Acquisition is proof of seeking. These are closely related and should not be split apart, else there will be bifurcation and a lack of unity.”⁵

It should now be clear that there are infinite possibilities in the interpretation of Wang Shou-jen's leading idea of *liang-chih*. The reader will also begin to understand why the master's teaching after his death became unrecognizably distorted by internal divergencies.

With these preliminary observations we are ready to study Huang Tsung-hsi's eight sections or branches of Wang Shou-jen's school, in each of which we shall meet one or more leading thinkers who are worth knowing as illustrations of how Wang's doctrine was developed and reinterpreted.

We come first to the Chekiang school, flourishing in the province where the master was born. In the earliest period, Wang's followers were fellow provincials. Three of them deserve mention. There was Hsu Ai, who married Wang Shou-jen's sister, and who was the first to put his master's words into book form, under the title *Instructions and Practices*. The master mourned Hsu Ai's premature death deeply. He was to Wang Shou-jen what Yen Hui was to Confucius. The student followed his teacher's instructions and practices so closely that one can find nothing peculiar to the student.

Another of Wang Shou-jen's disciples deserving of mention was Ch'ien Te-hung, a moderate man who kept to the middle of the road. But the road he trod was that of his teacher, and he never deviated from it. "The teaching of the master," said Ch'ien, "about making will true or real, is the key to the *Ta-hsueh*. 'Realization of knowledge' and 'investigation of things' are the ways by which the goal of making will true may be made attainable. After the pupils heard these words they knew the course to pursue in order to achieve this end. Advanced pupils made a survey of the nature of *liang-chih* and found that the stage at which heavenly order is conformed to is also the stage at which no beclouding occurs and at which responses are made to all sorts of stimulations, yet without one's nature losing its native calmness. This stage marks the utmost limit to which the making true or real of the will can be carried.

"After the death of our master, some of my fellow provincials complained that as long as discrimination between good and evil ceaselessly continues, *liang-chih* remains within the realm of phenomena only. These critics went further and stressed the essence or reality of *liang-chih*. They held that making will true or real is not the way which leads to the understanding of *tao*; but that there must be a kind of sudden awakening or enlightenment, and that at this moment will becomes eliminated. They held likewise that 'investigation of things' is not the correct approach to *tao*, but that if one returns to calmness, 'things' will automatically disappear. They demanded an awakening which was irrelevant to the normal order of human life, and they asked for a calmness which made impossible any chance of being alert or vivid. They became too speculative and exceeded the limit. They went the wrong way, and in so doing their procedure became contrary to common sense, to simple method, and to the solid understanding of our master."⁶

Ch'ien Te-hung had more to say in opposition to the theory of "beyond good and evil." From his master, Wang Shou-jen, he quoted the following words: "The utmost in making the will true or real is to reach the highest good."⁷ Ch'ien interpreted this passage to mean that the highest good is based upon making the will true. He never theorized after the manner of Wang Ch'i that the real *summum bonum* of the philosopher is "beyond good and evil."

This third member of the school of Chekiang, Wang Ch'i, had a contrary point of view which may be of interest. This thinker, in his preface to the *Collected Works of Wang Shou-jen*, said that *tao* lies not in what is expressed, but in what is inexpressible. "*Tao*," wrote Wang Ch'i, "can be transmitted only in what is written. Confucius warned us that heaven is speechless. Language is only a very imperfect means of expression. What is couched in the written word for purposes of transmission gives only a low level of understanding. Language is to a scholar what a candle is to one walking in the dark, or a cane to a cripple. What is written has meaning enough, and in this way it stimulates one, gives one something to depend upon. But the key [to this meaning] lies in awakening and enlightenment. If one clings to the letter and pos-

sesses no power of understanding, study is useless. Our master, Yang-ming [Wang Shou-jen], in his advocacy of the science of sagehood, coined the term *liang-chih* and the whole world followed him. But this phrase is a means merely of expression, and as such remains at a low level. When we pupils first began the study of the teaching of the master, I doubt that we felt its importance. Later, when we were on our way to an understanding of the doctrine, I doubt that we knew how to make it a part of our being. Finally when we felt that we had really understood it, I doubt that we did things quite in accordance with its real spirit. True understanding is not something gained from books. It comes from mind, and what is grasped by mind is over and beyond mere language. Language is a candle illuminating the way, or a cane to aid in walking. Whether these are helpful in seeing or locomotion is knowable only by our eyes and feet. Familiar and intimate correspondence with *tao* is possible only through perfect understanding, which is speechless, and which is truth at a high level.”⁸

From these words we may draw the conclusion that Wang Ch’i was speaking in terms of Ch’anism. For Bodhidharma spoke in the same vein. “This is the transmission,” so said the founder of the Ch’an sect of Buddhism, “of an extraordinary message, which does not depend upon language. It has a direct appeal to the mind.” Though Wang Ch’i’s words were expressed with relation to *liang-chih*, I am certain that Ch’ien Te-hung could not have agreed with him. This only goes to show how deep was the split, even among the colleagues of the same school of Chekiang.

We come now to the second branch of Wang Shou-jen’s school, the Kiangsi branch. According to Huang Tsung-hsi, in his *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*, “The school of Kiangsi is the only one which has inherited the true idea of Wang Shou-jen’s philosophy. Tsou Shou-i, Nieh Pao, and Lo Hung-hsien were the leading men of this group. They expounded unfinished ideas of Wang Shou-jen in an elaborate way. Theirs was the only school which could oppose and refute the Chekiang branch whose discussions were wide from the mark of Wang Shou-jen’s teaching even though his words were always on their lips. The Kiangsi school kept the master’s truth intact. Part of the reason

for this may be that Wang Shou-jen spent most of his life in Kiangsi, and that he was compensated according to the principle of action and reaction.”⁹

I shall present in turn each of these three men of the Kiangsi school; but first I must discuss one concept peculiarly characteristic of Chinese philosophy, i.e., *liang-chih* as the standard of right and wrong, a concept which is similar to Kant's Categorical Imperative. This Chinese idea seems to be definite and clear. The important question is how to find *liang-chih*? Is it ready made? Does it require training and cultivation? Should it be under self-control? Can it be found in the state of naturalness? It is quite usual for the Ming philosophers to consider *liang-chih* under two aspects: (a) *liang-chih* by itself, or as essence; (b) *liang-chih* as operational, or as working phenomenon. Then there is another important question: Should *liang-chih* be kept in calmness, under control, as it were, so that it may serve as the criterion of right and wrong; or should it be left unbridled, in the state of naturalness? A term which often occurs in connection with the exposition of the ethical standard is *chung* (the proper mean), and this refers to the absolute criterion as pre-active, or as in a state of pre-activity. After exercise has brought this standard up to the point of being the criterion of right and wrong, it is called “harmoniousness.” *Chung* and “harmoniousness” appear very often, as has just been mentioned, in the Chinese discussion of the moral standard.

All these questions which we, following the Chinese philosophers of the Ming Dynasty, are asking, intimate that *liang-chih* is like mercury, vivacious, sprightly, and uncertain. As a moral standard, it is not easy to grasp; and even supposing that it can be grasped, it is impossible to show it to others. Its essence may be said to be pure, impartial, bright, and just. The concept of *liang-chih* is of that extraordinarily complex type which throws it both into the category of the mental state, belonging to the descriptive science of psychology, and into the category of the norm, belonging to the normative science of ethics. It is intimately connected with the problem of the methodology of cultivation as opposed to naturalness. It is like life itself, which may be considered either as static or as something which changes or flows on forever.

With this brief digression into the nature of *liang-chih*, I return to the philosophical views of the four leading thinkers of the Kiangsi branch, in so far as their teachings remain within the limits of the internal controversy of the school of Wang Shou-jen.

We come now to Tsou Shou-i, who was a Hanlin scholar and dean of the academy. He once visited Wang Shou-jen to ask him to compose an epitaph for his father's tombstone. In the beginning he was not interested in Wang as a teacher of philosophy, but after hearing him discuss deep problems with his disciples, he developed an enthusiasm for his philosophy. It was Tsou Shou-i who, according to Huang Tsung-hsi, transmitted the real message of the master.

Tsou was one of the Kiangsi school who travelled the middle of the road; he neither attacked the Chekiang group nor went along with it. About this rival branch he wrote: "This school went too far afield in its speculation. I was much astonished by its view about reaching a stage beyond the means of expression, and about annihilating the will. However, after talking with Ch'ien Te-hung and Wang Ch'i, I found that they had gradually become more moderate and solid. Indeed, I was benefited by the brilliance and enlightenment of their discourse. To work unceasingly for attainment of truth is the way to the realization of *liang-chih*. To curb anger, to control desire, to correct error, and to turn to the right are the ways of approach to the realization of *liang-chih*. If such disciplinary work is considered unnecessary, the advice that will should be made true, so that it becomes as certain as one's love of beauty or hatred of foul smell, will be utterly valueless, even though one may repeat one's efforts a hundred or a thousand times. For a mighty river to emerge from a natural source is the inherent quality of water. The water may be hindered or obstructed, or directed through canals or pipes. But though man's labor is thus applied, the inherent quality of water is not changed; it is neither increased nor decreased. Therefore, it is said that water continues to run its course as if nothing had ever been done to it. If anger or desire are aroused, one does not try to stop them, but one merely clings to the confidence that *liang-chih* will function just the same, without being injured, in spite of the emotion. The situation is analogous to that of a flood when the water is not checked or

channelled; one still has the hope, nonetheless, that it will reach the ocean. But if, on the other hand, one tries to remedy human nature by imposing control on it, forgetting at the same time that human nature has its own quality which can neither be increased nor decreased by human effort, then one's attitude does not conform to the 'as if nothing had ever happened' point of view."¹⁰

This passage is from a letter of Tsou to Nieh Pao. It indicates that he was not opposed to discipline, but that at the same time he was well aware of the way of essence, according to which human nature should be "nursed," "as if nothing had ever happened to it."

So much for Tsou Shou-i. We come next to Nieh Pao, the second of the four leading philosophers of the Kiangsi branch of Wang Shou-jen's spiritual descendants. A *chin-shih* of 1517, Nieh was appointed a censor, but after impeaching a powerful eunuch he became prefect of Soo-chow. In 1526 he corresponded with the master himself, and his devotion was so deep that he became his posthumous pupil, by bowing ceremoniously before his portrait in the presence of another of Wang's disciples, Ch'ien Te-hung, as witness.

Nieh Pao believed that in order to have *liang-chih* work in the right way, one must keep it under control—a process which he called "returning to calmness." "Mind," he wrote in a letter to Tsou Shou-i, "can be calm at any time, and also responsive at any time. This is the nature of mind. Though at the moment of stimulation it must respond, it should also remain calm, for this is the way of self-discipline. Mind knows no distinction between calmness and responsiveness. Yet it would be erroneous to suppose that since mind is aware of no distinction here, mind therefore is incapable of finding a criterion for its responses in terms of calmness."¹¹

Then to Wang Ch'i, Nieh wrote: "Emptiness and brightness are the nature of a mirror. Reflection is the result of its emptiness and brightness. Consciousness is the same as reflection. If one tries to find the state of calmness while one is conscious, this is analogous to one's attempting to discover emptiness and brightness in the work of reflection. In other words, this is impossible."¹²

What Nieh Pao is struggling to say is that we may find the

morally right by first enjoying in ourselves a state of mental tranquillity—a calmness which is developed under “spiritual nursing.” While we are busy in the daily life of social intercourse, we may be frank, honest, and natural, but we can hardly find time for calmness. Nieh Pao wants to explain to Wang Ch’i, who emphasized “no forcing” and “no forgetting,” i.e., “no artificiality,” that one must submit one’s self to a period of tranquillity in order to attain the sense of right and wrong. Overemphasis on the aspect of “no artificiality” is incompatible with the achievement of righteousness.

Let us study for a moment Nieh’s way of replying to his antagonists. “There are,” he wrote, “three kinds of doubt raised against me: first, Confucius said, “*Tao* is not that from which one may depart even for a moment. *Tao* is there whether one is in movement or in a state of calmness. Why, then, the talk about self-discipline at the time of movement? Second, *tao* knows no difference between movement and tranquillity. But the emphasis on calmness implies a difference. Third, there are those who believe in the unity of mind with external events. By fixing one’s attention on mental activities one become oblivious of what goes on in the external world. This is the way of the Ch’anists.

“This interpretation of Ch’anism is entirely incorrect. The adherents of this sect relinquish the worldly life and find that the ordinary responses of daily life are a nuisance. They go the way of annihilation. My point, on the other hand, has nothing to do with their attitude. What I ask is that one should return to calmness in order to attain the right response; that one should seek emptiness in order to find being; that one should possess the key of quiescence in order to contain the field of movement. How can anybody mix up my doctrine with Ch’anism!”¹³

Elsewhere Nieh wrote: “There are sources at the beginning of the great rivers, like the Huang Ho, the Yangtze, the Huai, and the Han. Were it not for the rivers, there would be no way of recognizing the value of the sources. Those who do the work of irrigation should do their planning at the source, not where the rivers flow full. The basic part of a tree is its roots not its branches, or its blossoms, or its fruit. Those who engage in nursery work should care for this vital part—not the branches, blossoms, and fruit. There are those who, while discussing the realization of *liang-chih*, neglect

to speak of control of the source of *liang-chih*, whence awareness and response emerge; and who expect that awareness and responses will go along naturally. It is just as if one should try to find the sun and moon in their reflections rather than at the source of light and heat in the universe.”¹⁴

Though Wang Ch'i and others attacked Nieh, he was appreciated by Lo Hung-hsien, the third great leader of the Kiangsi school. "The view of Nieh Pao," said his admirer, "was like lightning from heaven. Many giants have been deceived before, but Nieh Pao uncovered a great mystery. The reason why he is appreciated is the same for which the rotating earth remains at rest on its axis forever. As a resting axis is necessary for a body which rotates, so calmness is a necessary condition for the operation of *liang-chih*." ¹⁵

A few biographical details about this admirer of Nieh Pao will not be out of place here. Lo Hung-hsien received his *chin-shih* degree in 1529 but was deprived of his rank for remonstrating with Emperor Shih-tsung for not holding court often enough. Then, in 1558, while Yen Sung was prime minister, Lo was asked to serve under him, but he declined. Six years later he died.

As a disciple of Wang Shou-jen, Lo's sympathy for Nieh Pao, already intimated, was rather extraordinary. This attitude is well exemplified in his opposition to the theory espoused by many of Wang's followers, that knowledge of right and wrong is *liang-chih*, and that "realization of knowledge" is merely compliance with *liang-chih*. "*Liang-chih*," he said, "is to know the highest good. When we know good, this is knowledge. Likewise when we know evil, this is knowledge. Because of the fluctuation between good and evil, it is necessary that we have a criterion in our minds. If there were no criterion, how could we say that *liang-chih* is forever bright and clear? If *liang-chih* were not always bright and clear, how could we comply with it in our actions without error? Thus, we must subject ourselves to a phase of complete calmness, in which all selfish motives are eliminated and heavenly reason appears in its fullness, in order that in our lives we may respond rightly in every way." ¹⁶

Perhaps the arguments among Wang Shou-jen's disciples can become more intelligible if I present some of their dialogues.

Here is a vivid representation of the views of Wang Ch'i and

Lo Hung-hsien. "Wang Ch'i says: '*Liang-chih* gives responses miraculously. Whether one is a sage or an ordinary man, this is the same. What use is it then to remain in a state of calmness or recollection?' Lo Hung-hsien does not answer. After a while he feels hungry and asks for food. Whereupon, Wang Ch'i continues his remarks by inquiring: 'Is a state of calmness or recollection a necessary condition for your knowing that you are hungry?' Lo replies: 'If so, why should it be necessary to learn to know what is right and what is wrong? Is there no difference between eating according to the proper manner, and eating greedily?'

"On another occasion Wang Ch'i says: '*Liang-chih* is in its very nature calmness. Why, then, is it necessary to talk about returning to calmness? Returning to calmness will lead to loss of freshness and mobility in mind. Moreover, *liang-chih* gives responses in a miraculous way. Hence, there is no use in taking care of it. For to take care of it means to add something to the moral sense, and this is redundant. When we are unable to give responses in the right manner, this is not the effect of imperfection in *liang-chih*, because *liang-chih* can neither be increased nor decreased.' Lo's reaction to these comments is to ask: 'Can we remain permanently calm?' To this Wang Ch'i replies 'No!' Then Lo takes up the thread of the discourse. 'If so, then what is wrong about recollection which is merely bringing *liang-chih* back to calmness?'

"Lo says: 'If one cannot give the right responses, may we say that *liang-chih* is obscured?' Wang Ch'i replies: 'Yes. This is correct.' Lo continues: 'When obscurities are removed, *liang-chih* regains its clarity. Thus, there is a difference between the sage and the ordinary man. In the *Meng-tzu* (Book of Mencius) is the saying: *When keeping, you hold it; when leaving, you lose it.* In other words, it [*liang-chih*] may be won or lost. If one nurses it, it will grow. If one neglects it, it will deteriorate. This means that *liang-chih* can be decreased and increased. Its description as self-sufficient is a reference to its ideal state. When one speaks of it as being stirred or unsettled, one means its physical nature. To indulge in talk about nature, but at the same time to be unaware of the evil of desire, is a sure way to get caught in a trap. On the other hand, to stress control without taking nature into considera-

tion is to be lopsided. To follow nature while dispensing with self-discipline is the certain path to licentiousness.' Commenting on this discourse of Lo, Wang Ch'i remarked: 'If such is your opinion, you can do no harm to the problem of *liang-chih*.'"¹⁷

From this dialogue the reader can infer that Wang Ch'i lost his case completely, whereas Lo Hung-hsien won a total victory, though he was sufficiently magnanimous to give Wang Ch'i credit for his emphasis on the quality of naturalness in *liang-chih*.

On this note, I believe I should bring the description of the Kiangsi branch of the school of Wang Chou-jen to an end. It will be best also to skip over the sections I previously indicated as (3) the Kiangsu and Anhwei group, (4) the Hupeh and Human group, (5) the north China group, and (6) the Kwangtung and Fukien group, because these made no special contribution to the controversy within the school of Wang Shou-jen. This leaves us with only two sections: (7) that of Li Ts'ai (the group which rebelled), and (8) that of T'ai-chou (the leader of which was Wang Ken). These we shall now discuss.

A student of Tsou Shou-i, Li Ts'ai at first belonged to the school of Wang Shou-jen. But he became convinced that *liang-chih* is merely a process and can in no sense be set up as the proper standard. Accordingly, he withdrew from Wang Shou-jen's school and founded a sect of his own, basing his doctrine on "culmination-cultivation." He had foreseen the consequences of the over-speculation of the followers of Wang Shou-jen, and he decided to become a rebel, which was indeed a great decision for him to make.

In the earliest period of his intellectual development, while he was still a pupil of Tsou Shou-i, he accepted Wang's formula, *liang-chih*, but at the same time he believed that there must exist a reality which is an entity and not a mere process. According to him *hsing* (human nature), as form of thought, is such a reality and is not a mere process. His own first formula was "awakening of human nature." Later in his intellectual development, he reached the conclusion that so slight a revision of Wang Shou-jen's idea of *liang-chih* to his own idea of "awakening of human nature," was not enough. This sort of trifling improvement he called "removal from one spot to another in a rat-hole, without leaving the rat-hole itself."¹⁸

The idea of "culmination-cultivation" came to him during his mature intellectual life and means that the essence of *hsing* (human nature) lies in tranquillity before birth, and this pre-birth calmness is the reality which he sought in contradistinction to process. When one conceives this prenatal tranquillity, which is not subject to physical change, one has grasped the *summum bonum*, and it is this alone that can serve as the proper standard. Here is the *locus* of "the ought." Li Ts'ai called it "culmination" or "resting place."

The reader will best understand Li's expression "culmination" or "resting place" by referring to the following passages from Chapter III of the *Ta-hsueh*: "In the *Shih-ching* (Book of Poetry) it is said: 'The royal domain of a thousand *li* is where the people rest.' The *Shih-ching* also contains the remark: 'The twittering yellow bird rests on a corner of the mound. The Master said: "When it rests, it knows where to rest." Is it possible that a man should not be equal to this bird?'

"In the *Shih-ching* one finds: 'Profound was King Wen. With how bright and unceasing a feeling of reverence did he regard his resting-place! As sovereign he rested in *jen*. As minister he rested in reverence. As son he rested in filial piety. As father he rested in kindness. In contact with his subjects he rested in good faith.'"¹⁹

In these passages from the *Ta-hsueh* the words which I have translated "culmination" or "resting-place" refer to the standard by which one ought to conduct one's life.

This concept of "culmination" Li Ts'ai also must have derived from the very first phrase of the *Ta-hsueh*: "To rest in the highest good!"—an idea which he likewise used in a different sense as a Confucianist defense against Buddhism. At the risk of being digressive I should like to quote this anti-Buddhist defense. It occurs in the second book of Li Ts'ai's *Collected Works* (*Ching-cheng-lu*). "Each school of philosophy," he says, "has a key. The school which aspires to the otherworldly life tries to avoid contact with the various phenomena of this world which the school which affirms life in this world tries to study—which is what Confucius sought to do in his later days. Confucius knew that one cannot be separated from the life of one's family, nation, or world. Since this point was clear to him, he tried to find a way to reduce the family to order, to rule the nation, and to bring peace to the world.

Quarrelling in these units is inevitable, yet a key must be found to build up harmonious living. Hence the remark: 'This is called knowing the root; this is called perfecting knowledge,' which occurs in the *Ta-hsueh*."²⁰

We come now to the second word of Li Ts'ai's idea, 'culmination-cultivation.' This second word also is taken from the *Ta-hsueh*. "From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people," one reads in this book, "all must consider the cultivation of the person as the root of everything."²¹ Our philosopher, after pondering the first chapter of the *Ta-hsueh*, found that "cultivation of the person" was the foundation of the other units of communal life: the family, the state, and the world. In short, he learned that work in behalf of family, state, and world, must be based on the smallest unit, namely, one's own person. When cultivation of the person is founded on development of the sense of right and wrong, or on the four virtues *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih*, then agreement is achieved with the objectives of the highest good.

So much for the meaning of Li Ts'ai's "culmination-cultivation." Behind this was his opposition to Wang Shou-jen's concept of "realization of intuitive knowledge." For Li, knowledge is a process which is changing every moment. He used to say that knowing cannot be considered a substance or a reality. At the same time, he liked to quote from Ch'eng Hao: "The reality of mind is *hsing* (human nature)." It will be recalled that in my interpretation, *hsing* is the storehouse of the forms of thought. Li, in other words, reverted to the two-level theory of mind, according to which *hsing* occupies the upper level and natural consciousness the lower.

Li's adherence to this two-level theory of mind may be explained as a result of his antagonism towards Wang Ch'i's doctrine of "beyond good and evil." Li believed that as long as there is a higher level of forms of thought—of *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih*, comprising the meaning of the word "good"—there is no possibility of a mental state "beyond good and evil." When one accepts the higher level as the reality and relinquishes knowing *qua* mere process, one will perceive that the presupposition of a state "beyond good and evil" is pointless.

Li Ts'ai declared his rebellion against the school of Wang Shou-jen openly. "The objective," he wrote, "towards which Wang Shou-

jen worked was sagehood. His formula was merely a momentary remedy, agreeing with the doctrine of Confucius and Tseng-tzu. [This latter personage was allegedly the teacher of Confucius' grandson, Tzu-ssu, to whom the authorship of the *Ta-hsueh* was attributed.] What we should learn from him is his real objective, namely, sagehood. There is no necessity for regarding his formula as an unalterable truth. Though Wang Ken was his student, Wang Ken did not take his master's idea seriously. Neither did Nieh Pao. If I were really to do something prejudicial to Wang Shou-jen's way to sagehood, I should certainly deserve to be scolded. However, what I am doing is merely discussing his idea, which is irrelevant to his prime objective of sagehood. Furthermore, I was preceded in this endeavor by the pioneers Wang Ken and Nieh Pao."²²

Li Ts'ai's self-defense for bolting the school was, in other words, that some of Wang Shou-jen's actual pupils had done the same. Why should he alone be blamed?

The truth is, however, that our philosopher was a man with convictions of his own. That he was bold enough to oppose the teachings of Wang Shou-jen while their influence was dominant shows also that he was a man of great courage. Moreover, he was outspoken and upright, all of which qualities appear in his political as well as intellectual life, for he achieved extraordinary results in fighting Japanese pirates in Kwangtung and the aboriginal tribes in Yunnan.

In concluding this exposition of Li Ts'ai, I should like to emphasize that he foresaw the consequences of the over-speculative nature of Wang Shou-jen's school; and so he tried to counteract it by propounding his own doctrine of the highest good as standard, and of self-cultivation as groundwork. As a rebel against the prevailing doctrine, he is on a level with Lo Ch'in-shun and Chan Jo-shui, each of whom had his own view point in debate with the master.

We come finally to the last of the eight divisions of the followers of Wang Shou-jen, namely, the school of T'ai-chou, the leader of which was a man who has already been mentioned several times, Wang Ken. This school may also be called the School of Naturalism under the banner of Confucianism. In the name of Wang Shou-jen it carried its teaching and way of life to a queer,

wild extreme, which turned the original doctrine of the master into something not easily recognizable. Huang Tsung-shi, in his *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*, dealt with eighteen members of this T'ai-chou school. I shall mention only five: (1) the founder, Wang Ken; (2) Chao Chen-chi; (3) Lo Ju-fang; (4) Chou Ju-teng; and (5) Li Chih. The last of these was omitted from the list by Huang Tsung-shi, although his name was referred to a few times. I shall include him because otherwise one cannot understand how unorthodox this T'ai-chou school became.

We turn first to Wang Ken, who was born in T'ai-chou, from which place the school took its name. His father was a merchant who travelled with his son into Shantung Province. The latter carried in his pocket the *Hsiao-ching* (Book of Filial Piety), the *Lun-yü*, and the *Ta-hsueh*. Whenever he came upon a sentence which he could not understand, he would ask its meaning from anybody he happened to meet.

Once during the wintertime Wang Ken saw his father washing himself with cold water. The son felt sorry for his sire and decided to do all his work for him. Our philosopher thus was not a man who could devote himself wholly to study. As time went on, he read the Classics in the light of his own understanding, and gave them his own interpretation.

One night he had a dream that heaven fell down, and thousands of people cried to be saved. He thought that he raised himself by his arm, and beholding the chaos of the celestial bodies, restored them to order. When he awoke he was so drenched with perspiration that it seemed as if he had been in a rain-storm. This dream, he felt, had awakened him to *tao*. He put on record that thereafter he understood *jen*, and that he had become enlightened in action and in silence. He referred to the *Li-chi* (Book of Rites) and made himself a special kind of dress to which a girdle was attached, and he carried a tablet in his hand. He said of himself: "I talk as the Sage-Emperor Yao talked: I do as that same emperor did. Why should I not clothe myself as he did?"²³

At this time Wang Shou-jen, while governor of Kiangsi province, was discussing philosophical problems related to his theory of *liang-chih*. He already had many followers south of the Yangtze, but Wang Ken in far off T'ai-chou knew nothing about this. For-

tunately, however, there lived in T'ai-chou a Kiangsi man named Huang Wen-kang, who at one of Wang Ken's seminars remarked: "What Wang Ken teaches is quite similar to the doctrine of Wang Shou-jen." This pleased Wang Ken, and he said: "Is that really so? Wang Shou-jen's teaching is based upon *liang-chih*; my teaching is based upon 'the investigation of things.' If there is a similarity, then Wang Shou-jen will be a dominating personality for generations to come. If there is no such similarity, then I should follow Wang Shou-jen."²⁴ Whereupon the philosopher of T'ai-chou decided to depart for Kiangsi Province in his specially made costume.

In due time he arrived at the middle door of the office of the governor of Kiangsi, and His Excellency Wang Shou-jen came out to receive him. At first Wang Ken took the guest seat, which was relatively high. Then after a period of discussion, he changed to a side seat, which was lower. This move was to express his appreciation of the great thinker. Of Wang Shou-jen he said: "His philosophical view is simple and appeals directly to the mind."²⁵ Then he came down from his seat altogether and bowed low before Wang Shou-jen.

The following day he returned for another discussion, and at first he resumed his position in the relatively high seat. But after listening a while to the master, he surrendered himself entirely to him as pupil. Wang Shou-jen exclaimed: "When I captured Prince Ch'en Hao I remained unperturbed. But now this man, Wang Ken, perturbs me."²⁶

When the philosopher from T'ai-chou asked the governor of Kiangsi Province about the cart in which Confucius is said to have journeyed to various feudal lands, the philosopher-governor smiled but did not answer. When Wang Ken returned to his native district he built for himself a cart in which he travelled to Peking. Upon it he hung a placard containing the following inscription:

"This is one world.

This is a unity of the manifold things.

In the mountain I go to see hermits.

In the city I try to enlighten fools.

I follow the *tao* of the sages, which is the law of heaven.

I realize *liang-chih* which is as unpredictable as spirits.
If I wish to convert the people to virtue
I cannot do otherwise than to make this showy display.
Those who know me will excuse my manner of travelling.
Those who do not know me will blame me for my manner
of travelling.”²⁷

There is no need to mention that once Wang Ken arrived with his strange garb and cart in Peking he was looked upon as an eccentric. Others of Wang Shou-jen's school tried to discourage him in his oddities, but to no avail. Finally a letter came from the master himself scolding the overzealous pupil who forthwith went directly to his master. To manifest his displeasure, Wang Shou-jen refused to see his disciple for three days. Then when the governor came out to bid a friend good-bye the unhappy pupil prostrated himself on the sidewalk and confessed his mistakes. Even then Wang Shou-jen paid no attention to him, but turned to walk back into his house. Only when Wang Ken cried aloud, “Confucius would not behave in so extreme a way!”²⁸ did the great philosopher help him to rise.

When Wang Shou-jen died, Wang Ken attended his funeral and looked after his household affairs. Wang Ken himself passed away in the fifty-eighth year of his age, i.e., in the nineteenth year of Chia-ching of Emperor Shih-tsung (A.D. 1540).

Let me now say a few words about the teaching of this philosopher from T'ai-chou. Though it is customary to consider him a disciple of Wang Shou-jen, whose formula was “realization of *liang-chih*,” the fact is that Wang Ken had a theory of his own, a doctrine about “the investigation of things” in accordance with the school of Huai-nan, south of the Huai river, where he lived. In short, Wang Ken followed Wang Shou-jen, but with reservations: he adapted the doctrine of *liang-chih* to suit his own interpretation.

In regard to the meaning which Wang Ken attributed to the famous saying “investigation of things,” one can do no better than to use his own words. “The word ‘investigation,’” he says, “means to find a pattern by which the right shape of a thing is regulated. It means to find a compass for measuring circles, or to find a T-

square for measuring squares. If you yourself are the T-square or the compass, the state or the world is the circle or the square. If the things in the world do not conform to the pattern, then your compass or your T-square is not the right one. The work to be done is to find a good compass or a good T-square. There is no use in busying yourself with various kinds of squares and circles. When the compass is right, the circle will be right. In other words, the pattern will be correct. It is said in the *Ta-hsueh* 'The ruler has a principle whereby he may regulate his conduct as with a T-square.' The situation is the same when one seeks the right pattern. As long as the root is defective, the branches will be out of order.

"'To investigate things' means to go to the root, to find the correct pattern. The root or pattern lies in yourself. When you yourself are in order, your family will be in order too. When you yourself are in order, your state will be in order too. When you yourself are in order, even the world will be in order . . . When you yourself are out of order, if you undertake the work of regulating a family, a state, or the world, you will get lost because you will not have begun at the root."²⁹

Interesting as this theory of Wang Ken is, it is impossible within the limits of this book to analyze it in all its details. Here I must restrict myself to dealing with it only in so far as it is a mark of the deterioration of the school of Wang Shou-jen. With this end in view, let me point out a few of the peculiarities of the philosopher from T'ai-chou's teaching.

In the first place, he emphasized that the work which the sage does can also be done by the ordinary man. In other words, the life common to both the ordinary people and the sage is *tao*. This slant in his teaching is the reason why he could appeal to a wood-cutter or a pottery maker. Wang Ken's philosophizing, in a sense, was democratic. He did not wish to limit his way of thought to a few scholars, but he wanted to enlarge it until it could extend to the masses of mankind.

A second peculiarity of his doctrine was his emphasis on naturalness and pleasure. "The so-called heavenly reason," he said, "is the reason of nature. When something artificial is added to it, this is against reason." On another occasion he said: "The science of

sagehood should not be hard, but should be carried on with pleasure." Here one might note that Wang Ken composed a *Song of Pleasure*.

"The human mind has its own pleasure,
 Except that it is bound by selfish motives.
 Even *liang chih* is aware of these selfish motives.
 But after the mind has eliminated them
 By becoming conscious of them,
 It reverts to pleasure.
 Pleasure is the state of being brought about by what you learn;
 Learning is the process of entering into experience of this
 kind of pleasure.
 No pleasure, no learning.
 No learning, no pleasure.
 By having pleasure you begin to learn,
 By learning you have pleasure.
 Pleasure is learning.
 Learning is pleasure.
 Indeed, what is the greatest pleasure other than learning?
 What is the greatest learning other than pleasure?"³⁰

Wang Ken's way, it is obvious, is like the path of the Ch'anist. The following anecdote will further illustrate my point. "A pupil remarked: 'The hardest thing is to find the mind which is lost.' However, when Wang Ken called his name, the pupil replied: 'Yes!' Then the master observed: 'Your lost mind is there. Why do you worry about it?'"³¹ Wang Ken liked to use the easiest means to teach the most recondite truths.

"On another occasion, a student who visited Wang was full of sincerity and earnestness. The master said to him: 'How can selfish motives penetrate you who are so careful and watchful? If you preserve yourself thus, you will be able to find the proper mean.'"³² While this anecdote does not give evidence of the similarity of Wang Ken's doctrine to Ch'anism, it does, like the former anecdote, show the simplicity and directness of his pedagogical method, and it helps to explain why the number of his followers was so great.

As a general characterization of the behavior of the members

of the school of T'ai-chou, I may say that they often evinced a wild kind of chivalry in their relationships with their friends, and that they were not remarkable for cold or formal asceticism in their lives.


Before proceeding any further in this description of the philosophical branches of Wang Shou-jen's school, I must give a genealogical table of the spiritual descendants of the master, in order to make the whole picture clearer. Since we are at present occupied with a study of the branches which contributed most abundantly to the degeneration of the school of Wang Shou-jen, the table will be largely confined to the T'ai-chou branch. However, it will also contain Wang Shou-jen himself at its summit; and side by side with Wang Ken, founder of the T'ai-chou school, we will find Wang Ch'i of the Chekiang school who exerted a strong influence on some of the later descendants.

Some of these spiritual heirs of Wang Shou-jen shall be dealt with briefly, others at greater length.

We come first to Yen Chün, who was noteworthy for his chivalrous and generous attitude towards his friends in need. When his brother philosopher, Chao Chen-chi, was sent into exile, Yen accompanied him; and when his teacher Hsu Yüeh died in battle, Yen found his bones and buried them. Yen Chün, in his discussion of philosophical problems, posted himself as one who could cure mental worries. Thus it was that a student in his audience, named Lo Ju-fang, asked how one could remain unperturbed in the face of problems of life and death, of gain and loss. In his answer, Yen Chün implied that imperturbability is only a matter of self-control and advocated the way leading to union with *jen*. Then he quoted from Mencius: "One who has the four beginnings [viz., *jen*, *i*, *li*, *chih*] should know how to develop and extend them, as fire beginning to burn, or water beginning to flow. The way of burning and flowing is natural and direct. You must follow your consciousness, which does not cease for a moment. You should leave everything to what comes to you in a natural way."³³ Hearing these words, Lo Ju-fang prostrated himself before Yen Chün as his pupil.

When his master was later jailed, the disciple sold his property and supported the prisoner for six years. After his release, the

GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE SPIRITUAL
DESCENDANTS OF WANG SHOU-JEN
(with particular reference to the T'ai-chou Branch)



master visited his pupil occasionally; the devoted student served each cup of tea and each piece of fruit with his own hands.

But to say something about Yen Chün's thought, he stressed that the objective of the philosopher should be to have the mind of innocence—the type of mind which comes to one without learning or deliberation. Lo Ju-fang, however, expounded naturalism more elaborately than his master, indeed even more elaborately than Wang Ken, the founder of the T'ai-chou branch of Wang Shou-jen's school. Lo, in fact, was the most important exponent of naturalism in the whole history of Confucianism. For this reason I shall analyze his doctrine in detail.

The essence of Lo's naturalistic Confucianism was to put forward, all in one, the ideas of innocence, mind, sense, and *tao*; and all at the natural level, which is the easiest and simplest level to reach, one which everyone can attain, not just the inquirers after *tao*.

To make this teaching clearer, let me begin by explaining the words "mind of innocence." "Somebody said to Lo, 'You trace back everything to the mind of innocence,' then asked: 'Why do you do so?' The philosopher replied: 'Are you not a child of innocence?' The pupil said: 'Yes.' Lo continued: 'If you were born a child of innocence, then how can you assert, now that you have grown up, that you are no longer a child of innocence? At this moment I question and you answer. Is this not the work of intuitive knowledge?' The pupil replied: 'Yes.' Then the master resumed by asking another question: 'Do questioning and answering need learning and deliberation?' The pupil replied: 'There is no need of study or deliberation . . . In questioning and answering one may speak as it occurs to one. The same holds true of everybody and of every time. But if this process continues, one will remain an ordinary person. How may one expect by such a path to reach *tao*?' Lo said: 'In the beginning you must have confidence. All depends upon your conscious awakening. In the days of Yao and Shun, it was said that the mind should be subtle, but that self-discipline should be penetrating and of single purpose. When self-discipline is sufficiently thorough, the essence of the subtle mind will be achieved.' The pupil asked: 'How may we discipline ourselves to attain the mind of innocence of the child?' Lo explained:

'Mind is master of the body. Body is the hotel of the spirit. Mind and body are fond of meeting each other and worry when they are separated. When you were a child, your body was happy and smiled most of the time, because then it and your mind were condensed into a unity. But when you grew up, you were full of thoughts and had many worries. In general, people follow one another, and thus go astray. They hunt for things in order to find pleasure. They do not know that the more they seek outside objects, the more dissatisfied they will become in their minds. They continue like this, without change, until their death. Only those who are highly gifted, who listen to some advice, or who read the words of the former sages are willing to reform. They may ultimately awaken to the realization that *tao* lies in themselves. Your body is the child of innocence. As the child of innocence it has intuitive knowledge and ability, which require neither learning nor deliberation. When you regain this stage, you will feel at home in yourself. Your mind will then be pure.' But the pupil was ready with another question: 'After this stage, what is the way of self-discipline?' Lo resumed his explanation: 'What you should worry about is how to reach *this* stage. There is no need of troubling yourself about how to discipline yourself afterwards. Just look at the mother! How kindly and tenderly she cares for her baby! This comes to her naturally.'"³⁴

Lo Ju-fang's advice to inquirers after *tao* always took the form of recommending an easy and light way rather than a heavy and difficult one. An apt metaphor was a light tea and a simple meal, which would do anybody good. The burden must not be an onerous one and he will not wander from the path of rectitude.

Our philosopher's method of teaching is nowhere more happily illustrated than in his story of the tea-boy. "A pupil remarked, 'These are usually regarded as the ways leading to *tao*: contemplation, right conduct, wide reading, and calmness. But none of these, according to you, is the right way. Indeed, I do not know then which is the correct approach to *tao*.' Lo replied: 'The tea-boy's way leads to *tao*.' The pupil exclaimed: 'How can the tea-boy know any such thing?' Lo continued: 'How many halls must the tea-boy usually pass through to serve tea?' 'Three halls.' 'The tea-boy,' Lo said, 'crosses many thresholds and climbs many steps. Yet he

does not break a single cup.' The pupil commented: 'Then the tea-boy is simply cautious and does his duty by instinct, without any knowledge of his effort.' The master then added: 'If the tea-boy gets along without knowledge, how can he bring us our tea? How can he cross the halls with such care?' The student kept silent. Then Lo Ju-fang continued: 'There are two kinds of knowledge. The tea-boy bringing cups of tea, and doing it by routine, illustrates one kind of knowledge. His routine is done without thought or deliberation. It belongs to heaven or nature. But when one brings tea consciously, this is another kind of knowledge. It becomes a deliberate act. This implies human effort. When a process belongs to heaven, it is natural and works out spontaneously. When, on the other hand, it belongs to human effort, there are varying degrees of uncertainty. A process of this latter kind, bound up as it is with human effort, should be united with intuitive knowledge, which works without learning or deliberation. The conscious process and the instinctive kind should be fused into one.'"³⁵

While Lo Ju-fang was an official in the Yünan Province he discussed the meaning of "village-contract" before an audience. In front of the meeting-place lay a lake surrounded by green crops. One of the audience pointed to a pine tree and said: "Last year when the magistrate intended to cut down these trees for building purposes, the birds moved their nests back. Just look at the birds! How pleased they are, and with what abandon they fly!" A magistrate named Hsia Yü, who happened to be present, remarked: "It is generally believed that sages are men to whom others cannot be equal. If there is a way to become equal to them, it must be through knowledge-seeking. Yet when one seeks to increase one's knowledge, one is removed all the farther from them, for one betrays ignorance of the truth that heaven or nature is self-sufficient in one's self. Let one follow, instead, the right in speech, in behavior, and in affairs. Then one can become equal to the sages." To this discourse, however, Lo Ju-fang did not give unqualified assent, for he replied, "What is called 'right' is not 'right' in an absolute sense." Hsia Yü, the magistrate, asked: "Why is the right way not necessarily the right way?" Lo resumed: "What is the 'right' way at one time in your speech, behavior, and affairs, may at another time not be the right way. Thus, the right way is not

necessarily the right way, or is not so in an absolute sense. Look at the birds in the trees. How they enjoy themselves flying! Look at the green crops! With what vigor they exercise their vitality! If you let yourself be tied down to the idea of the 'right' way, then tell me, how can you apply this same idea to the birds and green crops? What is the 'right' or the 'wrong' way for them? In the *I-ching* (Book of Changes) it is said: 'Water flows without ceasing. Things are produced and reproduced.' This is the creation of the world, and this resembles the ceaseless alternation of your work in day and rest at night. This persistence, this flowing, is reality. You must not limit yourself to the search for the right in speech, behavior, and affairs . . ." With these words of Lo Ju-fang, Hsia Yü, the magistrate, was suddenly awakened. "That," he exclaimed, "is what Confucius said: 'What flows goes on like this ceaselessly, day and night.' Man's mind also persists without a moment's rest. One feels in one's self, actively and yet comfortably, the same inner vitality as that shown by birds and new crops. This means *jen* uniting the world. If one seeks the right, this implies, on one hand, that there is right; but, on the other hand, that there is wrong. And such cognition is not the way to a sense of the unity of the whole world."³⁶

In my exposition of Lo Ju-fang's thought I have restricted myself to a description of his ideas about childlike innocence, naturalism, and unity. These topics he discussed plainly enough for everybody to understand, and this is precisely the reason why so many followed him. His thought is very rich, but this is no place to treat it extensively.

Let us now consider some other spiritual heirs of Wang Shou-jen and Wang Ken, in our genealogical tree. The philosophers we shall discuss next are Chao Chen-chi, Chou Ju-teng, and Li Chih. They are noteworthy because they declared openly for Ch'anism.

The first of them, Chao Chen-chi, was a high official during the reign of Emperor Shih-tsung. At one time he was exiled for offending a powerful prime minister, but later he was recalled to become Secretary of the Ministry of Ceremonies and to occupy other cabinet posts. His loyalty to his emperor was unimpeachable; and yet, as a disciple of Hsü Yüeh he was a self-confessed Ch'anist. Previously, such a step had seldom been taken by any Neo-Confucianist.

Chao wanted to write a book with the title *The Great Comprehension*. It was to have been divided into two parts: (1) affirmation of world-life, and (2) negation of world-life. The first part, again, was to have been subdivided into two sections treating of history and institutions, and the second part into two sections dealing with Ch'anism and the various schools of Buddhism. The book seems never to have appeared, but the proposed list of contents tells us the direction in which Chao Chen-chi's thoughts were drawn.

Our philosopher in a letter to a friend wrote: "Your epistle warned me about becoming interested in Ch'anism. My study of this sect began in my boyhood. How can I tell a lie? If you examine my career, can you find anything I have ever done that was contrary to the rules of Confucianism? This shows that Ch'anism is incapable of injuring the world. My life is a proof that Ch'anism is harmless. Ch'anism is completely different from what the arguments of its opponents would lead one to think. These arguments are merely empty words."³⁷

Chao's *Collected Works* contain poems, memoranda to the emperor, and essays. His attitude in these is similar to that of other Confucianists. But in his philosophical writings he is a Ch'anist. If one reads his preface to Wang Shou-jen's works, or his lecture on "The Speechless Confucius," one will find the Ch'anist point of view that what is expressed by speech or language is not the highest truth; the highest truth exists only in silence or in non-discrimination.

We come next to the second of the three philosophers who declared openly for Ch'anism, namely, Chou Ju-teng. A member of the Tai-chou school of which Wang Ken was the founder, he was also influenced by Wang Ch'i of the Chekiang school, whose theory "beyond good and evil" he singled out for special emphasis. Once during a philosophical conference he was opposed in his championship of this doctrine by one Hsü Fu-yüan, who marshalled nine explanations to make his point clear. Chou, in rebuttal, drew up nine counter-arguments which were essentially Ch'anist in spirit. Chou's nine statements will be presented in a later section. For the present it is sufficient to say that it is possible for a Confucian scholar to talk as a Ch'anist.

Chou Ju-teng wrote a book entitled *The Authoritative Message*

of the *Science of Sagehood*, in which he interpreted all the former wise men of China from the Ch'anist point of view. This work is a mixture of Buddhism and Confucianism.

Lastly, we come to Li Chih, who stands at the end of our genealogical table. I cannot omit him, because if I did the unusual situation in which the school of Wang Shou-jen eventually fell would not be clear.

Li Chih, in reality a literary man, became interested in Wang Shou-jen's theory very late in life. He had close ties with members of Wang Ken's T'ai-chou branch of the great master's school, but his main interest was fighting against conventionalities. He was exceedingly intelligent and possessed of a sharp tongue, so that he could pour out abundant contempt on the conventionalities of religion, philosophy, and custom. An example of his polemical writing is seen in the following.

"A man when he is born into the world is sufficient unto himself, and does not necessarily have to learn anything from Confucius. If a man is not self-sufficient, and if he necessarily depends upon Confucius, how could any man have been a man before the time Confucius lived?"³⁸

This argument, of course, is irrefutable.

Li Chih's attitude towards the female sex is of interest. Somebody once asked him about the intelligence level of man as compared with woman. He replied: "There are two kinds of intelligence, far-sightedness and short-sightedness. When one talks about things relating to the near future, children and the household, one refers to short-sighted intelligence. When one discusses speculative matters, the intelligence involved is far-sighted. The human view may thus be divided into these two capacities; but it would be a mistake to say that short-sightedness belongs to women and far-sightedness to men. It is quite possible that a person could be a woman, but that intellectually she could be as good as any man."³⁹ In short, Li Chih was opposed to the notion that the female is inferior to the male—a point of view which would have had few if any defenders in our philosopher's day.

Of Li Chih's essays in general, it may be said that they were analytical, well written, and popular. But let us turn briefly to his biography. The degree of *chin-shih* was conferred upon him in his

twenty-sixth year (1552). Sometime later he was appointed educational administrator of Kung-ch'eng district; then upon his father's death he became a professor at the National Academy of Nanking. Not until he was forty-five years old did he begin to cultivate the acquaintance of members of the T'ai-chou school, at which time he came to know Chao Chen-chi (the disciple of Hsü Yüeh), Keng Ting-li, and Keng Ting-hsiang. At this time also he began his association with a pupil of Wang Ch'i named Hsü Yung-chien.

For a while Li worked in the Ministry of Punishments at Nanking; after which time he was appointed prefect at Yao-an in Yünnan Province. But three years of this office sufficed, and he left his prefecture for Huang-an district in Hupeh Province, where his philosophical friends Keng Ting-li and Keng Ting-hsiang resided.

When our philosopher reached the venerable age of sixty-five, he shaved off his hair like a Buddhist monk, but kept his beard. Having sent his wife back to his birthplace in Fukien Province, he lived in a monastery with two nuns as his students. He shaved off his hair as a symbol of his desire to be free of human bondage. Once thus shaven, it was impossible for his family to invite him back into the home.

But Li Chih became thereby the butt of gossip. He was considered a strange fellow who had committed heresy by being a Confucianist and dressing like a Buddhist monk. He was likewise accused of adultery by living in a monastery with two nuns as students; these two, it was alleged, were his mistresses. The nuns were, incidentally, daughters of a governor.

With this attack, our philosopher could no longer remain in Hupeh Province. He was taken to T'ung-chou in Hopeh Province, and was put in jail on the charge of heresy and corrupting the youth. He committed suicide in the seventy-sixth year of his age (1602).

I must say that while Li Chih's condemnation was quite unjust, he himself was to blame. His unconventionality could only have been tolerated in a country where fundamental rights were well protected. His way of living and dressing aroused a custom-loving and conformist society to rise up and vilify him. This was indeed a tragedy, but it was a tragedy for which Li Chih himself was responsible.

So much for the many different branches of the school of Wang Shou-jen! Now what conclusions can we draw? Whereas the Chekiang branch was over-speculative, and laid inordinate stress on the dynamics of *liang-chih*, the T'ai-chou branch, standing for naturalism, pleasure, mental innocence, with a mixture of Ch'anism, showed pronounced features which would have been unrecognizable even to Wang Shou-jen himself. Huang Tsung-hsi, in his *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*, said that the Chekiang school, since it was somewhat under the restraining influence of the Kiangsi branch, did not run off into a trackless extreme; but the T'ai-chou branch, on the other hand, in passing through the minds of Yen Chün and Ho Hsin-yin, pretended even to be able "to catch the dragon with the naked hand, so that it [the school] had no need of the rules of Confucianism."⁴⁰ This metaphor means it is difficult indeed to become a sage, as difficult as catching so rare a creature as the dragon. Success requires learning, patience, and self-control. But since the T'ai-chou school stressed naturalism, mind innocence, and pleasure, it tried to attain sagehood by "the naked hand," that is, without preparation or discipline. This is one of the reasons why the school of Wang Shou-jen declined and fell.

Around the year 1592, that is, more than six decades after the death of Wang Shou-jen, there arose a great controversy between Chou Ju-teng [a follower of Wang Ch'i and the T'ai-chou school] and Hsü Fu-yüan [a disciple of Chan Jo-shui], who, in this case, defended Wang Shou-jen. While Hsü contended that a distinction between good and evil was necessary as a basis for philosophical discussion, Chou was entirely on the side of the Ch'anists who believed that good is non-existent. That Chou showed markedly Ch'anist elements in his thought is evidence that the school of Wang Shou-jen became permeated by Buddhism.

The controversy between Chou Ju-teng and Hsü Fu-yüan originated at a philosophical conference in Nanking, of a kind common in those days, at which many learned men and eminent ministers were accustomed to participate. When the subject *Record of Witnessing Tao on Heaven Fountain Bridge* came up for debate, Hsü Fu-yüan, as a disciple of Chan Jo-shui, disagreed with Chou. The

following day Hsü issued nine arguments which he distributed among the members of the conference. Whereupon Chou issued nine counter-arguments. It is in these nine counter-arguments that we find the evidence of how Ch'an thought had captured the schools of Wang Ch'i and T'ai-chou, and how deeply it had penetrated Wang Shou-jen's school of thinking.

Some of the arguments and counter-arguments of these two talented adversaries are worth knowing:

"THE FIRST ARGUMENT OF HSÜ FU-YÜAN. It is said in the *I-ching*: 'Yüan [i.e., primordially, one of the four attributes of the trigram *ch'ien*, *heng* or prosperity, *li* or utility, and *chen* or constancy] is the highest good.' Again it is said: 'What is the continuation is the good; what is the completion is nature.' In the *Shu-ching* it is said: 'He who is virtuous does not have always the same person as his teacher. He learns from what is good.' In the *Ta-hsüeh* three main steps are mentioned: 'To illustrate illustrious virtue, and to love the people, after which follows the final stage: to rest in the highest good.' In his conversation with Duke Ai, Confucius said, 'When one does not know what is good, one is not true to one's self.' His disciple, Yen Hui, seized the good, clasping it firmly to his breast, as it were, and not losing it. In the seven books of the *Meng-tzu*, Mencius advocated the doctrine of the goodness of human nature and fought against the teaching of Kao-tzu that nature is neither good nor bad. Such was the course of development of the science of sagehood so evident before us. Now, in this present conference the old tradition has been discarded and the theory of "beyond good and evil" has been substituted in its place as authoritative. The inference is contrary to what is written in the Classics.

"THE FIRST COUNTER-ARGUMENT OF CHOU JU-TENG. While in order to condition the people to a moral climate it is feasible to make use of the theory of doing what is good and getting rid of what is bad; nevertheless in order to exhaust nature and reach knowledge of heaven it is necessary to grasp the final truth and for that one must go 'beyond good and evil.' 'Beyond good and evil' means to seek no traces after doing good and shunning evil. While doing good or shunning evil, if one understands this doctrine of 'beyond good and evil,' one's comprehension is genuine.

These two sides can be mutually complementary and without contradiction, and their expressions may supplement each other without conflict. Such is the general idea of the *Record of Witnessing Tao on Heaven Fountain Bridge*.

"Those who object to the doctrine of 'beyond good and evil' suppose that when this teaching prevails, the people will be led into confusion and will do evil. But what these critics fail to grasp is that once good has disappeared there is no possibility that evil can exist. When one is healthy there is no need to talk about disease. When one has reached the stage of the non-existence of evil, there is no use in feeling the absence of good. When one has passed 'beyond' evil, there is no use in affirming good. To do so would be like adding an extra head to one's own head.

"The stage at which all predication becomes impossible is true reality, and the uselessness of the contrariety or alternation between good and evil, at this stage, is the last mystery of the world. This stage is the proper mean, the pervading unity, the truth, and the Supreme Good. What the sages sought to learn is precisely this.

"The word *shan* [good] in the Classics in most cases has its opposite, evil. But this same term, when it is applied as an expression for mind and human nature, is used in an absolute sense and is without any contrary term to oppose it. In a chapter, "The Model," of the *Li-chi* [Book of Rites] there is a sentence which reads in part: 'One in one's innermost heart is filled with *jen*.' The word *jen* here is not used in a relative sense having non-*jen* as a counterpart. Also, in the sentence, 'To be tranquil is to establish the standard of humanity,' the term 'tranquil' is not intended, as relative to 'moving,' as a counterpart. Moreover, whenever 'highest' precedes 'good,' the former term is to be understood in the absolute sense. The 'best' government is the rule which is unqualifiedly ideal. The virtue of which no predicate whatever is assertable is the 'highest' virtue. The 'utmost' *jen* and the 'utmost' *li* mean a *jen* and a *li* that are beyond all possibility of predication. 'Highest good' has this same significance. The 'highest good,' for which no predicate is available, can be reached only in one's own understanding, and this is what is meant by being true to one's self. 'Good' in the

relative sense, on the other hand, is to be understood only by way of comparison.

"Ch'eng Hao said: 'The stage of tranquillity before one's birth is something of which no predicate is assertable. When one talks about nature, it is no longer nature about which one is talking. When one supposes one's self to be speaking of nature, it is the continuation of nature [into experience] of which one is speaking, and it is this continuation which is good.' The goodness of human nature, in the sense in which Mencius uses the term, belongs to this same category.

"When one grasps the meaning of what I have said above, one will understand the significance of sentences in the absolute sense. This is the first counter-argument.

"THE SECOND ARGUMENT OF HSÜ FU-YÜAN. In the universe what is the proper mean and what is right is good. What deviates from the right course is bad. The distinction between good and bad is as clear-cut as that between ice and coal, or black and white, so that the distinction cannot be increased or decreased by subjective means. Thus there is the periodicity of the heavenly bodies, the constancy in the brightness of the sun and moon, the recurrence of the stars, the stability of mountains and rivers, and the true-heartedness of man. Each thing has its principle. In the family are children who perform filial duty. In the government are ministers who practice loyalty, and those who believe otherwise are traitors, perverts, and freaks. This is the reason why the sages advised people to act virtuously and to shun evil. When a sage becomes the ruler of the world he punishes evildoers and rewards doers of good. Heaven, applying the same principle, blesses the virtuous and condemns the wicked. Families who accumulate good actions will be rewarded, while those who do bad things will suffer from misfortunes. From the past down to the present this law has not been violated. But now we have a doctrine called 'beyond good and evil.' With this confusing thought, I believe men do not know what to do and what to shun.

"THE SECOND COUNTER-ARGUMENT OF CHOU JU-TENG. 'Middle,' 'right,' 'deviating,' and 'partial' are words and viewpoints artificially created by man. They have nothing to do with the universe

itself. Such contrary terms as 'right' and 'deviating' depend upon a distinguishable alternation, or belong to something which is increased or decreased. That of which no predicate is assertable—in other words, 'the unpredicable'—bears no relation to anything whatsoever. The periodicity of the cosmos cannot be called the 'good' of the cosmos. The constant brightness of the sun and moon cannot be called the 'good' of the sun and moon. The recurring of the stars cannot be called the 'good' of the stars. Mountains do not call their heights 'good.' Rivers do not call their flowing 'good.' Man has a true heart and can eat. What has his heart and his eating to do with 'good'? What has a bird's flying or a fish's darting to do with 'good'? Filialness is known only where there is unfilialness, and the genuinely filial know nothing about filialness. Similarly, loyalty is known only where there is disloyalty, and those who are genuinely loyal know nothing about loyalty. The theory of reward to the virtuous and punishment to the wicked is applicable only to fools who must needs be instructed. The theory of blessings and curses is like the doctrine of Karma, which does not preclude the Ch'anists' discussion of emptiness. But to place the teaching of Karma alongside the school which holds emptiness to be an essence, is to betray superficial understanding. For the school of emptiness, knowledge of what to do and what not to do is the great obstacle to philosophical insight, and such knowledge should be discarded.

"THE THIRD ARGUMENT OF HSÜ FU-YÜAN. The human mind is like the great void, which is spotless. Yet there exists in essence what can be established as the standard. This standard is also called the proper mean, good, and truth. Other terms, such as *jen*, *i*, *li*, *chih*, and *hsin* [faithfulness] belong to the same category. The good is the proper mean, pure and untarnished. It is not mixed with the physical and is not the product of mere human discrimination. It is common to all men. Therefore, by the former sages it was considered the resting-place or culmination. Now for you, with this theory of *beyond* good, what can the cosmic standard be? In the *Chung-yung* are the words, 'They [i.e., heaven and earth] are without doubles, so that they produce things in an unfathomable way.' Heaven and earth must proceed according to a regular pattern. How, otherwise, could men get along?

"THE THIRD COUNTER-ARGUMENT OF CHOU JU-TENG. As you said, mind is like the great void, which is spotless. It is not mixed with the physical, nor does it know the discriminations of human knowledge. But if this is the case, why should one be miserly with the word 'good,' not wishing to part with it? Such miserliness is a sign that one's mind is not a void, that one's mind has spots, that one's mind is mixed with the physical, and that one makes much of distinctions. There is a contradiction! Mind, like a void, to which no spot is attached, is the foundation of the universe. Yet you say that the foundation of the universe is the proper mean. Then with the proper mean and the empty mind you have a dualism. How is it possible that this empty mind and this proper mean, which latter existed before the state of operation, should be two rather than one? If the nature of the proper mean is thus, it will follow that the standard, good, truth, *jen*, *i*, *li*, *chih*, and *hsin* must be something extra, something added, which cannot be identified with the great void. On the basis of such misinterpretation, of course the doctrine of 'beyond good and evil' becomes unacceptable. This sort of discussion, leading to dualism, is not the road to sound philosophy.

"THE FOURTH ARGUMENT OF HSÜ FU-YÜAN. The original quality of human nature is good. Only upon mixture with matter and agitated by desire does evil arise. Even then the original goodness does not disappear. The sages tried in many ways to bring people back to their primeval state. To lift the cloud is to illuminate. To return to the origin is to culminate. When mind is not deviating it is on the right track. When will is innocent of falsehood it is true. When knowledge is unencumbered by puzzlement it is realized. When things do not function as obstacles they are objects of investigation. These are axioms, simple and self-evident. But now we have this talk 'beyond good and evil,' and so there is bias in reference to will, knowledge, and things. I should like to ask how, under such circumstances, the discipline of investigation, knowing, making true, and rectifying could possibly be worked out. Is it right to say that the *Ta-hsüeh* was written for people of low intelligence? Is it right to say that since modern scholars are highly talented they have no need of the kinds of discipline I have just mentioned?

"THE FOURTH COUNTER-ARGUMENT OF CHOU JU-TENG. In a sense the innate goodness of human nature is the highest good. But as soon as there is ignorance along with this idea of the highest good, a beclouding is generated. To return to the original nature is not to lose one's innocence. In the innocence of the child there is no evil. Then how can there be good for this childish innocence? The same principle of innocence may be applied to adults. Mind, knowing, will, and things are one and the same entity. Their being considered separate is merely a way of expression for the sake of convenience. The first step is to know what is good. When one knows what is good, one is *ipso-facto* true to one's self, and the need to speak of investigating, realizing, making true, and rectifying has vanished. The same principle is incumbent upon everybody whether of high or low intelligence. If, not applying this method, one wishes nevertheless to do the work of investigation, realization, rectification, and making true, this is a sure sign that one's first step was mistaken. The result must be chaos: what is considered right will be wrong, what is considered true will be false, what is considered realized will be confused, and what is considered investigation will be frustration. Such an intelligence is really no intelligence. How difficult it is to rid one's self of a prejudice of this kind—a resting-place which is no resting-place—and from the idea of which it is almost impossible to uproot one's self! All this is contrary to the doctrine of the *Ta-hsüeh*.

"THE FIFTH ARGUMENT OF HSÜ FU-YÜAN. The ancient sages, who had charge of moulding the moral climate and of awakening human hearts, depended upon the innate goodness of human nature. It is said in the *Book of Mencius*: 'Like what the people like; dislike what the people dislike.' In the *Analects* are the words, 'The people supplied the ground for which the Three Dynasties pursued the path of straightforwardness.' Because of the indestructible goodness of human nature those who are foolish and ignorant can be educated, those who are violent can be made moderate, the whole moral atmosphere can be changed from bad to good. This is the key to reform. But you who have this theory of 'beyond good and evil,' you would give up and discard the innate goodness of human nature. This theory of yours, if it is

allowed to spread, will cause great damage to the right course of the world.

"THE FIFTH COUNTER-ARGUMENT OF CHOU JU-TENG. A mind which is non-attached to the doing of either good or bad is the perfect paradigm for human nature's innate goodness. This is the path of straightforwardness. On the other hand, attachment to the doing of either good or bad is purposeful pursuit of what is good or bad, and thus is no longer straightforwardness. To educate the ignorant, to make gentle the violent, or to transform the moral climate is to lead the community on the basis of what one knows to be good. Knowledge of the good, in turn, is founded on the idea of the highest good in the non-relative sense, i.e., in the sense which borrows no meaning from the idea of opposition to evil. Merely to be obsessed with the desire to do good and to lead the community on this basis is not an adequate foundation for changing foolish into intelligent citizens or for making kind men out of violent ones. The moral atmosphere will never be purified by these means.

"With regard to the betterment of mankind I have much more to say. There are two kinds of human beings: the non-scholars, who commit wrong deeds and conceal them from the public; and the scholars who know what is good but are opinionated. Those who conceal wrong deeds should be taught how to act virtuously and how to shun evil, then they will have a rule whereby to avoid wrongdoing. Those who have subjective opinions about what is good belong to the class of virtuous men. But they are unaware that nothing is good in itself, and so they hold to what is called good, affirming this and denying that, choosing this and rejecting that. The consequence is that what they declare to be a true will is, in reality, not true at all, and what they declare to be a rectified mind is not right. Lu Chiu-yüan said: 'What is evil can set the mind on the wrong track; so also can what is good . . .' Wang Yang-ming has told us that mind itself is beyond good and evil. Such was his way of freeing men's minds from bondage, and of sending them back to the source, whence they could reach their culminating point. His way was to point out that the term 'good' should not be understood in the relative sense, but in the absolute

sense, which bears the meaning of 'beyond good and evil.' To get rid of evil is not the final truth. Rather to know that evil is non-existent is to know ultimate reality. . . How can this teaching of Wang Yang-ming do any damage to the cause of the amelioration of the world?

"THE SIXTH ARGUMENT OF HSÜ FU-YÜAN. Those who wish to climb to the summit of a mountain should not refuse to walk. Those who wish to cross a river must have the facility of a boat. Those who are interested in *tao* must discipline themselves. As a sage, Confucius said: 'One must learn what is low in order to reach what is high.' He also said [referring to himself] that he was so fond of earnest research in antiquity that he forgot to eat and sleep. All his life long he worked as if there was not time enough to finish his task. He mentioned many things such as self-control, return to decency, overcoming evil, keeping to the right, purifying the mind, withdrawing to one's inner self, restraining indignation, curbing desires, correcting mistakes, advancing towards good, and others too many to enumerate here, which are all discussed in the *Analects*. But these things you consider not good enough to follow. You advise that sudden awakening to the non-existence of good is the way to sagehood—which brings to mind Han Yü's question: 'Should one's aim be to go beyond Confucius? If the talented become possessed of such an idea as yours, they may speculate with too little restraint and lose their footing on solid ground. Or if those of low intelligence succumb to your advice they can only sing to your tune and echo your sound. How will the world be benefited by such puppets?

"THE SIXTH COUNTER-ARGUMENT OF CHOU JU-TENG. Wang Shou- jen never discouraged men from the work of self-discipline. Even to grasp the meaning of the words 'non-existence of evil' requires a man's entire lifetime, and the length of his life must not be too short. What one should understand is that non-existence of evil entails non-existence of good. Disciplinary work itself, consisting in the performance of virtuous acts and the avoidance of wickedness, without a trace of anything else, is the only real chastisement. The loyalty of the Minister Tzu-wen and the purity of Wen-tzu, the repression of a sense of superiority, and the repression of boasting, resentment, and covetousness by Yüan Hsien were all considered

to belong to the work of self-discipline, but were not regarded as actions of *jen*. What Confucius earnestly sought, even to the point of going without food, and what he called mind-purification and withdrawing into one's innermost self, were something other than that which you have mentioned. This so-called work of self-discipline must be true, which is the reason why Wang Shou-jen advised men to learn from the true Confucius. Your instruction not to talk too speculatively is mistaken.

"THE SEVENTH ARGUMENT OF HSÜ FU-YÜAN. According to the *Book of History*, 'Depending on what is good, one loses the good.' This means that the possession of good is something which should not be boasted about. Again, according to the former Confucianists, 'If one does good with a purpose, the good will remain only on the surface.' This means that good cannot be done with an ulterior motive. When one is pleased with an act of goodness, this good will never be on a very broad or magnificent basis. However, there are many kinds of good. There is, on the one hand, the maxim that no good deed should be done with a purpose, and, on the other hand, the aphorism that one should do one's good deeds with the feeling that there is not sufficient time. Each of these sayings has its significance for the proper occasion. One should not take the former as right and the latter as wrong, or vice versa, and subsume both under the category of the non-existence of good. Even if it were true that we should not do good, would we have to assume that the doing of good should cease? This is an exaggeration from a good-intentioned man like you.

"THE SEVENTH COUNTER-ARGUMENT OF CHOU JU-TENG. Since, as you have said, by having good one loses good, and by doing good purposefully one introduces a selfish motive, you yourself have given real evidence that the theory of non-existence of good is the correct theory. Even the splendid accomplishments of emperors Yao and Shun were like a mere puff of cloud in the Great Void. How can you assert that many kinds of good exist in this world? The virtuous deeds which genuine philosophers perform are good in the non-relative sense, and are good without a purpose behind them.

"THE EIGHTH ARGUMENT OF HSÜ FU-YÜAN. Wang Shou-jen's

conception of the realization of intuitive knowledge was from the very beginning precisely the same as that of the ancient sages. In his *Collected Works* he says, 'Human nature can never be evil. Thus, intuitive knowledge is innately good. Intuitive knowledge is the proper mean before mind's stirring, the great impartiality, reality itself, which is tranquil and immovable. In order that this not be obscured by desire, it is necessary, in the interests of purification for one to exercise self-discipline.' Wang Shou-jen also says: 'A sage can be a sage because his mind is bright, like heavenly reason, and is never selfish. If you would learn to be a sage, first of all you must make your mind bright like heavenly reason; that is, you must get rid of desire and hold only to reason.' To quote again from Wang: 'When one keeps a purely good will, it is heavenly reason which one keeps. Therefore, one should keep a purely good will.' In short, Wang's teaching is very clear. In his theory that mind goes beyond good and evil he refers to the proper mean before mind's stirring, to what is still and immovable. He does not go into the signification of the term, 'highest good,' nor does he discover the contradiction between his words and those of the *Great Learning*. However, in his expressions 'In one's stirrings of will one knows what is good and what is bad,' 'To know what is good or bad is the work of *liang-chih*,' and 'To do good and shun evil is to investigate things,' he is on solid ground, and his utterances give valuable suggestions for self-discipline. Now, your saying that mind, will, knowledge, and things are beyond good and evil is, I fear, contrary to the correct meaning of Wang Shou-jen.

"THE EIGHTH COUNTER-ARGUMENT OF CHOU JU-TENG. If, as you say, the theory of the realization of intuitive knowledge is the same as that of the sages, then why the realization of intuitive knowledge? According to Mencius, 'The knowledge that comes to one without the exercise of thought is intuitive knowledge.' To be under the restriction of arriving at good through the exercise of thought means that there is no longer innate goodness. If the dictum of Wang Shou-jen, 'Mind itself is beyond good and evil,' alludes to what is impartial and still, why should mind become something different after stirring? If before stirring it is impartial and still, it should be the same after stirring. If it is the same regardless of

whether it precedes or follows stirring, we may say that mind, will, knowledge, and things are in their essence inseparable. Therefore, the statement of the Four Non-existents is the mysterious doctrine of Wang Shou-jen—indeed, of all of us. There is no point in our doubting it. If we do not doubt it, we may carry out our conclusions into far-reaching ramifications. We shall find among them consequences valuable for self-discipline. Otherwise we shall be led into confusion, because what is man-made will be taken as heavenly and natural; what is selfish will be taken as reasonable—all of which is contrary to the doctrine of Wang Shou-jen. How can one create a contradictory theory and blame Wang Shou-jen for it?

"THE NINTH ARGUMENT OF HSÜ FU-YÜAN. According to Wang Ch'i, Wang Shou-jen, in his conversation on the Heaven Fountain Bridge, called the statements of the Four Existents and the Four Non-existents two ways of thinking suitable for two kinds of people. Even at the time of the conversation, Ch'ien Te-hung and Wang Ch'i, who were his interlocutors, disagreed with each other. It is said in the *Book of Changes*: 'Spiritualization by clarification depends upon the right man; silent fulfillment and wordless confidence depend upon virtuous conduct,' which implies that spiritualization and silent fulfillment have nothing to do with expression in language. Yen Hui sat for a whole day as if he were a fool, and Tseng-tzu exercised accumulative effort. We can imagine that both achieved the same high end through their virtuous conduct. How can you assert that what is expressed in a transcendental and mysterious language is adapted to those who are talented, while another kind of talk is fit for those of low intelligence? This would mean that a great barrier exists between the two. In the conversation on Heaven Fountain Bridge, the following words were also recorded: 'Wang Ch'i, what you allude to is the mystery of the message of the heart. Even Yen Hui and Ch'eng Hao dared not speak of it. But now you break the ice by talking about it. Perhaps the time is ripe for it to be revealed and there is no longer a necessity to keep it secret.' If such was the case, Wang Shou-jen discovered something which Confucius did not know, and Wang Ch'i was superior even to Yen Hui and Ch'eng Hao. Later, the statement of the Four Non-existents was often on the lips of Wang

Ch'i and other intelligent scholars who followed him. I wonder who ever was able to attain *tao* by hearkening to such statements? I fear that the conversation on Heaven Fountain Bridge was like adding feet to a snake in a picture—that is, superfluous. Your tactics in no way increase our respect for Wang Shou-jen. Rather you do him damage. In my opinion, yours is not an effective technique for interpreting his philosophy.

“THE NINTH COUNTER-ARGUMENT OF CHOU JU-TENG. The method of dividing men into two kinds, one above average, the other below, and teaching them differently was started by Confucius, not by Wang Shou-jen. The selfsame linguistic expression may be understood by one who has confidence in the source of the words, and misunderstood by one who is suspicious. Confidence or suspicion depends upon one's self, not upon others, because mutual understanding requires more than mere dependence upon words, though this latter is a necessary, if not adequate, condition. If, as you said, spiritualization and silent fulfillment depend upon the right man, clearly there is something mysterious in Yen Hui's sitting all day like a fool, and in Tseng-tzu's exercising accumulative effort. Hence it is also clear that attainment of *tao* is by way of self-reliance, not by way of reliance upon others. Finally, it is clear that there is no point in putting any blame upon a philosophical theory.

“Your remark about what Yen Hui and Ch'eng Hao dared not say, is too wide of the mark. Philosophical discussion should be on a high level. Mencius, indeed, may not have been superior to Yen Hui or Ch'eng Hao, but when his disciple, Kung-sun Ch'ou, asked about his goal, Mencius answered frankly that Confucius was his goal. Another disciple, Ts'ao Chiao, who is not the equal of the disciple Wan Chang, inquired ‘Can anyone become a Yao or Shun?’ Mencius told him: ‘Just say what Yao said, behave as Yao behaved.’ When one is possessed of a conviction one should give candid expression to it, should talk on a high level, and should let the people know what one's mission is.

“The statement of the Four Non-existents is not a product of fancy. Its origin traces back to many sages who lived in ancient times. There was an emperor who called himself Thoughtless. In the *Book of Changes* the question is asked: ‘Why should there be

thoughts and deliberations?' Emperor Yü said: 'Do nothing!' King Wen spoke of 'what is unrecognizable and unknowable.' Confucius tried to be free of foregone conclusions and egoism. He said: 'For me there is nothing affirmative and nothing negative.' Tzu-ssu spoke of 'what is unseeable, immovable, noiseless, and tasteless.' Mencius discussed 'intuitive ability and intuitive knowledge which come without learning and without deliberation.' All these quotations refer to the same subject. What Wang Shou-jen said in the conversation at Heaven Fountain Bridge he learned from others. How can you attribute the authorship to Wang Ch'i?

"A doctrine, however, is a prescription of a remedy for a disease. When the disease changes, the prescription must change too. It therefore is never final. The statement about Four Existents is not the sole truth. On the other hand, the statement of the Four Non-existents is something which you cannot avoid and which you are compelled to consider. If you restrict yourself to understanding language-forms, every word can become an obstacle to you—in which case my discourse, also, will be like adding feet to the snake in the picture. I fear that I have said more than I am willing to be responsible for."⁴¹

Chou Ju-teng, besides writing these counter-arguments, was the author of a book entitled: *Authoritative Message of the Science of Sagehood* [Sheng-hsüeh Tsung-chuan], which is a history of Chinese philosophy interpreted in the Buddhistic sense. Huang Tsung-hsi's *Philosophical Record of the Ming Confucian Scholars* was written with the thought of refuting it.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Causes Leading to the Downfall of the School of Wang Shou-Jen in China and to Its Rise in Japan

The preceding four chapters have made clear, I hope, the nature of Wang Shou-jen's philosophy and why there was conflict within the school. The three-cornered conversation at the Heaven Fountain Bridge among Wang and his disciples, Wang Ch'i and Ch'ien Te-hung, testifying to the character of *tao*, was an important factor which led the Chekiang and T'ai-chou branches of Wang's school to pure speculation, and finally to what is known as Ch'anism.

During this conversation two approaches to *tao* were indicated. First, the solid base of discipline as formulated by Wang Shou-jen himself is found in the following statements:

- (1) The reality of mind or mind *per se* is beyond good and evil.
- (2) What is stirred up in will may be either good or evil.
- (3) To know what is good or evil is the function of *liang-chih* (intuitive knowledge).
- (4) To do what is good and to eliminate what is evil is the work of "investigation of things."

On this firm basis Wang Shou-jen sought to lead people into an awareness of what was necessary if one was to be on the side of good in contradistinction to bad, rather than to carry them beyond all distinctions of good and evil. However, in the opinion of the disciple, Wang Ch'i, these "Four Existents" (for so he called the four statements just quoted since they presupposed the actual existence of good and evil) are not the ultimate truth. Thus we

come to the second of the two approaches to *tao* of the school of Wang Shou-jen. This second road is adumbrated in Wang Ch'i's words to Ch'ien Te-hung: "If mind *per se* is beyond good and evil, then will also is beyond good and evil; so also is knowledge, and so also are things. As long as you assert that in will there is good and evil, then there must be good and evil in mind too."¹ Wang Ch'i's formula, was known as the "Four Non-existents" because the four entities—mind, will, knowledge, and things—were conceived as beyond good and evil.

The details of this conversation at Heaven Fountain Bridge were reported differently by Wang Ch'i and Ch'ien Te-hung. The account given by the latter is included in the *Records of Instructions and Practices*. That given by the former, because he considered it his most important document, was included first in his *Collected Works*. These two versions of Wang Shou-jen's answer to Wang Ch'i and Ch'ien Te-hung are of peculiar interest. The general idea is the same in either case, yet the omission of a word here and the addition of a word there create different nuances in the meaning. According to both reporters the master taught two ways of approach for the students: one way for the most talented, another for the average person. Wang Ch'i says: "The most talented can be taught and awakened by the doctrine that mind *per se* is beyond good and evil. Such a one can find his way through Nothingness. This way of mind *per se*, or reality *per se*, is the most direct and simple, omitting nothing. This approach may be called the path of sudden awakening.

"The average person, who does not understand what reality *per se* is, cannot do otherwise than start with the idea that there are good and evil. The average person must live under discipline, he must do what is good and shun what is evil. This is a way of remedy. Such a person is awakened by the slow and gradual method. Starting with the theory of good and evil, he can, in the end, reach the stage of Nothingness."²

At the end of this conversation Wang Shou-jen repeated once more his formula of the four statements mentioned above. This offered a safe way for all people, whether talented or not. In Wang Ch'i's text, however, this repetition was omitted because the advice of the "Four Existents" was not to his taste. Wang Ch'i's

record of the conversation at Heaven Fountain Bridge was, I may add, like opening a dam for a floodtide. Since he was regarded as an authoritative spokesman for Wang Shou-jen, his interpretation led to indulgence in the most speculative vaporizings, and to forgetfulness of what is required on the side of good in contradistinction to evil. We have here the main cause of the downfall of the school of Wang in China. If another road had been pursued, the course of development might have been different. That is to say, if the part of the *Instructions and Practices* stressing the role of making will true and of knowing what should be approved and disapproved had been followed, the sect of Wang Shou-jen might not have fallen into the ditch of mad Ch'anism.

Let me analyze, for instance, a conversation between Wang Shou-jen and one of his disciples to illustrate the point of view of making will true and of innate knowledge. The master said: "Personal cultivation according to the *Ta-hsüeh* means cultivation of your five bodily senses, viz., ears, eyes, mouth, nose, and the four limbs. In order to cultivate yourself, your eyes should not see what is indecent, nor your ears hear what is indecent, nor your mouth speak what is indecent, nor your limbs move in an indecent manner. If you try to cultivate yourself you should know how to discipline yourself.

"However, mind is the master key to your body. Though the act of seeing proceeds through the eyes, what makes the eyes see is mind. Though speech comes from the mouth and movement is of the limbs, what makes the mouth speak and the limbs move is mind. Therefore, in order to cultivate yourself you must examine your mind and fashion it to fairness and impartiality, and purify it of all that is wrong. Once this master key is in order, other things will follow naturally. In the eyes there will be no indecent seeing, in the ears no indecent hearing, in the mouth and four limbs no indecent speech or movement. Hearken to what is said in the *Ta-hsüeh*: 'Personal cultivation lies in the rectification of mind.'

"Further, the highest good is in mind itself. In other words, it is impossible to conceive that in the reality of mind there should be anything contrary to good. In order to carry out the rectification of mind, most vital of all is the beginning. The work of rectification

depends intimately upon where mind begins to move or stir. It is impossible that the stirrings of mind should be entirely of pure goodness and without evil. The task to be done is to make will true. If the stirring is one of approval of what is good, then you should honestly and earnestly seek to do what is good. If the stirring is one of disapproval of what is bad, then you should honestly and earnestly seek to avoid what is bad. When the stirring is sincere and reliable, mind will invariably be on the right track. This is the significance of the text, 'Rectification of mind lies in making will true.'

"Further, realization of knowledge is the foundation of making will true. Something as yet unknown to others may be known to you. This is called 'solitary knowing.' This is your mind's innate knowledge. Yet it happens quite often that even when you know what is good you do not understand what your innate knowledge commands, and even when you know what is evil you do not cease to act in the way that your innate knowledge commands you to cease. In such cases your innate knowledge is obscured, so that your knowledge is not realized. When the commands of conscience are not executed, the good which has been approved will not be thoroughly realized. In such cases also, the bad which has been disapproved will not be thoroughly cleared away. Under these circumstances will cannot be made true. Therefore it is said: 'The realization of knowledge is the root of making will true.'

"However the work of realization of knowledge cannot be done in a vacuum. It must be done in the midst of actual life. If you intend to do good you must do it with reference to a particular matter in your mind or hand. If you have the intention of getting rid of something evil, again you must have reference to a particular matter. To abolish a particular item of evil means to change something from wrong to right. To do good means to rectify what is wrong, or to alter from wrong to right. Thus, innate knowledge is not beclouded by desire and is usable in the utmost degree. Also, the stirrings of will consist in nothing other than doing good and shunning evil. This is called 'To make will true.' Accordingly, the task of making will true is closely allied to 'investigation of things.'"³

In these passages Wang Shou-jen, instead of indulging in meta-

physical speculations, explains how personal cultivation may be carried out by discipline of will, intellect, and emotion. If his successors had followed this phase of his work the school of Wang Shou-jen would have been grounded in a solid, empirical base, and its course of development might have been entirely different from what it was. Had the disciples remained within the bounds of good and evil, had they looked after any one of the phases of mind—intellect, will, or emotion—they might have made many fruitful studies and achieved self-control. The result would have been far more substantial than the unsavory harvest which was reaped by Chinese intellectual life.

Let us examine what might have been derived from Wang Shou-jen's philosophy if attention had been more widely paid to what he taught about intellect. He was not, of course, interested in observation of natural phenomena, but he had something in common with Spinoza who believed that a man's first duty is to perfect his intellect or to have "adequate ideas." "The more the mind knows," wrote Spinoza, "the better it understands its forces and the order of nature; the more it understands its forces or strength, the better it will be able to direct itself and lay down rules for itself; and the more it understands the order of nature, the more easily it shall be able to liberate itself from useless things."⁴ This sentiment could readily have been endorsed by Wang Shou-jen because he, as well as the Jewish philosopher, believed that knowledge of the universe is the key to *tao* [in Spinoza's terminology: *amor intellectualis Dei*].

Or we may examine what might have come from Wang's philosophy if wider attention had been paid to his teaching about will. In this respect also the Chinese thinker had an almost identical outlook with the Hebrew thinker. Says Spinoza: "Will and intellect are one and the same thing,"⁵ for a volition is merely an idea which has remained long enough in consciousness to have passed over into action. This was also the discovery of Wang Shou-jen. As a result of this same insight he theorized that will and intellect are inseparable, and that will, before being set into motion, can be controlled by intellect.

Finally, we may examine what might have issued from Wang Shou-jen's philosophy if his followers had appreciated the close-

ness of his psychology and ethics to his metaphysics. Had his disciples followed the way of intellect and will, as described above, even the development of Wang Ch'i and the school of T'ai-chou would have taken a different course. What a pity that these two subdivisions of Wang Shou-jen's school lost themselves in a wilderness and, rather than plant themselves firmly on the cultivated ground of psychology and ethics, wandered off into mad Ch'anism!

However, I must add that in the Chinese idea of *pen-t'i* or simply *t'i* [reality] there were already contained the seeds of mad Ch'anism. Chinese philosophers who talk about reality mean what is shapeless, soundless, without smell, and what is beyond description and is ineffable. Chinese philosophers also consider knowledge expressed in the form of causal law to be an inferior sort of knowledge. The highest type is self-consciousness, which is complete in itself. The mental habits emphasized in these two characteristics of Chinese metaphysics helped to impregnate the school of Wang Shou-jen with the ideal of reaching a stage where nothing would be relative. This is reality, or the Absolute, or the highest truth. Such would be the justification of those like Wang Ch'i and others who tried to go "beyond good and evil," where there would no longer be relational concepts. Even Ch'ien Te-hung, who kept his feet on empirical ground, conceded that the reality of mind is "beyond good and evil." The idea of *pen-t'i* is, no doubt, an outgrowth of the mixture of Indian and Chinese thought. It was denounced by some Chinese on purely nationalistic grounds or as being mere speculation.

Thus far I have been attempting to explain why the school of Wang Shou-jen declined and fell in China. Incidentally it is interesting to note that before the collapse of the Ming dynasty there was a movement known as the Tung-ling school, which sought to counteract and correct the tendency towards over-speculation of the school of Wang Shou-jen. Needless to say, this Tung-ling school was too weak to spike the downfall of the school of Wang Shou-jen. But what is far more interesting to observe—indeed, what might be classed as one of the remarkable paradoxes of history—is that while the school of Wang Shou-jen became overripe and degenerate in China, it acquired a new lease on life in Japan. To this we must now turn our attention. Let us study the rise of the school of

Ō-Yōmei, (Japanese for Wang Shou-jen) in the Land of the Rising Sun.

About ninety years after Wang Shou-jen's death, Nakae Tōjū (1608-1648) popularized his philosophy in Japan. It is the opinion of G. B. Sansom that Nakae is the founder of the school of O-Yōmei in Japan. There are, however, Japanese sources which indicate that O-Yōmei was known before the time of Nakae Tōjū, for Keigo Ryōan is said to have gone to China prior to the master's death and to have interviewed him. This was in 1507. From that time on, works by Wang Shou-jen as well as those by his great precursor, Lu Chiu-yüan, were studied by Japanese monks in the Five Monasteries. Some essays on Ō-Yōmei's thought must have been published in Japan earlier than Nakae Tōjū. However this may be, there can be no doubt that Nakae was the first man to popularize Ō-Yōmei in the Land of the Rising Sun.

The story of how Wang Shou-jen's philosophy arose in Japan will have meaning only if preceded by a sketch of the historical Confucianist background. Since the period covered by this background is quite long, I shall divide it into three epochs: (1) introduction into Japan of Confucianism; (2) transplantation into Japan of Sung philosophy; (3) rise of the different schools of Confucianism in Japan.

(1) *Introduction into Japan of Confucianism.* The first one to study Chinese books in Japan is said to have been Prince Ujino Wakiiratsuke. He perused the *Lun-yü* and the *Book of a Thousand Characters*. There was this condition, however, that since the native language was like a sweet smile and should never be stained or mixed with an alien tongue, a foreign language should be studied only with the intention of revising it. Even as late as the reign of Bitatsu Tenno, fifteenth Japanese emperor after the introduction of Confucianism into Japan, there was still not one among the ministers who could read a document from Korea written in the Chinese language.

Prince Umayado, the Crown Prince of Sage-Virtue, who gave support to Buddhism transplanted from China, also dispatched students to the Middle Kingdom to investigate Confucianism. The Code of Seventeen Articles which he issued contained such Confucianist sentiments as the demand that there should be harmony

between the higher-ups and those below them. This, indeed, was the first article. But the second article was, "Be reverent to the Three Precious Things of Buddhism." The fourth article, returning to Confucianism, stated that the duty of a superior should be observance of *li*. In this Code, Prince Umayado used the Chinese aphorism: "Let there not be two kings in a country," which in China is accompanied by the further comment, "There is only one sun in heaven."

The forty-second emperor, Mommu Tennō, issued a decree establishing a national academy at the capital and in different localities where the Five Classics and the Four Books were to be required as the official texts. Worship before Confucius in his temple was also inaugurated.

During the succeeding period, called Nara [646-794], students were sent to China, at that time under the T'ang Dynasty, to study various branches of learning such as astronomy, the calendar, military strategy, yin-yang theory, and calligraphy. The official Japanese chronicles, the *Kojiki* and the *Nihon-shoki*, were written after these students returned to their homeland.

From the time of the introduction of Confucianism into Japan until the day when it was spread throughout the kingdom, this originally Chinese doctrine occupied a position midway between Buddhism and native Japanese Shintoism. Those who were taught Confucianism were limited to a certain number of families who handed down their profession of teaching from generation to generation, as hereditary right.

(2) *Transplantation into Japan of Sung Philosophy.* In this second epoch of the preparatory stage for the reception of O-Yōmei's thought into Japan, Buddhist monks played the all-important role of medium through which the books of Sung Neo-Confucianism were brought into the Land of the Rising Sun. One of these monks, Shunjō, whose interview with Yang Chien has already been mentioned, returned to his homeland after thirteen years in China [A.D. 1211] bringing with him 250 books dealing with the Confucian Classics, and a miscellany of 463 other books. He devoted himself to lecturing on the Four Books.

The approximate date of the introduction of Sung philosophy into Japan was somewhere in the middle of the Kamakura period.

The man who initiated the spread of the doctrine of the Ch'eng-Chu school was a Ch'anist monk named Neiissan. But there were many monks who furthered the cause, among them Kokan-zenji, Gen'e-hōin, Musō-kokushi, Shū Shingidō, and Katsura Goryōan. A monk, Gen'e, in the Ashikaga period, a lecturer to Godaigo Tennō, wrote a book entitled *Jinnō Shōtō-ki* [Record of the Orthodox Transmission-Line of the Tennō] which was much under the influence of Chu Hsi's *Tzu-chih T'ung-chien Kang-mu*. During this Ashikaga period, Sung philosophy in Japan was gradually purified of Buddhism and Shintoism. Finally, in 1473 [just one year after the birth of O-Yōmei] a Ch'anist monk named Keian returned from China and introduced a new method of punctuating and interpreting the Five Classics and Four Books. He also commenced the publication, in Japan, of Chu Hsi's new commentaries on the Confucian canon.

Sansom correctly says: "The official philosophy in Japan in the early Tokugawa period was that of Chu Hsi, a leading figure of the important philosophical renaissance which took place in China under the Sung Dynasty. The canon of this school was Chu Hsi's commentary on the works of the Chinese sages, entitled in Japan *Shisho Shinchū* or a *New Commentary of the Four Books*. The teaching of Chu Hsi, it will be remembered, had been studied in the Muromachi period by a small number of learned monks of the Five Monasteries, but it was not until the later sixteenth century that his philosophy became more widely known through the efforts of the scholar named Fujiwara Seigwa (1561-1619)."⁶ Fujiwara was at first a monk and then afterwards a rebel. He it was who first declared the independence of Confucianism from the Buddhist Church. Following in the footsteps of Han Yü and Chu Hsi, he attacked Buddhism because of its tendency to ignore the duties attendant upon human relationships.

Sansom has an interesting comment about the headdress of scholars in Japan. "This curious item of history is highly significant. Hitherto learning had been associated with the Church, and scholars had shaved their heads like priests; but now the Confucian studies were no longer made sport of by learned monks. The Confucian philosophy had an official status, and it may also be regarded as having achieved the position of an established

religion. Confucianism in one form or another displaced Buddhism in the esteem of the educated classes, and Buddhism seems to have surrendered without a struggle."⁷ After Fujiwara Seigwa, Japan entered an era of Confucianism purified of and separated from Buddhism.

(3) *Rise of the Different Schools of Confucianism in Japan.* The Confucianist schools which arose in Japan were the school of Chu Hsi, the school of Wang Shou-jen [Ō-Yōmei], and the "Back to the Ancients!" school. Since it would require too much time and space to give detailed accounts of the lives and teachings of the various scholars of these schools, I shall limit myself to characterizing, in as few words as possible, the main ideas of each sect. The school of Ō-Yōmei, however, since it is the major theme of this chapter, will be reserved for special treatment a little later.

(a) *The School of Chu Hsi* dominated the Tokugawa period (1615-1867). Japanese monks studying the doctrines of Chu Hsi in China, brought them back to their homeland. Certain Japanese scholars appreciated that the great Chinese philosopher's emphasis on human obligations would support the Japanese institution of *Bakufu* and the feudatories, the political set-up whereby the supreme head of the feudal lords usurped the power of the emperor. Such an interpretation would apply, of course, only to the environment and special circumstances of the Japanese; for neither the rise of Sung philosophy in China, nor the theories of Chu Hsi had anything to do with the shogunate or the feudal system in Japan.

Fujiwara Seigwa, as I have already said, was the first to declare the independence of Confucianism from Buddhism and to devote himself to persuading Japanese officialdom to adopt the commentaries of Chu Hsi. This remarkable thinker's basic conviction was the unity of reason and the multiplicity of manifestation. He stressed the "investigation of things." A follower of Chu Hsi, he nonetheless replied when somebody asked him about the difference between Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yüan, that one should study what was common to the two philosophers and not what divided them. In other words, though faithful to Chu Hsi, he was tolerant of Lu and Wang.

When Tokugawa Ieyasu offered him a position in the government, Fujiwara Seigwa refused and recommended his pupil

Hayashi Razan in his place. For himself he preferred a quiet and retired life. Hayashi Razan subsequently became head of the Confucian Academy—a post which was handed down to his descendants for ten generations. It is to this educational institution, the foundations of which were laid in Kyoto, that the strength and spread of the school of Chu Hsi in Japan are to be attributed. Hayashi Razan had the institution moved to Yedo (later called Tokyo). A third and a fourth institution for the study of Chu Hsi were established in Tosa and Mito.

(b) *The School of Ō-Yōmei* was founded by Nakae Tōjū (1608–1648). Originally a champion of Chu Hsi, at the age of thirty-three he turned his enthusiasm to Ō-Yōmei. Nakae Tōjū was called the Sage of Omi or Omi-seijin, and his successor was his pupil Kumazawa Banzan (1619–1691). The school did not enjoy the same uninterrupted development as did that of Chu Hsi. After Kumazawa it almost died, but was revived by Miwa Jissai and later brought to vigorous life by Sato Issai, Ōshio Chūsai, Sakuma Shōzan, and Yoshida Shōin.

(c) Opposed to these two schools of Chinese origin was the “Back to the Ancients” school, which stood for the Japanese tradition—for instance Shintoism, *Bushido* [the Japanese counterpart of European medieval knighthood], and a kind of dynamism in contrast to the quietism of Sung philosophy. This “Back to the Ancients” movement contained some elements which were no part of Confucianism or of such later outgrowths of Confucianism as Chu Hsi and Ō-Yōmei. On the other hand it also was allied, in certain respects, to a movement which may properly be called Confucianist. This was the school founded by Yamaga Soko (1622–1685), an originator of *Bushido*; by Ito Jinsai (1627–1705), a leader in the revival of ancient Japanese literature and an advocate of “Return to Confucius,” or back to the original founder of Confucianism rather than to Chu Hsi; and by Ogyu Sorai (1666–1728), a man who followed Hsun-tzu in the belief human nature is evil and who stressed the importance of practical administration.

Another movement, popular in this age, was Shingaku [mind-learning], sometimes allied to Confucianism, sometimes opposed to it.

What then is the Japanese attitude towards Confucianism or

Neo-Confucianism? First of all, let me make the general observation that the scholars of Japan were strongly eclectic. One might be pro-Chu Hsi, and still not be anti-Ō-Yōmei. Or, the other way around, one might be pro-Ō-Yōmei and still not be anti-Chu Hsi. Second, the Japanese scholars were much less speculative than the Chinese, and much less consistent in theoretical analysis. Thus, they did not follow to the logical end or try to be consistent in any philosophical stand they might decide to take. Third, the scholars of Japan were more interested in loyalty to sovereign and filial duty to parents than in pure speculation and theoretical analysis. Fourth, the Japanese scholars re-interpreted what they had learned from China in the light of their own background with reference to Shintoism, the imperial family, etc. One should not underestimate the Japanese in their ability to preserve Chinese theories and institutions in a singularly pure and beautiful form, as for instance, in the existence of the imperial family through long centuries. The Japanese are a young people, hence vigorous and resolute. This is one of the reasons why Ō-Yōmei has been and still is popular among them.

The contrast between the ultimate destiny of Wang Shou-jen's philosophy in Japan and in its native land is remarkable. In China it degenerated into mad Ch'anism. In the Land of the Rising Sun it played a great role in abolishing the feudal system and uniting the nation under the emperor.

We now return to a more detailed account of the lives and teachings of the Japanese scholars who advocated Ō-Yōmei. As was already mentioned, Nakae Tōjū first popularized him in Japan. Originally a follower of Chu Hsi and deeply interested in the *Ta-hsiieh*, Nakae came upon the dialogues of Wang Ch'i, a disciple of Wang Shou-jen, in his thirty-third year, and was inspired by him. Four years later he acquired the works of the master himself, and thereafter became an enthusiastic supporter of the school of Ō-Yōmei.

Nakae, in interpreting his Chinese teacher, stressed the importance of *liang-chih* as he should, and identified it with God, the highest good, truth, and the ultimate reality. Ō-Yōmei himself might have agreed to this much of the interpretation, but the interpreter added other elements. In an essay about Nakae Tōjū

contributed by Shihata Zingoro to the jubilee publication *Tokugawa-kō keisō shichi ju-nen kinen* [On Confucianism in Modern Japan] there is a diagram in which four factors are represented as being equally basic, namely, heaven, filial duty, intuitive knowledge, and momentary consciousness—the last an expression coined by Wang Ch'i. Now I think it is a logical impropriety to include filial piety—a derivative from intuitive knowledge—as a primordial factor along with the others. Nakae was especially well-known for his filial piety towards his mother, so it is quite understandable that he should have attached so much importance to this virtue.

Nakae was fascinated by the idea of "the great void," which he identified with the idea of God. In his later years he occupied himself with building up the indigenous Japanese tradition of Shintoism. Though a follower of the school of Wang Shou-jen, he considered the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi to be equal to Wang as leaders who illuminated *tao*.

Kumazawa Banzan (1619–1691), the disciple of Nakae Tōjū, was nominally a follower of Wang or O-Yōmei, but in fact he was most interested in practical politics. When asked about the comparative merits of the schools of the brothers Ch'eng, Chu Hsi, Lu Chiu-yüan, and Wang Shou-jen, he answered that they were equally good. This is patent eclecticism. To be sure, his starting point was *liang-chih*, but he was not interested in it as a problem of epistemological analysis. Rather, his interest centered on how it could be applied to questions of the integration of humanity and the universe, synthesis of *ri* [form] and *ch'i* [matter], and common origin of reality and function. He tried to reconcile Shintoism with Confucianism. He was a pioneer in attempting to establish the concept of loyalty to the Japanese sovereign.

After Nakae Tōjū and Kumazawa Banzan, interest in Ō-Yōmei's thought seemed to have subsided for a time. Then Miwa Jissai (1668–1744) stepped forward as its new champion. He was at first a pro-Chu Hsi scholar, but perusal of the *Collected Works of Wang Shou-jen* converted him. He commented on the teaching of Wang's philosophy in the form of four statements which formed the nucleus of his teaching. He interpreted the phrase "investigation of things" in the *Ta-hsüeh* to mean the study of consciousness, and not of entities in the external world. He held that inner reflec-

tion with the purpose of bringing to light what is wrong with one's will was the key to personal cultivation.

The leading roles in expounding Wang Shou-jen's thought just prior to the opening of Japan to the West were played by Sato Issai, Ōshio Chūsai, Sakuma Shōzan [a disciple of Ōshio], and Yoshida Shōin. Sato Issai (1772-1889) was a typical scholar and studied under the Hayashi family which headed the Shohei Academy. Later he became a professor at the institution. A charming anecdote is told of how he was introduced to the writings of Ō-Yōmei. Upon learning the four characters which mean "One arose after falling," he asked his teacher: "Where do these words come from?" The teacher replied: "They appear in the *Collected Works of Wang Shou-jen*."⁸ Thus Ō-Yōmei became known to him, and he was converted into a Wang scholar. His pupils reached the vast number of three thousand.

Here are a few typical lines from his writings: "The *ego* in your dream is yourself. The *ego* in your waking life is yourself. What makes you distinguish between the *ego* in your dream and the *ego* in your waking life? It is your spirit or intellect. This spirit or intellect is your true *ego*. This true *ego* is your consciousness in itself, regardless of whether you are dreaming or awake. It is immortal."⁹

Another passage from Sato Issai: "Mind is bright and not obscured. In it reason is complete, and the manifoldness of things proceeds from it. Where was mind before birth? Where will mind be after death? What is the destiny of mind? Is it alive? Will it die? If one reflects on these problems, one will come to the conclusion that mind is invisible, that it is heaven."¹⁰

In contrast to the scholar Sato Issai was Ōshio Chūsai, a man of an entirely different mold, though also a supporter of the Wang school. Like Sato he studied under the Hayashi family, and his rapid progress was gratifying to his teacher Hayashi Jussai. In his youth he was a local magistrate and he was popular among the people of his district. Upon resigning he devoted himself to the philosophy of Ō-Yōmei, even preaching to the village folk about the doctrine of *liang-chih*. He wrote four books: (1) *Comments on the Old Text of the "Ta-hsüeh"*; (2) *A Confucianist Anthology of the Theory of the Void*; (3) *Diary*; (4) *Commentary on the "Book*

of *Filial Duty*." Ōshio Chūsai's end was tragic. During a famine in Osaka he requested an official to start relief work. The charitable aid, however, was delayed and many people starved. The philosopher sold his private library of twelve hundred books to raise funds, but all he achieved was denouncement by the official. Then he instigated a rebellion, and was defeated. Finally, he burnt himself to death in the forty-fourth year of his age.

An interesting aspect of Japanese cultural life is its attitude after the impact of modern Western thought. Sakuma Shōzan (1811-1864), the best representative of this attitude, proposed that Eastern morality and Western technology could be mutually beneficial. A disciple of Sato Issai, he declared openly that his teacher was on the side of Ō-Yōmei. He did not attach importance to the knowledge-seeking phase, which was an aspect of the philosophical system of Ch'eng and Chu. He maintained that Western scientific study should be considered as supplementary to what the Chinese did not know. As one who was alert to the possibility of mutual aid between Western science and Eastern morality he showed remarkable foresight towards what may eventually become the issue of the impact of Western science on the East.

Finally, let me mention Yoshida Shōin (1830-1859), a disciple of Sakuma Shōzan. He may not be called with full propriety a Wang scholar, but since he was Sakuma Shōzan's pupil he must have come, in considerable measure, under the influence of Ō-Yōmei. He was one of the pioneers who fought for an Open-Door Policy for Japan, and who tried to escape from his homeland while there was still a ban against travelling abroad. Later he was executed. In Tokyo today a shrine stands sacred to his memory. He founded the academy known as Matzushita Sonjuku, where many later statesmen studied under him—such as Prince Ito Hakubun, Marquis Yamagata who built the Japanese army, and Saigo Takamori who led the rebellion in the South-western Campaign.

Yoshida Shōin propounded the following ideas which he thought should be the foundation for Japanese life: (1) Understanding the difference between man and animal, which is based on a sound knowledge of human relations; (2) unity of the emperor and the people; (3) loyalty and filial duty originating from a common

source; (4) courage with righteousness as its moral base; (5) honesty and truthfulness rather than cleverness and shrewdness as the principles of conduct; (6) knowledge of past and present; (7) teachers and friends; (8) martyrdom. This was the platform of the academy Matzushita Sonjuku, the nursery of the talented statesmen who worked for the Meiji reform.

After this reform, when the Japanese recognized the superiority of Western science, democracy, and technology, they tried hard nevertheless to preserve their own tradition, which includes Confucianism. The publication in the thirty-fourth year of Emperor Meiji of the *Nihon Rinri Ihen* [Collection of Japanese Works on Ethics] by the philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō is strong evidence of this appreciation of and devotion to the ancient tradition of the land.

Before concluding, let us look back once more at the effects of Wang Shou-jen's thought upon China and Japan. They are indeed in marked contrast. While it reduced the Chinese academic world to a spiritual chaos, its importation into the Land of the Rising Sun brought spiritual and political vitality. G. B. Sansom writes: "Like Zen, the O-Yōmei philosophy rejected the authority of written works, recommended a practical subjective morality, and insisted upon the intuitive perception of truth to be reached by self-study and self-command. Such doctrines, because they were free from traditionalism and pedantry, have always appealed to the most vigorous and most thoughtful type of Japanese of the upper classes, and it is perhaps because they were dimly aware of this that the *Bakufu* opposed the O-Yōmei school, since independence of mind was not a quality that they could safely encourage. The most celebrated Japanese followers of O-Yōmei were resolute men, of a reforming spirit, and it is noteworthy that the list includes, as well as great scholars, leaders of revolutionary movements like Ōshio, who attacked Osaka at the head of a hungry mob in 1837, and Yoshida Shōin, who broke the exclusion edicts of 1859."¹¹

My explanation of why Wang Shou-jen's philosophy worked out differently in China and Japan is this: The first reason is that the Japanese always stand on solid, empirical ground. They never forget moral values and their own tradition, especially as these concern loyalty and filial duty. They are always on *this* side of

good and evil and never talk about *beyond* good and evil. The second reason is that the interest of the Japanese is less speculative and less metaphysical than is that of the Chinese, so that questions of reality, the absolute, or *pen-t'i* seldom arise. They may on very rare occasions go as far as Ō-Yōmei indicated in his teaching that the reality of mind is beyond good and evil, but the rule is that they do not indulge in speculative thought. The third reason is that in Japan the break of Confucianism from Buddhism was much more complete than in China. Indeed, the two reasons which I have already given may in turn be attributed to this third reason. In China the penetration of Ch'anism into Confucianism in a subtle form during the Ming period was so deep-rooted that it proved impossible to get rid of it. The Chinese interest in *pen-t'i* is an outgrowth of this mixture of Buddhism with Confucianism. The fourth reason is that the Japanese are a young people, most of them in deadly earnest, so that their character is more resolute and ready for action than is that of the Chinese. The Ō-Yōmei doctrine of the unity of knowing and doing has given them a theoretical background for action. Even when they fail they are ready for martyrdom or suicide. This was shown in the cases of Oshio Chūsai and Yoshida Shōin.

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CHAPTER SIX

The Tung-Lin School, Liu Tsung-Chou, and the Writing of Four Histories of Chinese Philosophy

While the school of Wang Shou-jen was going mad Ch'anist, another school, that of Tung-lin, appeared on the scene. Philosophically it was opposed to the Ch'anist speculations of the followers of Wang Shou-jen, and politically it combatted the corrupt government of the closing days of the Ming Dynasty. The Tung-lin group consisted of a number of friends who held similar philosophical views but who constituted at the same time a political party.

The name "Tung-lin" is derived from the name of an academy where these philosophical and political friends assembled. Founded in the Sung Dynasty by Yang Shih, a disciple of the Ch'eng brothers, it stood originally in Wu-hsi District of Kiangsu Province, and was afterwards rebuilt by Ku Hsien-ch'eng, his brother Ku Yüan-ch'eng, and Kao Ching-yeh. A rallying place for philosophical debate and political activity, it counted more than three hundred among its members, and several thousands among its sympathizers, which is why it can be called a political party as well as a philosophical school.

The group was politically significant during the last years of the Ming Dynasty. But its significance is not understandable unless one knows something of the political situation of that time. What then was the situation from 1573 to 1644? Four emperors Shentsung, Kuang-tsung, Hsi-tsung, and Ssu-tsung reigned during this period. It was marked by three important legal cases, namely, the Case of the Cudgel-Blow, the Case of the Red Pills, and the Case of the Removal from the Palace.

Shen-tsung, in the early years of his reign, was considered a good ruler. His appointment of Chang Chü-cheng as prime minister was a good choice, for Chang repulsed an invasion of a northern tribe called Yeh-ta, made several reforms in the financial administration, and reviewed the efficiency of the civil servants. But he was impeached after being in power for fifteen years. Thereupon Shen-tsung failed to hold court for two decades and even neglected to make sacrificial offerings at his ancestral temple or at the Temple of Heaven, where it was the duty of the imperial ruler to appear annually.

To come back now to the three cases. The Case of the Cudgel-Blow involved the heir apparent. Emperor Shen-tsung had two concubines, Princess Wang Kung and Princess Cheng Kuei. The first bore him a son named Ch'ang-lo, and the second bore him two younger sons; but after this third son was born, Princess Cheng Kuei was promoted within the ranks of the concubines. Thereupon the censors became suspicious that his majesty might prefer one of the sons of Princess Cheng Kuei to his oldest son, Ch'ang-lo, and many memorials were written requesting him to settle the question of his successor forthwith. After protracted discussion, Prince Ch'ang-lo was named, and the problem was solved. However in 1615, that is, in the forty-third year of Shen-tsung's reign, a man from Soochow named Chang Ch'ai, bearing a plumtree cudgel, came to Prince Ch'ang-lo's palace and struck the eunuch doorkeeper. The incident cast an unfavorable light upon Princess Cheng Kuei. There was suspicion that she might have even instigated Chang Ch'ai to murder the heir apparent. Several ministers submitted memorials demanding an investigation of the princess and her brother, Cheng Kuo-t'ai. In the meantime, she went directly to Prince Ch'ang-lo and cleared herself. The prince expressed the view that the investigation would be pointless, and so the Case of the Cudgel-Blow was closed.

Eventually Prince Ch'ang-lo ascended the throne as Emperor Kuang-tsung, but a few days later he fell sick. He then took medicine, but that only made matters worse. On the recommendation of the prime minister, Fang Ts'ung-che, a high official named Li K'o-shao offered him a red pill. The first red pill brought some improvement, but the second red pill killed the emperor. This gave

rise to the Case of the Red Pills, and the censors had to determine who was responsible for offering his majesty this fatal medicine.

But to return to Kuang-tsung's predecessor, Emperor Shentung, during his last illness Princess Chen Kuei attended him, at the Ch'ien-Ch'ing Palace, as his nurse. She remained there after his death. The censors took exception to this. It was not long before they complained that she was the cause of the illness of Shentung's successor, former Prince Ch'ang-lo, later Emperor Kuang-tsung. But Princess Cheng Kuei was not the only one who persisted in her desire to remain at the Ch'ien-ch'ing Palace. After Kuang-tsung's death, his favorite concubine, Li, wanted to do the same thing. But the censors decided that since she was not the mother of the next emperor, Hsi-tsung, she had no right to live there, and she was requested to leave. This rather long drawn-out case is known as the Case of the Removal from the Palace.

These three cases, as we may imagine, were relatively unimportant affairs dealing with the domestic affairs of the imperial family. But since, in those days, no boundary line was drawn between affairs of the state and the family affairs of the emperors, ministers and censors were under the necessity of discussing such matters as if they were questions of great national moment. The Tung-lin school was drawn into this uncomfortable situation, and had to make the best of it. The position it took in regard to the three cases shall be explained later.

When Kuang-tsung's successor, Hsi-tsung, ascended the throne, and when the three cases were at an end, there appeared on the political stage a eunuch named Wei Tsung-hsien. A rascal even in boyhood, he was fond of horseback riding and archery. When he lost at gambling and was treated roughly, he made a eunuch of himself in order to get a job as servant-boy at the palace. First he worked as cook to Hsi-tsung's mother. Later he was appointed supervisor of the Eastern Quarter in charge of investigations, arrests, and punishments. He had a collaborator, the emperor's wet-nurse, named K'o Shih. Now it happened that Hsi-tsung was interested in little else than carpentry and painting, and spent every day among his saws, chisels, and paints. Whenever Wei Tsung-hsien went to him to discuss memorials about state affairs, his majesty always told him that since he understood everything

he could decide matters for himself. The result was that the eunuch had complete freedom of action. He trained an army of ten-thousand eunuchs, equipping them with weapons. He murdered Kuang-tsung's concubine, and he performed an abortion on the empress which made her barren. A chief censor named Yang Lien finally had to send a memorial to the emperor, listing twenty-four crimes committed by Wei Tsung-hsien. One hundred other good citizens, some members of the Tung-lin School, also submitted memorials impeaching the eunuch. This aroused the wrath of Wei. Though many of the writers of these memorials were not members of the Tung-lin School, they were put under the same category. A list of 108 alleged supporters of the school was published under a blacklist to be dismissed from office. A proposal was made to examine those who had given advice regarding the disposition of the three cases, which was intended to lend support to the view that members of the Tung-lin School had given poor advice. Other Tung-lin members were accused of accepting bribes from the commander-in-chief in Liaotung who fought the Manchus. Even a censor named Chang No, in order to ingratiate himself with the powerful eunuch Wei Tsung-hsien, suggested that the Tung-lin Academy be demolished, along with all other academies in the empire. Memorials concerning the three cases were collected and put in book form under the title *Important Documents of Three Dynasties* which condemned the Tung-lin School. The eunuch became so powerful that people trembled before him, and those who were blessed by his favor submitted memorials describing his virtues as being equal to those of Confucius. In fact while still alive, Wei had his tablet actually placed next to that of Confucius. When Emperor Hsi-tsung died, he was succeeded by his brother, Yuchiao, as Emperor Ni-tsung or Ch'ung-cheng, who was the last of the Ming sovereigns to rule over China. The new emperor knew well what evil the eunuch had done to the dynasty, and after reading the memorials of impeachment which came pouring in against him ordered his arrest. Wei committed suicide. The wet-nurse, K'o Shih, was executed. The book *Important Documents of the Three Dynasties* was destroyed. Those who had been accused were granted posthumous honors. Thus concluded the chapter of Wei Tsung-hsien.

Let us now consider the political views of the members of the Tung-lin School. The leader of the school, Ku Hsien-cheng, expressed his views ably in a passage where he spoke of public opinion and the question of right and wrong. Here are some pertinent remarks: [His words imply a criticism of philosophical conferences where men like Wang Ch'i, Hsü Fu-yüan, and Chou Ju-teng participated but failed to express approval or disapproval in regard to political questions of the day.] "Those who work in the central government do not have the emperor's safety in mind; those who are the governors of provinces do not have the people's welfare in mind; those who live by river-banks or lake-shores, or in forests, and who discuss philosophical problems do not have the moral climate in mind. All these men, in spite of their contributions in other respects, cannot be considered as people of noble character."¹ These words were written to stimulate students of philosophy to show an active interest in political problems. They are in keeping with the tradition of Chinese scholars fighting for freedom of conscience and press, from the time of Ch'eng I in the Northern Sung Dynasty, and Chu Hsi in the Southern Sung Dynasty. The Tung-lin school is particularly noteworthy because its political activities were carried on by a group of men uninterruptedly.

A few anecdotes about some of its leading members may also throw light on the Tung-lin School.

(a) *Ku Hsien-cheng*. When Emperor Shen-tsung simultaneously conferred the title prince on all three of his sons, Ku protested that as emperor he represented heaven and should only give his eldest son the title heir apparent. To confer on all three merely the title of prince, would establish no order of priority among them, so that eventually there would be a struggle among them for the throne. What Ku really had in mind is not entirely clear. The fact is that Shen-tsung had no son by the empress and that all three sons were by concubines. But what Ku wished to impress upon the emperor was that, even so, the assignment of the heir apparent's position should be made to the eldest son in accordance with the established tradition of the monarchy. That Ku Hsien-cheng could submit a memorial of this kind which in effect meddled with the family affairs of the sovereign shows that he was a man of supreme moral courage.

Being very straightforward, Ku tried to put good men in power. It was told that once the prime minister said to him: "There is a strange thing indeed! And what the cabinet considered to be right was found by public opinion to be wrong. And what the cabinet considered to be wrong was found by public opinion to be right." Ku retorted: "With us also there is a strange thing! What was considered to be right by public opinion was found by the cabinet to be wrong. And what was considered to be wrong by public opinion was found by the cabinet to be right."² The two men separated after this exchange of wit. Another occasion of argument over the choice of men occurred. Ku as usual took a different stand from the officials and was dismissed.

Ku Hsien-cheng returned to his native district upon dismissal and began rebuilding the Tung-lin Academy where not only philosophical problems were discussed, but sharp criticism was directed against the government and its leading officials. This institution became the model for other districts, many of which established academies of their own where Ku was invited to lecture. He became the rallying point of the people when they wished to express approval and disapproval of government policy. As the Tung-lin School grew in strength and other groups were organized to combat it, party strife became bitter. As I said before, after the eunuch Wei Tsung-hsien became powerful, he dismissed good men from government service simply by pinning the label "Tung-lin School" on them.

(b) *Ch'ien I-pen*. An outspoken man like Ku Hsien-cheng, Ch'ien I-pen submitted a memorial to the emperor in which he listed ten weak points of the prime minister. How plain his words were may be seen from the following: "The first important thing for an emperor to do is to choose his prime minister. But the choice of a prime minister depends upon the character of the emperor himself. A country's foundation should not be played with as if it were a toy. Confucius mentioned nine standards of measurement for a king, among which personal cultivation and choice of good men were at the top of the list. If an emperor is in constant contact with sycophants and flattering women, or if he is greedy for wealth, his mind will never be clean and pure, nor will his body be strong. Furthermore, if the woman he loves has the beauty

of a Pao Ssu and the ingratiating skill of a Li Chi, his mind will be soft and befuddled. If you yourself do not have a sturdy character, how can you find the right men for government?"³ Ch'ien was of course dismissed because of this straightforwardness. He joined the Tung-lin Academy and shared in the work of teaching with Ku Hsien-cheng.

(c) *Sun Shen-hsing*. It was Sun who, during the Case of the Red Pills, charged the prime minister Fang Ts'ung-che with the responsibility for the fatal prescription. He conducted the judicial investigation according to the yardstick of the *Spring and Autumn Annals* of Confucius, saying: "According to the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, the Duke of Hsü died after taking medicine from his son; whereupon the son committed suicide. In the *Annals* it is recorded that the son murdered the father. In the case of Kuang-tsung, Fang Ts'ung-che should have done away with himself long ago; but instead he only sent Li K'o-shao home, the man who had administered the pills. Fang had no intention of murdering the emperor, yet the fact remains that there was a killing. He might escape the epithet 'killer'; but there was no escape from the fact of killing. So it should be recorded: 'After Fang offered him two pills, the emperor immediately died.'"⁴ At the time of the judicial investigation both Li K'o-shao and Fang Ts'ung-che were soundly hated by everybody at court, so Sun Shen-hsing's document was much applauded.

(d) *Kao P'an-lung*. After impeaching the prime minister Wang Hsi-chieh, Kao was dismissed and sent home. Then followed thirty years of retirement, but later he was recalled to fill a high position in the Imperial Department of the Cuisine. When the Case of the Cudgel-Blow came up, he accused Chen Kuo-t'ai, brother of Princess Cheng Kuei, as a conspirator behind the scene. But the emperor was dissatisfied with Kao's memorial; it would have placed him in an awkward position in regard to the family of the princess who had been his father's favorite concubine. Kao also saw a connection between the Case of the Cudgel-Blow and the Case of the Red Pills. His conviction was that Li K'o-shao and Fang Ts'ung-che, the murderers of Emperor Kuang-tsung, worked hand in glove with the family of Princess Cheng Kuei. The only reason why Kao was not punished for his memorial was that the prime minister and

other ministers appealed on his behalf. But Kao was irrepressible. Later he submitted another memorial accusing a censor, Ts'ui Ch'eng-hsiu, of receiving bribes. Ts'ui happened to be a favorite of the powerful eunuch, Wei Tsung-hsien, with the result that a gendarme was sent to arrest the author of the memorial. Kao, however, anticipated seizure by drowning himself in a pond at home. Thus cheated, Ts'ui took revenge by dragging Kao's son off to prison.

Hitherto the Tung-lin School anecdotes have been concerned with one or more of the famous three cases. However, members of this school were involved in other matters as well. For instance, several of them suffered under the eunuch Wei Tsung-hsien while he enjoyed the favor of Emperor Hsi-tsung. On one occasion, when the eunuch wished to extend his power over the government, he arranged that a confederate, Wei Kuang-wei, approach a friend of the Tung-lin School, named Chao Nan-hsing, to enlist his collaboration. Chao, however, instead of receiving the eunuch's representative, placed several of his own friends in the government. This, of course, infuriated the eunuch and his cohorts. Nevertheless, Wei Tsung-hsien was so well entrenched that even when the censor Yang Lien submitted the memorial accusing him of twenty-four crimes, he did no more than run to the emperor and beg for his mercy. Hsi-tsung treated him as if nothing had happened, and Yang Lien was reproved. The battle was an uneven one. Wei's confederate, Wei Kuang-wei, later drew up a list of names of more than a hundred persons, mostly Tung-lin associates, every one of whom was dismissed from official position, and a few of them even had their property confiscated. At this point it is necessary to revert to the three cases if we wish to understand the political situation during these last days of the Ming Dynasty. Wei Tsung-hsien contrived to have the three cases re-introduced for additional review—his motive being, of course, to show that members of the Tung-lin School were responsible for all the bad advice received during the prosecution of these cases. We have had occasion already to refer to the anti-Tung-lin compilation of reviews concerned with the three cases, the *Important Documents of the Three Dynasties*. By this means Wei Tsung-hsien hoped to evict all members of the school from government service. Their names were

posted in public places throughout the empire and they were treated as subversives.

Then Emperor Hsi-tsung died. The eunuch took one step too many by attempting to usurp the Ming throne. Fortunately, the new emperor, Ch'ung-cheng, stepped in and did away with him. By this time the deterioration of Ming politics and the penetration of the Manchus had gone so far that collapse of the dynasty was inevitable.

Some remarks from Huang Tsung-hsi, author of the *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*, are apropos, since they offer an evaluation of the Tung-lin School. "Those," wrote Huang, "who gave advice on the question of the heir apparent were labeled members of the Tung-lin School. Those who disclosed the corruption of the Examination Halls were called members of the Tung-lin. Those, of course, who attacked the party of the eunuch Wei Tsung-hsien were also labeled Tung-lin. . . . Any opinion which was on the right track, or any person who did not conform to the wishes of the eunuch Wei, was charged with being inspired by the Tung-lin. It was as if the Tung-lin group had spread everywhere and had lived many generations. How unfortunate it is that this school was so accused! But was it the deliberate intention of the Tung-lin School to become the target of attack? No, this was not the school's intention. Mean and petty men made it the target of attack. Some said that the Tung-lin School, as the fountain of public opinion, became a school of martyrs. According to Confucius, 'The *tao* of men of noble character is like a pillar.' Public opinion is the pillar of mankind. Confucius' criticism of Tsang's usurpation and of the family Chi for offering sacrifices to the mountain T'ai Shan was a kind of public opinion. As soon as public opinion ceased to be effective, then petitions in favor of Wang Mang, the Han Dynasty usurper, and of the eunuch Wei, began pouring in. Therefore, public opinion, which mean men hate, is like a dam that stops the flood of the Yellow River. During the period prior to the accession of emperors Hsi-tsung and Ni-tsung (Ch'ung-cheng), who were the men ready to sacrifice their lives for the enthronement of these emperors? Were they not members of the Tung-lin School? In the last few decades the brave people who have been willing even

to sacrifice their wives and children, and the weak who have been ready to be buried, were they not members of the Tung-lin School? Such was the spirit of loyalty to the Ming Dynasty—a spirit which was superior to that of any other dynasty. And this spirit was the product of the educational labors of the Tung-lin School. Its teachers and pupils bled for the purification of the world. Yet vituperation has been heaped upon them, which seems to me to be unjust and deplorable.”⁵

Let us now pass on to the philosophical teachings of the Tung-lin School. Because the members of this group were in a position to see the immediate consequences of the doctrines of Wang Ch’i and the Tai-chou School, they conceived a kind of antagonistic attitude towards Wang Shou-jen and his followers, or, at least, they set in motion a desire to revise their teachings.

The targets against which they directed their attack were, first, Wang Shou-jen’s theory of “beyond good and evil,” i.e., his theory of reality in the absolute sense; second, the doctrine of the separability of reality from its functions. Contrary to this view, the philosophers of the Tung-lin School held that moral value, reality, or mind itself, or the reality of mind, cannot be dealt with separately from disciplinary work (in other words, from its functional or operational aspect) and that this disciplinary work should be performed in one’s own mind. A third target at which the Tung-lin thinkers hurled their weapons was the theory of the school of Sung philosophy that essential nature is distinct from physical nature. These three points I shall now illustrate, or explain, by citing the opinions of leading members of the Tung-lin School.

In a letter which Ku Hsien-cheng wrote to Li Meng-pai, he said: “The teaching of the former sages was to instruct people how to do good and how to eliminate evil. To do good is to do the inherent; to eliminate evil is to do away with what ought not to be. The principle involved here is the sort of principle which is the same whether it is applied to the theory of reality or to disciplinary work. Wang Yang-ming often said that one should do good and eliminate evil; yet elsewhere he also used the phrase, ‘beyond good and evil.’ In such confusion, were one to believe in the latter, one would have to forget the former.

“As long as Wang’s theory is that the reality of mind knows

neither good nor bad, then it is clear that neither is inherent in ourselves, and each is attached merely to the surface of our consciousness. Then, if the idea of good or evil is merely something on the surface of our consciousness, this idea becomes an obstacle to understanding the theory of reality. And the choice of what is good and bad must be a question of no importance . . . Wang Shou-jen says that while the Statement of the Four Non-existents is for men of high intelligence, the Statement of the Four Existents is for men of low intelligence. He intended to keep the idea of doing good and avoiding evil, but at the same time he tried to hold to the notion of going 'beyond good and evil.' He thus created a dilemma. He wished both to obliterate and to maintain the distinction between good and evil . . . If one clings to the former horn of the dilemma—doing good and avoiding evil—one neglects the latter horn—going 'beyond good and evil.' Contrariwise, if one clings to the latter horn, the former horn is naturally out of the picture."⁶

The passage just quoted gives a clear idea of how basic to the work of the Tung-lin School was the assault on the theory of "beyond good and evil."

In close connection with this theory of "beyond good and evil" was the second target at which the Tung-lin philosophers directed their attack. They believed that reality and its functions or disciplinary work are inseparable.

During the celebrated Conversation at Heaven Fountain Bridge, Wang Shou-jen said that while the Statement of the Four Non-existents refers to the theory of reality, the Statement of the Four Existents refers to the theory of disciplinary work—as if the former statement were on a higher level, and the latter statement on a lower level; the former being the proper way, while the latter was not. Such teaching leads students to believe that one should be more attentive to the theory of reality than to disciplinary work—a situation which caused Ku Hsien-cheng to declare that if Wang Shou-jen were alive to-day he would worry about this interpretation of his doctrine. Kao Ching-yeh said: "One should not fret that the theory of reality cannot be clearly understood. Rather, one should fret that disciplinary work can be overlooked at any time."⁷

Since reality of mind is the product of cultivation and purification of mind, it is not something ready-made, but is the result of discipline. The philosophers of the Tung-lin School preferred to say that to know the reality of mind is itself a kind of disciplinary work. Or, in other words, where there is reality there is discipline; and where there is no discipline, there reality also disappears. According to Shih Meng-lin: "Nowadays professors of philosophy point out only 'the momentary' to the students. If one asks: 'What do you mean by the momentary?' the answer is 'Something you do at the *moment* that it is required, such as eating when you feel hungry, or sleeping when you feel tired.' This kind of behavior goes on so naturally that no discipline is required. According to this popular teaching, emphasis on discipline is superfluous because it runs counter to reality. Such naturalism can only lead to spiritual flabbiness, and it is a pit for people to fall into. But in my view, reality and disciplinary work are inseparable. As long as there is reality, there is also the need of discipline; and as soon as there is no discipline, then there is no reality. When Fan Ch'ih inquired of Confucius: 'What is *jen*?' his question was concerned with the nature of *jen* itself [the reality of *jen*, as it were]. Confucius' reply, however, referred to disciplinary work. 'In private life,' he said, 'one should be decent; in management of affairs one should be attentive; in intercourse with others one should be faithful. Now, one cannot live apart from private life, management of affairs, and intercourse with others . . . Decency, attentiveness, and faithfulness are part of disciplinary work, or personal cultivation. Nevertheless, they constitute the reality of mind. Here is good evidence that discipline and reality are inseparable; and it also gives a hint as to the real meaning of 'momentariness' and the true significance of naturalism. To eat when one feels hungry and to sleep when one feels tired, are the impulses which we share with animals. If such impulses are to be taken as constituting "momentariness" and naturalism, then human life is brought down to the level of animal life . . . When Li Chih in his lectures at Nanking so stressed 'momentariness' and naturalism as to give the impression that every man is a ready-made sage, he implied that knowledge-seeking is something superfluous, and that such terms as 'loyalty,' 'filialness,' 'righteousness,' and 'stamina' refer to mere artificialities

... His teaching became very popular because it was easy to understand, and it led many people astray. When finally he was impeached and imprisoned, distressed and not knowing what to do, he stabbed himself to death. His suicide, however, cannot be regarded as martyrdom, for he died neither for the cause of *jen* nor for the cause of *i*.”⁸ In this passage Shih Meng-lin tells us that in one's life one must encounter many impassés, and that it is only by disciplinary work that one can make one's character as bright and enduring as gold. His point is also that to talk about reality is not to attain it.

In the wake of the theory of the interrelation between reality and function there follows another argument of the Tung-lin School, which maintained that essential nature cannot be separated from physical nature. A leading member of the school, Ch'ien I-pen, wrote: “One knows that what is called ‘nature’ comes with birth. But does one know that what daily grows is also properly called ‘nature’? If one understands by ‘nature’ what comes with birth, but overlooks what grows daily namely, habits—one reduces man to the level of animals.”⁹ And Sun Shen-hsing wrote: “Nobody believes that the ‘nature’ of a grain of wheat depends upon the fertility of the soil, the quantity of rain, and the human environment. So-called ‘physical nature’ comes after birth. Moreover, the grain's shape, endowed by heaven and earth, and its adaptation to changes in the human environment, are just as important as the fertility of the soil, the amount of rain, and the human surroundings. These last three items, according to Confucius, come under the rubric of habits. But for some reason which I cannot understand this terminology of Confucius has now been dropped, and the name ‘physical nature’ has been substituted for it. When one says that ‘essential nature’ is good, it follows that ‘physical nature’ must be good, too. Take for example a grain of wheat. That it has vitality is ‘nature’; that it grows is ‘physical nature.’ How can one say that the self-same grain is divisible into two parts, one ‘essential,’ one ‘physical,’ and that the former is good while the latter is bad?”¹⁰

Since the philosophers of the Tung-lin School believed that so-called ‘nature’ is inseparable from the physical, their view differed from that of the Sung philosophers, who held that the

'physical' part should not be treated as 'nature.' For the Tung-lin School, 'essential nature' is endowed by heaven; so also is 'physical nature.' Both constitute 'nature.' Thus it is meaningless to say that one part is good while the other is evil. The Sung philosophers' attribution of all human imperfection to 'physical nature' was regarded by the Tung-lin School as a sign that the Sung thinkers were midway between Mencius, who believed human nature to be good, and Hsün-tzu, who believed it to be evil. This comment of the Tung-lin thinkers was a mild reproach against the Sung School philosophers for not adhering strictly to the doctrine of Mencius.

The general trend of the Tung-lin School was, as has been explained above, to oppose the theory of "beyond good and evil," and on the contrary, to defend strongly the distinction between good and evil, and to stress the importance of disciplinary effort and the physical aspect of "nature"—all of which shows plainly how far removed the Tung-lin School was from the metaphysical and speculative attitude of Wang Shou-jen and his followers. The Tung-lin thinkers sought positive and solid grounds. This was a new turn in the philosophical road at the end of the Ming Dynasty, and it continued into the Ch'ing Dynasty, of which more will be said in later chapters.

But before closing the present chapter I should like to discuss Liu Tsung-chou, the teacher of Huang Tsung-hsi whom I have frequently cited as the author of the *Philosophical Records of the Sung, Yuan, and Ming Scholars*. In these *Records* Liu holds a conspicuous place, for he is considered the last of the philosophical giants of the Ming Dynasty. Since he was sympathetic towards the Tung-lin School and was one of those who impeached the eunuch Wei Tsung-hsien, he is fittingly discussed in this chapter.

If Liu Tsung-chou is not considered an opponent of Wang Shou-jen, he must at least be regarded as a revisionist of Wang's school, one who tried to save what was good in Wang's philosophy. Huang Tsung-hsi, in his *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*, included the *Trustworthy Record of Wang Shou-jen*, an anthology from Wang's writings and conversations, compiled by Liu Tsung-chou. This anthology provides an interpretation of the thought of Wang Shou-jen from the point of view of Liu Tsung-chou, who was interested in refuting what to him were false

interpretations by Wang Ch'i, Wang Ken, and others. By inserting this *Trustworthy Record* in his chapter on Wang Shou-jen, Huang Tsung-hsi gave Liu Tsung-chou the effective role of a revisionist, rescuing what was worthwhile in the philosophy of Wang Shou-jen.

What was Liu Tsung-chou's revisionist work? On the one hand, he defended the solid and profound elements in Wang Shou-jen's philosophy; on the other hand, he eliminated what appeared to be mad Ch'anism. But let us betake ourselves to Liu's own words, and see to what extent he differed from him.

Liu was of the opinion that Wang Shou-jen's starting-point—that mind is reason, or intuitive knowledge—was sound, but that Wang Ch'i's elaboration was mistaken. According to Liu, the center of gravity should be mind actually put under control, not just talk about mind in itself. The kernel of Liu's philosophy is expressed in the formula: "vigilance in solitude." When one is by one's self, and no one else sees how one lives, let one learn from one's own conscience whether what one has in mind is right or wrong. Then, in such solitude, one may carry out what is right in accordance with the dictates of one's conscience, or, in Chinese terminology, in accordance with one's solitary knowing. Solitary knowing, thus, is nothing other than *liang-chih*, which I have discussed at length in my analysis of Wang Shou-jen's thought. The following is an essay by Liu Tsung-chou entitled "Vigilance in Solitude."

"The scholarship of a man of noble character is ultimately for the good of the world, though at first it is for his own country. Before he works for his own country, however, he must make a beginning by regulating his family and cultivating himself. In order to cultivate himself, he must exercise his mind, his will, and his faculty of knowing. Farther back than this he cannot go, because now he has arrived at the place which is innermost and most subtle. It is called 'the solitary.' What is 'the solitary'? It is the innermost. On the one hand, nothing is there. On the other hand, everything is there. It is the focal-point of integration for all that is best. The text, 'Realization of knowledge lies in the investigation of things,' is an allusion to work on the solitary self. The solitary self is the source of all things in the world. Vigilance over self is the first step in the so-called 'investigation of things.'

"The cultivation of a man of noble character does not lie in isolating himself from social intercourse. He cannot become silent without talking to the people; he cannot cease hearing and seeing without being in contact with the world. Yet, when he talks to the world it is not for the sake of being heard by the people, but it is to be in accordance with how he hears himself. He acts, but not for the sake of being seen by others, but to be in accordance with how he sees himself. Hearing himself and seeing himself is a way of saying that he knows himself.

"To attain self-knowledge one should keep one's mind at its culminating point, at rest, in tranquillity, at ease, in the condition of being able to think. This is the maximum of vigilance.

"'Vigilance in solitude,' from one point of view, means the work of making will true, although at the same time it also means the work of investigation of things. Hence, the gist of the *Great Learning* is 'vigilance in solitude.'" ¹¹

Thus far Liu Tsung-chou reveals himself as a disciple of Wang Shou-jen, because, as I have already noted, solitary knowing is only another name for *liang-chih*, by which one is able to know right and wrong. Wang Shou-jen himself said clearly that "vigilance in solitude" means the same as "realization of intuitive knowledge!"

But we may trace Liu and Wang's identity of viewpoint still farther. Liu explained the phrase "investigation of things" in an idealistic way which likewise agrees with that of Wang Shou-jen. Liu wrote:

"In the universe there are all kinds of things. Distributively speaking, heaven is a thing, earth is a thing, and each object is a thing. In a generic sense, heaven, earth, and all things constitute One, monistically conceived. This monistically conceived One is, at the time of primordality, non-being. Non-being is the highest reason, unparticularized in particular things, the highest good, of which mind is the storehouse. However, though reason is not particularized in things, it must manifest itself in the phenomenal world. When it is heard, it is a sound; when it is seen, it is a color or shape. These all are things, yet they come under mind. When the ear hears a sound, it can distinguish whether the sound is heavy or light, which means that mind controls the sense of hearing. When the eye sees a color, it can distinguish whether the color is

black or white, which means that mind controls the sense of seeing. Thus, the senses are under the governance of the bright and clear mind. In the final analysis, the criterion of mind is intuitive knowledge, intuitive knowledge being to things what a mirror is to objects reflected, or what a scale is to weights, or what a T-square or compass is to squares and circles. A mirror cannot reflect without objects to be reflected; a scale cannot weigh without things to be weighed; a compass or T-square cannot determine squareness or circularity without objects to be measured. Therefore, it is said: 'realization of knowledge lies in the investigation of things.'

"However, to say that it is mind which applies the power of hearing is not to say that mind hears everything. Yet mind, hearing, knows what the highest good is. And to say that it is mind which applies the power of seeing is not to say that mind sees everything. Yet mind, seeing, knows what the highest good is. To hear what the highest good is means that inaudibility is in the background, and to see what the highest good is means that invisibility is in the background. Thus we reach the unknowable. Therefore, it is said in the *Doctrine of the Mean*: 'A man of noble character is cautious before the invisible, and fearful before the inaudible . . . when he is motionless he has a sense of reverence, and when he is speechless he has a feeling of truthfulness.' This is the kernel of the meaning of 'vigilance in solitude' . . ." ¹²

Thus far Liu Tsung-chou is still on the side of Wang Shou-jen, because he has abandoned mere talk about reality and has imposed a task upon his mind in the face of the inaudible and invisible.

Another essay by this philosopher is entitled *Hunting for Externals*. A warning to scholars overly interested in career, wealth, honor, and satisfaction of desires, it is, at the same time, advice to return to themselves. Following are some excerpts:

"I discover that the key to all kinds of evil on the part of the scholar is 'hunting for externals' . . . Everyone after birth is necessarily tied up with the environment of external things. One's efforts are mostly wasted in trying to gain what is outside. I like to advise those who are interested in *tao* to withdraw all these efforts to acquire externals and to apply themselves to the cultiva-

tion of self." Liu then proceeds to discuss the problem of self in much the same manner as did William James in his *Principles of Psychology*. "It is possible," continues Liu, "that when one returns to one's self, one does not recognize what one's self is. One may, in the first place, mistake one's physical body for one's self. Or, going a little farther, one may mistake one's mind for one's self. Indeed, mind is often confused with what one hears, or with the talk on one's lips. When told that one is mistaken, one may reply: 'I understand self to be what is meant in discussions of human nature and divine order.' But the fact is that what is meant in discussions of human nature and divine order is of the same nature as topics of philology, such as terms, objects, phenomena, and numbers. Irrespective of what one hunts after—whether the physical body, the five senses, or the topics of philology—it is all external. When the direction of one's efforts is external, one can get only externals. One's daily life is on the external surface—just like one's daily meals; so also with one's speaking and silence. Even one's spiritual nursing and inner reflection must be on the external surface. Learning of this kind cannot lead to attainment of *tao*."

"Ordinarily college study is the stepping stone to a civil service career, and the purpose of a civil service career is to acquire money and honor—the highest being the premiership. Even when one shows one's self to have a strong character, or when one writes with a good style, one's aim is merely to win external fame. The pursuit of fame is one of the evils of 'hunting after externals.'"

"My advice is to work for the real self. All effort should be directed to the self which is one's innermost being. The real self has nothing to do with the physical body. The real self's mind has nothing to do with what can be heard and seen by ears and eyes. Human nature has nothing to do with the topics of philological study: terms, objects, etc. The real self is inaudible and invisible. If one grasps this idea, though one's mode of living, one's speech, and one's movements, may be no different from what they would have been otherwise, yet one's efforts are indeed directed towards the real self and one no longer aims at career, wealth, literature, or strong character. Then one's accomplishments are genuine acquisitions for one's real being."

"*Tao* knows no difference between inside and outside. But the direction of one's mind may be towards inside or outside. If towards the inside, one will be deep-rooted, and will be developed well. Therefore, it is said in the *Doctrine of the Mean*: 'The way of the man of noble character is to prefer concealment of his virtue, while it daily becomes more illustrious.' But if, on the contrary, one's mind is directed towards the outside, the more one acquires the greater will be one's disaster. Therefore, it is said in the same book: 'The way of the mean man is to seek notoriety, while he daily goes more and more to ruin.' Which way does the scholar go? I hope that he has a clear mind."¹³

On the whole, Liu Tsung-chou's thought-system was within the framework of Wang Shou-jen's mind, reason, and *liang-chih*. Yet Liu trimmed it in such a way that the ontological speculations in which Wang Ch'i and others indulged were avoided. Liu's advice was to retreat to the innermost self, in other words, to "vigilance in solitude." His counsel was, in Chinese terminology, to "penetrate into the inner kernel." And so, Liu Tsung-chou was considered a giant among the Ming scholars.

There were certain other respects in which Liu, as a contemporary of the Tung-lin School, shared with that group in the interpretation of the doctrine of the inseparability of reality and function and certain opinions about *tao* (the metaphysical) and *ch'i* (the physical). But these we shall not go into.

Liu Tsung-chou's life was characterized by down-right honesty and straightforwardness, as is well exemplified in his memorials to the emperor, and was crowned by martyrdom after the fall of the city of Hangchow when he fasted for twenty-three days. He was one of the hundreds who refused to live under Manchu rule. Liu's death ended not only his personal life but also closed the most brilliant chapter in the philosophy of mind.

It is of interest to note, however, that this very awareness of the close of an era in Ming thought aroused scholars to the need for reviewing Chinese philosophy in its entirety. This may be the reason for the appearance of four histories of Chinese philosophy, all planned and written at this time except for the last, which was not completed until about the middle of the nineteenth century. The four histories of Chinese philosophy are as follows:

- A. Chou Ju-teng (1547-1626): *Authoritative Message of the Science of Sagehood* (*Sheng-hsüeh Tsung chuan*). Finished in 1605; published in 1606.
- B. Sun Ch'i-feng (1584-1675): *Authoritative Record of the Philosophy of Reason* (*Ri hsüeh Tsung chuan*). Finished in 1635; published in 1666.
- C. Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695): *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*. Finished in 1676. The first third was published in 1691. The first complete edition was printed in 1735-1739.
- D. Huang Tsung-hsi: *Philosophical Records of the Sung and Yüan Dynasties*. It was started by Huang Tsung-hsi in 1676, he died before he could finish it. His son Huang Pai-chia was likewise unable to complete it. Supplementary material was added and the work was completed by Ch'üan Tsu-wang in 1746-1754. However, much collation remained to be done between the different texts, and this work was not undertaken until 1837-1838 and 1843-1844. It was then that the book was printed.

In the discussion which is to follow, this last history will be omitted because although it was conceived by Huang Tsung-hsi it was finished in the middle of the Ch'ing Dynasty. It will receive consideration only in so far as the labors involved in its compilation were part of the labors that produced Huang's other and earlier history (C above). A comparative study of the remaining three histories of Chinese philosophy should be of considerable interest to the reader, because the review of Chinese thought which they contain is meaningful rather than accidental.

Chou Ju-teng's *Authoritative Message of the Science of Sagehood* was the first book on Chinese philosophy ever written. He begins with the legendary emperors Fu Hsi and Shen Nung, about whom he is limited to the speculations of later authorities, and carries his history down to a contemporary member of the T'ai-chou School, Lo Ju-fang. In writing this history Chou takes as his central theme the emptiness or nothingness of the Ch'an Buddhists. Yet, as a Confucianist, he cannot omit Confucianist ideas altogether. However, one is never in the dark while reading the account of each

philosopher, that Chou's point of view is truly Ch'anist. The preface by T'ao Wang-ling tells us that the word "tsung" in the title: *Sheng-hsiieh Tsung chuan* was borrowed from the Ch'anists in order to express the idea of authoritative, because the author wished to imply orthodoxy and also to place other schools of Buddhism beneath the Ch'an sect. Nevertheless, T'ao makes it plain in his preface that Confucius, Mencius, Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, Lu Chiu-yüan, Yang Chien, Wang Shou-jen, and Wang Ken are especially mentioned in this history as the standard-bearers of philosophy. Chou particularly compliments Wang Ch'i in his chapter on that philosopher. Indeed, there can be little doubt that Chou Ju-teng's book was the product of the thought of Wang Ch'i and the T'ai-chou School.

Huang Tsung-hsi, reading Chou's history before he started to write his own, criticized him for mixing gold, silver, copper, and iron together in order to make one utensil. Huang's meaning was that each philosopher had his own viewpoint and that it should be presented objectively—whereas Chou had amalgamated all the philosophers to produce his own form of eclecticism.

We now come to the second history of Chinese philosophy, that of Sun Ch'i-feng. Its author kept the text with him for thirty years before it was published. He says, in his preface, that the book was with him in three successive places: first, in his native place; second, in Pai-ch'üan, Honan, to where its author moved; and third, in Chekiang Province, where its author settled finally. During all this time Sun Ch'i-feng kept his manuscript with him as a treasure. At last it was published in 1666, during the reign of Emperor K'ang Hsi. Sun selected eleven thinkers of the Sung and Ming periods to be the standard-bearers of the philosophy of reason, namely, (1) Chou Tun-i, (2) Ch'eng Hao, (3) Ch'eng I, (4) Chang Tsai, (5) Shao Yung, (6) Chu Hsi, (7) Lu Chiu-yüan, (8) Hsieh Hsüan, (9) Wang Shou-jen, (10) Lo Hung-hsien, and (11) Ku Hsien-cheng. These constitute, as it were, the line of apostolic succession. Other thinkers, including the Han scholars, Han Yü and all the pupils of the school of the Ch'eng brothers and of Chu Hsi, are called "auxiliaries" of the apostles. Sun Ch'i-feng had still a third group: the Sung scholars, Chang Chiu-ch'eng and Yang Chien; and the Ming scholars, Wang Ch'i and Lo Ju-fang (whom

Chou Ju-teng most appreciated), all of whom he placed in an "Appendix" at the end of his book. The name of Wang Ken was excluded even from this "Appendix."

The third of these histories of Chinese philosophy, that of Huang Tsung-hsi, was the most comprehensive and objective of them all. Undoubtedly Huang had his own viewpoint, but he presented each thinker in his true colors, not as the compiler would have preferred him. Thus, Huang said: "Each philosopher has his personal view. His personal view is his way of approach. Without a formula of his own no philosopher's theory can be other than chaos."¹⁴

Huang also said: "If an author of a history of philosophy just takes a few phrases from each thinker without knowing which phrase is most important, then the main idea of each philosopher concerned is not presented clearly. I myself read the whole of the collected works of the thinkers about whom I am to treat, extracted the essential phrases from each, and plagiarize from none of the texts of older writers."¹⁵

These passages show with what care Huang Tsung-hsi set about his task. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao regarded Huang's two *Philosophical Records* as the best histories of Chinese philosophy ever written, for four reasons: (1) because as histories they were fair to all the main schools of thought, regardless of the chronicler's point-of-view; (2) because each philosopher has his leading ideas presented clearly; (3) because each thinker was pictured as he really looked, not according to the prejudices of the author; and (4) because the life history and historical period of each philosopher was delineated to provide background material for the reader. But regardless of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's favorable comment, there can be no doubt that these works are indeed more objective than those of Chou Ju-teng and Sun Ch'i-feng.

In my opinion, the conception out of which these histories of Chinese philosophy grew—from Chou Ju-teng's history through that of Huang Tsung-hsi—was the attempt to make an inventory of the Chinese intellectual heritage. The development of the School of Wang Shou-jen brought Chinese philosophers to the crossroad: one fork going to the Ch'anist way, the other going the way of being faithful to Confucianism. And so, Chou Ju-teng wrote his

Sheng-hsieh Tsung-chuan, and Sun Ch'i-feng wrote his *Ri-hsueh Tsung-chuan*, both assuming a subjective point of view. Huang Tsung-hsi then compiled his history and took an objective and comprehensive point of view from which the various schools appeared as they really were. Huang's work was most appreciated and achieved great circulation during the Ch'ing Dynasty.

In concluding this chapter, I wish to stress that the political degeneration and fall of the Ming Dynasty made scholars fearfully aware that the brilliant era of Wang Shou-jen was closing. The debate among the mad Ch'anists and members of the Tung-lin School and others was a clear indication. The three historians just mentioned perhaps felt unconsciously that a new age was dawning. They were living in a period of confusion and uncertainty; they tried to make a philosophical balance sheet, as it were, for their own use; and, at the same time, they wanted to show a new way to future generations. This period marked not only the final chapter of Wang Shou-jen's philosophy, but also, with the inertia of the next two centuries, it marked the final chapter of Neo-Confucianist philosophy as a whole. And so, the stage was set for the entrance of Hsü Kuang-ch'i. With him, Christianity and Western science entered China. To be sure, this was only the beginning of the Occidental impact, but the conversion of Hsü, a Chinese scholar, meant more than the mere transformation of a Confucianist into a Christian; it meant the shaking of the Chinese spiritual foundations. The Jesuit Father who converted Hsü—Matteo Ricci—made a deep impression upon the Chinese mind. His coming, in fact, was a cultural inroad second in importance only to that of Buddhism. The mathematical and astronomical science which he and other Jesuits brought to the Middle Kingdom showed Hsü Kuang-ch'i and his colleagues that there was a new, positive, and empirical approach to knowledge. For the sake of this, Hsü abandoned his speculations about reality, after the fashion of the school of Wang Shou-jen, and became a disciple of Matteo Ricci, the scientist-Jesuit.

However, I should like to point out that besides this Western way there were many other ways to knowledge, equally positive and solid, which were sought by the Chinese scholars. This was a period of wide groping for new paths. Some scholars maintained

that a revision of Wang Shou-jen's philosophy was all that was needed. Others insisted on a return to Chu Hsi. Still others believed that the study of the Classics and of philology was the surest road since these ancient books provided reliable data; and there was even a group who recommended geographical study. Such was the variety of the schools of thought at the end of the Ming Dynasty.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

The Transition From the Ming to the Ch'ing Dynasty; and Paul Hsü Kuang-Ch'i

In the last chapter we saw that the Ming Dynasty, in its last days, was threatened externally by the Manchus and internally by domestic troubles. The Tung-lin School could find no other remedy for so sad a situation than frank and straightforward criticism of the government. Many thinkers turned away from Wang Shou-jen whose views still prevailed. The new tendency was to be anti-speculative or anti-metaphysical, and to substitute for this a positive and pragmatic view, even though it became somewhat heterogeneous.

From the end of the Ming Dynasty until the beginning of the Ch'ing many attempts were made to find new directions of thought. No single school dominated the scene, and the individual thinkers stood and fell on their own merits. Let me first enumerate and briefly characterize some of these individuals.

(1) PAUL HSÜ KUANG-CH'I (1562-1633). This man came in contact with the Jesuit Father Matteo Ricci who arrived in China in 1552. Hsü, after learning mathematics, astronomy, and gun-making from him, was baptized a Christian in 1603. Hsü thought he found something positive and useful in the Western sciences and in Christianity. He may have been the first Chinese to add a foreign name to his own.

(2) CHU CHIH-YÜ (1600-1682). Opposed to the fine-spun analysis of the concept of *liang-chih*, which became the intellectual sport of the followers of Wang Shou-jen, Chu Chih-yü preferred simple and elementary principles capable of being put into practice by

everybody in daily life. After the fall of the capital Nanking, he went to Annam and then to Japan to ask for an expeditionary force for the relief of his homeland. But realising that his efforts were in vain he settled down in Japan, became an adviser to Tokugawa Mitsukuni, Prince Mito, and gathered a circle of Japanese pupils around him. His thinking was along the lines of Chu Hsi.

(3) KU YEN-WU (1613-1682). A vigorous assailant of the Wang Shou-jen school, Ku proposed the study of the Classics as a substitute for empty talk about nature and mind. He travelled widely in the interests of geographical research and was also interested in history.

(4) SUN CH'I-FENG (1584-1675). This man, author of the *Authoritative Record of the Philosophy of Reason*, was opposed to the notorious eunuch Wei Tsung-hsien, and fought against the Manchus. His attitude towards Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen was balanced. "Chu Hsi's way," he wrote, "led to indigestion if one takes an overdose, so the remedy was to have a purgative. It was therefore right for Wang Shou-jen to advise the people to return to their own minds; but unfortunately the result was over-speculation. The people now are suffering from anaemia. What they need is more nourishment."¹

(5) HUANG TSUNG-HSI (1610-1695). The author of the *Philosophical Records of the Sung, Yuan, and Ming Scholars* was one of the few who remained by the side of Wang Shou-jen. He interpreted Wang's philosophy in the sense of his (Huang's) teacher, Liu Tsung-chou; and, when the Ming Dynasty declined, he criticized the scholars for their empty talk and for their ignorance of the Classics. His interest in historical studies was meant to convey the much needed advice to students to base their scholarship on grounds more solid and substantial than had been the case for some time.

(6) WANG FU-CHIH (1619-1692). Showing vigorously in his writings his nationalistic feelings against the Manchus, this philosopher became one of the trio—the other two being Ku Yen-wu and Huang Tsung-hsi—who many years later served to inspire the Chinese revolutionaries at the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty. After the Manchu troops defeated Wang's army in 1648, he first joined the Prince of Kuei in Kwangsi Province, and then, convinced that the Ming cause

was hopeless, returned to his native place Heng-shan where for the next forty years he devoted himself to study. He left seventy titles in 358 volumes, none of which was published until the middle of the Nineteenth Century. His philosophy was based upon the views of Chang Tsai who emphasized *ch'i* (matter) as the primordial reality of the universe. In short, Wang considered matter, or that which exists, as the starting point of philosophy.

(7) LI YUNG (1627-1705). This thinker, like Liu Tsung-chou, was one of the few who followed Wang Shou-jen in the last days of the Ming Dynasty. To counter the wild speculations of his time he wrote the *Ssu-shu Fan-shen Lu* (Records of Reflective Thinking on the Basis of the Four Books) to show that philosophizing should consist in inner reflection and practice.

(8) YEN YÜAN (1635-1704). Disgusted with China's fall into the hands of the Manchus, Yen was much more extreme than Ku Yen-wu in his opposition of Sung and Ming philosophy, advocating practical activity as a substitute for book-learning and contemplation. He wanted to see scholars learn horseback riding, archery, and other kinds of practical knowledge, so that they would be in a position to defend their country. Of all the thinkers of this period, Yen Yüan was the most vigorous in his attack on Sung and Ming philosophy.

(9) YEN JO-CHÜ (1636-1704). This well-known philologist wrote the *Shang-shu Ku-wen Shu-cheng* (Inquiry into the Authenticity of the Book of History in Ancient Characters), which exerted great influence on subsequent philological study, as it was the first work of textual criticism in the Ch'ing Dynasty.

If now we compare and contrast the points of view of the philosophers and literary men whom I have characterized so briefly, we shall find that they represent five different ways of thinking: (1) Ku Yen-wu advocated study of the Classics; (2) Huang Tsung-hsi and Li Yung, following in the footsteps of Liu Tsung-chou, were revisionists of the philosophical system of the School of Wang Shou-jen; (3) Paul Hsü was the first Chinese to be converted to Christianity and Western science; (4) Chu Chih-yü and many others were persuaded that return to Chu Hsi was the right course; and (5) Wang Fu-chih wished to revive the philosophy of Chang Tsai. The very fact that these various viewpoints existed is a sign that a

common outlook for all had not yet been established. It was many years before the School of Philology, or the School of Han Scholarship, in the Ch'ing Dynasty, became predominant. That school became a great success for the single reason that scholars had no other alternative. Under Manchu rule freedom of thought was much curtailed; thinkers suffered from numerous literary persecutions. There was always anxiety lest discussion of philosophical doctrines would lead to controversy, and controversy would invite the interference of the Manchu emperor, who was hypersensitive to any criticism. Thus the path of least resistance lay in confining oneself to a form of literary activity which could offend nobody in official life. Such is the explanation commonly given for the rise in philological study during the Ch'ing Dynasty.

With this knowledge of the decline and fall of Wang Shou-jen and the growing interest in philological studies in the Ch'ing Dynasty, I think it is time that we turn our attention to some of the leading thinkers in somewhat greater detail. We begin with Paul Hsü Kuang-ch'i.

Hsü lived during the reign of Emperor Shen-tsung. His career was at first no different from that of any other scholar, the seeking of a civil service career through examination. In his thirty-fourth year, however, a great change took place. He happened to meet a Jesuit Father named Cattaneo in Chao-chou, Kwangtung Province. Later, in the year 1600, while travelling to Peking, he called on another Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, who was then living in Nanking, but failed to see him. Three years later, in this same city, Jean de Rocha baptized Hsü, conferring the name Paul on him. From 1604 to 1607 Hsü worked with Ricci translating Euclid's *Elements* into Chinese. In addition to this, Ricci taught him astronomy, geography, hydraulics, and agriculture. Hsü came into prominence again, almost a decade later, after having written the important document entitled *A Memorial in Defense of True Learning* (*Pien-hsieh Chang-su*) in which he requested protection for the Jesuits. This was written under Shen Chüeh, Under-secretary of the Board of Ceremonies, at a time when the policy of being unfriendly towards the Catholics was being revived. After the defeat of the army of Commander-in-Chief Yang Hao by the Manchus, Hsü wrote another memorial in 1619 asking that he be permitted to

train a new army and go to Korea to enlist aid in the campaign against the Manchus. At the same time he suggested that cannon be purchased from the Portuguese in Macao. Hsi's plans were adopted, but their implementation was frustrated by jealous officials. After temporary retirement, he was called back to the capital in 1621 upon the fall of Shen-yang and Liao-yang into the hands of the Manchus. Again he insisted that he be sent to Korea, but his mission was again opposed—this time by Ts'ui Ching-yung, Secretary of War. Therefore he resigned and went back to his home-town Zikawei in Shanghai.

But this resignation was no more lasting than his former retirement. In 1628, after the accession of Emperor Ch'ung-cheng, he was appointed Recorder of the Daily Life of the Emperor, and the following year was promoted to the vice-presidency of the Board of Ceremonies. While in this office he proposed revision of the calendar, which had become erroneous in its predictions of solar and lunar eclipses. This recommendation led to his appointment as president of the new Calendar Bureau, with his friend, Li Chih-tsao, and two Jesuit Fathers Longobardi and Terrenz as assistants. When the latter of the two Jesuits died in 1630, he requested Johannes Adam Schall von Bell and Jacques Rho to aid him in his work. But while the revision of the calendar was in progress, his mind was distracted by the threat of invasion by the Manchus, and he renewed his proposal for the purchase of cannon and ammunition from Macao. (Longobardi and Sambiasi were later sent to buy ten cannon.) There was a temporary cessation of hostilities by the Manchus in 1630; three years later Paul Hsü Kuang-ch'i died. In 1640 his grandson, Hsü Erh-tou, presented to the throne his grandfather's posthumous work *Nung-cheng Ch'üan-shu*, a book on agriculture administration.

There can be no doubt that Hsü Kuang-ch'i, besides believing in Christianity, was deeply impressed by, and highly appreciative of Western science and engineering. The period in which he lived, marked by the invasion of the Manchus, is similar to the age of Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, who lived during the time of the Opium War, and who likewise acknowledged the value of Western science. They built the Kiang-nan Arsenal and established a translation bureau so that their countrymen could avail them-

selves of Occidental works on mathematics, natural science, gun manufacture, and navigation. Hsü started this work of translation of astronomical and mathematical books in the Ming Dynasty, before anyone else thought of it.

The decline and fall of Wang Shou-jen's thought, the miscalculations of solar and lunar eclipses by Chinese astronomers, the deterioration of Buddhism, and the quarrels of the Tung-lin School with the government—all these factors no doubt contributed to the mental uneasiness of Hsü and his friends, and aroused them to grope for a new faith and a new way to knowledge. According to Chinese traditional thinking *tao* (metaphysical principles) and *hsüeh* (learning) have always been conceived as having a harmonious relationship. This standard Hsü applied to Matteo Ricci and found that he indeed was an example of that harmony. In his personality also these two phases were marvellously blended, for in him Christianity exemplified *tao* and science exemplified *hsüeh*. I believe this to be the correct explanation of the psychological factor in Hsü's conversion to the Christian Church. But let us turn to what he and his friends have to say. From the preface to the work *T'ien-chu Shih-i* (Exposition of the Real Meaning of the Lord of Heaven) written by Li Chih-tsao, we read:

"When Confucius discussed the question of personal cultivation, he began with filial devotion to parents, and extended his discourse to knowledge of heaven. Mencius completed this Confucian concept. To serve one's parents and to work for heaven are the same, though heaven is the root of everything. . . . When the philosopher Chu Hsi explained the word *ti* in the *Book of Changes*, he said it meant 'Lord of Heaven.' Thus the concept 'Lord of Heaven' is not something begun by Matteo Ricci. The popular idea is that heaven is too remote to be the subject of intelligent discussion, and since the arrival of Buddhism in China people have forgotten to show filial piety to their parents. The Confucianists knew much about the Decree of Heaven, Heavenly Reason, and the *tao* of Heaven, and yet they were converted to Buddhism. . . . The learning of Matteo Ricci is based upon the doctrine of service to heaven. He said: 'Everyone knows that one must serve one's parents; but no one knows that the Lord of Heaven is the great parent. Everyone knows that the sovereign of a country is the legi-

timate ruler, but no one knows that the Lord of Heaven is the supreme ruler of the whole world. Without serving parents one cannot be a son; without obeying the government one cannot be an official; without the Lord of Heaven one cannot be a man.' Matteo Ricci also stressed the distinction between good and evil, between virtuous and wicked deeds. . . By doing good one will enter paradise; by doing evil one will go to hell. He stressed repentance, confession, suppression of desires, and extension of love to others. One should be fearful before the Lord."²

When Hsü Kuang-ch'i submitted *A Memorial in Defense of True Learning*, it was a time when an unfriendly policy was being pursued against the Catholics. So Hsü began with the remark that if charges of subversion were to be made against the Jesuit Fathers Diego de Pantoja and others, he himself should also be held accountable for their misdeeds, because he likewise believed in Christianity and worked with them. Then he goes on to say that he knew them intimately; that they were the followers of sages and wise men; that their *tao* was the right *tao*; and that their character was disciplined, their knowledge vast, their insight deep, their heart true, and their view definite and determined. But to quote Hsü directly: "They," he wrote, referring to the Jesuits, "are men of caliber in their own country. They are the few among thousands or tens of thousands. Coming here over a distance of ten thousand miles, they have devoted themselves to personal cultivation in order to serve the Lord of Heaven. They heard that the Chinese are like-minded with themselves, that the beliefs in regard to personal cultivation and service to heaven in China and the West are the same. They have come here under hardship and danger. Now that they have compared our land with theirs they hope that everyone will do good, love mankind, and conform to the Will of God. The root of their doctrine is to serve God; the vital point is to love all human beings; loyalty, filial piety, mercy, and love are the manifestations of their doctrine; their desire is to transform bad into good; their method of self-improvement is through repentance and purification of sin; the reward they offer is Paradise, the punishment Hell. Their rules conform to the human ideal and to heavenly reason. Their way of teaching leads to the doing of good from a true heart and to the wiping away of evils

completely. Since they believe that the Lord of Heaven saves souls, and that He rewards and punishes fairly, they are able to make people believe and be fearful in the sincerity of their heart."³

These words of Li and Hsü make it plain, in my opinion, that the version of Christianity introduced into China by Matteo Ricci somewhat identified the "Lord of Heaven" of Christian tradition with the "heaven" of Chinese tradition. But although Ricci and Hsü held that Christianity and Confucianism could co-exist, they were not so tolerant of Taoism or Buddhism, and indeed took an aggressive attitude towards both these religions. There is much in Hsü's writings which is bitterly hostile to them.

Hsü Kuang-ch'i is particularly interesting in what he has to say to the emperor about persecution of the Catholics. He proposed three ways of examining Jesuits and three ways of treating them. Under the first heading he said:

(I) Let all books on Christianity, natural science, government, the calendar, medicine, music, hydraulics, and agriculture be translated. Let their good and bad points be submitted to public judgment. If they are found to contain anything subversive, I shall submit myself, along with the other Catholics, to suffer under criminal law.

(II) It seems to me that the teachings of the Jesuits agree with those of the Confucianists, but disagree with those of the Taoists and Buddhists. Let the points of disagreement be discussed, on the one side, by the Taoists and Buddhists and on the other side by the Jesuits. Let the Confucianists take part in this conference, too. If the Christians are unable to vindicate themselves, I shall submit myself likewise to punishment.

(III) If the translations mentioned under (I) cannot be done at once, let those books already translated be submitted for discussion. If these are found not to contain material suitable for the betterment of the character and customs of the people, I shall submit myself, along with the other Christians, to punishment.

Hsü Kuang-ch'i's three ways of treating Jesuits are as follows:

(I) Let their means of subsistence be granted by the Chinese government, and let remittances from foreign countries for their subsistence be stopped.

(II) Permit Jesuits to preach in the place where they live. But

let ten or twenty families stand warrant for each Jesuit to see that he behaves himself. In cases of misbehavior the Jesuits should be expelled.

(III) Let the character of individual Chinese converts to Christianity be reviewed in order to find out whether they are good or bad.

When the memorial containing all this advice about Catholic Christianity was submitted, the emperor wrote three words on it: "*Chih tao liao*." ("I have understood it.") As a result the policy of persecution was abandoned. It is no wonder that Hsü Kuang-ch'i is considered one of the three pillars of early Christianity in China.

Hsü moreover, as we have seen, is also recognized as the first Chinese to appreciate the value of Western science for his homeland. He first translated Euclid's *Elements* into Chinese. His colleague Li Chih-tsao translated a work on logic which expounded the foundations of science. Between the two of them many Western books on astronomy, hydraulics, and geography were rendered into Chinese.

Hsü's acknowledgment of the worth of science may best be culled from his own words prefacing his translation of Euclid, as well as from Matteo Ricci's Chinese preface to this same translation (which I presume was written by Hsü, though according to Ricci's idea). In the former of these two prefaces, Hsü says:

"Since the T'ang and Yü Dynasties, Hsi Ho in charge of astronomy, Ssu K'ung in charge of education, Hou Chi in charge of agriculture, and the one in charge of music—all these had to have knowledge of measuring and number to do their work properly. Among the five arts of the Chou Dynasty was arithmetic. Without arithmetic none of the other arts could have been put into practice. The greatest musicians, dealing with sound, and the engineers dealing with machines, had no other skill than to apply expertly the theory of number. I suppose that in pre-Three Dynasty times this study was carried to a high peak of perfection, and was then handed down from generation to generation. But unfortunately it was all lost in the Burning of the Books during the Ch'in Dynasty. After the Ch'in Dynasty, whatever was attempted was based upon guesses and gropings, like the archery of a blind man who cannot see the target; or was based upon assumptions and pretense, like holding

a firefly to light up an elephant, for the head may be visible while the tail is wrapped in darkness. In other words, this study has been lost for a long time. These *Elements of Geometry* are the foundations of measurement and number upon which squares, circles, planes, lines, T-squares, compasses, and rulers are based.

"My teacher, Matteo Ricci, besides having an interest in Christianity, has an interest also in mathematics . . . After I knew him well, our conversation often came around to mathematics. I requested that the books on mathematics be translated. But Matteo Ricci's reply was that if you do not know Euclid there is no use in your trying to read other books on mathematics. The first six books [of Euclid's *Elements*] have now been translated by us. This work begins with what is easy to reach, and carries on to what is difficult; or, it begins with doubt and ends with certainty. It is a work of pure science, and upon it rest all practical arts. It is all shapes in miniature, and it is the basis of all science. Unexpectedly, therefore, even though the sciences were lost long ago, we can today, after two thousand years, restore them; and we can make good what has been lacking since the time of T'ang, Yü, and the Three Dynasties."⁴

This passage from Paul Hsü's preface to his translation of Euclid is, of course, a great compliment to Western science in that it believes that Western science can serve to restore what was lost after T'ang, Yü, and the Three Dynasties. His way of looking at Western science, in other words, might even make one feel that he regarded it as being on a level with the sacred books of China. Hsü's appreciation of Ricci in this same preface is also worthy of note. "His [Ricci's] learning," says Hsü, "consists of three categories: (1) the greatest part of his learning is his personal cultivation and his service to the Lord of Heaven; (2) the least part of his learning is his knowledge of the natural sciences; (3) a portion of No. 2, namely, his knowledge of mathematics. In each of these three areas Ricci is thorough, exact, and never afflicted with any doubt. His method of analysis is so clear that a person can follow him with certainty. The reason I am engaged in writing out what I have just called the least part of his learning is that this least part is the way by which faith in the man may first be awakened. Anyone who goes through with this book will come to the con-

clusion that Ricci's teaching offers a firm and reliable foundation. This book may therefore produce a more far-reaching effect than what is explicitly contained in it."⁵ It is clear from this appreciation that Hsü wanted to convey the idea that there were two aspects in Matteo Ricci's personality, his scientific knowledge and his Christianity. The scientific knowledge was but another phase of his religion. The analogy between the Christianity-science relationship and the conventional Chinese *tao* (metaphysical principles)-*hsüeh* (learning) relationship was something which could not have been lost on his readers.

After the preface Hsü made a few comments on the value of Euclid. "Science," he wrote, "has two aspects: one is pure theory, the other factual data. This book has two advantages: first, it can teach those who are interested in pure theory how to follow patiently the path of truth, and how to train the mind to think in an exact and precise way; second, it can make a practical man more skillful and ingenious if he follows the rules carefully. Familiarity with this book will facilitate progress in other books and other arts."⁶

Hsü then proceeds to point out four "uses" which Euclid does not have: (1) There is no use to doubt it; (2) there is no use making guesses about what it means; (3) there is no use to put it on trial; (4) there is no use to correct it. There are also four "cannots": (1) You cannot leave out anything; (2) You cannot refute anything; (3) You cannot reduce in any way; (4) You cannot change the order of the propositions.

Finally, Hsü wrote: "This book seems hard to understand, yet it is self-evident. By using the self-evident truths you can explain what is obscure. This book seems complicated, but in reality it is simple. By using the simple truths you can simplify what is complicated. This book seems difficult, but in actuality it is easy. By using the easy truths you can solve the most difficult problems. This book is based upon self-evident truths."⁷ These remarks are a clear indication that the first Chinese scholar to become acquainted with Euclid's *Elements* saw the value and nature of geometrical method and mathematical reasoning.

And now let us turn to Ricci's preface to this translation of

Euclid. As a Roman Catholic missionary he was interested, of course, for the sake of his religion, in making a favorable impression on the minds of the Chinese, and he saw that it would be astute first to point out the value of science. Ricci therefore said: "The scholarship of Confucianists consists in realizing knowledge. The study of natural phenomena is the path to the realization of knowledge. There are truths hidden behind the physical world, and the human capacity to know is limited. The only way to realize knowledge is to find out what is unknown through what is known. Though the territories of the Western countries are remote and small, study of natural phenomena in their universities is far superior to that to be found in other lands. They possess many books on natural sciences. Western scholars work with the aim of finding true laws, which can be verified, and they are not inclined to express mere opinion. With true laws one has real knowledge; but with mere opinion, there is always the possibility of a contrary opinion for the sake of argument. Real knowledge means certainty; mere opinion means uncertainty.

"Theories of a vague and speculative nature, though not entirely without foundation, may be met by arguments which win the agreement of the people, but without impressing them as irrefutable.

"When true laws are found, on the other hand, all doubt disappears. True laws are so unshakeable that nobody can be hesitant about accepting them nor can anyone counter-argue.

"Real knowledge, solid and profound, is available nowhere else but in geometry."⁸

Then Ricci goes on to say how the laws of geometry may be applied in the various fields of astronomy, mechanics, civil engineering, transportation, surveying, and geography. None of these topics is separable from geometry.

Finally, he betakes himself to the social sciences and government. "If," he warns, "you do not know your production and consumption, your revenues and expenditures, how can you conduct your government well? If you do not know the seasons of the year properly, how can you sow seed or prevent flood or famine? If you do not understand your climate, how can you look after the people's

health?"⁹ He even has something to say about military strategy, because he appreciated the importance of the subject to the Ming statesmen of the time.

In this whole preface to Euclid's *Elements*, Matteo Ricci mentions the Lord of Heaven only once and even then briefly. Ninety-nine per cent of what he says could be written by any scientist today.

This chapter would be incomplete without further mention of Paul Hsü's colleague and fellow-convert, Leo Li Chih-tsao, who was also interested in mathematics, and especially in geography. Before he met Matteo Ricci he made a world atlas, and after becoming acquainted with the missionary he found upon the wall a map of the world which he recognized to be better than his own, as far as latitudes and longitudes were concerned. He then became an apprentice to Ricci, under whom he and Hsü studied from 1604 until their master's death in 1610. With Ricci, Li translated into Chinese a treatise on geometry under the title *Yüan-jung Chiao-i*, and a treatise on arithmetic under the title *T'ung-wen Suan-chih*. He was baptized by Ricci after they had worked together for a decade, which shows how serious and time-consuming the question of conversion was to a Chinese scholar.

In 1611, upon going to Hangchow to mourn the death of his father, Li invited Nicolas Trigault, Lazarre Cattaneo, and Sabastian Fernandez to preach. This same year he started to build a chapel in the city. About this time there was bitter hostility against the Catholic Church among the Buddhists because one of their number, Yang T'ing-yün, had been recently converted to Christianity. Upon his first request for baptism Yang was rejected because he kept a concubine, whereat he exclaimed: "I am a censor. Why may I not be baptized in spite of my concubine?" Li Chih-tsao explained to him: "The Christian Church has its rules for bettering human life. It insists upon observation of these rules without deviation." Convinced, Yang renounced his concubine and was baptized. Another incident of interest was that in December of the preceding year the Board of Astronomy proved to have miscalculated an eclipse. As a result, Li was recommended as a qualified man to translate Western books on astronomy with an eye to reforming the calendar.

We now skip a decade, and come to 1621 when the Manchus captured Shen-yang and Liao-yang. Li, as a sub-director of the Ministry of the Kitchen and Banqueting and as chief of a division in the Board of Public Works, was sent to Macao to buy cannon from the Portuguese. These cannon, ten feet long, three to four feet in circumference, with bores three inches in radius, were the best weapons of the day. Because of opposition from the Grand Secretary, Shen Ch'üeh, however, Li was not able to do much in the way of building up a new type of military equipment. He then retired to his native city Hangchow.

The rest of his life was devoted to literary effort, writing a preface to the *Chih-fang Wai Chi*, a geographical work begun by Pantoja and completed by Aleni, and translating with Francis Furtado the *Caelo et Mundo* of Aristotle as well as a treatise on logic under the title *Ming li t'an*, the first book about Western logic ever rendered into Chinese. Printed in 1628, it remained unnoticed for more than two hundred years, until it was revived towards the end of the Nineteenth Century. At that time, when John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic* was translated into Chinese, research brought out the fact that Occidental logic had been introduced into the Middle Kingdom during the Ming Dynasty.

In concluding this chapter, I must repeat that Hsü Kuang-ch'i and Li Chih-tsao were far-sighted men who appreciated the strength of Western knowledge. Implicit in Hsü's writings was the conviction that scientific knowledge (which he considered as a part of Christianity) could be made complementary to Confucianism. He and Li worked for the introduction of Western science but not at the cost of Confucianism. They were not so reactionary as many men of their time who remained faithful to Confucianism and Sung philosophy by opposing the introduction of Occidental knowledge; nor were they so radical as those who wanted to develop science but ignored the Confucianist tradition. For Hsü and Li there was no conflict between Confucianism and Western science, nor between Confucianism and Christianity. These men, who lived in a time of transition, gave their contemporaries the very best advice when they insisted that East and West could be made complementary to each other. If their advice had been listened to and if, during the reigns of K'ang-hsi and Yung-ch'eng, there had been

no expulsion of missionaries, the Middle Kingdom might not have lost contact with Western science for a hundred and fifty years. In other words, in that century and a half she might have kept abreast like the Western nations in acquiring scientific knowledge. Her subsequent attitude towards questions of democracy and science might then have been different. If China's link with the West had run along more smoothly during the last three centuries, the disaster of the Boxer Trouble and other violent upheavals might never have occurred.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Chu Chih-Yü, the Refugee-Philosopher in Japan; and His Japanese Disciples

Chu Chih-yü is dealt with in the chapter following our discussion of Paul Hsü because Chu, like Hsü, has been passed over in histories of Chinese philosophy. He was disappointed with the thinkers of his native land of his day because they did nothing to save the country. Going voluntarily on a mission to Annam and Japan after the fall of Nanking to request an expeditionary force for the relief of his homeland, he came to realise that the Ming cause was hopeless, and so he settled down in Japan where he ultimately died and was buried.

Chu was a man who jumped out of his own circle, as we say in Chinese. Since he lived to witness the downfall of the Ming Dynasty, and because he spent most of his years abroad, he had the opportunity to reflect upon both the advantageous and harmful effects of Chinese philosophy on the land of its birth. He was not a member of the school of Wang Shou-jen but inclined instead towards the school of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi. However, he was more or less aloof from all philosophical controversy. His way of teaching the Japanese is adequate indication of his philosophical convictions. Since he was a refugee in Japan, with much time on his hands for reflection, his views were different from the common run of Chinese philosophers who lived at home.

Before sketching his life I must mention that his *Collected Works* was published in Japan by the family of Tokugawa Mitsukuni, Prince of Mito. It has two prefaces, one by Ando Shuyaku, the other by Tsunaeda, a son of Mitsukuni. It should also be said, by way of introduction, that Chu Chih-yü remained unknown in

the Middle Kingdom until the end of the nineteenth century, which explains why his name does not appear in histories of Chinese philosophy. It was not until the period of the Revolution and the establishment of the Republic that this patriot, who had exiled himself for hatred of the Manchus, began to be appreciated and studied in his own land.

Born in the District of Yü-yao, Chekiang Province, in 1600, Chu was, paradoxical as it may seem, a fellow-villager of Wang Shou-jen, the founder of the school towards which he was so antagonistic. He was also a fellow villager of Huang Tsung-hsi, the great revisionist of this same school. Politically, he was in accord with Huang Tsung-hsi and Ku Yen-wu, both of whom were so zealous to restore the Ming Dynasty.

When Emperor Ch'ung-cheng died, Chu, already forty-five years old, refused several invitations to take a government position. Then an order was issued appointing him Commissioner of Justice for Kiangsu Province and, concurrently, head of the Personnel Department of the Ministry of War. Still adamant, he refused again, because he had no desire to serve under Ma Shih-ying. Ma regarded this refusal as disobedience, ordered his arrest, and arrested he would have been if shortly afterwards Nanking, the capital, had not fallen to the Manchus. Subsequently, when Prince Fu was crowned in Fukien Province, Chu persisted in refusing to accept government office. Meanwhile he worked with a commander-in-chief in Chusan, an island off the coast of Chekiang, and went personally to Japan, in the hope of getting military aid from the feudal lord of Satsuma who had promised to provide 3,000 criminals as soldiers, a promise which was not kept. From Japan he went to Annam.

With Chu Chih-yü's departure for Japan the second period in his life begins. Hitherto his activities were confined to his homeland, but from 1645 onward he worked abroad. Back and forth among Chusan, Annam, and Japan he travelled for fifteen years, suffering many hardships and ordeals. These are his voyages chronologically:

- (1) 1645: From Chusan to Japan and Annam, then back again to Chusan.

- (2) 1651: En route from Chusan to Annam, his boat was driven off-course by a storm, and he landed at Japan. Refused permission to stay, he returned to Chusan.
- (3) 1653: En route to Annam he stopped at Japan.
- (4) 1658: A summons written by the Prince of Lu in 1656 and reaching Chu in 1657, requested him to return to China. This he was unable to do, as he was in jail in Annam for refusing to kneel before the King. The following year, after release, he reached Japan in the summer, then returned to China.
- (5) 1659: Fifth voyage to Japan.
- (6) 1661: Sixth voyage to Japan. This time he settled down, and remained there until his death in 1682.

In regard to the dates of these trips and other doings the evidence from Chinese sources is conflicting. I have, therefore, in the tabulation above, depended upon Japanese sources because Chu spent the latter part of his life in Japan. My Japanese sources are: (1) a biography written by his disciple Andō Shuyaku;¹ (2) Tokutomi Iichiro's *Modern History of the Japanese People: First Period of Tokugawa Bakufu*.

Why did Chu Chih-yü go to Annam for military aid? The answer to this question is not clear. Perhaps after the Ming government withdrew to southwest China, reinforcements from Annam would have been useful. What he did in Annam, also, is not clear, except for the episode of his refusing to kneel before the king, about which fortunately he left us an essay. The King of Annam, it seems, commanded that somebody who knew Chinese be brought to him. Since Chu was well versed in Chinese literature, he was questioned by an official and was then granted an audience by his royal highness. The audience was conducted in grand style, with a pageant of many thousands of courtiers. In the course of the ceremony the Chinese character *pai* (to kneel) was scratched in the sand with a stick. The implication, of course, was that Chu should now kneel before the King. But instead, the philosopher, taking the stick in his own hand, wrote the word for "not" on top of the character *pai*. Needless to say, he was summarily removed

from the court, and was even threatened with death unless he obeyed. He defended himself however by saying that since he held a high position in China he should not be required to kneel. In fact, said Chu, he preferred death to kneeling. The official listening to him was much astonished, and admired the strength of his character. He was then entrusted with writing a letter of reply to a Ming official, and was requested to compose a poem in Chinese. Thus awkwardly detained in Annam he sent memorials to the Prince of Lu begging him to put pressure on Annam for his release. Finally, after three months, he was freed. Unable to return by direct route to China, he sailed first for Japan; thence he resumed his voyage to the seat of government of the Prince of Lu.

Besides his difficulties in Annam, Chu Chih-yü suffered mistreatment in Japan. In 1651, for instance, on the occasion of his second trip there he wrote a letter to the Commander of Nagasaki explaining how his own country was under alien rule, how he had refused to shave his head after the manner of the Manchus, and how he now sought refuge in Japan. Much silk, porcelain, and medicine, he continued, were bought by Japan from China, but since a man of honor and integrity was more valuable than commodities, why should not he, a Chinese, be allowed to stay? Otherwise, it would be as if one did not know how to choose between real jade and a stone. Then he added that if he were permitted to remain in Japan he would work as a farmer, a gardener, a fortune-teller, or a proofreader, and so would not put any burden on the government. But in spite of this pitiful request he was turned down. Not until 1661, when Andō Shuyaku, working with other Japanese, importuned the Commander of Nagasaki for a permit to let Chu into the country did the philosopher succeed in having his request granted. From that time until his death he was a teacher in the Land of the Rising Sun.

Now begins the third period of his life. The man who made it possible for Chu to stay in Japan, was, of course, his disciple Andō Shuyaku who opened the door of Japan to him. Master and disciple met originally through the introduction of a Chinese named Ch'en Ming-te. Andō's admiration was aroused not only by Chu's

capacity as a philosopher, but also by the loyalty of his political attitude, which placed him in the role of martyr.

Shortly after Chu Chih-yü settled in Japan he wrote an essay—stimulated by a question from Andō—as to why the Ming Dynasty fell. The title in Chinese is *Yang-chiu Shih lu*.² It so happened that three years later Tokugawa Mitsukuni, Prince of Mito, a member of one of the three ruling Shogunate families, sent a Confucian scholar named Oyake Seijun to Nagasaki to look for learned foreigners. As a result of this search Chu was invited, in 1665, to serve the prince. His stipend was one hundred pieces of silver and enough rice for twenty persons. He worked with his patron heartily, and together they discussed Chinese philosophy, history, poetry, and politics—the instruction being always directed towards the improvement of the prince as a ruler. Several years later (in 1672) a bureau for compiling a *History of Great Japan* was organized. The leading idea of the book was the supremacy of the emperor, and expulsion of the barbarians, which are Confucian principles from the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. Other activities of Chu were writing an essay on the ceremonial worship of Confucius, constructing with his own hands a wooden model of the Temple of Confucius on the scale 1:30, and training Japanese students to make sacrificial offerings. When Chu reached his seventieth year, and again when he reached his eightieth year, the Prince of Mito celebrated his birthday with elaborate honors. After the first of these occasions, the philosopher ordered that a coffin of cypress wood be made. This was to show that he intended to die in his adopted land. He had already expressed in his Last Will and Testament that his remains were not to be transferred to his native land until after the rule of the Manchus came to an end. He died at the age of eighty-two. I shall discuss his contributions to Japan later, in connection with his Japanese disciples. For the present let us turn to his philosophy.

I have been interested in tracking down Chu Chih-yü's philosophical affiliations. According to one Japanese source, he studied under Chang K'en-t'ang, a member of the Tung-lin School. If this affiliation is correctly identified, Chu was definitely on the side hostile to Wang Shou-jen. At any rate, it is quite certain that he

was opposed to speculation and fine-spun analysis, and that he would have no traffic with the Lu-Wang School versus the Chu Hsi School controversies. Let me translate one of his letters to Andō Shuyaku:

"Formerly, there lived an ingenious carver who whittled from a small piece of wood the shape of an ape with eyes, ears, mouth, and even body-hair. One must say that it was the work of the finest craftsmanship. If my sight had been too defective to allow me to see it properly, I should have said that this was only a lump of sand or mud, and therefore useless. But I saw the eyes, ears, etc. on the carving, and still I said: This is a lump of sand or mud! What was the reason? It was that the object, though skillfully made, had no practical value. This carver's *tao* is not my *tao*. If my *tao* is left unemployed by the community, then it is best to put it away in the storeroom. Otherwise, let it have the benefit of making sons dutiful and ministers loyal; of having fair weather and, at harvest time, producing good crops; and of enjoying a moral climate and good government. I shall have nothing to do with controversial discussions. The Sung philosophers indulged in much fine analysis, but what was their actual achievement? They accomplished nothing but building a house on the top of another (meaning duplication). Ito, who intended to come to discuss with us, should be halted! Otherwise, there will be polemics and controversy,—which will be bad for Japan."

In another letter to Andō, Chu reiterated the same idea: "My scholarship is like some wooden utensils, or chinaware, or rough linen and wheat, while Mr. Ito's scholarship is like fine embroidery."³ And in a letter to an anonymous correspondent he writes: "What I meant to say was that the *tao* of the sages is the proper end which you should seek in mind, nature, and will, and which you should practice in your family and public life. If you seek *tao* in what is vulgar, it will, of course, be dregs. If you seek it in fine-spun analysis and speculation, it will fail to encourage the younger generation. Speculation can produce only imaginative ideas, which, even though they are of the noblest, are difficult for people to understand. Speculation invariably leads to logomachy and non-productivity. Better is it to seek *tao* in the active life of society, between sovereign and minister, father and son, husband

and wife, elder and younger brother, between friends. You should try to find a commonplace *tao* through which natural sentiments can find expression. This is the *tao* of the Five Human Relations, which is not contrary to the *tao* of Chou Tun-i, Shao Yung, the Ch'eng brothers, or Chu Hsi—five philosophers who made a profound study of reason, and who are irrefutable. Chu Hsi belonged to the School of Knowledge-Seeking and thus differed to a certain extent from Lu Chiu-yüan who emphasized the theory of Supremacy of Virtue. Indeed, Chu Hsi was involved in a controversy with the School of Lu Chiu-yüan. But in spite of this, Chu's doctrine lays before us reason in its actuality, and solid scholarship, and it breaks completely with the imaginary and the exaggerated.”⁴

Following is Chu Chih-yü's opinion of Wang Shou-jen, who, says Chu, “was my fellow countryman. We lived so near one another that my lamplight could reach him; his cock's crow could be heard by me. His strategy to defeat Prince Ch'en Hao and to suppress the aborigines are pages from a record of distinguished services. He was secretary of the Ministry of War, and the title of count was conferred upon him. He liked to be superior to others. Without originality he could not think of himself as distinguished from others. Thus, his creation of the theory of *liang-chih* was to show the distinction between himself and Chu Hsi. He did not know that his teaching would lead to wild speculation. In my opinion, Wang Shou-jen's philosophizing was superfluous and a mistake. I am convinced from a study of history that when one's motive is unselfish one can find reason, which is impartial; when one has no ulterior motive one can find the true law, which is ideal. If your country seeks only the spectacular, and indulges in mutual flattery and glorification between philosophers, then I do not see how any good can ensue.”⁵

This one passage shows, I think, more than anything else, that Chu Chih-yü was opposed to Wang Shou-jen and why he was so opposed, that he was against pure speculation in general, and that he inclined to use philosophy to promote the values of daily life.

But what Chu detested most of all was philosophical controversy between schools. Here is an observation by him on the competing schools that flourished between 1502 and 1620. “During the reigns of Chia-ch'ing [1502–1566], Lung-wu [1567–1572], and

Wan-li [1573-1620], it was the custom to have students assemble, and to establish academies where they could discuss the science of *tao*. In time each student built his own school, where the only true doctrine taught was that by his own teacher. The doctrine of Essence and Singleness, taught by the former sages, was no longer the guiding principle. Instead, there was a continuous fight among the students, like the war between water and fire. Some, who talked speculatively, went to the field of virtue and nature; others put on scholars' robes like actors' dresses and made themselves ridiculous. Thus the seeds of true Chinese philosophy were killed."⁶

What then did Chu Chih-yü himself stand for?

His first requirement for a scholar was that a man should have truthfulness, or sincerity, in himself. He said of his own person: "What I strive for in my discourse and action is, internally, never to lie to myself; and, externally, never to lie to others. Sometimes I do not say what I do; but not once have I failed to put into deeds what I say."⁷ Then, in giving advice to Okumura Noriteru he said: "As the world proceeds with the worsening of its moral life, the people's character declines. What worries me is not when the people are stupid, but when they are untruthful or insincere. Truthfulness or sincerity is like the foundation of a house. When the foundation is solid, a house of many stories can be built on it. If you devote yourself to study, and lead an ascetic life, you will make yourself a superior person. But what is most essential is to develop truthfulness or sincerity to a maximum. Then you will indeed have a great future! Truth is the way to heaven. To reflect and to strive to attain truth is the way of man. Try to keep these words in mind."⁸

To another Japanese disciple, Kondo Sadashisa, he gave the following warning: "Formerly Liu-chung Hsien-kung asked Ssu-ma Kuang, 'Can you give me one word which I should put into practice for the rest of my life?' Ssu-ma Kuang answered: 'This one word is truthfulness. If you are true to yourself, you will remain the same, internally and externally, from the beginning to the end. You will be respectful, sincere, and pure. You will win confidence from others.' It is said in the *Doctrine of the Mean*: 'A man of noble character regards the attainment of truthfulness as

the most excellent thing.' Also it is said in the *Book of Mencius*: 'Never has there been one possessed of complete truth who does not move others. Never has there been one who did not possess truth who was able to move others.' Again, Tzu-ssu said: 'When one is true one will be intelligent; when one is intelligent one will be true. There has never been one who was true and yet unintelligent.'"⁹

So much for the first requirement of Chu Chih-yü for his personal philosophy. Now we come to his second requirement, namely, to live the life of concentrated mind. In this regard we find the surest indication of his bent towards the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi. The Ch'eng-Chu School attached great importance to the practical realization in daily life of the morally correct. Now normally what is morally correct does not coincide with what is wanted by one's instinctive desires. One should therefore train one's mind to apply the rules of ethical conduct to daily life, whether in small things or great. The Ch'eng-Chu School advocated mental concentration as the means to keep one's self attentive at every moment to the rules of life. Since, in the eyes of Chinese philosophers to practise what is right and proper is as important as knowledge of the true, the problem of mind concentration is as vital in Chinese thought as epistemology is in Western thought. Chu Chih-yü expressed this idea to a friend who took the single word *ching* [concentration of mind] as a motto for his studio.

"*Ching*," said Chu, "is a virtue which is vital for all men. Each man comes in the course of his life to a crossroad where, if his thoughts are confused and he loses grip over himself, he can go the wrong way and even become insane. But if he controls himself, he can take the right way and become a sage. When the mind is concentrated, the limbs and senses are under proper guidance. To live attentively, even during the night, is a way to transform habit into nature. Inclination towards comfort and ease makes a man idle. Attention makes a man strong and vigorous day by day.

"What is the meaning of *ching*? It means that a man is modest and holds himself ready as if he was afraid something was about to fall. Internally he keeps his mind in order, and externally he is attentive to his movements. His dress and appearance are digni-

fied, for shabbiness, careless dress, and sloppiness degrade him. In action or in silence he is sincere from beginning to end. No relaxation! Self-control! This is the way to personal cultivation and the betterment of the world. This is the eternal way.”¹⁰

Chu Chih-yü stressed the rules of ceremony as the pillar of community life and personal cultivation, and he illustrated this by a story: “When I was invited to call upon Koxinga (Cheng Ch’eng-kung), I saw that the military officers and gentry around him were frivolous and did not observe the rules of ceremony, which, in their eyes, had become obsolete. I knew then that Koxinga could not succeed. So I took my departure, not leaving so much as a calling card. Koxinga was not fit for survival, and it is the same with others. To maintain a sense of ceremony is the spiritual guardian, the foundation, for national as well as individual life.”¹¹

Because Chu Chih-yü disliked wild speculation, he emphasized the value of sober study in every walk of life. “When,” he wrote, “parents are living, one should learn the duty of being filial. When there are brothers around, one should learn the duty of having fraternal considerations. With a wife, one should learn to live in harmony. When one goes out, one should learn loyalty towards the ruler and faithfulness towards friends. Everywhere one can learn.”¹² In short, a person should study—directing his studies, always, towards what has practical value, firstly, to himself and secondly, to the community.

Curiously, Chu Chih-yü was a craftsman as well as a scholar. He understood the arts of agriculture, carpentry, and tailoring. When Tokugawa Mitsukuni asked him about the construction of the Temple of Confucius, he made, as I had occasion previously to say so, a model of the temple at the scale of 1:30, for the guidance of the Japanese carpenters. This model is still preserved at Mito. Even professional Japanese carpenters admired him because they recognized him as one superior to them in their own craft. He also was an expert in making robes for scholars who offered sacrifices at the Temple of Confucius.

It is safe to conclude then that Chu Chih-yü was no theoretician. Theoretical systems of philosophy without practical value never appealed to him and he never spent time in constructing

them out of his mind. And yet Chu's impact on Japan's intellectual life was enormous and has lasted to the present. Three of his Japanese disciples are especially important. They were (1) Andō Shuyaku, (2) Tokugawa Mitsukuni, (3) Asaka-Kaku or Asaka Tampaku.

(1) Andō Shuyaku comes first because without him Chu's stay in Japan would have been impossible. Chu himself, in a letter to his son, tells about Andō's kindness. "For forty years," he writes, "Japan had not allowed a Chinese to settle down within her boundaries. Then, a year ago seven boats from Nanking arrived at Nagasaki carrying mostly rich business men. But their petitions to remain were rejected. So I relinquished the intention of staying. Andō Shuyaku however repeatedly begged me to stay, and he negotiated with the governor for a permit on my behalf. This permit was the only exception made during all these years. Andō Shuyaku shared with me his rice allowance of eighty *piculs*, sending me forty *piculs*, and paid me two visits a year . . . He lived frugally, wearing plain clothes, and eating coarse rice and vegetables. His best meal was a dish of a few fish. He had a Chinese pan which looked dusty and rusty because nothing was ever cooked in it. His friends scolded him, but he cared little for what they said because he was happy with his poverty and pleased with his *tao*." ¹³

It is interesting also to read Andō's account of this story. "At that time," he writes, "many people requested you [Chu Chih-yü] to stay. After the governor gave his consent I was so glad that I could not sleep. I returned to my house and decided to give half my rice allowance to you . . . You said that it was too much. As my teacher I regarded you as holding a position equal to that of father and sovereign. Since a man can die for either of them, that matter of rice is not worth mentioning. I should have kept only a third for myself, and sent you the remaining two-thirds, but I knew that you would not accept it. So I took the middle road and divided my rice allowance in halves. Because you are honorable and righteous you will refuse anything which comes from unclean hands. I hope that you will not consider my offer as coming from unclean hands." ¹⁴

Andō Shuyaku's admiration for Chu Chih-yü may be explained in part by the profound impression Chinese martyrs of the Sung

Dynasty (such as Wen T'ien-hsiang) left on the Japanese mind. When Andō found out that Chu was virtually a martyr of the Ming Dynasty, he worshipped him. His admiration was expressed in a poem composed on the occasion of their meeting in 1658:

"Coming to the Eastern Sea in order to escape the barbarians,
You, like Lu Chung-lien,
Refused to submit yourself to the Emperor of Ch'ing
To do right is the work of the patriot,
To care for the public welfare is the duty of the citizen.
Your name was formerly known to your emperor,
But now you have been expelled from your country.
Your return depends upon your efforts to restore the Ming.
I hope that your boat will sail under a fair wind." ¹⁵

Andō's respect for his Chinese teacher received a high compliment from the philosopher of the time, Itō Jinsai, who remarked: "I have heard that Chu Chih-yü, a Confucian scholar of the Ming Dynasty, refusing to serve under Manchu rule, came to stay in Nagasaki. You have made yourself his [Andō] disciple and are studying under him. You choose to remain a bachelor and are satisfied to deny yourself the comforts of life in order to give half your rice allowance for his upkeep. Your noble aim and unselfish deed are worthy of a man of honor and distinction. You belong to the group Mencius had in mind when he said: 'Scholars of extraordinary ability can arouse themselves even without the leadership of a King Wen.'" ¹⁶

In 1663, a fire swept through Nagasaki and burned down the house where Chu Chih-yü was living. Getting wind of this news, Andō immediately set out for the unfortunate town, and found another home for his teacher.

How the master influenced the loyal pupil is nowhere set forth more clearly than in the following poem:

"I am of humble nature,
I wish to live the life of an unknown man.
To do good for fame is no longer good,
To serve the cause of justice by enslaving others, is no longer justice.

The flower which one plants will bloom and fade,
Drinking before the moon, one does not know who is host and
who is guest.

The greatest pleasure comes from contentment,
Let one open or close one's mind as innocence dictates." ¹⁷

(2) Tokugawa Mitsukuni, or the Prince of Mito, is the second of the disciples of Chu Chih-yü. As the head of the ruling Mito family he was ambitious to make his name immortal. Yet he was modest in his dealings with Chu Chih-yü. After the philosopher had been in Nagasaki for four years, the prince conceived the idea of asking Chinese scholars to assist in the compilation of a history of Japan. The ruling Tokugawa family gave especial patronage to the school of Chu Hsi, which had been known in Japan for many years, and when, in 1664, a Japanese Confucian expert named Oyake Seijun was sent to Nagasaki to make inquiries, he advised the prince that the only man he could recommend was Chu Chih-yü. Accordingly a few months later, the philosopher appeared, upon invitation, before Tokugawa Mitsukuni, and was treated with such respect that he agreed to serve him.

The role which this prince played in Japanese history can best be told in relation to his efforts in behalf of the *History of Great Japan*. He was the spirit of the Mito School, which stood for the principle of restoration of full power to the emperor. Though, as is well known, the shogunate at that time was taking power away from the emperor, and though Tokugawa Mitsukuni himself belonged to a shogunate family, he was nevertheless, perhaps unconsciously, sympathetic with the idea that the emperor should be made a real sovereign,—an idea which afterwards became the driving force in the abolition of feudalism in the Meiji period. This idea had been expressed centuries before in the Confucian classics, in *The Spring and Autumn Annals*, and more recently in Chu Hsi's *History of China (Tzu-chih Tung-chien Kang-mu)*. At any rate, whether from early studies or from some other source, the idea left a deep impression on the prince's mind.

It is recalled that when Tokugawa Mitsukuni was a boy of eighteen he read the biography of Po I in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's *Shih-chi*. Then, clapping his hands with joy, he sighed: "Without books

how can we find the documents of the T'ang and Yü Dynasties? Without the brush of the historian, how can later generations be inspired?"¹⁸ From that time on the compilation of a history of Japan became his passion. Tokutomi Iichiro in his *Modern History of the Japanese People* tells us that Tokugawa Mitsukuni, after having read Po I's life in the *Shih-chi*, was so profoundly ruled that he resolved to do three things: (1) to study seriously to become a scholar; (2) to follow Po I in abdicating his position of rulership in favor of a son of his brother; (3) to compile a history of Japan. Tokutomi believes also that the Prince of Mito was an unusually sensitive man, and had the foresight to know that the conception of social obligations would eventually grow in the mind of the Japanese people so that the emperor would become a real sovereign. But who should this sovereign be? Who are the usurpers? What should be the attitude of the citizens towards their country? Toward barbarians? These were among some of the questions which were already invading the Japanese mind.

Tokugawa Mitsukuni became convinced that nothing short of an unbroken succession of the imperial family should become an established fact of the Japanese state. The idea had an ancient lineage. And it became the fundamental principle of the Mito School, whose founder, needless to say, was the prince himself. But to return to the compilation of the *History of Great Japan*, the motive behind this history was to illustrate and exemplify the fundamental principle of the Mito School.

As a member of a shogunate family, it was the duty of Tokugawa Mitsukuni to look after the interests of his clan. However, he said to himself, "I am a member of a shogunate. But every citizen is a subject of the Emperor of Japan. When the time comes to decide between my family and the emperor, I shall give all to the emperor. Such was the law of the Mito clan."¹⁹ How the *History of Great Japan* was to be written was decided in Tokugawa Mitsukuni's mind long before the first word was set down.

In 1672 a history-compiling bureau, called *Shōkō-kan*, was established. The two words *shō* and *kō* mean respectively "study of the past" and "survey of the future." In a memorandum the bureau said: "History is for the purpose of putting on record what was rule and what was misrule, of showing what was good and

what was bad, of giving data as background for reward and punishment. In China, after Ssu-ma Ch'ien and Pan Ku, historiographers came one after another in rapid succession, so that Chinese historical annals are numerous. In Japan there are historical works dealing with the ancient and medieval periods. But there is nothing dealing with modern times." ²⁰

This *Shōkō-kan* was filled with men who studied under and corresponded with Chu Chih-yü. Thus, we may safely assume that he was the chief adviser for the whole project, though he personally did no work in the bureau itself. The actual editing was under the supervision of his disciple Asaka Tampaku.

(3) Asaka-Kaku or Asaka Tampaku is characterized by Tokutomi Iichirō in his *Modern History of the Japanese People* as "the leading man who finished the splendid work of compiling the history of Japan. As a boy of thirteen he went to study under Chu Chih-yü; later, at the age of twenty-six, he was appointed an editor; and then finally he was made director of the bureau." ²¹

Some of Asaka-Kaku's remarks about history are worth quoting. "History-writing," he says, "may take many forms: (1) annals are a kind of history; (2) biographies and special studies are also a kind of history. The records of the former emperors belong to category (1). Category (2), which comprises historiography in its most general form, may be subdivided into chapters on individual emperors, chapters on economics and cultural life, and biographies of individuals other than emperors. The measures utilized by governments, the deeds of ministers, good rule, disorders, ceremonies, music, criminal law, and administration should all be dealt with in separate chapters as special studies. Such is the idea of the Prince of Mito, and such is the work of the *Shōkō-kan*." ²²

The *History of Great Japan*, consisting of 73 chapters devoted to the emperors, and 170 biographies devoted to other individuals, was finished in the fifth year of *Shōtōku* (1715). Mitsukuni's son, Tokugawa Tsunaeda, wrote a preface to the work and there he alluded to the incident of his father's being inspired to write the history from reading Ssu-ma Ch'ien's biography of Po I. Tsunaeda then goes on to discuss the main objectives of the *History of Great Japan*. "A history is a record of events," he says, "it should be written as the events actually happened. Then, what was good

and what was bad will be clear to the reader as a matter of course. From the olden days down to the present, whether the moral climate was healthful or tainted, whether the government was admirable or corrupt, the historical facts should be presented as clearly as if they were on your palm. The good should be taken as an example to be emulated, and the bad as an example to be avoided. Then rebel ministers and disobedient sons will have yardsticks to measure their conduct with, and the result cannot be anything but the improvement in social obligation and responsibility. Writing should be honest and straightforward. Recording of events should be accurate. Otherwise history will not be reliable.”²³

Besides conceiving a *History of Great Japan* as a means of revealing the legitimacy of the emperor's supremacy, Tokugawa Mitsukuni revived the memory of Prince Kusunoki Masashige as a symbol of loyalty to the imperial house. He asked Chu Chih-yü to write an epitaph for Masashige's tombstone, and this inscription, in part, runs as follows:

“Loyalty and filial duty are the two fundamental virtues of mankind. The sun and the moon shine in the sky. If it were not for them the world would be dark, obscure, and gloomy. Similarly, if loyalty and filial duty should disappear from the mind, treachery and disobedience would follow in rapid succession. Now I know that Kusunoki Masashige was a man of faithfulness and fortitude, to whom no other was equal. As a great strategist he could foresee strength and weakness, he could make sudden decisions, and he knew how to choose the right men and how to open his heart to his aides. His decisions were invariably correct, and in battle he was always the winner. He was as solid as metal and stone. He was never beguiled by pecuniary motives nor intimidated by threats. He restored the monarchy and re-established it in the old capital.”²⁴

Tokugawa Mitsukuni's dual achievement—compilation of the *History of Great Japan* and erection of the monument to Prince Kusunoki Masashige—led eventually to the realization of his fondest dream, restoration of the supremacy of the emperor. This was what actually happened when feudalism was abolished and the monarchy restored in the nineteenth century. Behind this significant reformation, conceived by the Mito School and its founder Tokugawa

gawa Mitsukuni, looms the great shadow of the refugee philosopher Chu Chih-yü! It was he who in fact laid the spiritual foundations for modern Japan. It must have been a satisfaction for him to see the principles of Confucianism, or Neo-Confucianism, firmly implanted on the soil of his homeland's neighboring island.

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CHAPTER NINE

Ku Yen-Wu, Advocate of Classical Study

Ku Yen-wu is one of the three best known loyalists of the Ming Dynasty. With Huang Tsung-hsi and Wang Fu-chih, he formed a trio who, even many years after their death, were a source of inspiration for the Chinese revolutionaries at the end of the nineteenth century. As staunchly anti-Manchu as Chu Chih-yü, the hero of our last chapter, these three scholars were also vigorously opposed to the school of Wang Shou-jen, though Huang might more properly be classed as a revisionist. Ku was unlike Chu and Huang in that he did not leave China after the Manchus came to power, but like them he refused to accept any position under their rule. A good businessman who understood farming, he was able to supply himself with enough money to study and travel without depending on the government. Ku has often been called the pioneer of the Ch'ing philological or classics-study movement, but in my opinion this label is misleading. It is true, however, that he was opposed to the speculative nature of the Wang Shou-jen school, and applied himself to fields of study which were positive, solid, and practical. In the course of this study, he exploited many fields: geography, phonetics, history, archaeology, and study of the Classics. The last of these is only one of the areas where he led the way; it is therefore inadequate to speak of him as merely the pioneer of Ch'ing philology. Rather, I should call him a man whose aim was to go back to the real source of knowledge, to first-hand observation and research. If Ku lived in Europe he would have likewise sponsored a method of experiment and observation and probed into the secrets of nature—which in the seventeenth century was just beginning to produce important results in the Western

world. With the peculiar circumstances which then existed in China, there was no way in which he could free himself from written documents in order to study the Book of Nature. Even so he applied the scientific method to phonetics, geography, and history, which were areas of study intermediate between the world of books and the world of nature. In these realms he did original pioneer work, though shortly after him the tendency to be concerned only with books soon manifested itself. This is the reason why philology became the predominant study in the Ch'ing Dynasty.

Ku Yen-wu was born in K'un-shan District, Kiangsu Province, in 1613. Even as a boy there was something markedly peculiar about him. He joined the Fu-she, a political club like the Tung-lin School. When Nanking fell and the Manchus moved into his district, he tried to raise an army to fight them, but he was defeated. He could have been arrested by the conquerors and killed, but fortunately he was living with his mother who, through sheer strength of character, managed to save him. She died after fasting six days, and in her will she enjoined that he was never to serve under an alien dynasty. Ku abided by these terms for the rest of his life. The year after his mother's death he was invited by the Prince of T'ang, recently crowned in Fukien Province, to take a position in the Ministry of War as head of the Division of Geography. He refused on the plea that his mother was not yet buried. Meanwhile a personal enemy in K'un-shan was scheming to get him into trouble, so Ku thought it prudent to disguise himself as a tradesman and leave the district. Then a servant, Lu En, who had been employed by the Ku family for three generations, in collusion with a village leader Yeh accused Ku of conspiring in Fukien with the Prince of T'ang. Ku was soon apprised of this calumny, caught Lu and had him drowned in a river. Lu's son-in-law thereupon tried to bribe the local magistrate to have Ku executed, and he was incarcerated in Lu's house, where of course he was in continual danger of his life. Eventually a friend of Ku's, named Kuei Yü-kuang, applied to Ch'ien Ch'ien-i, a collaborator with the Manchus, to arrange for the scholar's release. This Ch'ien agreed to do, only on condition that Ku become his disciple, something which Kuei knew Ku would never consent to. But the

friend was anxious to help the scholar, so on his own initiative he signed Ku's name to a calling-card as a disciple of Ch'ien, as Ch'ien requested, and Ku was released. In due time the scholar found out about this ruse and sought to set himself right by posting notices on the city wall that he was not, and never had been a disciple of Ch'ien Ch'ien-i. By this time he fully realized that K'un-shan District was no place for him, and he departed for a trip to north China. He travelled through Shantung, Hopeh, Shansi, Shensi, and Honan, not for pleasure but to study local history and geography. He even went north of the Great Wall. In 1662 word came to him, while he was in Peking, that the last prince of the Ming Dynasty had been killed in Burma. Appreciating finally that the Ming cause was hopeless, he determined to devote the rest of his life to study though of course his deep sense of loyalty to the old dynasty remained as firm as ever. Whenever he passed near Nanking or Peking he always remembered to stop to pay his respect at the tombs of the Ming emperors.

He made it a practice to have four mules with him while traveling—two for his reference books which he found frequent occasion to consult en route and two for himself, alternately now on the back of one, now on the other. The purpose of his travels was to confirm with first-hand factual information what was written in the books, in other words, to check the printed word against personal observation. For instance, when he arrived at a spot of strategic importance in a past war, he would find a veteran, then make inquiries about the details of the locality, the deployment of forces in the battles, etc. If the accounts he heard contained discrepancies, he would retire to a nearby tea-shop or inn to consult his books.

Sometimes, in his journeys, he would come into rich agricultural areas. He would then buy a piece of land for farming. He owned properties in Huai-an of northern Kiangsu Province, in Chang-ch'iu of Shantung Province, and in Yen-men and the Wu-t'ai area of Shansi Province. In such areas he would promote various businesses and let his disciples manage them. He used to say: "If I have thousands of cows and sheep in the pasture lands of north China, why should I dream about my home south of the Yangtze Valley."¹

In 1668, when Ku Yen-wu was fifty-six years old, he ran into trouble again. A servant in the home of a Shantung family accused his master, a Mr. Huang, of writing subversive poems against the Manchus, and Ku was implicated. He was exonerated only after six months of legal proceedings. He then retreated north into Hopeh Province, and crossed again to the region beyond the Great Wall.

Interested in the question of where the capital of China should be, Ku left us a book entitled *Capitals during the Different Dynasties*. He found that Ch'ang-an or Sian, the capital during the Western Han and the T'ang Dynasties, was the best place. "Here," he wrote, "if you withdraw just ten *li*, you have a pass in your keeping. Suppose you wish to expand your power towards the east, then you need only sally forth by way of your pass. Its position is like the top of a house from which you can direct water down by hose and extinguish a fire."²

The son of Ku's sister, Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh, was an influential man under the Manchu Dynasty. When this collaborator, though a relative, invited Ku to come to live with him, he refused. On another occasion, Hsü asked the recalcitrant scholar to attend a dinner-party in the evening. Again Ku refused, saying: "A drinking-party should take place in daylight. Only elopements and bribery are carried out at night. It is not proper for a gentleman to attend a banquet at night."³

After the establishment of a bureau for compiling the history of the Ming Dynasty, Ku was twice requested to join it in 1671 and 1679. His answer was what might have been expected: "My mother," he said, "committed suicide because of her opposition to the Manchus. In her last will and testament she gave instructions that I should never serve under an alien dynasty . . . Now, as a septuagenarian I have no desire to disobey her. What I hope for is death. If I should be compelled to serve under the Manchus, I could do nothing but commit suicide."⁴ Henceforth he did not return to Peking. It was suggested to him, however, that a third party should recommend him to the emperor for the position; then, after having been recommended he could refuse the appointment. In this way his name would be much more forcibly brought before the attention of the public. But Ku objected by saying that "this

would be what is called hunting for fame in the headlines!" He went on to explain: "If a woman after the death of her first husband resolved to remain a widow in memory of him, this would not be hunting for fame. But suppose that through another she should try to arrange for a betrothal for herself, and then refuse to appear on her wedding-day giving as her excuse that she was determined not to remarry; such a woman, in my opinion, would not be of good character."⁵ After this final refusal to work for the Bureau of Historiography, Ku lived another three years, and died in 1682.

Let us now turn to Ku's attitude towards Sung and Ming philosophy. He is known as the man who "pulled down the house" of Wang Shou-jen in the last days of the Ming Dynasty, and there are not lacking scholars who hold that his thought was influenced by the School of Chu Hsi, since his work *Record of Daily Knowing* was patterned after the *Jih-ch'ao* (*Daily Record*) of Wang Ch'en and the *K'un-hsieh Chi-wen* (*Record of Hard Work*) of Wang Ying-lin, both direct disciples of Chu Hsi. Thus Ku may justly be classified as a follower of Chu Hsi. But I may also add that Ku had a philosophy of his own, based on the formula: "Seek knowledge in the widest range, and have a sense of shame in personal conduct." This double motto, with much else that indicates his views on epistemology and ethics, is contained in a letter to a friend which is worth quoting at length.

"After I had done much travelling in the north and south," wrote Ku, "many friends began to regard me as one who had some knowledge. They insisted on asking me questions, although, in point of fact, I had no more knowledge than a blind man. I regret that scholars for the last hundred years have occupied themselves with discussions about mind and human nature, which are the most difficult topics to understand. Even Confucius seldom discussed such items as divine order and *jen*. Human nature and *tao* were subjects about which the disciple, Tzu-kung, rarely heard from his master . . . Confucius, while answering his students' questions often said: 'Of first importance for personal cultivation is to behave with a sense of shame.' Of his own scholarly pursuits he said: 'I am fond of antiquity, and study it seriously.' He never talked about the 'Message of the Mind,' much less about 'danger

of the human mind,' 'subtleness of the *tao*-mind,' 'fineness' or 'singleness.' Instead, he said much about 'holding to the proper mean,' and about the decrees of Providence when the people suffer from poverty.

These words show that the scholarship of sage is plain, simple, and easy to follow. Confucius said: 'In your studies, start from what is low [visible] and proceed to what is high [invisible, metaphysical].' Yen Hui was almost a sage, yet Confucius felt it appropriate to advise him to be interested in a wide range of literature. Again, the master mentioned the value of wide reading while discoursing to Duke Ai of the Kingdom of Lu. Among all the disciples, from Tseng-tzu down, the one who was most solid was Tzu-hsia, who, when he inquired about *jen*, received from Confucius the reply: 'Get wide knowledge, make your mind serious, ask relevant questions, and be reflective.'

"But nowadays the practice of scholars is just the contrary! They assemble audiences of dozens or hundreds, people who differ so widely in temperament and intelligence that they resemble the various kinds of grass or trees. Yet the scholars treat them all alike. The Confucian method of seeking wide knowledge is abandoned. Instead scholars look only for a kind of specious unity. Forgetting the poverty and misery of the people, they yet devote themselves to discussing mental danger, subtleness, fineness, and singleness. I suppose they imagine themselves to be superior even to Confucius, and that they regard their pupils as more intelligent than Tzu-kung. They skip over Confucius and go directly to the 'mind-message' of the two emperors. This I do not understand.

"In the *Book of Mencius* it is true questions about mind and human nature come up very often. But when a student like Wan Chang or Kung-sun Ch'ou asks such a question and Mencius answers it, query and reply alike are always related to public life, either as regards accepting or refusing it, either as regards remaining in office or leaving it. I Yin was helpful to his emperor by making him as good as Yao and Shun, the ideal rulers. But I Yin was governed by a fundamental principle: even if he was offered a thousand teams of horses [as a gift] he would not look at them. I Yin and Po I were unlike Confucius, but there was one point of agreement among all three of them: they would not attempt

to win a whole empire if it cost one act of injustice, or the killing of one innocent man.

"Accordingly, we see that human nature, divine order, and heaven were topics upon which Confucius seldom touched per se but present-day scholars are occupied with them every moment without reference to realities. Again, the questions of being in public service or staying out of it, of accepting or declining official appointments, were subjects to which Confucius paid much attention. But scholars of the present day are not interested in them at all . . . Loyalty and integrity may not cover the whole range of *jen*, but one who knows nothing about loyalty and integrity, can never reach *jen*; the idea of no greed, or no covetousness, may not cover the whole range of *tao*, yet who can attain *tao* who is inclined towards greed and covetousness? If I am asked: 'What is *tao*?' my answer, in accordance with my point of view, is this: For the attainment of *tao* two things are necessary; (1) to widen knowledge as much as possible, (2) to behave with a sense of shame. Whatever is relevant to the individual, the country, or the world, belongs to the field of knowledge. Whatever concerns the status of son, minister, brother, or friend, or whatever concerns taking on public service or declining it, accepting it or rejecting it, belongs to the field of the sense of shame. It seems to me that this sense of shame is the most important factor in one's moral life. One should not feel ashamed because of ragged clothes or bad food, but one should feel ashamed if one is unable to do what is expected of him. Therefore it is said in the *Book of Mencius*: 'All things are complete in me; when truthfulness is found in me during self-examination, this is a great pleasure indeed.'

"Without the sense of shame, a scholar loses the very ground on which he stands. Without interest in antiquities or in other related subjects, a scholar's knowledge is empty. A man who loses his own ground, and who is occupied with what is empty is a long way off from sagehood, regardless of how much he may talk about it."⁶

In this often quoted letter, Ku Yen-wu's antagonism towards discussions of mind and human nature—the sort of preoccupation which took up so much time in the last days of the Ming Dynasty—is clear and unmistakable. There can be no doubt that he strove to pull down the philosophical edifice built by Wang Shou-jen.

Yet one gets a lopsided picture of him if one thinks of him as exclusively concerned with the gathering of knowledge. His emphasis on the sense of shame is an indication that he attached much importance to moral values in human conduct, although these values are not of the same order as those of Wang Shou-jen, which are based on the conception of *liang-chih*. Very often Ku looked at the history of mankind from the viewpoint of the sense of shame. Though he never worked out a coherent system of ethics, he saw clearly the significance of the ethical value of human life.

Ku is known as the founder of Ch'ing philosophy or classical study, but this is not strictly correct. What he wanted was to find an empirical and positive basis from which to fight the empty jargon of the school of Wang Shou-jen, and although he did not build a theoretical system of his own around the interrelationships of *ch'i* (matter) and *ri* (reason), he nevertheless made it explicit that he stood for Chu Hsi and Chang Tsai. In an essay entitled "Preface to a Guide to Positive Thinking," or "To Study on a Low [i.e., physical] Level," he tells us how the dialogues of Hsieh Liang-tso, Chang Chiu-ch'eng, and Lu Chiu-yüan, are worthless because they were written under the influence of the Ch'an sect. He ends his preface with the sentence: "If one can follow the way of Chu Hsi, this book, *A Guide to Positive Thinking*, will not have been in vain, for the way of Chu Hsi is the only fruit which is left."⁷

In another letter to a friend, Ku gives us some further insight into his convictions: "According to my view," he wrote, "the way to sagehood is to start by studying at a low [empirical, or physical] level, and thence ascend to a high [metaphysical, *tao*] level. The principles of behavior are filial piety, brotherhood, loyalty, and sincerity. Duty in daily life is to clean and sweep, to question and answer, and to present one's self and withdraw. For these the literature to read is the *Book of Odes*, the *Book of History*, the three *Books of Rites*, the *Book of Changes*, and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. Each individual should know what is right in respect of staying at home and going out into public service, declining and accepting or giving and taking of public office. Work for one's country consists of administration, culture, and punishment. The purpose of literary activity is to contribute to the promotion of good order, to prevent misrule, and to improve the people's moral

climate, for the people should be able to enjoy peace and prosperity . . . Any discussion about human nature and divine order should stay close to the principles of the physical world and the practical life, where its roots properly belong.”⁸

These words should show the difference between Ku Yen-wu in the role of philologist in the Ch'ing Dynasty, to which he is usually assigned, and Ku Yen-wu as the social thinker. In this Preface he makes it explicit that philosophy should be based on the practical life. His importance in the history of Chinese thought may also be seen in his *Record of Daily Knowing*. The sixth book of that work, for instance, discusses human nature, etc. but the significant thing to remember, if we wish to see Ku in the proper perspective, is that he discusses these problems not after the manner of Wang Shou-jen, but of Chu Hsi, and of Chu Hsi's teacher, Li T'ung. Far from being a mere philologist, Ku was in fact a pro-Chu scholar.

In addition to being a follower of Chu Hsi, Ku Yen-wu had a well-defined philosophy of his own, which centers around the theory of the sense of shame. By this yardstick he sought to measure and appraise Chinese history. That is, he tried to interpret the rise and decline of historical periods in terms of the moral climate which was the expression of man's attitude to the sense of shame. Ku was convinced that insensitivity to shame was invariably followed by deterioration of the moral climate. Thus in his *Record of Daily Knowing* he wrote:

“In the *History of the Five Dynasties* one finds the following comment in Feng Tao's ‘Biography’: ‘Decency, righteousness, clean-handedness, and sense of shame are the four pillars of a country. If they are not strengthened, the country cannot exist.’ These words may be traced to Kuan Chung, prime minister to Duke Huan of the Kingdom of Ch'i. Decency and righteousness are the fundamental principles for the community; clean-handedness and sense of shame are the two principles which constitute honesty in the individual. If there was no clean-handedness, one would be able to accept anything offered as a gift. If there was no sense of shame, one would be able to do anything one's desires prompted. The result would be corruption, illegality, and finally disaster. If those in high position are greedy and shameless, the country will be lost. Among these four principles the most vital is

the sense of shame.' Mencius said: 'A man may not be without shame. When one is ashamed of being without shame, one will afterwards have no occasion to be ashamed.' Elsewhere he said: "The sense of shame is of great importance to a man. Those who are scheming and full of tricks do not allow their sense of shame to come into action.'

"Unclean-handedness, which is contrary to the principles of decency and righteousness, may be traced back to shamelessness. When the people at the top level are shameless, they are bound to bring shame to the whole country."⁹

More explicitly, Ku Yen-wu tried to find the laws of rise and decay in the history of Chinese civilization, much as Brooks Adams did in his *Law of Civilization and Decay*. Ku began with a comparison of the Spring and Autumn period (B.C. 722-481 or 479) with the Contending States Period (B.C. 475-256), always having regard for the moral character of the people. He mentioned six qualities distinguishing the earlier era from the later:

(1) In the Spring and Autumn Period the people appreciated deeply the rules of decency and faithfulness. In the Contending States Period, this was no longer so.

(2) In the earlier era the feudal lords still paid high respect to the emperor of the Chou Dynasty, but in the later era, this was no longer so.

(3) In the Spring and Autumn Period the rites of sacrificial offering and of visiting among the feudal states were still observed, but this was no longer so in the period of the Contending States.

(4) In the earlier period priority was given to the aristocratic families, but in the later period this was no longer so.

(5) In the Spring and Autumn era songs and poems were sung at the banquet-table; but, later, in the age of the Contending States, this was no longer true.

(6) In the Spring and Autumn Period on the occasion of a king's death or coronation a notice was dispatched to other countries. In the period of the Contending States this practice was no longer followed.

Such were the great changes which Ku Yen-wu discovered to have been going on over a period of 141 years, from 475 until 334 B.C. Then a degeneration set in which continued down to the

Ch'in (221–207 B.C.) and Western Han (206 B.C.–24 A.D.) dynasties. According to Ku the improvement of the Chinese people's character began with the establishment of the Eastern Han Dynasty (A.D. 25–219). This was how he explained it: "During the [Western] Han Dynasty, after Emperor Wu-ti canonized the books of Confucius, a great number of Confucian scholars appeared, but the principles of morality did not prevail among the masses. Therefore, when Wang Mang usurped the throne, thousands of people could sign their names to a petition complimenting him. The founder of the Eastern Han Dynasty, Emperor Kuang-wu, profited by this example of usurpation and he adopted a policy of exalting lofty principles and elevating high integrity. He encouraged persons who performed solid and distinguished services. Only those who were familiar with the Classics and who behaved themselves in accordance with the precepts of self-cultivation, were employed by the government. Emperor Kuang-wu no sooner put this policy into effect than a great change in the moral character of the people took place. Even when the political situation went from bad to worse in the later years of the dynasty, those who criticized the regime remained faithful to noble principles and sacrificed their lives for the good of the land, like cocks crowing on a dark and stormy night. So, after the Three Dynasties, the Eastern Han was the age in which morality reached the highest point of development. Fan Hua, author of the *History of the Eastern Han Dynasty*, wrote of this period: 'During the reigns of Huan-ti [A.D. 147–167] and Ling-ti [A.D. 168–189] the throne deteriorated, government discipline became lax, and conflicts were many. Anybody of average intelligence could see that the dynasty could not last long. But influential men did not dare to put schemes of usurpation into effect, and rebels were under the control of public opinion. Hence, there was no immediate collapse of the Han Dynasty, because loyalists continued to support it.'" ¹⁰

Ku Yen-wu next proceeded to investigate the causes of political division from the fall of the Eastern Han Dynasty until reunion was again effected under the Sui Dynasty (A.D. 589–617)—except for the brief interval of unification under the Chin Dynasty (265–316), which came to an abrupt close when it was displaced by the Eastern Chin Dynasty (317–419). Ku blamed this political

division on Ts'ao Ts'ao, founder of the Wei Dynasty (220-264), and on the so-called "Pure Talk" (speculative, Taoistic discourse) of the Chin Dynasty. Ts'ao Ts'ao, prime minister under Hsien-ti of the Eastern Han Dynasty, succeeded in arrogating so much power to himself that the emperor became his puppet. Ts'ao's hypocritical character is well illustrated in his refusal to accept any of the honors his emperor wanted to bestow upon him. Then, at last, his son Ts'ao Pi snatched the throne from the last sovereign of the Han line. While Ts'ao Ts'ao was hatching this intrigue, he gave all sorts of encouragement to unscrupulous rascals to join him. He even issued an order that anyone who had a bad name, or who had been insulted by others, or who was considered inhuman and undutiful, should rally to him, provided he had the ability to govern and could plan strategies. Such an order, needless to say, created worse chaos among the people: it prompted deceit, trickery, and downright dishonesty.

Although Ts'ao Ts'ao's son Ts'ao Pi became the first emperor of the Wei Dynasty, the regime he founded was short-lived. In A.D. 265 Ssu-ma Yen chased away Ts'ao Pi's last descendant and usurped the throne himself. This act only served to bring more anarchy upon the Middle Kingdom, for Ssu-ma's sons became embroiled in civil wars among themselves. The Five Barbarians then took advantage of the confused situation and occupied northern China, so that the Chins were forced to move their seat of government south of the Yangtze Valley.

As regards the second of Ku Yen-wu's reasons for the political division of China in those days, namely, "Pure Talk," when Ts'ao Fang became the third emperor of the Wei Dynasty in A.D. 240, under the title Cheng-shih, the Seven Wise Men of the Bamboo Forest started this game of ceaseless and unending talk. Devoted to the books of Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, and others, rather than to the Confucian Classics, they regarded having a jug of wine as the most accomplished and polished way of life, and looked with contempt upon anyone who tried to observe rules of decency or righteousness, likening such a one to a louse staying in the seams of trousers [for seams are straight, narrow, and confining]. It is not to be wondered at that Ku Yen-wu regarded the way of life exemplified by these gentlemen of the bamboo grove as one of the

reasons why north China came to be occupied by the barbarians from the beginning of the fourth century down to A.D. 581.

The T'ang Dynasty, as is well known, was celebrated for its military achievements and poetry. According to Ku's scale of evaluation, however, this era does not come off so gloriously. Since its scholars were in the habit of paying visits to high officials to beg for favors, his appreciation of the period was slim. The Sung Dynasty according to Ku, reached the stage of excellence and refinement and the reasons are not far to seek.


The founder of the Sung Dynasty, Chao K'uang-yin, well understood the situation in the period of the Five Dynasties which preceded him, and thought of it as "the shameless period." Thus, after his coronation, he conferred signs of distinction only on those who showed ruggedness of character in order to make clear to the world the direction in which the new wind was blowing. Thus until the reigns of Chen-tsung and Jen-tsung, many ministers stepped forth who remonstrated frankly and straightforwardly with the emperors. They felt noble pride in their ruggedness of character and sense of shame. Through them the shamelessness of the Five Dynasties was wiped away. Even after the Sung were compelled to withdraw south of the Yangtze Valley, many loyalists rose to defend them. In spite of grave perils, those who submitted to alien rule were few. Down to the very end of the dynasty, there was no dearth of martyrs willing to sacrifice their lives for the Sung cause.

From his historical studies Ku Yen-wu drew the following conclusion: "Since the moral climate in which the people lived during the reigns of Ai-ti and P'ing-ti of the Western Han Dynasty actually changed for the better during the Eastern Han Dynasty, and again, since the moral climate in which the people lived during the Five Dynasties changed for the better during the Sung Dynasty, I know that any kind of moral climate, good or bad, can be changed by human effort."¹¹

At this point in order that we may more conveniently grasp Ku's view of the rise and fall of Chinese civilization, let me give a graphical representation first introduced by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to illustrate the same doctrine.

It should be clear by now that Ku Yen-wu showed profound

DIAGRAM OF THE RISE AND FALL OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION



interest in the philosophy of history. It should also be clear that he was no mere philologist, and that his historical discussion is not pure speculation. As an interpreter of history he made a real effort to see the historical fact as it really is. It is important to note that a philosophy of history in the style of Ku Yen-wu, with insistence on the need of the infusion of moral ruggedness into the people—another one of Ku's accomplishments—was not a fit subject for encouragement and discussion in the Ch'ing Dynasty because the Manchu overlords wished the Chinese to be submissive and not to develop sturdiness of character. For this reason the essential and most characteristic elements in Ku's philosophy remained unnoticed until the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty when the revolutionary movement got under way.

Ku Yen-wu not only had his own philosophical point of view, but he was also a pioneer in several new fields of study, and the discoverer of a new methodology. He realized that empty talk and book learning in these new fields were useless, so he began to apply the technique of observation and field-work. In geography, phonetics, archaeology, history, and classical study, he opened many fresh vistas. The thirty-eight titles under which his posthumous works fall cover political institutions, local history of various provinces and districts, astronomy, river-transportation, agriculture, military science, metal and stone epigraphy, phonetics, and archaeology. In all of these fields he made original and positive contributions because his method consisted of personal observation and investigation of source-material at firsthand. In geography he gave us two books: the *Chao Yü Chih*, a compendium of historical geography, and the *T'ien-hsia Chiin-kuo Li-ping-shu*, a treatise on different regions with special reference to their wealth and poverty. In the preface to the former of these works he wrote this in regard to his method: "First, I referred to the General Gazetteers of the Empire, next to the provincial, departmental, and district chronologies, and finally to the *Twenty-one Dynastic Histories*. In all, more than one thousand works were consulted."¹² His information, in other words, was supported by wide research. His interest in geography was so intense that in addition to writing the two books just mentioned, he compiled another called *The Capitals of the Various Dynasties*, as well as chronicles for several districts.

But aside from geography Ku made positive contributions also to other branches of knowledge. His *Five Books on Phonetics* was a revolutionary book on the work of reconstruction of the phonetic pattern of archaic Chinese. He went all the way back to the *Shih-ching* (Book of Odes), which he believed contained the system of rhymes of that time. That was lost, he thought, through the publication subsequently of three books: (1) the *Ssu-sheng P'u* (Vocabulary Arranged According to the Four Tones) by Shen Yüeh (A.D. 441-506) of the Southern Sung Dynasty, who constructed a system of rhyme-words based upon the scheme prevailing in the Han and Wei Dynasties; (2) the *Ch'ieh Yün* by Lu Fa-yen, published in A.D. 601, which was the standard work of rhyme-words in the T'ang Dynasty; and (3) the *Yün Hui* by Liu Yüan-chih of the Sung Dynasty, which was modified by Huang Kung-shao of the Yüan Dynasty, and which replaced the phonetic system of the T'ang period after it was lost. Ku Yen-wu was overjoyed to find that he actually could trace back to antiquity the changes in the pronunciation of Chinese words. His hope that the old pronunciation could be restored, of course, brought no result, but the light he cast upon the phonetic evolution of the Chinese language was considerable. We know from his own words that he carried around the *Five Books on Phonetics* with him in manuscript form for thirty years, revised it three times, and that thrice he copied every word of it with his own hand. This indicates how meticulous was Ku's scholarship!

Besides contributing to geography and phonetics, Ku Yen-wu left his mark also in archaeology. His work *Inscriptions in Metal and Stone* contains innumerable epigraphs from mountains, great cities, temples, and monasteries. Sometimes he climbed mountains to get copies of inscriptions. He regarded such durable records as important sources for the confirmation of what is written in historical texts.

Another of Ku's works, highly appreciated by the majority of Chinese scholars, is the *Jih-chih Lu* (Record of Daily Knowing). Its contents include Books 1-7, the Classics; Books 8-12, government, land system, weights, monetary system, finance; Books 13-15, ethics, social customs; Books 16-18, civil service examinations; Book 19, the writing of essays; Books 20-29, literary and historical

topics; Book 30, astronomical phenomena, astrology; Book 31, geography; Book 32, miscellaneous subjects.

Peculiarly interesting is Ku's methodology, or his technique for acquiring knowledge and collecting items of information. Fortunately he himself and his friends have written explicitly on this subject. His disciple P'an Lei said: "He travelled through half of China. Everywhere he made friends with leading men; he studied geography, social customs, and economic life on the spot."¹³ His biographer, Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wrote: "Wherever Ku went, he summoned veterans and those familiar with the area and asked them questions related to his study. If the information he thus elicited did not agree with what he had previously believed, he entered the nearest shop or inn to refer to his library, which he always had with him."¹⁴ Ku Yen-wu himself, describing his method of writing the *Record of Daily Knowing*, said: "What I have written was never said previously by the ancients, and it is indispensable for future generations . . . If I discovered that what I wrote had been said previously then I crossed it out."¹⁵ When he was asked how his book was progressing, he replied: "The writing of books today is like the minting of coins today. In olden times copper had to be dug out of the mines. Nowadays people no longer dig copper, but instead they melt old copper-cash for the purpose of making new coins. Therefore, modern coins are inferior in quality. Moreover, since modern coins are made from the copper of old coins, these latter, which should have been preserved as treasures rather than melted, have been lost for future generations. Thus, there is a dual disadvantage: the coins are worse, and the ancient coins have disappeared. You asked how many books of the *Record of Daily Knowing* have been completed. It seems that you think of my writing as you would of melting old coins to get copper. I can tell you that, since our separation, I have devoted myself to study, day and night, and have pondered my questions thoroughly; but though I have worked hard, I have only about ten items ready, because I dig fresh copper from the mine."¹⁶

It is clear from the words of P'an Lei, Ch'üan Tsu-wan, and Ku Yen-wu himself, that the scholar whom we have been considering in this chapter was a man of real originality. His method was to read the Book of Nature: he travelled, observed, and studied.

Between him and the later philologists, of whom he is sometimes regarded as the precursor, there was a world of difference. He had recourse to experimentation; they were bookworms. I must deny emphatically that Ku himself ever had the intention of becoming a philologist, or a father to a school of classical studies, in the sense in which these two dominated the intellectual life of the Ch'ing Dynasty.

There was reason why his followers limited the importance of this great scholar, and even misconstrued his real significance. If the philologists of the Ch'ing Dynasty regarded him as the father of philology, it was because they borrowed from him a novel methodology. He had worked it out in a variety of new fields of knowledge; they narrowed its application down to study of the Classics and philology.

Just what was Ku Yen-wu's new method? I think it can be characterized, though perhaps inadequately, under four headings: (1) It involved the creation of an academic atmosphere where there could be study on a positive and empirical basis. (2) It involved the discovery of new intellectual disciplines: phonetics, historical geography, archaeology, and comparative study of the Classics and history. (3) It involved collecting information and acquiring evidence by observation and fieldwork, for the purpose of supporting knowledge with solid empirical data. (4) It involved an attitude well illustrated by Ku's warning to beware of plagiarism, and to beware of following fashion like claps of thunder following one another, each sounding just the same as the one before it. This fourth item reminds us incidentally of Bacon's *Idols*.

Now, let me make more precise the connection between philology and this new method, which resembles the method of Bacon in all four of its points, so closely as to be startling. China's intellectual life has been filled for ages with the Classics and their commentaries, with histories and their commentaries, and with books of the philosophers and their commentaries. Crust has been piling up layer upon layer so it is no wonder that much work can be done in philology, especially when each character, through the millenia, has undergone many changes both in form and pronunciation. The task of philological sifting and emendation is great enough to give employment to thousands of scholars. Then, along

came Ku Yen-wu with a novel method of inquiry, which was as well adapted to philological investigation as to any other science. Later generations applied it to the field where they had evinced most interest, which was philology, and they found that it led to great success. Thus, there eventually arose the new study of classics or philology, which dominated the intellectual life of the Ch'ing Dynasty.

When Ku's technique was applied to the Classics, the result was an abundant commentary written in the new style. When it thus proved richly productive in philology, in the study of the Chinese written language, then it was extended to phonetics, to the study of institutions (especially the study of the origin and development of rites), to history, geography, archaeology, and mathematics, which at that time had just received a great stimulus from Western mathematics and astronomy introduced by the Jesuits. It is not too much to say that Ku was the father of all these new sciences, if one means that he originated the method which was afterwards used to develop them.

But after all is said that can be said about Ku's being the father of the Ch'ing Dynasty classical study and philology, I must emphasize that he was a far greater man than would be implied in this characterization. He was, in his vision, his calibre, and his nature, a social leader and statesman. In many essays he showed ability as a reformer, a political theorist, and a student of finance (he was an expert on coins, banknotes, banking, and taxation). His great aim was to renew China's political and cultural foundations, but he was never able to translate his ideal into reality because of the downfall of the Ming Dynasty. Or, if one wishes to look at the matter in a different way, it was precisely because of the downfall of the Ming Dynasty that he had the opportunity to rethink all the problems related to political science, economics, strategy, and culture in general. Unfortunately Ku was compelled by external circumstances to limit his activities. The whole of his knowledge would have been of inestimable value to his country if he could have been in a position to apply it on a large scale, particularly his ideas about changing the people's moral climate, by showing them the importance of a sense of shame, independence of mind, and ruggedness of character, which constituted his view

of cultural reform. Many truths concerning government, the monetary system, taxation, and civil service, which he learned from his study of the historical development of various institutions, were, in fact, the proposals of a statesman, but they were no sooner uttered than they were shelved, and were never looked at again during the Ch'ing Dynasty. Only the smallest part of his contribution—his philology and phonetics—succeeded in winning the appreciation of the generations that followed him. These blossomed forth as the new philology of the Ch'ing Dynasty.

Bringing this chapter to a close, let me stress again that Ku Yen-wu was in spirit a Baconian. If his work is studied in this light, he will appear as a most plausible intermediary for promoting cultural understanding between Chinese scholarship and Western science, thus establishing that harmony and co-operation between them which is so urgently needed.

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CHAPTER TEN

Huang Tsung-hsi, Revisionist of the Wang School

Huang Tsung-hsi was another of the Ming loyalists who, along with Ku Yen-wu and Wang Fu-chih, many years after their death, became the spiritual leaders of the revolutionary movement at the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty. In contrast to Ku Yen-wu and Wang Fu-chih, both of whom were opponents of the school of Wang Shou-jen, Huang Tsung-hsi remained faithful to this school, although he tried to re-interpret its thought in his own way, or at least in the way of Liu Tsung-chou, to whom he was much devoted. The academic atmosphere in which Huang Tsung-hsi lived was one which encouraged an empirical attitude towards learning. He was interested in various branches of positive learning: astronomy, mathematics, science of music, history, governmental institutions, and classical study. In him there was an unusual blend of two kinds of emphasis; he was an earnest seeker of knowledge, but at the same time he was a philosopher trying to re-establish Wang Shou-jen's system of thinking on a sound basis. That he had the capacity to carry on this dual task is evidence of his genius and versatility.

He was born in the thirty-eighth year of the reign of Wan-li, under Emperor Shen-tsung (1610). His father, Huang Tsun-su, died in prison for having impeached the notorious eunuch Wei Tsung-hsien, who, as we recall, brought so much misery and unhappiness to a number of philosophers and men of integrity. His mother never recovered from the grief caused by the elder Huang's untimely end, and she constantly reminded her son that it was the eunuch and his henchmen who were responsible for his father's death. Thus it was that after the new emperor Chung-cheng as-

cended the throne, Huang Tsung-hsi went to Peking, carrying with him a memorial and an iron club, both to be used if the occasion demanded to avenge his father. But, as luck would have it, Wei Tsung-hsien was dead when he arrived in Peking, so the only opportunity left to him was to submit the memorial. But he was not forgetting the club. In this memorial he made charges against two surviving colleagues of Wei Tsung-hsien, who had assisted in the punishment of his father, namely Ts'ao Ch'in-ch'eng and Li Shih. At the same time two other Wei Tsung-hsien collaborators, Hsü Hsien-shun and Ts'ui Ying-yüan, were brought into court to be tried. Huang appeared during the trial and gave the former of these such a beating with his iron club that the poor man was covered with blood from head to foot. The victim pleaded that his sentence should be mitigated because he was a nephew of Empress Hsiao-ting. Huang replied that Hsü's eunuch master had almost succeeded in bringing the imperial house to ruin, and that even if he, Hsü, were a prince-of-the-blood, he should be executed. Since he was only a relative in the female line, this was hardly enough to excuse him from the supreme penalty. Accordingly Hsü was put to death. Huang next used his iron club on Ts'ui Ying-yüan, pulling out his moustache, which he placed on a table as an offering to his sire. In spite of these acts of extreme violence, he was not remonstrated by the emperor, because what he did was in fulfillment of his filial duty to avenge his father's death, and that was the most sacred of all duties. Upon completion of his mission to Peking, Huang returned to his home town and devoted himself to study. Faithful to the admonition of his father that one should be profoundly learned in the history of the Ming and preceding dynasties, he read all of the *Twenty-one Dynastic Histories* at the rate of one book a day from dawn until twelve o'clock midnight.

It was after the return to his home town that Huang began to study under Liu Tsung-chou, a tutor who did more than anyone else to shape Huang's philosophical views. The mad Ch'anist sect was then flourishing. The followers of Chou Ju-teng, T'ao Wang-ling, and T'ao Shih-ling attended Liu's lectures to heckle him. Huang came to his aid and assembled sixty scholars to expose the fallacies of mad Ch'anism. While still a young man in his early twenties (1632), Huang made his first contact with members of the

Tung-lin and Fu-she political clubs. That stimulated him with the desire to form his own political and literary groups.

When the capital city of Peking fell into the hands of the Manchus in 1644, the Prince Fu of the Ming House had crowned himself in Nanking, it was all because he had the aid of a survivor of Wei Tsung-hsien's party, a man named Juan Ta-ch'eng, who was then the political boss in Nanking. Huang wanted to have nothing to do with the remnants of the malicious eunuch and led a group of 140 sympathizers in denouncing this Juan by a public manifesto. Juan ordered the arrest of everyone who signed it. Fortunately the order was never carried out, for by then the Manchus had become installed in Nanking. Huang at once withdrew again to his home in Chekiang Province, only to find that his revered teacher, Liu Tsung-chou, had committed suicide rather than live under Manchu rule. Another scion of the Ming imperial family, Prince Lu, was then set up as Protector of the Realm in Chekiang. Huang raised an army called the Brigade of Loyalty to assist him in fighting the Manchus. As commander-in-chief of this army, Huang was also concurrently Chief of the Geographical Department of the Ministry of War. He advocated a policy of counter-attack along the Yangtze Valley, because the territory under the Ming loyalists in Chekiang Province was too small to be self-sustaining. But before this policy could be put into practice, the Ming cause suffered more reverses and Prince Lu was forced to flee by sea to Fukien Province. Huang followed him and was appointed Deputy Head of the Censorate.

Meanwhile news came to him that the names of all members of the families of those who persisted in working with the Ming government were to be listed and reported to the Manchu authorities. Fearing that his mother might thus be in danger of her life, Huang obtained leave from Prince Lu to return home under disguise. One of his friends, Wu Chung-luan, accompanied him for six miles in a small boat, then bade him farewell.

But this interruption in his service for the Ming cause seems to have been short-lived, for we next hear of him as being attached to a delegation going to Japan to seek expeditionary relief forces while Prince Lu was in Chusan. We know of this journey from a poem by Huang himself in which he speaks of Japanese life as he saw it.

But Huang could not be away from his mother for long and returned to his native village where he eked out a precarious existence. Owing to his unending loyalty to the Ming cause he became a "wanted man!" Quite often he had to flee with his family and hide himself among the tall reeds along the seashore. As soon as he thought the danger was over, he would emerge and return to his mother, so unflinching was his filial devotion. For all that, it is remarkable that Huang found time to write. It was during this period that his *New Theory of Music* and his *Theory of Numbers and Signs in the Book of Changes* were composed. His passion for knowledge and scholarship was so strong that very often, in spite of danger, he would venture out to consult the books in many of the large libraries that existed in his day.

In 1668, when Huang Tsung-hsi was fifty-eight years old, he began to give philosophical lectures at the *Cheng-jen Shu-yüan* Academy founded by his teacher Liu Tsung-chou. Though these lectures had been suspended after the founder's death, it was here that Huang clarified his teacher's basic ideas, which he did in three sentences: (1) Other than remaining in tranquil or quietistic state, no mode of behavior may be called "investigation," even though mental operations be in process; (2) The term "will" refers to what remains tranquil, or quiet, in mind, not to stirrings; (3) The terms "ante- or pre-stirring" and "post-stirring" refer to the order of logic, not to the order of time. Of these three sentences, number two is peculiarly important in the doctrine Huang means to explain; he wishes to show that he is talking about Wang Shou-jen's *liang-chih*, and also about the doctrine that the "proper mean" is the state of mind which logically precedes stirring. Dating from the time of these philosophical lectures, Huang was an enthusiastic advocate of the philosophy of Liu Tsung-chou.

Eight years later (1676) Huang had completed his *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*, and had begun his *Philosophical Records of the Sung and Yüan Dynasties*, which was destined to remain unfinished at his death, but which his son, Huang Po-chia, was instructed to carry on. He was recommended in 1678 to Emperor K'ang-hsi as a great and learned scholar, but refused to appear before the sovereign; instead he chose to give lectures on the Chinese, Mohammedan, and Western calendars to

a distinguished scholar named Huang Tao-chou, who was to die afterwards as a martyr to the Ming cause. Emperor K'ang-hsi then commanded that Huang Tsung-hsi's writings be copied and sent to the Bureau of Ming Historiography. Huang was recommended to him a second time, but Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh replied that the philosopher was too old to make the trip to Peking. This Hsü (nephew of Huang's friend, Ku Yen-wu) was very influential under the Manchu regime. It was he who once extended an unsuccessful invitation to his uncle to attend an evening dinner-party. The *History of the Ming Dynasty* was written, therefore, in the office at Peking, but all important topics were sent to Huang for final decision. He died in 1695.

Summing up Huang Tsung-hsi's role as a philosopher, I may say that since he lived at the end of the Ming Dynasty, when the atmosphere was changing from speculation to empirical scholarship, it is natural that he should have devoted much attention to various empirical disciplines. But what is perhaps unexpected is that he should also have been deeply engrossed in revising Wang Shou-jen's philosophy, or, to be more precise, in trying to save what was best in Wang's thought by following the footsteps of his teacher Liu Tsung-chou.

Since Huang was a versatile genius, his writings cover many different fields. I shall here limit myself to merely giving the titles of his works.

- (1) *Theory of Numbers and Signs of the Book of Changes* (I-hsüeh Hsiang-shu lun).
- (2) *On the Book of History*. [Huang supported Yen Jo-ch'ü, who attacked the Old Script text as a forgery and tried to prove the authenticity of the Modern Script text of the *Book of History*.]
- (3) *A Study of Eclipses in the Spring and Autumn Annals*.
- (4) *New Theory of Music*.
- (5) Various writings about mathematics, astronomy, and the calendar.
- (6) *A Plan for Revising the History of the Sung Dynasty*.
- (7) *Record of Events at the End of the Ming Dynasty*.
- (8) *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*.

- (9) *Philosophical Records of the Sung and Yüan Dynasties*.
[Completed by Huang's son and Ch'uan Tsu-wang.]
- (10) *Anthology of Ming Essays*.
- (11) *Until Dawn (Ming-i Tai-fanglu)* [a treatise on political theory].
- (12) *Collection of Poems*.
- (13) *Collection of Essays*.

By way of introduction to Huang's basic ideas and to an understanding of his scholarly attitude and method, I shall turn to Ch'uan Tsu-wang who quoted Huang as follows: "The Ming scholars chewed only the dregs of the philosophical dialogues, without building on the foundation of a study of the Classics, because they were inclined toward speculation, ignoring the study of real literature.

"Scholars are required to study the Classics; yet, remaining faithful to the Classics, they may become inflexible and impractical. Thus, they should also be required to study history, so that they may know how circumstances change with the times and thus avoid being dogmatic.

"When one does not read books, one does not know the great variety there is in points of view. When one does not reflect within one's own mind, one's knowledge does not extend beyond the common and ordinary."¹

Huang's ideal of the scholarly attitude and method, in short, was to possess a vast store of positive knowledge to have a stock of factual information, while remaining free to be speculative and philosophical.

Huang's criticism of his contemporaries was heartily subscribed to by his disciple Ch'uan Tsu-wang. The latter says as follows: "Since the middle of the Ming Dynasty, philosophical discussions have shown nothing constructive and have come to a decline. Many scholars have only produced empty talks on human nature and divine order with no grasp or understanding of literature. Others have been mediocre bookworms. The knowledge of both these groups has no root. According to Huang Tsung-hsi, one's scholarship must be firmly grounded on the Classics; otherwise, it becomes vague and without content. One must know history so that

one's knowledge becomes substantiated by realities. This approach provides us indeed with a method which prevents us from falling into the evils which have vitiated philosophy for a long time."²

We may also find remarks in Huang Tsung-hsi's own works critical of his contemporaries. "In the field of scholarship," he said, "after finer and finer analyses have been made, a way of escape is provided. Confucianism has come to be understood under four divisions: (1) literature, (2) scholarship, (3) the school of Reason, (4) the school of Mind. This division of labor is all to the good because it shows that Confucianism does in fact possess many facets. But it is most surprising that those who belong to the school of Mind pay no attention to the various other kinds of method by which knowledge is obtained and principles discovered. In the same way, students of the school of Reason restrict their reading only to the obvious parts of the Classics, and understand under the concept 'investigation of reason' merely the interpretation of terms. They look with contempt on literary men as knowing only how to write with a style, and they deplore the fact that scholarship, in the general sense, may cost a man his whole lifetime without giving him anything in return. So they close their ranks and exclude others. Their reading is limited to one or two books. Their vision is not much different from that of a girl who in making a piece of embroidery sees only the cloth under her eyes. If an earthquake should occur, or even if heaven should fall down [metaphors for political disaster], they would be unconcerned; yet they brag about unity and diversity, and call themselves experts-in-*tao*. This is a fine way of escape!"³

Huang Tsung-hsi's efforts to revise the philosophical theory of Wang Shou-jen were a reaction against that mad Ch'anism by which Wang's followers in the schools of Wang Ch'i and T'ai-chou sought reality, the Absolute, or the inexpressible beyond good and evil. These devotees of mad Ch'anism had no use for logical discipline, because what they wanted was something non-relative, or a reality beyond ethical distinction. Another of their tenets was that reality should be sought in a natural way, that is, without artificiality or self-control. This mode of philosophizing led to speculative babbling and to a life of looseness, of which Li Chih was an example. Huang Tsung-hsi's intent was to counteract these tendencies,

not by denouncing them as did Ku Yen-wu, nor by formulating a new theory as a substitute for them, as did Wang Fu-chih [to be discussed in the next chapter], but by re-interpreting Wang Shou-jen's thought in a strict way.

This revisionist work of Huang Tsung-hsi is best shown in his chapter on Wang Shou-jen in his *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*. Here his first move was to attack the famous Conversation on Heaven Fountain Bridge by proving that the ideas issuing from it did not agree with the doctrines of Wang Shou-jen. But let us listen to Huang's own words:

"This Conversation," he wrote, "consisted of four sentences: (1) The reality of mind is beyond good and evil; (2) the stirring of will is directed towards good or evil; (3) to know good and evil is the work of *liang-chih*; and (4) to do what is good and to avoid doing what is evil are to 'investigate things.' At the present time those who try to interpret the first of these sentences force it to mean that the nature of mind consists in its reality's being beyond good and evil. When the mind is in operation, it is will which knows good and bad. Furthermore, it is will which uses the faculty of intellect to distinguish between good and evil. At last, the final stage is reached when the 'investigation of things,' i.e., doing good and avoiding evil, takes place. This mode of interpretation starts from the inside and pushes towards the outside—a process, I must say, which is crude and superficial. Why? Because the meaning attributed to *liang-chih* here is one which no longer contains the sense of categorical imperative, giving the final decision without deliberation. Therefore, Teng Ting-yü said that these four sentences were, perhaps, hypothetical propositions. Now, according to my understanding, the mind's reality being beyond good and evil merely means a mental stage at which neither good nor bad volition arises. The sentence does not signify that mind's nature consists in its being beyond good and evil.

"Now, as for the second proposition that the stirring of will is directed towards good or evil, this no doubt refers to the good or bad motive entertained by the will. These first two propositions cover the whole of mind, whether in operation or at a standstill.

"Once when Wang Shou-jen was talking to his pupil Hsieh K'an, he said: 'When reason is at a standstill it knows neither good

nor bad; when *ch'i* or matter is in operation it may be good or bad.' Wang's words to his student have the same meaning as my [Huang Tsung-hsi's] interpretation of the first two sentences above.

"As for the third proposition: 'To know good and evil is the work of *liang-chih*,' I [Huang Tsung-hsi] must say that this does not imply that after will has gone into operation, intellect then plays the role of distinguishing between good and evil. To know good and evil is within the scope of true will, which chooses the good and rejects the evil. This inclination or hatred, whichever the case may be, is expressed under the form of the categorical imperative, and originates in the intelligence of the mind itself.

"Also, this doing what is good and avoiding or getting rid of what is evil are unavoidable actions, in accordance with nature, without the admixture of evil. Here I agree with Wang in his application of *liang-chih*, or rationality of mind, to the various kinds of things, as is proper.

"These four sentences in their original form contain nothing incorrect. But a certain amount of misunderstanding has arisen because the first sentence has been interpreted to mean that from the standpoint of the highest good one knows neither good nor evil. If this were the correct interpretation, there would be two kinds of goodness: one in which the correlation of good and evil exists, the other in which that correlation does not exist. Such reasoning leads to absurdity. This mistaking the post-stirring stage of *liang-chih* for the pre-stirring stage is just like pointing to moonlight on the earth instead of to the moon itself in the sky when one is talking about the moon. The more one seeks along this avenue, the farther one goes from the object of one's search."⁴

These critical remarks of Huang Tsung-hsi testify to his antagonism towards the mad Ch'anists, who looked for the Great Void or Emptiness, and who ignored the distinction between good and evil. Huang, on the contrary, held that as long as human beings exist, moral value also exists, and it begins with the distinction between good and evil—a distinction which determines the direction in which mind should will, know, and 'investigate.' In the immediately preceding paragraph, Huang's refutation of the idea that two kinds of goodness can exist—one as relative to evil, the other as not relative to evil—was the strongest possible argument,

on a logical foundation, that could be launched against the mad Ch'anists, and one which they, no matter how clever they were, could not successfully rebut.

Huang's next step was to re-interpret Wang Shou-jen's thought in order to save what was best in it. In a preface to his biography of that philosopher in the *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*, he gave expression to this design in a summary of Wang's doctrine. "The scholarship of the Ming Dynasty," he pointed out, "in the beginning was a mere repetition of what the former philosophers had advocated. The men of the early Ming period did not know how to think reflectively, or how to create original thoughts, each in his own way. Here one man repeated what Chu Hsi had said; there another man also repeated what Chu Hsi had said. For this reason Kao Ching-yeh said: 'We find no theory in the *Dialogues of Hsieh Hsüan and Lü Ching-i* which is original. Since Wang Shou-jen's discovery of the doctrine of *liang-chih*, everyone can apply it to his own mind by way of reflection. This doctrine has thus pointed out a way leading to sagehood. If Wang Shou-jen had not lived, I suppose the ancient tradition of scholarship would have been discontinued.'

"However this may be, Wang Shou-jen produced in the latter part of his life a formula of 'realizing intuitive knowledge,' though he never had time to explain it in an exhaustive way. Afterwards, his disciples interpreted it with their own ideas, and indulged in wild speculation, just as if they were guessing at the gambling table. The meanings they extracted from the formula were completely different from what Wang had intended."⁵

Huang Tsung-hsi then proceeded to put Wang Shou-jen's doctrine within the proper framework in order to check the urge towards wild speculation. "The expression 'investigation of things,'" wrote Huang, "means, according to Wang Shou-jen, application of rational principles, originating in mind, to the various kinds of things, so that the manifoldness in the world would be in harmony with them. In other words, since the danger of over-speculation always seemed imminent, he believed that the proper procedure was to apply rational principles to things as they come."⁶

Huang showed, further, that "to put into practice" is the funda-

mental principle under which "to read widely," "to question cautiously," "to think carefully," "to analyse clearly," and "to practice seriously," are combined as parts of a whole process. The last step, namely "to practice seriously," is not an isolated step, but includes the preceding four steps as well. This stress on practice indicates Huang's opposition to speculation which has no factual basis. It also means that philosophy should not restrict its capital to knowledge, and the *liang-chih* is not mere knowing but involves actual practice as well. Huang means, furthermore, that since practice is an integral part of *liang-chih*, Chu Hsi's doctrine of knowledge first, and practice second, must be abandoned.

Huang Tsung-hsi's work as a revisionist of Wang Shou-jen's philosophy is so thorough that it is worth-while even to pay attention to some of the supplementary considerations which I shall present in the following way: (1) Let wild speculation be discarded, and let the thinker return to a positive basis; that is, let him control his mind. (2) Let precautionary measures be taken to ensure that will, before stirring, remains tranquil. This is called "having a true will," by means of which the proper mean is kept intact. (3) One should appreciate fully that in respect to point (2) above, if one waits until intellect starts functioning, it will already be too late. The operation of will or volition comes before the operation of intellect, that is, knowing. Once the intellect has started to play its role, no time will be left for the entrance of the "true will" on the stage. If one takes the necessary precautions to ensure that volition is kept true, one will prevent wrongdoing at its inception, that is, at the moment of germination. Since knowing follows willing, one will be too late to prevent the occurrence of an act of evil will, if one waits for knowledge. When I discuss later the views of Liu Tsung-chou, I shall make this point clearer.

Huang Tsung-hsi's revision of Wang Shou-jen's thought involved two phases: (1) he made the mad Ch'anists responsible for every interpretation that put Wang's philosophy in a bad light; (2) he tried to clear Wang entirely of responsibility for all such interpretations. Thus Huang wrote: "Wang Shou-jen deplored that scholars ever since the Sung Dynasty have taken knowledge for real knowing, and so have considered that inasmuch as the human mind is capable of enlightenment it has the power to discover

principles in the many kinds of phenomena in the universe. The work of man, therefore, [according to these post-Sung philosophers] is to discover these principles, whence follows the enlightenment of mind whereby there is revealed an agreement between it and its objects. It seems that scholars, since the Sung Dynasty, held that no line of demarcation should exist between the external and the internal—a point of view in which they were inconsistent with themselves because the sources of the knowledge they sought were all on the outside.

“Now in contrast to this theory from the Sung Dynasty, Wang Shou-jen believed that the science of sagehood is the science of mind. Mind is the embodiment of reason or of principles. According to Wang, the expressions, ‘realization of knowledge’ and ‘investigation of things,’ mean that principles (i.e., heavenly reason), all of which are possessed by mind or are an integral part of intuitive knowledge, should be applied to the various kinds of things. In this manner, all phenomena can be brought under the rule of reason, or can be placed in a rational order. Yet, if intellect is understood wholly in terms of knowledge, then it becomes superficial and non-vital. Hence, Wang insisted that actual putting into practice must also operate as a working condition. Intuitive knowledge, in his sense, because of its hypersensitive nature knows no INTERVAL of waiting. It is bright in itself, and accordingly, is intellect. To act without deception to this original brightness is to put into practice. This was Wang’s conception of the unity of knowing and doing. Up to this point I [Huang Tsung-hsi] have been summarizing Wang Shou-jen’s philosophical doctrines.

“But it is said that Wang’s theory of mind was affiliated with the Buddhist theory of mind. As a matter of fact there is a great gulf between them, and that gulf is to be found in the word *reason*. The Buddhists put reason beyond the pale of consideration. What they held to was mental enlightenment. The Confucianists, on the other hand, never regarded enlightenment as important. What they held to was reason or principles. There was one understanding common to both sides: Buddhist and Confucianist meant the same thing by mind being the embodiment of reason, and mind being enlightenment. What Wang meant was that to search for reason and principles in the external world is like searching for

water where there is no source, or for wood where there are no roots. Even if agreement occurs between knowledge and the reality of mind, it is an agreement belonging only to a second-hand source. One who tries to proceed in such a fashion is like a beggar who asks for food from door to door, or like a man who can see no light after closing his eyes. Wang's point was that mind stands as the sole source of knowledge, not because of enlightenment, but because it is the embodiment of reason. This keynote of *reason* makes a world of difference between the Confucianist and Buddhist schools. This fact comes to light in just such a conspicuous way, thanks to Wang's efforts, as a mirror long buried in dust becomes clean and bright again after somebody brushes it off."⁷

The new interpretation of Wang Shou-jen, to which the foregoing paragraph refers, was Huang Tsung-hsi's counter-argument against the Heaven Fountain Bridge statements. It was also his way of setting the philosophical theory of Wang on a track from which it could not be derailed. It should be noted, however, that this method of approach by Huang was not, strictly speaking, original with him, but was based on the teachings of Liu Tsung-chou to whom Huang was deeply devoted. In his chapter about Wang Shou-jen in the *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*, Huang's citations from Wang are not his own choice, but are Liu's choice of appropriate quotations from Wang, contained in a work entitled *The Trustworthy Record of Wang* which was intended to distinguish Wang's authentic views from the unreliable reports of members of the schools of Wang Ch'i and T'ai-chou. In this work by Liu, most of the sayings taken from Wang emphasize the distinction between good and bad, return to reason by elimination of desires, practice, and mind control. Like Huang, Liu was particularly antagonistic towards Wang Ch'i's record of the Conversation at Heaven Fountain Bridge.

Indeed, Huang's intellectual connection with Liu was so intimate that if one wishes to go into the details of Huang's doctrine one must turn to his biography of Liu. Here he characterizes Liu's thought by four major points, namely:

(1) "In regard to mind-control, the important thing is to keep to tranquillity. There is nothing to be gained by talking about introspection while the mind is in operation. The query was raised

that 'since the task of mind-control is to maintain watchfulness in solitude, and since this is also what is achieved by keeping to tranquillity, must not one do something else when mind is in activity?' To this Liu Tsung-chou answered: 'Work of this kind may be compared to gardening. After a tree has taken root it will have branches and leaves. Since watering and fertilizing are only serviceable when applied to the root, there is no use in trying to treat similarly the leaves and branches. If the work of maintaining tranquillity is not properly done, rage at one time and joy at another time will not be expressed appropriately. What can leaves and branches do? If one knows how to keep the mind tranquil, as it is in the pre-stirring stages before there are any indications of selfish motives, there is no point in trying to belabor it. If rage and joy occur out of order, checking one's self should be done; it belongs to the work of keeping mind in tranquillity.' Once his disciple I Jun-shan asked whether to make will true involves both internal and external effort. Liu Tsung-chou answered: 'When will is true, mind's mastery is held at the level of the highest good. The areas where this highest good is manifested may be body, mind, family, country, or world, but the source of motivation always remains the same, i.e., the will. When one takes care of what is hidden, what is obvious will follow in due course. Hence, there is no value in discussing another method, to be applied at times of action. Hence, also, nothing is to be gained by discussing introspection while mind is in operation. Introspection is a part of mind's role in keeping tranquillity . . . If keeping to tranquillity is considered to belong exclusively to mind during its periods of calmness, this will lead to the contemplation of the Ch'anists. If, on the other hand, introspection, while mind is active, is regarded as belonging exclusively to ordinary life, this will lead to vulgarity . . . It is necessary for one to be vigilant over one's mind whether one's mind is in tranquillity or in operation.

(2) "Will as quiet, and not as stirring, is what mind keeps. According to the *Great Learning*: 'The meaning of *to have a true will* is to allow no self-deception, in the same way as we hate a bad smell or we love the beautiful!' This passage signifies that love and hatred express themselves on the inside only in the interests of a virtuous cause, and not in the interests of a vicious cause.

But if will devotes itself exclusively to the virtuous and not to the vicious, then there must be a state of will which is directed solely at good, and is wholly unmixed with evil. The so-called 'subtle' or 'imperceptible,' that is, the good at the germinating stage, is the quiet will which mind keeps. Otherwise, how can there be any meaning in the expression that mind keeps will quietly?—for if it is will as stirring which mind keeps, mind cannot be said to be kept quietly. Again, if mind stands for what is kept quietly and if will stands for what is stirred up, then stirring precedes what is kept quietly, which is contrary to the doctrine of the *Great Learning*. Mind is nothing in itself save will; will is nothing in itself save knowing; knowing is nothing in itself save objects of consciousness. Objects in themselves do not reveal themselves save as objects of consciousness; knowing does not reveal itself save as volition. So the actual result is consolidated in the operation of willing, which is the reality of the whole process. If one tries to separate thinking from willing, 'investigation of things' and 'realization of knowledge' become meaningless . . .

(3) "The pre-stirring and post-stirring stages of will refer to ideal and not to temporal relationships. According to the Ch'eng brothers, joy, rage, sorrow, and pleasure in their pre-stirring phase constitute the 'proper mean,' which, they think, should not be labeled as the stage of tranquillity. The opinion of the Ch'eng brothers was one of genius, and gave us something which we have not had before. The joy, rage, sorrow, and pleasure about which they spoke are unrelated to the seven emotions. What they meant was that mind is characterized by various modes of self-expression: when it shoots forth, this is joy of the same nature as *jen*; when it blooms, this is pleasure of the same nature as *li*; when it tightens, this is rage of the same nature as *i*; when it begins to fade and disappear, this is sorrow of the same nature as *chih*, meaning 'to divide.' We have here an analogy to the four seasons of the year, which change periodically, but which depend upon the vitality and vigor which give them life and harmony. Interpreted in this way, the Ch'eng brothers have explained to us the 'proper mean,' which is the ideal of human nature . . . Thus the self-same thing has two aspects: the *yang* and the *yin*; in other words, movement and rest,

speaking and silence, which bear to one another the ideal relationship of correlativity.

(4) "Supreme Ultimate" is the general term for the different kinds of things of the universe as a whole. Confucius said: 'In the world of change there is the Supreme Ultimate.' Chou Tun-i said that it is 'the Ultimate of Nothingness, but the Supreme Ultimate,' and 'this Ultimate of Nothingness is merely a synonym for Supreme Ultimate.' Chou Tun-i's mode of expression was for the purpose of preventing people from becoming obsessed with the idea of Being. Unfortunately, later generations put the idea of Nothingness before the idea of Being, whence it followed that Being came from Nothingness. Again, others originated the notion of the Non-existence of Nothingness. Thus, the puzzle of Being and Nothingness led to confusion.

"However, I [Liu Tsung-chou] must say that the One means the Supreme Ultimate. After the One is divided it is the two modes: *yin* and *yang*. After the appearances of *yin* and *yang*, the Supreme Ultimate is behind them, and does not stand by itself.

"Indeed, what is called 'metaphysical' is inseparable from what is called 'physical.' Apart from the physical, nothing metaphysical can exist; apart from matter, reason cannot exist. The so-called 'universe,' or 'heaven,' is the general term for the manifoldness of things; it does not exist as a king who looks at beings as his subjects. 'Tao' is the general term for the thousands of material things; it is not the reality of which they are the appearances (phenomena). 'Nature' is the general term for the various kinds of shapes of things; it is not the equal of them. We know, therefore, that the *tao*-mind is the original of the human mind, and that 'essential nature' is related to 'physical nature.'"⁸

In point (4) Liu Tsung-chou brought the philosophy of Wang Shou-jen from heaven down to earth. Wang's own system contained, as we know already, a triad of basic tenets: mind is reason; the external world is a congeries of objects of consciousness; and the fundamental factor in the world is *liang-chih*. Now that we have Liu's interpretation, we can add to this triad a fourth tenet: the metaphysical is inseparable from the physical. In the light of this supplementary doctrine, what Wang considered as mental or

spiritual or conscious, we must now think of as also physical or material. Wang's own conclusions, in other words, must be re-assayed. Under this new light it becomes obvious that since man is bound up with the physical world, mind must ever be kept under vigilance; the attitude which Liu called "watchfulness in solitude." One's vigilance should be so keen as to catch sight of, examine, and put under control especially what is stirred up imperceptibly in mind. This was why Liu was assiduous in studying the pre-stirring stage of will, and the proper mean. The change in point of view, so palpably expressed in his thought, from the metaphysical to the physical, or from the speculative to the empirical, was an adaptation to the prevailing academic climate at the end of the Ming Dynasty and the beginning of the Ch'ing.

Liu's point (1) about the all-importance for mind-control of the state of tranquillity was vigorously defended by Huang Tsung-hsi in his preface to his collection of Liu's essays. Again, according to him, Liu's point (2) about the quiet will being what mind keeps, was a great discovery, because it is at this stage that the proper mean is preserved; and this stage is the source of the Categorical Imperative, for as soon as the least stirring of will occurs, the purity of will is no more, and it enters into mixture with knowledge, like and dislike, and calculation of gain and loss. While will remains in the state of tranquillity, unselfish and righteous motives persist. Such pure motives, of course, constitute human nature, which at the pre-stirring stage is to be found only in human emotional expression. This last contention Huang supported by an allusion to Mencius. This sage, next in importance only to Confucius himself, explained the four virtues: *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih*, by concrete example of how a man exercises the senses of commiseration, shame, and modesty, and how he judges between right and wrong. In short, Huang argued, Mencius' way of explaining the four virtues of human nature makes it clear that they are exhibit-able only on the basis of human emotions. In this preface of Liu's *Collected Essays* Huang confirmed his own standpoint in regard to the inseparability of the metaphysical from the physical. Altogether Huang perceived that three main principles are implied in the philosophy of Liu Tsung-chou, namely: (1) No rational principle can be found apart from the physical; (2) the goodness of

human nature cannot be shown except through human emotions; (3) the reality of mind is attainable only through control of mind; and control of mind, in turn is attainable only through "watchfulness in solitude."

What we have been thus far studying is the work of Liu Tsung-chou and Huang Tsung-hsi as revisionists of the philosophy of Wang Shou-jen; that is, their attempts to find a new way of interpreting his thought so that it would be acceptable to normal men. In addition to this, however, Liu also revised Wang's view of will, a correction which we shall find well worth considering.

"Knowledge of good and evil," wrote Liu, "presupposes the distinction between good and evil. When knowledge of good and evil comes after the standard of good and evil has already been established, then knowledge is the servant of what is willed. But how can such knowledge be called 'intuitive,' or knowledge in the best sense? Knowledge of good and evil is contrary to the theory of 'beyond good and evil.' If in reality there is no distinction between good and evil, but if, nonetheless, one has knowledge of good and evil, then plainly knowledge is a troublemaker for the mind. How can such knowledge be called 'intuitive,' or knowledge in the best sense?"

"This confusion arises because Wang Shou-jen misunderstood the nature of will. He did not comprehend that the proper mean is to be found in the pre-stirring stage of mind. He supposed, on the contrary, will to be the operation or stirring of mind. Since he missed the standard of ethical judgments here, at the pre-stirring stage, he was compelled to seek it in the intellect. Again, since he took intellect in its crude form, he had to go further to seek the standard in mind . . ." ⁹

Yet Liu Tsung-chou admitted that Wang Shou-jen did not neglect entirely the point which he emphasized, for Wang had once said: "It is neither good nor bad when reason is in a state of rest. It can be either good or bad when the physical is in action." Liu interpreted this passage as meaning the possibility of being "beyond good and evil" is only relevant to the state of rest. As long as reason exists, how can there be "neither good nor bad"? Liu's point was that, for Wang, the possibility of being "beyond good and evil" was unrelated to mind, for if it is correct that mind is

"beyond good and evil," then what becomes of will with its capacity to will good or evil? What becomes of intellect with its capacity to know good and evil? What becomes of our capacity to do the virtuous and eschew the vicious?

Liu's critique of Wang's doctrine of will would lead one to suspect that he lived through three periods in his attitude towards the older philosopher. The many conflicting elements in Wang's teaching at first aroused doubts in him. This was the initial period. Then he became reconvinced by, or re-converted to Wang. This was the second period. Finally, he saw error in Wang's doctrine of will, and tried to correct him.

Such was Liu's revisionist work, to which Huang remained faithful. And now, before proceeding to a discussion of the non-philosophical part of Huang's contribution, I should like to state his position as a philosopher in his own right. This is no easy task because he changed his views often. The following summary reflects his thought as it was in its final stage.

(1) Essential nature and physical nature are inseparable. After Wang Ch'i advocated the theory that the reality of mind is "beyond good and evil," mind itself became something which belonged to the world of the Absolute. Ch'eng Hao was repeatedly quoted as having said: "It is useless to try to pursue the state of tranquillity in a man's mind after his birth. At this stage when one starts to speak of nature, nature is already no more." In other words, nature exists only before birth, when its existence still involves no relationships to anything else. Once a man is born, he comes into a world of relativity, so that there is no longer in him any real nature. Huang, following in the footsteps of the Tung-lin School, believed that this sort of talk about nature was absurd, and he wished to bring the discussion down to earth. Such fine-spun reasoning suggested too palpably the Buddhist view that an entity could exist before the creation of the physical world. Huang believed, on the contrary, that no nature can exist as embodied in physical elements: essential nature can exist only in physical nature.

(2) The traditional interpretation of the doctrine of the goodness of human nature made this goodness appear to stand by itself, to be independent. After the spread of mad Ch'anism, scholars went to the extreme of asserting that it is, in fact, "beyond good and

evil." Then people began to re-think the whole question, and came eventually to see the point that the goodness of a grain of wheat, for instance, is only recognizable when the grain becomes a plant. It is difficult to divide the spiritual aspect from the physical. To grow is, to be sure, the most vital element in the character of a grain of wheat. But it is difficult, indeed impossible, to consider the vitality apart from the plant itself. Similarly, the goodness of human nature is recognizable only in man as a material being, i.e., in human emotions, intellectual activities, etc.

(3) In China, as everyone knows, moral value is the topic in which all philosophers are mainly interested. The ability to give concrete expression to moral values depends upon man's aptitude to judge between right and wrong, and upon his having the occasion every now and then to show intellect, bravery, generosity, or the like. These expressions of moral value also depend upon man's getting into the habit of disciplining his mind. Accordingly, the principal work of a philosopher, as far as mind is concerned, should be to teach mind-control or self-control. Wang Ch'i was excessively fond of talking about the reality of mind and that disciplinary efforts were useless, or, at best, secondary and superficial, and worthy only of being despised. Huang Tsung-hsi, on the other hand, under the influence of the Tung-lin School, held that there is no such thing as this so-called "reality of mind"; or, at any rate, that there is nothing more to it than what is achievable through disciplinary work. The more one controls mind and masters it, the more one becomes the ruler of one's self. Huang emphasized strongly the aspect of self-discipline, and abandoned empty discourse about mind *per se*. Thus, the opening sentence in the preface of his *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars* is what one might expect: "There is no reality of mind except disciplinary work."

(4) Since Huang was interested in the physical world, he regarded study of the manifoldness of phenomena as important. He was personally attracted by this inquiry, although he understood, as he says himself, that study of natural phenomena must proceed through mind.

(5) Since Huang was a disciple of Liu Tsung-chou, he could not forget Wang Shou-jen. His whole work, the *Philosophical*

Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars, was based upon the authority of these two thinkers, although at the same time his book was fair in its treatment of all schools of thought. Huang was so imbued with the doctrine of "realization of *liang-chih*," with the "unity of knowledge and action," and with the concept of "mind as reason," that in his preface he declared: "What fills the whole world is mentality!" By this he meant that every judgment, whether of fact or of moral value, must pass through mind. In this respect he agreed completely with Wang Shou-jen. However, I must add that his way of knowledge-seeking was more reminiscent of Chu Hsi than of Wang Shou-jen.

Rather than a great thinker, Huang Tsung-hsi was a great historian of philosophy. Why has his book been ranked as a masterly contribution? The answer has already been given in Chapter One. But it may be worthwhile to add something more as to why he wrote it, and for this purpose nothing could be more apt than to quote his own words:

"These *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*," he wrote, "which I have finished, cover all scholars who belonged to the various schools. The conclusions they reached may be right or wrong. Yet they were the results of reflective efforts, and deal with patterns of thought or opinion which were worthy of being considered as a school. They did not come from puzzled minds or from minds bent on selling counterfeits and dregs.

"I classified them according to the nature of the various schools, so that the opinions might be clearly differentiated. They are really aids to the study of sagehood. There is a fundamental doctrine running through this history, which can neither be augmented nor decreased. It is like a water jug set in the middle of the road from which any passer-by may drink if he has a ladle or cup."¹⁰ That is, this book was written for the sake of illuminating truth as seen by each philosopher.

Huang goes on to stress the importance of mind. "What fills the universe," he wrote, "is mentality. It works miraculously, so it must manifest itself in a plurality of phenomena. Mind has no reality in itself; the disciplinary work one exercises is its reality. If we wish to study the principles of things, it is to the manifoldness which mind imposes on us that we must turn. Principles are

not to be found in the thousands of things themselves.”¹¹ Here Huang merely betrays the influence of the opinion prevailing in the late Ming Dynasty that knowledge depends upon the manifoldness of phenomena. At the same time, he was too faithful a disciple of Wang Shou-jen to discard the role of consciousness in knowledge.

Huang's next step, in his method of writing history of philosophy, was to show that the formula, or motto, or credo is the key to the thought of a philosopher. "Each thinker," he wrote, "has a main theme, or principal topic. This theme is the result of his research and also his way of approach to his subject. Philosophy is something which is inexhaustible. Without confining it in a formula, it is impossible to grasp it as one's own subject matter. Without a main theme, a thinker may have many good sayings, but there will be no key thread by which to unravel the bundle of silk. To try to study a thinker without knowing his principal thought is to be like the explorer Chang Chien, who went to Bactria without knowing anything about the country."¹²

Huang makes it plain that the quotations he culled from the different philosophers were all taken from the best, the essential, and the most characteristic parts of their systems. They were not copied second-hand from other histories of philosophy. His book was genuinely an original work.

He also makes it plain that he was fair to each of the various schools. "This book," he wrote, "contains views which are one-sided, and views which are contradictory of each other. The reader should pay attention to this aspect of diversity, for the diversities are expressions of one and the same thing. Philosophy exists in dissimilarity, not in similarity. It is like the tide, which in order to rise needs a force other than water to push it."¹³ A student of Huang's *Philosophical Records* will come away with the impression that "he was proud of the Ming thinkers for their ability to be analytical and to evolve fine-spun theories like silken threads from a cocoon, or to classify with a sense of nicety that not even an ox hair is denied its proper place."¹⁴ The care with which he chose citations, in order to let each school speak for itself, and the acuteness with which he distinguished between the various nuances in the same man's thought, or in different men's thought, all the

while pointing out divergencies and contradictions, were precise, meticulous, and to the point. This is why his book is an acknowledged masterpiece of thought and scholarship.

It is interesting to note that Huang Tsung-hsi, though an authority on the philosophy of reason, was opposed to the inclusion of a special chapter to be entitled "Biographies of Scholars of the Philosophy of Reason," in the *History of the Ming Dynasty*. The Bureau of Ming Historiography, working on this problem, sent him a statement describing the manner in which they would compile the chapter, but Huang advised that the chapter not be written. His view was that the philosophy of reason included many schools, and that it would be practically impossible to set up any standard. If, for instance, the Ch'eng-Chu School was regarded as the standard and discussed in such a chapter, then the school of Wang Shou-jen would have to be excluded. Indeed, even within the Ch'eng-Chu School, the differences were sufficiently great that certain points of view would have to be omitted if certain other points of view were regarded as alone strictly orthodox. Thus, though the deviations from orthodoxy might be slight, the results, from the standpoint of philosophical standards adopted, could be disastrous, and thinkers like Wang Shou-jen, could very possibly be excluded. The Bureau of Historiography had indeed at one phase of the discussion assumed the position that the school of Wang Shou-jen had proved to be harmful. Huang undertook the defense like a lawyer. He maintained that Wang's originality made repetition of Chu Hsi's theory unnecessary. The school of Wang Shou-jen had, it is true, at one time gone astray, but Huang himself took the trouble to redirect its course. Huang complained that the Bureau was not doing Wang justice by confining its attention only to what was deleterious in his doctrine, overlooking his valuable contributions. The result of this exchange of views was that the special chapter to be devoted to *Tao-hsüeh* (philosophy of *tao*) or *Ri-hsüeh* (philosophy of reason) was cancelled, even though there was such a chapter in the *History of the Sung Dynasty* which had been previously published.

Huang Tsung-hsi was indeed a great historian of Chinese philosophy. He combined the ability to give an impartial and objective account with the capacity to be critical and analytical. The times

did not permit him to be a great creative thinker. Rather than building a new system of his own, he limited his efforts to revising Wang Shou-jen's system which he thought like Liu Tsung-chou, to be the best remedy for mad Ch'anism.

Apart from his works on Ming and Sung philosophy, Huang Tsung-hsi was a great political theorist, the first, and indeed the only Chinese to denounce the absolute monarchical system of China. In 1662, when sixty years of age, he wrote the *Ming-i Tai-fang lu* (Until Dawn), meaning that in spite of the fundamental principles of government which the book contains there is no hope of their being put into practice immediately, but that one must wait "until the dawn" of amelioration of the political situation. This work had immense value because it was a denunciation of China's absolute monarchy, the first such denunciation ever to have been written. The work burst like a bomb over China towards the close of the Manchu rule when it was reprinted by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and extensively distributed. It became the Chinese equivalent of Rousseau's *Social Contract* or Locke's *Of Civil Government*, because it brought the people of the Middle Kingdom to a completely new outlook on the question of government. The first essay "An Inquiry into Kingship" will show what I mean.

"In primitive society each member was selfish and looked after his own interest. The public interest of society as a whole was disregarded, and no attempts were made to suppress acts against the public good. Then some far-sighted man came along who did not care for his own welfare, but was interested in seeing that everybody lived well and enjoyed himself along with the rest of society. He was a man who considered his own disadvantage to be unimportant, but wished all of society to be free from anxiety. Such a man's work must have been a thousand times harder than that of the other members of society, for he labored without enjoyment for himself. His effort, of course, did not appeal to the people at large whose interest lay only in their own comfort. Thus, we know from ancient history that persons like Hsü Yü and Wu Kuang refused the kingship when offered to them. Yao and Shun abdicated after becoming kings. Even Emperor Yü, who eventually took the position of ruler and was forced to keep it, at first refused. That such persons were unwilling to become sovereigns shows how diffi-

cult their work was and what responsibilities it involved. All people prefer to live in ease; they dislike heavy work.

"Emperors in later generations were however of a completely different type. They held that kingship was the source from which they could derive absolute power. As emperors, they took for themselves everything that was profitable, and shifted all the disadvantages to the people. Their power was so embracing that nobody dared any longer to be self-regarding or self-seeking. The king's personal interest came to be identified with the country as a whole, which was ruled only nominally for the public welfare. At first these later emperors still felt shy in doing what they did, but as time went on they became accustomed to their improper conduct. They took the whole country to be their private estate [domain] and their children inherited it for their own enjoyment. When the first emperor of the Han Dynasty, Kao-tsu, conquered China, he said to his father: 'Look at the empire! How does my property compare with the fortune my elder brother acquired?' Such talk showed clearly that the profit-motive was behind his conquests. Now why did Han Kao-tsu express himself in this way?

"In the olden days the people were the host, while the king was the guest, and he worked carefully and arduously for the country's welfare. Nowadays, the king is the host, while the people are the guests, and when the people live peacefully and joyously he would say that it was all because there was the institution of kingship.

"Before the conquest of an empire, a self-appointed king would sacrifice thousands of lives and disrupt thousands of families for the sake of dominating over it. He never feels the least bit uneasy, because it is his purpose to acquire a property which he believes will last a very long time. After his conquest, he exploits and squeezes the people in order to raise money for his own entertainment and debauchery. This he considers to be the right way to act, because the sole question involved is to acquire dividends from what he has invested.

"It should be clear to us now that the source of harm to the people is kingship. If there were no such institution, each person would be free to consider and seek his personal interest. I may ask therefore what is the *raison d'être* of kingship?

"In ancient times the people loved the king as their father, or compared him with heaven. Indeed, men like Yao and Shun deserved to be loved. Nowadays the people hate their king as if he were their enemy, and they call him a megalomaniac. A label of this kind has its good reason.

"However, petty scholars take the view that the relationship between king and subject is inviolable as it is based on the law of nature. Even when the tyrants like Chieh and Chou misruled, T'ang and Wu [founders of the T'ang and Chou dynasties respectively] should not have punished them, according to their view. And they fabricate the stories of Po I and Shu Ch'i, who out of respect even for tyranny escaped in order not to live under the succeeding dynasty. These scholars consider the sacrifice of thousands of human lives as if they were only rats. How can they deem the existence of a single family [that of the king] among millions of others to be so sacred that it alone is worthy of respect and preservation? The sage Mencius called Chieh and Chou megalomaniacs. He was a sage indeed. But later rulers in imposing the sacred and inviolable institution of kingship upon the people prevented them from looking at it even through a peep-hole, and found in Mencius' criticism of the kingship a source of great inconvenience, and they had had Mencius' tablet removed from the temple of the sages. Is not this because these petty scholars have their way?

"If, however, a king has the ability to keep his property, and to have his children keep it forever, the people might not have minded that he regarded the empire as his private possession. Yet no emperor ever realized if he desired that property, everybody else desired it no less. The king would have to keep the property in a safe-deposit box with only one key, and that in his own hand, before he could escape from the cleverness and skill of millions of people, because even though he be king, he would be no match for their combined strength. But, in fact, every ruler's property was lost, if not in his own lifetime, at least after a few generations. Even their children have had their heads chopped off. Therefore, there have been emperors who swore before they died that never again would they wish to be reborn in a royal family. The Ming emperor Ch'ung-cheng said to his princess, 'Why were you

ever born into my family!' How pathetic and painful was this remark!

"When we see clearly the duties and responsibilities which devolve upon a king, we understand why, in the days of Yao and Shun, people refused the kingship. Those who escaped, like Hsü Yü and Wu Kuang, are not rare persons who acted with common sense.

"When we are ignorant of the duties of a king, any one of us may be covetous of a bit of empire, and no Hsü Yü or Wu Kuang will be found among us.

"History contains many examples which teach us that a king's time for enjoyment of pleasures and comforts was short, while the tragedies were so disastrous that even a fool could see the difference between what is desirable and what not."¹⁵

Since Huang Tsung-hsi lived in the last days of the Ming Dynasty, at a period when the tyranny of a powerful eunuch held an absolute monarchy within its grip, and when personally he even witnessed the sufferings of his own father under that tyranny, it is not to be wondered at that his political thought should become so radical. As a Confucianist and as a follower of Mencius, Huang believed that the dignity of man and public welfare should be the main objectives of government. The people should be the master, and the king their servant: in other words, the principle that the people are more important than their ruler, which was clearly expressed as early as Mencius, should be restated and reaffirmed. Huang did not develop any theory of the sovereignty of the people, or any representative form of government, as Rousseau and Locke did in Europe, but all the same he was a great stimulus to the revolutionary movement in China at the end of the last century. The concept of the dignity of man constitutes the fundamental principle alike of Confucianism and of the philosophy of Huang Tsung-hsi, and from that he developed his ideas on human rights, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, and equality before the law. It could well be that the Chinese concept of *tao* was the forerunner of the idea of the law of nature, or natural right in Europe, and given the appropriate environment Huang Tsung-hsi, though a Confucianist, could have become one of the earliest sponsors of the republican ideal.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

Wang Fu-Chih, Advocate of Realism and Change

Wang Fu-chih, the third member of the triumvirate which includes Ku Yen-wu and Huang Tsung-hsi, exercised great influence over the revolutionary movement at the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty. He was a voluminous writer, and he did his utmost to remain a hidden man under the rule of the Manchus. It should be no surprise, therefore, that Huang Tsung-hsi nowhere mentioned him in his *Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucian Scholars*; he simply was unaware of Wang's existence. Wang was a radical enough thinker to shake off the mantle which Buddhism and Taoism had spread over Chinese philosophy. The answers he gave to various kinds of philosophical questions revolutionized the tradition of Sung and Ming thought. He was disgusted with the mad Ch'anism of the Wang Shou-jen sect, but chose a course to counteract it different from either that of Ku Yen-wu, who called upon scholars to apply the new method of field-work and observation, or that of Huang Tsung-hsi, who tried to revise Wang Shou-jen's theory. Wang Fu-chih founded a realistic school of Confucianism, in contrast to Chu Hsi's knowledge-seeking school, and to Lu Chiu-yüan and Wang Shou-jen's "supremacy of virtue" school. He built his doctrine on the pattern of Chang Tsai, whom he much admired. Wang's first premise was recognition of the existence of the external world. With this premise he denounced the Buddhist dogma of the illusoriness of the world, and also the doctrine of the Wang Shou-jen sect that reality is "beyond good and evil." Then he proceeded to tell us that thinking is the most important of the functions involved in building up our knowledge and morality, or our philosophy and ethics. As a realist, he did not hold that matter, or

energy, is the ultimate reality, or that sensations constitute the only basis for our knowledge of the external world. Instead, besides recognizing the existence of the external world, he kept a balanced and coordinated epistemological view in which sensations, logical judgments, and an integrated conception of the universe formed the basis of knowledge and morality. As a realist also, he did not underestimate the role of matter of sensation, but he attached importance to the role of transcendental synthesis, which made him something of an idealist. Wang Fu-chih's balanced view made him an arbitrator between Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen. He revived Chang Tsai by writing a commentary on the *Correction of Youthful Folly*. But he was in fact more than a follower of Chang Tsai. He belonged to the class of original thinkers who were the founders of Neo-Confucian philosophy: Chu Hsi, Lu Chiu-yüan, and Wang Shou-jen. He replaced many of the views of these thinkers with his own original views, without however depriving Chinese philosophy of a healthy, sound, and well coordinated base.

Let me first give a sketch of Wang Fu-chih's life.

He is known best in China as Mr. Wang Ch'uan-shan—the last two words (*ch'uan* and *shan*) meaning “ship” and “hill,” because he lived on a hill that looked like a ship. He was born in the forty-seventh year of Wan-li (1619), in the reign of Emperor Shentsung. His precocity is shown in his having completed the reading of the Thirteen Classics when he was seven years old. He received the *chü-jen* degree when he was twenty-four.

After the Manchus conquered Peking, the southern provinces fell into the hands of a couple of bandit-leaders, named Li Tzu-ch'eng and Chang Hsien-chung. The latter of these, invading Hengyang (Wang's home town) in southern Hunan, arrested Wang's father, and looked around for Wang, because he wanted the young scholar to work for him. When the young scholar heard that his father had fallen into the bandit's hands, he inflicted torture upon himself by lacerating his face and elbows until it appeared he was seriously hurt. When he was taken to Chang Hsien-chung as a hostage to bargain for his father's release, the bandit-leader was so impressed by young Wang's condition that he freed both father and son.

The Manchus then came into Hunan Province and attacked

Hen-yang. Wang seized the occasion to organize an army of resistance, but was defeated. He moved on to Kwangsi Province to join the Prince of Kuei, having been recommended by Ch'ü Shih-ssu for the position of *Hsing-jen* (secretary in charge of ushering, visiting, and receiving, and of issuing imperial orders and decrees). In this capacity, he submitted a request for the impeachment of a cabinet minister, Wang Hua-ch'eng, but would have been put to death for this act had he not managed to escape to Kuei-lin, where he stayed with Ch'ü Shih-ssu who had recommended him. But Ch'ü committed suicide, and the Manchus conquered Kuei-lin. Wang returned to Heng-yang. He was then in the prime of life—thirty-three years old—and from that time on he lived as a hidden man avoiding contact with the world, and never left the hills. The remaining forty years of his life, all spent, of course, under Manchu rule, were devoted to study and writing.

At the end of the Ming Dynasty his name was little known, though he had accomplished the enormous literary labor of writing 250 books under 77 titles—in classical studies, history, Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, Ch'ü Yüan's *Elegy*, Chang Tsai, and the scriptures of the Vijina-vadin sect. Some of his works, in original manuscript form, were later shown to the officials of the Manchu government to be reviewed for entry in the Imperial Catalogue. But none of them was published until 1842, when Teng Hsien-o undertook to bring them to light, and again in 1865, when Tseng Kuo-fan and his brother showed the same interest. Wang's works thus began to attract attention among the Chinese for the first time in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and the books which became best known were the *Tu-t'ung chien-lun* (Studies of History)—a reading of the *Tzu-chih T'ung-chien*—and the *Sung lun* (Comment on the Sung Dynasty). His philosophy, scattered through many different writings, was the last part of his literary output to receive recognition, and that not until the second decade of the Chinese Republic. Since his philosophical utterances were his greatest contribution, the rest of the present chapter will be devoted entirely to these.

Before we proceed to discuss Wang Fu-chih's philosophy, it will be necessary for us to look back once more on the development of Chinese thought in order to be able to understand why he reacted the way he did.

Since the Sung Dynasty, *ri* (reason or rational principle) was the main foundation upon which philosophy was built. What was of interest to philosophers was not the specific question "How do we know?" but the principles underlying human relations and institutions, and the principles underlying the natural world. The Chinese considered *ri* to be the eternal truth. But there was a two-fold attitude towards the way in which this truth was discovered: one was the acquisition of knowledge; and the other laid stress on a state of mind called "concentration," which was supposed to be practised for the purpose of rectifying the mind. A combination of these attitudes constituted the methodology of the Sung and Ming Neo-Confucianists. Lu Chiu-yüan and Wang Shou-jen stressed the role of mind exclusively because they thought that the rational principles of things must become objects of consciousness first; that is, they must exist in mind first, before they can become knowledge. Thus, they reached the conclusion that Chu Hsi's bifurcation of knowledge and mind was mistaken. They advocated the doctrine that mind is reason: in other words, it is precisely in mind where rational principles are to be found, if their receptacle is sufficiently bright and impartial. Wang Shou-jen, coming after Lu Chiu-yüan, emphasized the importance of *liang-chih*. He reverted to the doctrine of "innate ideas," without paying much attention to the external world. In its late period, the school of Wang Shou-jen was interested in the question of *pen-t'i* (reality), characterizing it as "beyond good and evil." In reaction against this view, Wang Fu-chih asserted that before, and in place of all speculation, the existence of the external world must be acknowledged. The so-called rational principles, *tao* or *ri*, are discoverable only among things in the physical world. *Tao* is to be found in the physical world. This was his guiding premise that the metaphysical and the physical are inseparable. Since, in Chinese terminology, the word for "particulars" is *ch'i*, meaning "implements" or "utensils," all of which exist in the physical world, Wang's teaching has the flavor of John Dewey's Instrumentalism. The Chinese word *ch'i*, for "particular," is rich in implications; for instance, a particular has usefulness or purpose, and this usefulness or purpose is limited or finite. Each thing—a chair for sitting, food for eating, a house for living in, clothes for protecting the body—has its definite and limited use. Such is the nature of the world of hard facts in which

we dwell, and the sooner we acknowledge the existence of this universe of implements as a fundamental reality, the better it will be for us.

Recognition of the physical world as a primordial fact was not original with Wang Fu-chih. The Sung philosopher Chang Tsai antedated him in the thought by many centuries. He reiterated time and time again that the primordial fact about the world is being. The universe is composed of *ch'i* [in this case, however, *ch'i* is a different character from the word for "instrument" which we have been discussing: it means "matter" or "air"]. Especially is space full of *ch'i*, the gaseous emanation surrounding the earth, and since there is so much air it is nonsense to say that reality is emptiness or a void. Chang Tsai's theory of being, as the reader will readily understand, was his weapon for attacking Buddhism and Taoism.

This theory of being, or "implements" or "utensils," was revived by Wang Fu-chih to combat mad Ch'anism. The principle of the reality of the external world was, then, first promulgated by Chang Tsai, and Wang Fu-chih wrote a commentary on his *Correction of Youthful Folly*, complimenting him for being the next man to Mencius to bring the Confucian tradition back to life.

Wang Fu-chih's philosophy begins with this world, where (he says) "what exists are implements or utensils. There is also *tao*, the metaphysical, but it is the metaphysical of the physical. It is impossible to assert that implements are merely of implements [i.e., that the physical is of the physical]. "When there is no *tao*, there is also no implement," it was suggested. In this Wang concurred. But then he said the contrary was also true: Where there is no implement there is no *tao*. "It would be more proper to say that as long as there is no implement there is no *tao*. In primitive society, when government still did not exist, there was no principle defining who should rule and who should not. In the time of Yao and Shun, when there was as yet no hereditary monarchy, there was consequently no *tao* according to which a tyrant should be overthrown. The *tao* prevailing in the age of Han and T'ang was different from that of to-day, and the *tao* of today will be different from that of future generations.

"It is the same with physical objects. When there are a bow

and arrow, there is the *tao* of shooting; when there are a cart and horse, there is the *tao* of riding. When there are a sacrificial cow, wine, jade, a bell, musical strings, and a flute, there is the *tao* of music and ceremony. When there is a son, there is the *tao* of father; when there is a younger brother, there is the *tao* of an elder brother. As long as an environment exists, a *tao* arises to be applied to it. Though there may be many different possibilities of *tao*, out of all those possibilities only that *tao* comes into existence which is required by the physical world. Thus, I say that when there is no implement there is no *tao*. This point is seldom observed or understood.”¹

The next step which Wang took was to explain why men cannot live in isolation from the physical world. This was set forth in his *Commentary on the Book of History*. “One cannot live,” he wrote, “detached from the objects of the world, because the ego is related to the non-ego, that is, the objects; and, conversely the non-ego or objects are related to the ego. If the ego, standing in relation to the objects, tries to exist in isolation, all are hurt. In such cases, the ego and objects frustrate one another, and the whole world suffers accordingly. The policy of trying to live in isolation can never be carried through. Even your sleep is impossible unless you have contact with objects. The same may be said of your food, your talk, your movements. None of these is possible without establishing some relationship with objects . . .”²

Wang Fu-chih then gave an interesting classification of the world of objects:

- (I) Wind, storm, rain, and dew: objects of heaven.
- (II) Mountains, plateaus, plains, and marshes: objects of earth.
- (III) *Yin* and *yang*, soft and hard.
- (IV) Birds, fish, animals, and plants.
- (V) What can improve life and be useful to the people.
- (VI) Gain and loss, right and wrong.
- (VII) Father and son, elder and younger brother.
- (VIII) The good sayings and meritorious deeds of former sages.
- (IX) *Jen, i, li, yüeh* (music).

“If real existence,” he pointed out, “were refused to all of these [classes of object], one would have to believe as the Buddhists do

that only the *Tathagatha* is real, and that the whole world is an illusion."³ Wang Fu-chih, on the other hand, believed that all these objects (moral as well as physical) are genuinely real.

He thought that objects belong to two spheres: metaphysical and physical. Before having shape, they abide by the laws of nature, according to which they are formed and are sensed. After taking on shape, they become visible and perform the functions for which they are made. Thus the cart carries, and the basket is a receptacle in which things may be put. Even the dutifulness between a father and son, and the loyalty between a king and subject, are principles which become valid to the extent that they are enforced for the welfare of the persons involved. For Wang, the laws of nature and the rules of morality are metaphysical, namely, they are *tao*. This brings us to his theory of the inseparability of the physical and the metaphysical, which may be expressed in many other ways, such as the visible and the invisible, *a posteriori* and *a priori*, or that the physical is the basis of the metaphysical and the metaphysical is implicit in it.

The inseparability of the physical and the metaphysical he discusses with extraordinary clarity in the following words: "The so-called metaphysical does not mean 'non-physical,' or 'shapeless.' Where the physical is, there also is the metaphysical, which goes beyond it. To imagine something metaphysical without a physical basis is impossible. Such a monstrosity has never been met with, either in human history, or in the history of natural objects, past or present . . . For example, hearing and seeing are functions of ears and eyes; thinking is the power of the mind and brain; *jen* is the virtue of men; *i* is the fitting-togetherness of different kinds of events; proper mean and harmony are the significance of ceremony and music; justice is the quality of punishment; utility grows out of material resources like water and fire; betterment of life derives from rural products such as grains, fruit, silk, and hemp; social obligations spring from the relations between sovereign and subject, and father and son.

"If one puts aside these concrete objects and searches for a non-physical entity, one can go through history, past and present, and one will find nothing to which one can attach a designation, to say nothing of attributing reality. The Taoists, ignorant of this basis,

advocated the theory that *tao* is to be found in the void. Similarly the Buddhists held that *tao* is in emptiness. Where can the void and the empty be found? The teachings of these sectarians sprouted from their imaginations, and can satisfy nobody. Given implements, shapes exist, and beyond shapes is the metaphysical. But given no physical world, how can the metaphysical exist? . . . Therefore, *tao* is to be found in a thorough knowledge of the implements, i.e., the physical world.”⁴

In connection with Wang's doctrine of the inseparability of the physical and metaphysical I should like to mention his specific theory in regard to reality (substance) and operation (function). He was of the opinion that these are correlative. “Reality,” he said, “must show its operation; operation must be traceable back to reality. If there is no cart, how can one carry? If there is no bowl, in what can things be put? This means that without reality there is no operation. If there is no carrying, how can you speak of a cart? If there is no ‘putting in,’ how can you speak of a bowl? This means that when there is operation one can assume reality.”⁵

Wang Fu-chih, in other words, believed that reality and operation are divisible in a distributive sense, but that they are so correlated that given reality, operation must follow; given no operation, reality ceases to exist.

Let me proceed to Wang's concepts about “being” and “life,” both of which were for him weapons to fight against Buddhism and Taoism. According to Buddhism what is called “being” is an illusion. “Being” is merely an out-growth of the human art of designating, specifying, and characterizing. All is momentary, the Buddhist insists, all is empty, all is without self, all is such as it is (*Sarvam tathatvam*). Similarly, Taoism held that what is considered right or wrong in ordinary life is unreal and untrue. Wang Fu-chih opposed this theory of illusion as vigorously as he could. Let us listen to his own words:

“What is dependable is being; what is constant is life. Both of these are utterly true and cannot be called illusion. Why? The reason is evident. Since we are men, and since we cannot walk upside down like ants, we must live on the earth. Since we are not earthworms, burying ourselves underground, we must have air. Since we are not [snow-] maggots dwelling in the mountains of

Szechwan, we must live under sunshine and with fire. Since we are not mice burrowing in volcanoes, we must live near water. Again, we must have grain in order to avoid hunger, and drink in order to assuage thirst. Those who need nothing to stave off starvation and thirst are no longer men. Grain grows only in soil; beverages are made of water. Grain springs from seeds; beverages must be poured into cups. If you plant tares instead of seeds, no grain will be produced. If you use a brick instead of a cup, you will find that it does not hold the beverage. Both the grain and the drink are interrelated with other things, fitting neatly into them. Otherwise nothing would remain or hold . . . Grain will become grain; it is bound to. How can one call this illusory? Can the Buddhists' emptiness produce a pattern in which all these different shapes of things, these distinctions between the foolish and the wise, the ugly and the beautiful, will be wiped away? . . . Being can never be thought of as undependable or unreliable.

"When we consider the life of man, we find that kneeling will produce pleasure; squatting, anger; passing a graveyard, sorrow; a musical instrument and wine, cheerfulness. Shall we not say, therefore, that there are constant relations in the different attitudes of human life? Whatever fails to occur in life does not exist because it has had no part in the universal creation or in human effort. Thus no person knows what an uncultivated piece of land will produce: whether grain or tares. And before any jug was ever used for bathing or watering a garden, nobody knew what water was for . . . Life is nothing else than movement or flow of time. The progress of a year, or a day, or an idea in the mind, can have great influence on the years to come. Life never proceeds in disorder or haphazardly, nor does it work and cease working with interruptions. How can one say that life lacks conformity and is an illusion?

"Hence, both being and life are reliable and constant; they can never be falsified, and they are not illusory. Their origin reveals itself in thunder, which creates being and life. Both are born in accordance with the laws of development."⁶

Wang Fu-chih reasoned that the Buddhists entertained their negative attitudes towards this world because they disdained what is physical. As a result of this contempt they were ignorant of

human sentiments; and as a result of this ignorance, they were oblivious to the daily life of human beings, to moral obligations, and to virtues like *jen* and *i*. The Buddhist argument may be traced back to the dogma of emptiness. Wang compared the Buddhist conception of reality as "beyond good and evil" to the process of painting colors in the void—that is, in a realm characterized only by utter absence of entity.

He produced a purely logical argument against the Buddhist concept of nothingness. "Those," he wrote, "who champion the theory of nothingness are angered by those who advocate the theory of being, and try to refute them. What they intend to do is to prove that the concept of being is incorrect and that being is non-existent. Alas! How can one assert that nothingness exists in this world? When one says that a tortoise has no hair, there is an implicit reference to a dog, which has hair, and which has nothing to do with the tortoise. When one says that a rabbit has no horns, there is an implicit reference to a deer, which has horns, and which has nothing to do with the rabbit. A theory is establishable only if it can be shown to refer to something, whether by contrast or by conformity; otherwise it cannot stand. Now the Buddhists intend to establish the concept of nothingness. I do not know that this concept can stand, because throughout all space and time no such thing can be found."⁷

Then Wang proceeded to bring his doctrine of "being" and "life" into close relation with his teachings about "operation" and "reality." "What is operable," he wrote, "is based on being. From operation we infer reality. Because of being we have operation or function. Because of being we have reality, which produces the constitution of things. Reality and operation together build up truth by means of which the laws of nature and morality act. Therefore, it is said in the *Great Learning*: 'Truth is the beginning and end of all objects in the world; no truth, no objects.'"⁸

For Wang the highest concept is truth, the Supreme Ultimate, *tao*, or Heaven. He had a philosopher's interest in the *Book of Changes* wherein is written: "*Tao* works by *yin* and *yang*." This fundamental principle of universal creation he adopted as basic also to his system of philosophy, and believed that he could derive from it the truth that there is a process in the world: a change

which transpires endlessly by two forces, *yin* (the negative force) and *yang* (the positive force), and that thus the world renews itself every day, every minute. Since the primordial process is an alternation of *yin* and *yang*, it follows that all things are somehow interrelated: upper is related to lower, left to right, heaven to earth. Consequently, we must take the view of interrelation or integration. "Is there a thing in this world," he asked, "which is distinctly by itself and has no relation to anything else whatsoever? No such thing can be found in the universe. Neither can it be found in mind. Heaven is high up, yet coming down to earth it works effectively upon what is there. Earth is low, yet it rises to heights unlimited. When the backward-moving force reaches its utmost limit, the forward-moving force comes to the front, and vice versa. What was existent in former days could not stay until today. What seems extinct today may not always be lost for the future. All of this shows that the positions of things which exist in relation to each other can change. Again, there are some things which everybody takes to be right; yet the right which one holds can become wrong. And there are some things which everybody takes to be wrong; yet the wrong which one holds can become right. The right is different from the wrong; but what the robber does may be done in the name of good. Though the bad cannot be mixed with the good, yet even the bad [e.g., sexual desire] cannot disappear from good men. Good and evil, therefore, cannot be said to be fixed . . . The relation between king and subject is based upon the principle of righteousness; yet a loyalist motive may also be full of love. The relation between father and son is based upon love, yet at the offering of sacrifices in ancestral temples strictness of ceremony is observed.

"Correlation is evident in many other things. Such cases as the fact that wheat is collected in summer and that fireflies shine at night show that *yin* and *yang* are intermixed. Or such cases as the fact that gold becomes fluid after burning and that water becomes hard after freezing indicate that no line can be drawn between hard and soft. That teeth decay and hair grows gray or falls out, imperceptibly, and that finger-nails and toe-nails grow—these processes occur hardly noticed. They are a sign that no hard and fast demarcation exists between boyhood and old age. Clouding does

not always mean rain; the appearance of a rainbow is not a sure omen of sunshine. In other words, the relation between cause and effect is not necessary. Therefore, a thing or a concept which is completely isolated, and related to nothing whatsoever outside of itself, is impossible to find, either among the various kinds of physical things, or in mind."⁹

For Wang, the idea of interrelatedness was the same as the idea of reciprocal action, or of change behind phenomena. Wang's own words make his conception admirably clear: "The great quality, virtue, or attribute of the universe is life, which is a process going on endlessly. Coming into being is the appearance of what previously did not exist; and passing away is the disappearance of what previously was there. What comes into being is visible. What passes away is invisible. What comes into being and realizes itself is in the present. What passes away and disappears is in the past. But what proceeds without moderation will fly away and never return. Therefore, inhalation and exhalation are the natural rhythm common to everything."¹⁰

Imbued by the *Book of Changes*, Wang Fu-chih sometimes talked like a Seventeenth Century Bergsonian. For instance: "The nature of the universe is immutable, but renews itself every day. The wind and thunder of today cannot be the same as the wind and thunder of yesterday. We know that the sun and moon of today cannot be the same as the sun and moon of yesterday. Yet we know that the nature of wind is air; of thunder, sound; of the sun and moon, light. We know also that the limbs and senses of today are different from those of yesterday. Yet the function of hearing and seeing is that men have senses, and the function of the sense of touch is that men feel. Because the quality of a thing remains the same, the impression created is the same. When a thing is beaten or conscious of defeat, it is ghostly; when it stretches out and rests itself it is spiritual. When it is spiritual, it is alive. When it is ghostly, it is dead. When it consumes and cannot continue, it is death in youth. Everything which clings to what it was and knows no way of renewing itself will wither away even if it is not consumed. And so one says: "The ability to renew self is a great virtue."¹¹

"Chang Tsai remarked: "The shape of sun and moon never

changes.' This word 'shape' refers only to their form, and not to the elements of which they are composed. Though the elements change every day, the shape remains the same. This means that *tao* remains the same, but that the utensil cannot remain the same. The water in a river stays water, whether the water in question exists at present, or existed in the past; but the present water is not the past water. The light of a candle stays light, whether present or past; but the present light is not the past light. Water and light are so near to us that it is easy to determine their characteristics, while the sun and moon are so remote that with them the problem is difficult. Nails and hair grow everyday, and yet what is old will in time become extinct; this is familiar to everybody. Skin and flesh grow, and yet what is old will eventually disappear; this again is known to all people. Just as one may be aware that shape is unchanging, yet hardly realize that the elements within the shape are being destroyed, so one may have the impression that the sun and moon of today are the same as the sun and moon of past ages, and that the skin and flesh of today are the same as the sun and moon of past ages, and that the skin and flesh of today are the same as the skin and flesh of former days. One who remains persistently under such an impression cannot be taught to understand that life in the world is daily being renewed." ¹²

Wang Fu-chih's emphasis on regeneration led him to see in this concept a spur to active and vigorous life. "The past and future," he said, "have something in them similar, and also something dissimilar. What is dissimilar are life and death among men and natural objects. Also what is dissimilar are today's sun and moon not consuming yesterday's light, and this year's winter and summer not having last year's air. If yesterday's light were still doing duty, the light in lamps and mirrors would be gloomy and dull. If last year's air were still in active service, it would be like the heat from hot water, or like water in a ditch—that is, it would be diminished and impure. Therefore, what one calls 'rich,' is what is renewed daily. The same may be said for the light of the sun and moon, which is bright every day and every night. The same may be said for the seasons, which alternate between heat and cold. What is

old is given away, and then one refreshes one's self. Thus, the world runs in an orderly fashion, without trouble. This is the dissimilarity, which of course, is in contrast to the similarity. As far as similarity is concerned, everything in the universe comes into being through life, and disappears because of the process of change. Life and change have their origin and opportunity, yet the species to which they belong is their determining factor. A man will remain a man through the ages; a thing will remain a thing through the ages. This is the principle of the genesis of species in which the universe works purposelessly, and differentiates them [e.g., a man and a thing] according to their elements and shape, and within limits, so that they cannot be confused. Those who have life are active and bright; they also are differentiated, but the line of demarcation is not hard and fast. The process of creation is like the mountain air, which evaporates when it gives birth to clouds, and after turning into rain, will not return again to the same mountain. Or one may compare it to firewood, which burns like coal, but will not again fertilize the same wood. This principle is applicable to the genesis of things which possess elements and shape; but it is even more applicable to what is spiritual and active. It is the natural process which multiplies life in the world. This is the similarity, in contrast to the dissimilarity."¹³

Thus far we have been considering Wang Fu-chih's doctrine of reality. I should have called it his metaphysics, in the Western sense of that term, except that for him metaphysics and physics, though they occupied different levels, were two aspects of the same topic. Before leaving his doctrine of reality and moving on to his teachings about human life, let us look back once more at his recognition of the physical world as the primordial fact, and at the alternation of *yin* and *yang* by which it undergoes perpetual change and is ever renewed, so that the distinction between old and new is blurred over, and a line can hardly be drawn between them. Of this eternal process of daily regeneration Wang wrote: "Since we did not see the beginning of the universe, we do not know when it began; so also with the end of the universe, which no human being will see."¹⁴ In his opinion, only fools discuss the beginning and end of the universe. The knowledge proper to us is

that the universe is born every minute, and that it dies every minute, so that life and death constitute an endless process of creation.

We now are ready for Wang's doctrine of human life, and the first subdivision under this topic which I shall discuss is human nature.

Based on his theory of the process of universal change or growth, Wang Fu-chih held that human nature is not something isolated from the physical world, is not something with which man is endowed before birth while he is still in a state of tranquillity, and is not something fixed and "given" once for all. In other words, human nature submits itself to the rule of daily growth.

The Sung philosophers formulated the doctrine of two kinds of nature: essential nature and physical nature, as if they could be treated separately, one as essence, the other as belonging to the physical world. Wang Fu-chih, as it should now be clear was opposed to this bifurcation for the simple reason that in his opinion the metaphysical and the physical are inseparable. What is called "human nature" is merely the rational growing out of the physical. Wang used an interesting simile to explain his conception of the relation between human nature and the physical body. Human nature is like a song, in which musical sounds and rhythm combine; the physical body is like the flute from which the song comes. Much of man's intelligence, activity, and courage are his spiritual part, depending upon his constitution and his physical health. But when his physical body is also conceived as including his constitution and health, it becomes difficult to define just where his physical part leaves off and his rational part begins. One must say that the rational is inseparable from the physical, and that the physical, when it is well taken care of, can contribute to the rational. Then Wang goes on to explain that human nature is never "given" once for all, but, on the contrary, that it develops daily. Let me quote his own clear words:

"Human nature is the rational principle behind the growth of the physical body, and this body increases in size and progresses towards completion day by day. The so-called heavenly order is not a command given just once, at the time of birth. If it were,

it would be a fixed quantity, enjoined by heaven, accepted by man, and without the capacity to increase or decrease. Of course, all living beings receive an order from heaven at the moment of birth. Otherwise, how could man be endowed with the moral virtues? But man's growth from boyhood to middle life, and again from middle life to old age, are also an order of nature. If such were not the case, the heavenly command would be forgotten during the passage of time . . . A life is conceived through the mingling of the two forces *yin* and *yang* with the five elements, and its structure grows because it absorbs different kinds of substance from the universe, according to a law of nature which is common to all individuals. This life develops in stature, constitution, and in degree of rationality. At birth and during subsequent growth it accepts from heaven. Therefore, heaven sends forth its orders, and man receives them daily. And therefore I [Wang Fu-chih] say that the process of development is continuous, going on from day to day."¹⁵

Wang's doctrine of human nature was a great contribution to thought and life in the sense that it contained implications of enormous ethical importance. If life grows daily—indeed, by the minute—then it must be well taken care of every minute. Since human nature develops continuously, one's contacts with the physical world must proceed cautiously, in regard to what one ought and ought not to do.

Said Wang: "A person after his birth is not strong enough to take and do for himself. He has only what he has received from heaven, and that is good. Such is an order which heaven issues to man. After growth, he is sufficiently powerful to take and do for himself. And what he takes and does is in accordance with what he becomes accustomed to, and with what he likes. Therefore, good and evil arise. What he takes and does cannot go beyond the two forces and the five elements. Such, again, is an order which heaven issues to man. It is said in the *Doctrine of the Mean*: 'What is decreed by heaven is nature.' Since orders come from heaven every day, nature grows every day. The sight of the eyes develops every day; the hearing of the ears and the thinking of the mind increase day by day. Physically our stature grows . . . and spiritually the rational approaches towards perfection. When one receives the good and chooses the pure, evil has no way of infecting one. It

is said in the *Book of Changes*: 'A man of noble character should strengthen himself without ceasing; he should be vigilant day and night; he should cling to the good.' This is the way to build up human nature. Then a man's nature, after birth, can make progress towards perfection.

"Otherwise—if a bad mingling of the two forces and five elements occurs—the wrongness in a person can expand, and in combination with laziness and unmanliness it can lead to self-indulgence and slavery to desire. Nature, under the influence of bad habit, will turn out to be evil.

"Since the issuance of heavenly decrees is continuous, human nature is subject to continuous change. The rational, because it is good in itself, can return to its origin. What is not accomplished can be accomplished. What is already accomplished has still a chance to be corrected. Human nature, evidently, is not fixed in its form, but is alterable and rectifiable . . ." ¹⁶

Wherein lies the goodness of human nature? Wang Fu-chih answered this question from his realistic point of view. Though human nature cannot, indeed, be separated from the physical constitution of the body, nevertheless in the human mind there dwells a sense of what "ought to be," followed and approved by everybody. This vivid consciousness of the "ought" really exist, and really is experienced, so that it is impossible to say that it is separated from life. Human nature, accordingly, is good, and cannot be otherwise.

Whence comes the evil in human nature? Wang Fu-chih does not place the responsibility for wrongdoing on the physical body, because the senses and the limbs (part of the physical body) are merely the necessary organs of seeing, hearing, walking, etc., without which none of these actions is possible. Neither can one put the blame on natural objects, such as swords. Wang's point is that evil cannot arise when the mutual intercourse between physical objects and the organs of the human body proceed on the basis of virtuous motives, in the right place, and at the right time. Let us read our philosopher's own words:

"We cannot blame the organs of our physical body, nor the material objects of the universe. Wrongdoing can only be attributed to unpredictable contingencies in the contact of physical or-

gans with natural objects. For instance, the organs and the objects do not meet at proper places and times, and do not have correct proportions. Then wrongdoing is the issue. Thus, unpredictable contingencies, on the side of man and on the side of objects, conspire with wrong intentions, to produce moral evil.

"A female beauty attracts men, but when birds and fishes see her they fly, or dart away. Why does her beauty not entice the birds and fishes? Though cows are fond of grass, and pigs like husks of grain, neither grass nor husks of grain arouse the lust of covetousness in men. Thus, responsibility for moral evil cannot be assigned to man's nature, nor to his capabilities, nor to the physical objects themselves. The origin of wrongdoing must be attributed to human emotions, for when the mind in its imperceptible stirrings is attracted by external objects, and when the latter are sufficiently strong to set motives into action, then emotions are developed. This intercourse between external objects and mind is not purely inside nor purely outside. It is aroused by the comings and goings of both the internal and external, which merge together . . . That neither external object nor mind can do wrong in or of itself may be explained by the example of 'fusing.' Gold in and of itself cannot fuse; nor can fire in and of itself fuse. The two, gold and fire, must come together. This coming together is what constitutes fusing. If the melting occurs properly, the result will be good. Otherwise, of course, the result will be bad. This encounter between gold and fire is analogous to the meeting of men's senses with attractive things which issues in evil." ¹⁷

Wang Fu-chih has some keen observations about how one's biases are formed through habit. "That a man can do good," he says, "is because of his nature; that he can do wrong is because of his habits. Habits limit a man's capacities in many ways. For instance, when the hearing of his ears is restricted, his natural auditory power is lost; when the seeing of his eyes is restricted, his natural vision is lost. Parents exercise influence on their children when the latter are learning to speak and move; neighbors influence them when they are beginning to like and dislike. Once the eyes, ears, and mind have been set or fixed in a certain way, these faculties can no longer even see a mountain, or hear thunder. This does not mean that they do not want to see or hear. It is simply

that the faculties are so limited, or bent, that they never take the initiative to see or hear, but prefer to remain blind and deaf."¹⁸

I now come to Wang's doctrine of mind. His great predecessors, Wang Shou-jen and earlier still the Sung philosophers, looked upon mind as the source of reason. By this treatment, which was abstraction, they separated mind from the physical body. Now Wang Fuchih's move was to begin to put mind back into the context of flesh and blood, a motion to which he was logically committed because of his master's premise that the metaphysical or spiritual is inseparable from the physical or material. He discussed mind under two aspects: *tao*-mind and human mind. In the former are what Western philosophers call "forms of thought," or, in Chinese terminology, the four cardinal virtues: *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih*. In the latter (the human mind) are the emotions: joy, anger, sorrow, pleasure. Wang put these two sets in parallel order, because he wanted to show that moral judgments (forms of thought) are inseparable from the flesh, which expresses itself in bursts of emotion, such as joy, anger, etc. This whole discussion was started by Mencius who put the accent on the virtues, but without forgetting the emotions. Said this second sage: "From concrete cases we may perceive that the feeling of commiseration is inherent in man, that the feelings of shame and dislike are inherent in man, that the feelings of modesty and complaisance are inherent in man, and that the feelings of approving and disapproving are inherent in man. The feeling of commiseration is the principle of *jen*. The feelings of shame and dislike are the principle of *i*. The feelings of modesty and complaisance are the principle of *chih*."¹⁹ This teaching may be graphically represented as follows:

TAO-MIND OR FORMS OF THOUGHT

EMOTIONS

<i>jen</i>	feeling of commiseration
<i>i</i>	feelings of shame and dislike
<i>li</i>	feelings of modesty and complaisance
<i>chih</i>	feelings of approving and disapproving

Wang's intent in setting forth the cardinal virtues and the emotions in parallel order was to revive the doctrine of Mencius. He had to correlate ordinary emotions: joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure

with Mencius's moral ideas. This he did by denominating the former "emotions" under the human mind, and the latter "moral ideas" of the *tao*-mind. Both live in the same dwelling, and they are complementary to each other. Behind each virtue works one of the emotions, and conversely, behind each emotion works one of the virtues. This means that the forms of thought cannot be isolated from their emotional counterparts. In this doctrine we have Wang Fu-chih's refutation of the Buddhist recommendation of the quietistic state, in which mind is undisturbed by emotions. Wang was out of sympathy with the Buddhist conception that mind is to be considered only in so far as it is the subject of awakening or enlightenment, and that the forms of thought, with their close connection to the emotions, should be ignored. He was also out of sympathy with Wang Shou-jen's theory that mind is reason, because the earlier philosopher forgot the role of the emotions. Wang Fu-chih confirmed his doctrine of the *tao*-mind by showing that it contains the potentialities of Mencius' four virtues. He knew well that the emotions lead to indulgence and violence, but he had the idea that a man can control them by moderation and self-restraint. Therefore he stressed that the contingencies which may appear, either in indulgence or in self-control, should be taken great care of.

In connection with the problem of *tao*-mind and human mind I shall also bring in the term "proper mean," which acquired its importance at the beginning of Sung philosophy. Wang Fu-chih said: "The mental state before the operation of joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure is the proper mean. This is a great obstacle for a Confucianist to cross, and it is unintelligible except to an unbiased mind . . . One interpretation that it is the mental state before the expression of joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure is incorrect, because the natural expression of an emotion is the reaction to what arouses it. When there is no such thing, there is no joy, anger, or the like. How can a state without joy, anger, or the like be called proper mean? When it was suggested that, 'Since in such a state there is neither good nor bad, neither inclining towards this side nor inclining towards that side, it is quite possible to call it proper mean . . . ' [Wang Fu-chih replied]: 'For example, in an empty room there is nothing—not even furniture. So there is no possibility of inclining

this way or that. But inclining neither this way nor that cannot be called proper mean.' Then Wang offered another interpretation: To speak of a mental state before the operation of joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure as the proper mean is to signify a mental state in which each of the four emotions is in proportion to the case requiring it: joy when there should be joy, etc. Proper mean signifies nothing else than goodness. Goodness is the essence of proper mean, lying in human nature . . ." ²⁰

Wang Fu-chih's interpretation brought Wang Ch'ii's misinterpretation of "proper mean" as the reality beyond good and evil back to solid, concrete, and ethical ground again.

Before I proceed to Wang's doctrine of thinking as the major work of mind, I shall discuss his theory of reflection, by which he touched upon a phase of human experience never previously envisioned by any Sung or Ming philosopher. He brings before us an aspect of mind suggesting very strongly Henri Bergson's theory of "duration."

Wang said: "When one talks about 'giving,' the correlative 'accepting' comes to mind. When one talks about 'profit,' the contrary 'loss' comes to mind. When one speaks what is speakable, one also considers whether one can put into practice. Practicing what is practicable, one reflects upon what one has spoken. What one does later continues the doings which one began before. After one acts today, one considers the consequences which will come tomorrow. The manifoldness of things all jam into the compact mind. Things which are ten thousand miles away can be brought to one in reflection . . . Though eyes change with varieties of color, though ears change with varieties of sound, though yourself changes with different kinds of environment, what remains the same is mind; what is unalterable is *tao*."

"It is said: 'Reflection should not be held too tightly . . .' [Wang's reply] According to my understanding, what is called past is the origin of the flow. Though it is called past, yet it never disappears. What is called future is continuation of the flow; though it has not yet come, it certainly will come. What is before us is the present moment. But this moment is not only a moment. It is connected with the past and the future which constitute a continuous chain of goings-on in mind. Chuang-tzu said: 'If there is no day, there

will be no year.' If the moments of time are not connected together, then a life means a day, while death may come in the night. Today one may be a sage, tomorrow a robber. Therefore, I believe: What is connected is reflection. When one adheres to it, one knows where to apply one's efforts. When one forgets, one is insane . . . But nowadays scholars hold the idea that the mind of a sage should be like a mirror with no image left in it, or like a scale which weighs according to the weights left in it. What is past does not remain there; the future can wait for what comes. Not to abide in anger or fear is the way to rectify mind. The talk of these modern scholars is derived from the Buddhist notion of no reflection, or from Chuang-tzu's doctrine of sitting and forgetting. I want to ask: If the past has nothing left, how can the present arise? If the present does not know what will come, how can one prepare one's self?"²¹

The reader may be interested to compare these words of Wang Fu-chih, with the following passages from the French philosopher of change, Henri Bergson: "Duration is the continuous progress of the past, which gnaws into the future and swells as it advances."²²

"The past in its entirety is prolonged into the present and abides there, the actual and acting."²³

"Each moment is not only something new, but something unforeseeable; . . . change is far more radical than we suppose."²⁴

"The primary function of memory is to evoke all those past perceptions which are analogous to the present perception, and so to suggest to us that decision which is the most useful."²⁵

It appears that Bergson's "memory" and Wang Fu-chih's "reflection" are the same thing. Yet there is a great difference. While the French philosopher believed that "a living being is a center of action; that it represents a sum of contingency entering into the world," and that, accordingly, the future is unforeseeable, the Chinese philosopher, on the contrary, supposed that a man could knowingly apply his reflective efforts to doing right. Wang cited the *Book of Changes*: "Those who reflect can become sages; those who forget will go crazy"—which means that when one clings to good ideas, holding them fast, reflective effort can direct a man's actions purposively. Wang stressed the importance of Confucius' maxim: "Memorize silently," which is affiliated with Bergson's

theory of memory. He argued that in memorizing you can add as much as you like without flooding the memory, or causing it to run over, and that you can use choice in adding selectively what you know you do not already have in your memory. The power of memorizing does not disappear with the passage of time. This is why reflection can go on: before a thing comes, one knows how to get ready for it; upon its arrival, one knows how to keep it. Men are so constituted that they can have adequate knowledge to meet any emergency. Wang was of the opinion that "to reflect in terms of past, present, and future is a mark of what distinguishes man from the animals."²⁶

Let us now come to Wang Fu-chih's epistemology. He was like Mencius, the first Chinese philosopher to put his whole stake on thinking, or knowing. "The contact," he wrote, "of mind with things in the world brings out the operation of cognition. When you know a thing, you find a name for it and understand its significance. Without contact with things, even when you have an abstract principle in mind, you do not find a name for it . . . A child's ignorance is the effect of his having had no experience. A fool's ignorance exists because knowledge of things has never reached him."²⁷ Wang held that cognition derives not only from objects and their shapes (Locke's primary and secondary qualities), but also from intellectual understanding. He asserted that after objects, their shapes, and their understanding meet together, cognition is formed, and he gave an example of why sensory perception is not enough, but must be accompanied by understanding. "Ears hear," he said, "where there is sound; eyes see where there is color. These two are the doors of mind. When the ears and eyes come together with sounds and colors there is sensation. But this merging is not the issue of ears, eyes, sounds, and colors alone. When a carload of wood is passing [a metaphor taken from Mencius] which nobody pays any attention to because of distracting noises, it will get past as if nobody ever heard or saw it. Therefore, it is clear that sensation is not enough to bring out cognition."²⁸ Wang believed that cognition is formed by the shape of things. Things are determined by their own unalterable natures and capacities. "Dry things are dry, wet things are wet, beautiful things are beautiful, ugly things are ugly—each has its own nature."²⁹ Wang believed that a pre-

established harmony between man's sensations and cognitions, and the manifestations of nature, must be presupposed if knowledge is to be possible. Things themselves, he wrote, are unknowable: What we know are the principles of things, or, in Kantian terminology, the forms of conception. "What thinking can reach," said Wang, "and what science can study, are principles. What thinking cannot reach, and what science cannot study, are things themselves. So-called names are limited. So-called numbers are limited. In reality each thing has a kind of its own, within which are species and sub-species. Kinds and sub-species are so numerous that a skillful calculator could not exhaust them even if he were to work his whole life long. For example, the number of leaves on a great tree are in the millions or billions, yet no two of them are exactly similar. Thus, even such terms as 'leaf' do not tell us the exact nature of a thing, because each individual thing deviates, and sub-deviates, in so many respects, from every other thing. And furthermore if a leaf is kept for a day and night it will change itself again. 'Sunny' and 'rainy' are terms for weather. Yet it is hard to find two days or two nights which are exactly alike. Thus, terms and numbers cannot exhaust what is called knowledge."³⁰ And thus, also, Wang Fu-chih reached the conclusion that what we know are the forms of conception, not things-in-themselves.

Wang was the philosopher who held that thinking is the main function of mind; but for him, thinking covers not only logical judgments, but also moral judgments. In other words, a man's mind formulates logical judgments according to the categories, to be sure, but it also formulates ethical judgments according to the Four Cardinal Virtues. Wang appreciated Mencius as the sage whose chief contribution was to sound the keynote to philosophy. Mencius had compared the functions of the senses and of mind, and had called the former, as exemplified in hearing and seeing, the ignobler part, and mind the nobler part of man's constitution. Wang explained that the Second Sage had reached this conclusion because the senses are obscured by one thing and another, whereas mind, whose function is thinking, gives man a correct view of the external world. Wang meant that since mind stands over the senses, controlling and coordinating them, and since it makes a study, in every case, of importance and righteousness, so the function of

mind is (to use Kantian terminology) to make a transcendental synthesis. Because of the synthetical unity, mind is not obscured like the senses. In other words, the principles of right and wrong are in mind. To use modern terminology: both knowledge and moral valuation originate in mind.

Wang Fu-chih was an arbitrator between the schools of Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen. As we know already, Wang Shou-jen's standpoint was that mind is reason; Chu Hsi's standpoint was that knowledge-seeking is necessary if mind is to be made ready for right judgment. The former attacked the latter for bifurcating mind and reason. If we look at this situation from the logical standpoint, we shall see that a decision in the controversy required the settling of one vital point, namely: When we make judgments, is there a difference in kind, such that for some judgments knowledge-seeking is necessary, while for others it is unnecessary? Now Wang Fu-chih gave an answer to this very question as follows: "In the case of a son who wants to know why he is loved by his parents, there is no use in his proceeding according to the method of 'investigation of things' in order to discover whether he should exercise filial duty towards them. The case makes it plain that filial knowledge does not come from investigation; rather, it comes from a man's own mind.

"On the other hand, there are cases in which knowledge of what is good and evil does depend upon external things: for instance, a malicious person whose features are so conspicuously wicked that no one dare make friends with him; or arsenic, the poisonous nature of which is so well known that nobody dares to touch it. Also there are cases in which one person alone can know and decide: for example, a secret motive for doing some shameful act, which only the man who entertains the motive knows he must put a stop to; or the quantity of grain, meat, or wine which a person can take in his stomach. This can be decided only by the one with the stomach. Such cases, being instances of mere self-consciousness, have nothing to do with 'investigation of things.'

"Filial duty, therefore, does not derive itself from knowledge by learning or deliberation. Love of one's children derives from one's having had the experience of being married, and of having had children born. It is a kind of willing rather than knowledge.

This filial duty and this love of children have nothing to do with knowledge nor with external things . . .

"K'uang Chang's case of being unfilial was rather complicated, and required investigation if one was to ferret out what was right. Having discovered what was right, one then knew how to serve one's parents sincerely. In this case both the inner sense of right and wrong and the study of things had to work together.

"Furthermore, the number of things in the world is endless, while one's capacity is limited. But even though one's capacity is limited, it can reach perfect knowledge. Confucius' disciple Yen Hui, when shown one instance, could infer ten instances which would follow. Another disciple of Confucius, Tzu Kung, when he was taught the number one, could infer only the number two . . . One need not wait until everything in the universe is exhaustively studied in order to reach perfect knowledge. In Chu Hsi's supplementary chapter to the *Great Learning*, he said: 'After one exerts one's self in this way for a long time one will suddenly find one's self possessed of wide and far-reaching penetration.' The point is that 'investigation of things' by accumulating one item after another will never permit a man to know everything, yet mind can, in itself, and entirely through its own operations, become perfectly intelligent. Mencius said: 'A carpenter or a carriage-maker may give a man a circle and a square, but cannot make him skillful.' The circle and the square are things which can be studied, or investigated; skillfulness is a self-possession which cannot be learned by investigation. Nevertheless, skillfulness must be learned through the circle and the square. So it is said: 'Realization of knowledge is through investigation of things.' We know that skillfulness cannot be found in the circle or in the square; yet we are told that in spite of 'realization of knowledge' and 'investigation of things' being different from each other, they are mutually complementary.

"In conclusion, mind and senses are both necessary in cases of 'investigation of things.' Learning does the main work; thinking power is auxiliary . . . In 'realization of knowledge,' the role of mind is the more important. Thinking does the main work; learning is auxiliary. Therefore, the maxim: 'Realization of knowledge is by investigation of things' means that the operations of the senses

should give aid, on an empirical basis, to mind; not that the senses should do the whole work, while mind stands by, idle. This line of demarcation was drawn by the school of Chu Hsi, and so Lu Chiu-yüan at Goose Lake reproved it."³¹

The question of knowledge as to how far it is sufficient unto itself, and how far it is dependent upon study of external things, has puzzled philosophers both in China and in the West. In China, it was further complicated by the problem of whether mind and reason are to be monistically or dualistically considered, or to use Wang Shou-jen's expression, whether there is 'bifurcation' of mind and reason. Wang Fu-chih, after making a fair and objective study of knowledge, as we have seen, concluded (1) that filial duty, sense of shame, etc., are known by themselves entirely apart from 'investigation of things'; (2) such cases as determining whether one's stomach is full at the time of eating are also known by one's self, without recourse to 'investigation of things'; (3) perfection of knowledge and acquisition of skill depend upon one's self, not upon outside things. However, knowledge of many things, such as drugs, and a complicated ethical case in which man's duty towards others was involved, do, indeed, depend upon study of objects.

Wang Fu-chih thus drew a line between innate knowledge and knowledge derived from external objects. In so doing he clarified the epistemological problems in Chinese thought, while giving credit to both Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen. It is conceivable that the problem might eventually be settled in the direction towards which he pointed—just as the controversy between rationalism and empiricism in Europe was settled—without deciding in favor of either party. In this respect, Wang's sharp and analytical mind made a real contribution to the development of epistemological thought.

After giving this brief resumé of his thought, let me leave him here, though in so doing we omit many fascinating aspects of his philosophy. Wang then was a realist, who based his scheme on the premise of the existence of the physical world as a fundamental fact. The world is organized on two levels: the metaphysical (*tao*) and the physical (*ch'i*). It is run by two forces, *yin* and *yang*—in other words, by rest and movement, so that it is ever-changing: Its nature remains the same, but its elements are in the eternal

flux of replacing the old by the new. Appreciating the importance of change in the scheme of things, he opposed the quietistic attitude of meditation, as being by nature intimately related to rest and laziness, and as contrary to the actual work of the universe, which consists in change. This was a revolutionary way of thinking, since it flatly contradicted Chou Tun-i's tranquillity and the Ch'eng brothers' concentration of mind. Wang Fu-chih may be called the first to stand for activism in Chinese thought. By basing his interpretation of the cosmic process on change through *yin* and *yang*, he was led to acknowledge that the institutions of a country must submit to change. In his day many Chinese philosophers dreamed of a restoration of feudalism and communal ownership of the land, but Wang said definitely "No!" Why? The element of change, time, makes retrograde steps impossible. Wang Fu-chih was one of the very few Chinese thinkers who recognised the importance of progressive change or renewal. He was in essence an exponent of the idea of evolution.

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26. Wang Fu-chih, *op. cit.*, *Commentary on the Book of History*, Book 5, p. 27.
27. *Ibid.*, *Commentary on Chang Tsai's "Correction of Youthful Folly,"* Book 1, p. 4.
28. *Ibid.*, Book 4, p. 3.
29. *Ibid.*, *Commentary on the Great Diagram of the Book of Changes*, p. 27.
30. *Ibid.*, *Study of Tung-chien*, Book 25, p. 5.
31. *Ibid.*, *Commentary on the Ta-hsueh*, p. 10.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Yen Yüan, the Pragmatist

The title "Pragmatist" is bestowed on Yen Yüan (Yen Hsi-chai), the subject of the present chapter, not through any attempt to "modernize" him superficially by borrowing a term from American philosophy, but because a real similarity exists between him and his American counterparts.

The American pragmatists, Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, stressed "action" and "practical consequences" in their philosophical thinking. Peirce said: "Consider what effects, that conceivably might have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."¹ William James said: "The pragmatic method tries to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. If no practical consequences whatever can be traced between two alternatives, they mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle."² John Dewey expressed the same idea in different words: "When the claim or pretension or plan is acted upon, it guides us truly or falsely; it leads us to our end or away from it. Its active dynamic function is the all-important thing about it, and in the quality of activity induced by it lies all its truth and falsity."³

If this "active dynamic function" is taken as the criterion of the truth or falsity of a notion, there is every good reason for calling Yen Yüan a Chinese pragmatist, though the background for his pragmatism is quite different from that of the American version. In America the rise of this school is attributed to a reaction against the intellectualism of Hegel's logic, and to the progress of modern science, technology, and industry, in which experimenta-

tion and method by trial and error play a rôle. Yen Yüan is convinced that Sung and Ming philosophy left the country militarily unprepared for the emergency of foreign invasion, and brought utter defeat in the wars with the Mongols and Manchus. So he founded a new philosophy which stresses practice, dynamic function, and practical consequences.

Yen Yüan was original and brave in advocating his doctrine because he had to assume the responsibility of attacking the schools of Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen whose prestige had been well entrenched in the Chinese mind for many centuries. Yen has been described as one who opened a mouth which had never previously been opened, and who wrote down what had never previously been written down. Herein lies his originality.

Yen Yüan was born in 1635 in the district of Po-yeh, Hopeh Province. His father was the adopted son of an old man named Chu Chiu-tso, and so changed his name from Yen to Chu Pang-liang. However the adopted son could not long tolerate the mistreatment he suffered from members of the Chu family, and consequently ran away and joined the Manchu army which at that time was in Hopeh. His wife (our philosopher's mother) remarried after the disappearance of her husband.

When Yen Yüan was seventeen years old his memory was already so good that he never forgot a book after he had read it two or three times. But in his youth he was as much interested in wrestling and military science as he was in the writings of the Sung philosophers and Wang Shou-jen. By the time he was twenty-four he wrote a book of his own called *On Institutions*, in which he advocated the restoration of the "well-field" land system and feudalism.

Meanwhile Yen Yüan learned from his "grandfather" Chu Chiu-tso that his father had been an adopted son in the Chu family. He gathered the same information from his mother, who, as has already been mentioned had remarried after the father's disappearance. This unexpected knowledge disturbed Yen Yüan so much that he determined to set out to find his father.

One peculiar trait of our future philosopher was his deadly earnestness. For instance, he tried to live up to every word in the Classics on ceremony. Thus when his "grandmother" Chu died, he

abstained from all food and drink except rice and water during the period of mourning, and wept three times for her every day. It was this strict observance of ancient ceremonies that awakened him to the truth that practice should be the test as to whether an institution or a book is right or wrong. This led him to a critical review of Sung philosophy.

In 1669, in his thirty-fifth year, Yen wrote a second book, *On Human Nature*, in which he expounded the theory that essential nature cannot function without physical nature. This point of view was contrary to that of the Sung philosophers, who distinguished between essential and physical nature, and dealt with them separately. The same year Yen wrote *On Learning*, in which he explained that Confucius' six arts: ceremonies, music, archery, chariot-driving, reading, and mathematics are subjects which everybody should study, and that the theories of human nature and the heavenly way are not studies adapted to everybody. At about this time Yen Yüan decided to drop the name of the family into which his father had been adopted, and resumed the surname of his own family Yen. The old man Chu, his adoptive grandfather, became ill, and invited him to come and live with him. This Yen Yüan did, and he also took care of him until his death the following year.

At forty-eight Yen finished another book, *On Humanity*, which attacked Buddhism because it neglected the obligations of human relations. With this work, his philosophic tetralogy was complete: *On Institutions*, *On Human Nature*, *On Learning*, and *On Humanity*. When he wrote the first of these he was still much interested in Sung philosophy. The four books together present clearly his philosophy of pragmatism.

In 1684 he decided to go to Manchuria to find his father. Wherever he went, he posted notices on the streets describing his father's appearance, and asked for information. One day a Mrs. Chin saw one of these notices and recognised it to describe his father, whom she knew to have died thirteen years earlier. Yen had his father's body removed to Po-yeh, where he was buried again.

Although Yen Yüan had a number of students in his house, he never attempted to found an academy, as had been the custom of Sung and Ming philosophers. However, in his sixtieth year he was

invited to become president of Chang-nan Academy; two years later he assumed this position and sought to put his educational theories into practice. He divided the Academy into four faculties. The first on the east side of the academy was called Civilian Affairs. Here were taught ceremonies, music, books, mathematics, astronomy, and geography. The first faculty on the western side of the academy he called Military Science. The curriculum consisted of strategy, defensive and offensive tactics, camping, land and naval warfare, archery, charioteering, and wrestling. The second faculty on the eastern side of the academy was called Classics and History. Here courses in the Thirteen Classics, the histories of the different dynasties, etc., were offered. The second faculty on the western side he called Arts and Crafts, and here the subjects taught were hydraulics, the science of fire, engineering, mathematics, and designing. Two other faculties were later added—one for teaching the Philosophy of Reason, and the other for giving instruction in the composition of the "eight-legged essay." This division of faculties, Yen explained, was an attempt to revive Confucius' way of studying, and to steer away from pure meditation and Chinese philology, so that teachers and students could devote themselves to the practical arts which were useful to the country and to themselves.

Unfortunately in the year that the newly organized academy was founded, it was washed out by a flood and had to be closed. Its president then returned to Po-yeh where he wrote an essay in praise of the Sung statesman Wang An-shih, a favorite butt of the Sung philosophers. They thought he was a stubborn champion of the policy of interference in industry and agriculture. Yen went further and even defended Han To-sui, who was generally regarded as responsible for the collapse of the Southern Sung Dynasty. Yen Yüan died at the age of seventy.

Both as a boy and young man, Yen witnessed the defeat of his homeland by the Manchus, and considered this alien rule imposed upon his people a great disgrace. He traced the cause of the collapse of the Mings back to the Sung period, and thought that the Ming was merely a second chapter of what was begun in the Sung Dynasty. The root of the weakness was to be found in Sung philosophy, because its advocacy of metaphysical specula-

tion and meditation killed the active, practical, and dynamic spirit of the Chinese people. With the spread of this philosophy, China suffered complete defeat, first at the hands of the Mongols, then later at the hands of the Manchus—something which had never occurred before in her history. Yen made an analytical study of the consequences resulting from Sung thinking and came to the conclusion that it was worthy only of condemnation since it had no plan to offer for making China active, strong, and healthy. Instead, it led the people to sit quietly in meditation, to indulge in metaphysical speculation, and to forget what was practical and useful. Yen exposed the great weakness of China which mere book-learning, writing of books, empty talk, and meditation had created in her life, ever since these enervating preoccupations started to spread in the Sung Dynasty. He concentrated his attacks especially on Chu Hsi, who was the most influential and prolific writer of all. He compared the Sung philosophy and way of living to the teaching of Confucius and Mencius, and said that there was a vast difference between them in that the two ancient sages emphasized activity and actual work, while the Sung thinkers merely played with words. Yen called himself Hsi-chai, a man of practice, to distinguish himself from the Sung philosophers. Here are some of his typical remarks:

“Ch'en T'ien-hsi, having come to study, said: ‘The philosophers Ch'eng and Chu, though they were separated from Confucius and Mencius by centuries lived in the hall with Confucius and Mencius, and so should not be condemned.’ Yen Yüan answered: “If you had the pictures of the two halls, you would see the difference between them. In one hall sat Confucius. He was equipped with a sword, a quiver, and a girdle on which were hung jades and whips, and he was dressed in a long, one-piece robe. He was surrounded by seventy students, some rehearsing ceremonies, some practising stringed instruments or on musical stones, and some dancing either civil dances with feathers and flutes in hand, or military dances with spears and shields. He discussed with them *jen* and filial duty, or military affairs, commerce, agriculture, and politics. The students were clothed like Confucius. On the wall were hung bows, arrows, swords, flutes, musical stones, abacuses, riding-whips, and ceremonial dresses and hats.

"In the other hall sat the Ch'eng brothers, who wore high hats and wide girdles. Their eyes looked to the ground like a clay Buddha. They were surrounded by the students Yü, Yang, Chu, and Lu, who sat quietly either absorbed in reflection, or reading books. Some were discussing the problems of tranquillity and concentration of mind, or holding brushes for writing. The wall was covered by books, scrolls, ink-stones, and other articles of stationery. Can you say that these two halls were like each other?' Ch'en T'ien-hsi listened, remained silent and laughed."⁴

Yen Yüan then compared the achievements of the leaders who lived before Confucius with the achievements of men who flourished in the Sung Dynasty—and again he was convinced that his denunciation of Sung philosophy was justified.

He wrote: "Even during the period of ideal rule in the days of Yao, Shun, and the Three Dynasties, a sage appeared on the stage only after an interval of several centuries, and then had a few good men as his ministers, like the Great Yü and Kao Yao under emperors Yao and Shun, or like Yen Hui and Tseng-tzu, disciples of Confucius, who were really exceptional men. When they lived they gave abundant prosperity to the people. As Confucius said: 'In one year a number of persons could be assembled; in two years a city could be built; in three years a capital would flourish.' He [Confucius] also educated three thousand pupils, who were all able men. A sage would never live without achievement.

"However, since the age of Ch'in and Han the world has deteriorated. Even people of the calibre of Confucius' disciples Chung Kung and Tzu Lu could not be found. The Sung Dynasty was weak and crippled, and submitted itself to the Kitans by assuming the title of 'brother,' dishonored itself by being 'subject' to the Kins and Mongols. How could such a dynasty consider itself as being capable of producing, again, three or four Yaos, a Confucius, and six or seven Yüs and Yen Hui, when it had to change its capital to K'ai-feng? How could it consider itself as being capable of producing again, three or four Yaos, a Confucius, and six or seven Yüs and Yen Hui when it had to withdraw its capital to south of the Yangtze Valley? In the period of the Northern Sung, though several sages and wise men lived, not one saved the government from danger or difficulty, and not one worked as a good

prime minister or an able commander-in-chief. The Northern Sung, with its own hands, abandoned two emperors to the Kins, and let the capital fall. In the period of the Southern Sung again many sages and wise men flourished, but we do not find one who averted a danger or surmounted a difficulty, or who was a good prime minister or an able commander-in-chief. The Southern Sung, with its own hands, let its young emperor drown himself in the sea, and delivered the Imperial Seal to the Mongols. Is it conceivable that an age with so many "sages and wise men" should have failed so completely?"⁵

Yen Yüan also wrote:

"The disciples of Confucius talked and discussed. But they also practised what they learned. They would read the books on ceremony, then practise the ceremonies; or they would read the books on music, then practise the music, for they were required to know musical instruments and musical notes. For them, it would have been impossible to conceive that learning was merely a matter of reading and discussion. The way of the Sung philosophers, on the other hand, was to sit straight for a whole day in order to observe the proper mean before stirring the mind—a type of preoccupation which was unheard of in pre-Confucian days when the sage-emperors lived. The Sung philosophers, besides discussion, meditated by sitting quietly. Without doing any active work, they regarded the fundamentals of the universe to be within their grasp. Is it true that the fundamentals of the universe can be found in this way? Were the principles of the universe in their hands?"⁶

Yen Yüan was disgusted with the interminable number of commentaries written by the Sung scholars. They thought they were only doing what Confucius had done. But he answered that book writing was not the original intention of Confucius. The Sage would have been glad to do practical work for the good of the country and the people. He started to write books only after he failed in his original design. "People will tell me," said Yen Yüan, "that Chu Hsi's devotion to writing, and the wide appreciation of his labors, is after the pattern of Confucius and his zeal in editing the Classics. But I must say that Confucius did work of this kind only after he had become equipped with all the qualities of sagehood, and trained a group of young men of inestimable value to

the government. When Confucius found that there was no opportunity for him to serve in his own Kingdom of Lu and that the Chou Emperor would not receive his recommendations, he was driven to the last resort of travelling to the different kingdoms in order to explain his stand. He had no alternative; no other work was left for him to do after he had carried his educational effort to its limit. It was when he felt that his *tao* could not be put into practice that he went back home to Lu and devoted himself to editing the Classics.

"The Sung scholars on the other hand, neglected Confucius' educational work and his ambition of carrying out *tao* in his time, but instead plunged immediately into editorial work. Their educational work, if so it could be called, was to teach youth how to write and edit. Even in their discussions of ceremonials and music their purpose was to write books on these subjects, in the expectation of becoming immortal through them. . . . Confucius' editorial work aimed at the elimination of what is superfluous, and preserving what is the important—for the elucidation of *tao*. He feared that future generations might otherwise go astray in the labyrinth of superfluities, and lose what was vital.

"The Sung scholars did just the opposite of Confucius. That is, they wrote ever more and more commentaries. It was as if a dike was broken and water came flooding in. The number of books increased, but *tao* deteriorated."⁷

Yen Yüan's disciple, Li Kung, denounced the Sung Confucianists in much the same way as his master. He wrote: "After the spreading of the *Tao*-philosophy in the Southern Sung Dynasty, scholars were interested in commentarial and philological work. Those who were intelligent discussed the theories of human nature and of heaven, and wrote dialogues; those who were not so intelligent just busied themselves with the state examinations. But whether intelligent or not they forgot the practical institutions such as ceremony, music, military science, and agriculture, and they were ignorant of the administration of justice and public finance. All they did was to hold a brush in their hands, merely for writing. That is why it is remarked: 'While the Chinese occupied themselves with their brushes, barbarian tribes were busy training armies and horses. In the interior of China, bandits arose wherever

the land was poor. Thus the Ming Dynasty collapsed. Thus also the world which had been handed down from the emperors of antiquity was conquered by the barbarians.' When I [Li Kung] read these remarks, I felt ashamed and very sorrowful." ⁸

Such was the background for the rise of Chinese pragmatism. This new slant in philosophical attitude was the result of a sturdy reaction against book learning, book writing, and the vague speculativeness of the great thinkers of the Sung and Ming Dynasties. Yen Yüan and Li Kung put the responsibility for the fall of both the Sung and the Ming dynasties squarely on the shoulders of the Neo-Confucianists. Disregarding for the moment, whether this charge was justified or not, we must recognize the existence of such a reaction against Sung and Ming intellectualism and speculativeness as a fact, and that the atmosphere at the close of the Ming and the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasties was suffused with the spirit of withdrawal from the Sung way of learning.

Yen Yüan, as I have already said, was a very brave man in daring to condemn Chu Hsi and the other Neo-Confucianists who had dominated the Chinese mind for over half a millennium. His courage also displayed itself in his attempt to offer a constructive program as a substitute for Sung philosophy. There is good reason why I use the term "pragmatist" to describe him. Yen Yüan's word "*hsi*" (practice) connotes activity, physical exercise, and mobility. He believed that a scholar should learn by doing, and "by doing" Yen meant "by manual and bodily work." A scholar should, in other words, be mobile and dynamic. A man learns only when he actually practises the things about which he is learning; thus the student of music must not only read books about music, but must play the lute, or the flute, or some other instrument. A Chinese scholar, in the Confucian sense, knows with experience, ceremony, music, archery, charioteering, reading, mathematics, and all the relevant objects. A scholar is not supposed only to sit quietly and meditate. A scholar's paramount duties are to learn with an eye to practical consequences, and thereby bring utility and benefit to the country and people. How close Yen Yüan's philosophy is to American pragmatism is thus quite obvious.

Some further quotations from him will, I am sure, make matters much clearer.

(1) Because he was opposed to the contemplative life recommended by Sung philosophy, he elevated "activity" or "the dynamic" to the level of a first principle for the sage-emperors and Confucius. "The former emperors," he wrote, "the Duke of Chou, and Confucius told the people that 'the dynamic' should be the first principle. [These distinguished teachers] built the whole structure of life upon the principle of the dynamic. The five *pa* [the five hegemonies of the Spring and Autumn Period] made use of this dynamic principle to their own advantage. The Han and T'ang dynasties applied a little of it for the good of the country.

"However, in later ages, and during the Southern Sung dynasties, with a goodly portion of the empire already lost to invaders during the Chin Dynasty, people began to concern themselves with Buddhist emptiness, Taoist non-entity, and meditation. People immersed themselves in the writings of Chou, Ch'eng, Shao, and Chu, who preferred a more meditative attitude of life. And this was why talented people had no occasion to rise and why *tao* became extinct . . . In my view, when a person is active he will be a strong man; when a family is active, it will be a strong unit; when a whole country is active it will be powerful; when the world is active it will be strong and healthy . . ." ⁹

(2) Yen Yüan insisted that in learning one must actually handle physical objects. The celebrated words "investigation of things" he interpreted to mean having such contacts. "Li Chih-hsiu," he wrote, "once asked about the meaning of the 'realization of knowledge' and 'investigation of things.' Yen Yüan replied: 'Knowledge itself is no reality. It becomes such only when it comes with objects, just as when the eyes perform their function of seeing colors and shapes. Though a man's eyes are bright, eyesight cannot do its work without his eyes seeing white and black. Though mind is an organ of knowledge, it cannot do its work without touching objects. Now, many students interpret 'realization of knowledge' as if it meant only book learning, discussion, and inquiry. I do not understand it in this way. If you want to know what ceremony is and confine yourself only to books on ceremony and discussing them, you will remain ignorant of ceremony. To understand it you must kneel down and make offerings. If you do this, then you know what ceremony is. If you wish to know what music is, your

reading of musical notes, and the explanations of your teacher are not enough to make a musician out of you. You must pluck the lute, play on the flute, and dance. It is only then that you begin to understand music. Only in this way are 'things investigated,' and 'knowledge perfected.' To investigate has the same kind of meaning as to bring a fierce animal under control . . . For example, suppose you are studying a hat of ancient times. Even if we asked a sage of the Three Dynasties, he could not tell us the period to which it belonged. Even if he had learned about it from hearsay, he could not tell us how warm it is. Only after he had put it on his head, could he know its feel as a head-protector. Again, take the case of vegetables. Even an agricultural expert cannot tell us whether such and such a vegetable is edible. Or if he can, on the basis of considerations of its color and shape, he cannot tell us how hot it is. One must take one's chopsticks, pick the vegetable up, and put it into one's mouth. Then one will know its taste. Therefore, after mind has reached its objects, *knowledge is perfected.*"¹⁰

(3) The importance which Yen Yüan attached to "practice" is also plain in the following passages: "Chu Hsi undoubtedly elucidated the meaning of books, and worked on them very hard. What he did was to render their meaning clear, but this has nothing to do with the attainment of *tao* in your person. The Four Books, the Classics, the histories, and the writings of the philosophers, contain principles of things and ways of dealing with matters. However, if one takes the reading of the Classics and histories, and the collation of the different texts, as a means for studying principles and for dealing with matters, and, at the same time, as a means for inquiring after *tao*, then I must say that one is a thousand miles away from understanding *tao*. Again, if one takes the reading of the Classics and histories, and the collation of the different texts as a means for studying principles and for dealing with matters, and if one assumes that one has grasped *tao*, then I must say that one is ten thousand miles away from *tao*. . . Let me explain the reason by the example of lute-playing. The *Book of Odes* and the *Book of History* are like musical notes. If a boy is familiar with musical notes and with their explanation, are we to allege that he knows how to play the lute? And so I say that read-

ing books and discussing them still leaves one a thousand miles away from inquiry into *tao*. Again, somebody points to some musical notes and exclaims: 'That is a lute!' Now, he may have been thinking not just of the bare notes, but also of knowledge of the rise and fall of sounds, the harmony of tones, and the inspiration which a lute-recital can give. But even so, is it possible to allege that musical notes really equal the lute? Therefore, I say, taking for granted that books are *tao* is to be ten thousand miles away from *tao*. The distance mentioned above, one thousand miles, and ten thousand miles, are vast. I shall explain further by the example of lute-playing. It may be said that one understands how to play the lute if one sings in accordance with the notes, puts one's fingers in the right places, strikes the strings and stops accurately, and produces sounds agreeable to the laws of harmony. Such a one is familiar with lute-playing. If, furthermore, one's hands go with one's heart, if the sounds go with the hands, if the lightness, heaviness, quickness, and slowness of the sounds accord with the notes, and if the striking gives a constant effect so that there is rhythm, then one has learned by practice how to play the lute; but one is not yet a virtuoso. When one knows how to make a lute with one's own hands, when one's ear can discover the laws of musical notes, when poems and songs can be rendered as one wishes, when heart and hand go together without one's remembering the connection, when hands and strings go together without one's remembering the connection, when selfish desires are not active in the heart, when one is in the midst of a great harmony, when all one's feelings agree with the rhythm of *yin* and *yang*, and achieve transformation of the universe, then one is really a virtuoso.

"At the present moment, one only plucks by the finger without the heart accompanying it, and one knows only how to read and explain the notes. For such a one to be called a student of lute-playing is like crossing the Yellow River and calling it the Yangtze Valley. This is why I spoke of the distance of a thousand miles. Furthermore, if one's eyes do not see, if one's ears do not hear, if one has only a book of musical notes, and if [to top it all] one takes this book of notes for the lute—one may as well point to Chihli Province and call it Yünnan. This is why I spoke of the distance of ten thousand miles."¹¹

A pupil of Yen Yüan, named Wang Fa-ch'ien, remarked one day that "there is no use in studying archery and chariot-driving. What one should learn is the policy-making of a prime minister!" The master replied: "If everybody wanted to become prime minister, who would prefer to work as a civil servant? To learn means to work like a civil servant. Let me explain by the example of a medical doctor. The old books of medical science such as the *Su wen* and the *Chin kuei* explained theory. However, the curing of disease depends very much upon pulse-taking, prescription-writing, acupuncture, cauterizing, and massage. Now, there is a fool who after reading thousands of books about medicine, and knowing them well, calls himself the best doctor. He looks with contempt upon pulse-taking, acupuncture, cauterizing, and massage, as if they were the work of an inferior breed, and of no use. Medical practice of this kind, if it spread, would lead to a world filled with so-called first rate doctors, but also the sick and the dead would follow one after another, and there would be no end to mortality . . ." ¹²

(4) Yen Yüan opposed the abstract theory of moral right, and demanded that practical consequences be the test of an institution, because, from his point of view, right would have beneficial results for the people. His intention was to revive the doctrine of the Six Virtues: *chih*, *jen*, sagehood, righteousness, loyalty, and harmoniousness; the Six Kinds of Conduct: filial duty, friendliness, kindness to all, goodness to relatives, sense of responsibility, and charitable work; and the Six Arts: ceremonies, music, archery, chariot-driving, reading, and mathematics. Education based on these three groups of six he believed would be more positive and empirical than discussion of *ri* (reason) and *ch'i* (matter), or the contemplative life, book learning, and the commentarial labors of the Sung philosophers, simply because it would be practical and useful. From this utilitarian standpoint his disciple, Li Kung, refuted a conception of moral right which had been held ever since the days of Tung Chung-shu in the Western Han period. Li Kung wrote in his book, *Questions on My Commentary of the Analects*: "Tung taught that the morally right ought to be kept in mind, and that there is no need of deliberation about gain; that one should be clear as to what is *tao*, and that there is no need of anxiety in seeking achieve-

ments derivable therefrom . . . Pan Ku, author of the *History of Han Dynasty*, changed the word 'anxiety' into 'calculation.' The Sung scholars abided by this modified version and accepted that as the standard. They reached the conclusion that if one thinks too much about accomplishment, the result will be that much prudence, design, and scheming will enter into one's efforts, and that one's motives will be in opposition to the purity of heavenly reason. However, China's weakness in later generations, and her general good-for-nothingness, were the fruit of this clinging to the doctrine of Tung Chung-shu. I like to say: When a son fulfills his filial duty according to heavenly reason in order to minister to his parents, does he not expect to derive pleasure from his service? When a subordinate attends his superiors, does he not expect appreciation for his service? If one does not expect an objective to be attained, it is really that one does not wish the objective to be attained. If one does not believe that a task can be accomplished, it is really that one wants to let the task go without accomplishing it." ¹³

And so Yen and Li were both utilitarians as well as pragmatists. They could not discount the good effects flowing from an act. They had no sympathy with the notion of abstract rightness (another version, of course, of Kant's Categorical Imperative), and the notion that all feeling and all deliberation of loss and gain have no place in ethical motivation was utterly repugnant to them. Yen Yüan changed Tung Chung-shu's aphorism to read: "Keep the morally right in order to gain; be clear about *tao* in order to calculate achievements." Thus, he advocated, in ethics, retention of the balance sheet of loss and gain, but without relinquishing his idealistic standpoint.

Let us now examine the four books of which Yen Yüan was the author. They are: *On Human Nature*, *On Institutions*, *On Humanity*, and *On Learning*. In these he sets forth his philosophy in a systematic manner. The essential features of his thought have been discussed, and we now turn to some specific fields to which he applied his thought. Let us then consider his views on human nature and see to what extent they were a part of the prevailing climate of opinion at the end of the Ming Dynasty, and how far he was ahead of his time.

(1) *On Human Nature.* Yen Yüan, in his psychology of human nature, followed the view held by many of his predecessors, by the Tung-lin Schools, and by Huang Tsung-hsi, that essential nature is inseparable from physical nature. His refutation of the Sung philosophers that physical nature is evil is so convincing that it is worth going into here. "Many scholars," he wrote, "have explained essential nature and physical elements as being analogous to water and its impurities. They have tried to show that evil is dirt, that physical elements, which are heaven-given and which are as useful as spiritual elements, are a burden on 'nature.' In my view, if there were no physical elements, where would reason dwell? Or, if the physical elements were taken away and 'nature' left as an abstract entity, what function would it perform? Mencius advocated the doctrine human nature is basically good. His way of proving the goodness of human nature was to point to the emotions and capacities. So he said: 'Shape and color are productions of the nature of heaven. Only sages know how to fulfill the missions of shape.' His sense was that one who does not become a sage thereby violates his own shape. Only when a man becomes a sage does he fulfill the mission of his shape. This term 'shape' refers to nothing other than the physical elements. The attribution of evil to an instrument which can make a man a sage leads [according to the theory of the scholars whom Yen Yüan is criticizing] to the propriety of holding the physical elements to be despicable. Is this the right attitude to take? If so, who will believe the teachings of Ch'eng and Chu about personal cultivation?"

"Let me [Yen Yüan] clarify my point by making use of the analogy of the cotton plant. The soft and fibrous material being protected by a hard outer coat corresponds to the contrast between *yin* and *yang*. The four pieces into which the outer coat is divided corresponds to the four virtues of the *Book of Changes*: primordiality, prosperity, beneficiality, and constancy. To work with the cotton plant by separating the fibre from the seeds, by beating, by spinning, and by weaving, such is the process of production and transformation of the universe. When the substance of the cotton plant is woven and made into garments, this is the birth of a man. The collar, sleeves, lap, and skirt in a garment correspond to the four limbs and five senses of the human body. They are the physi-

cal elements under the control of nature. The collar to protect the neck, the sleeves to cover the hands, the lap and skirt to protect the front and rear of the body respectively, these correspond to a son doing his filial duty, or to a minister loyally serving his government. They are nothing other than the emotions and capacities, made up of physical elements. How can we say that what is contained in the clothes, what is beaten, separated, spun, and woven, is cotton; but that after it has been made into the clothes it is no longer cotton? How can we say that the border of a garment is cotton, but that the corners of the garment are no longer cotton? In short, how can we divide nature into two: essential and physical? How can we say that the essential part is good, while the physical part is bad?

"If one asks, whence comes badness? I answer that it is filth. After a thing is tainted, it loses its fresh color and grows corrupt. Filth comes from the outside. There are different kinds of filth: some things are dirty when they are newly made; some things become dirty after they have been used for a long time, and they may become dirty either in whole or in part. Washing and scrubbing can take away stain. To assert that the only way to clean a garment is to cut off the soiled parts is absurd. Also, the notion that the garment in itself is dirty is untenable, even after it has been worn for a long time; for no matter how heavy the stain is it can be washed away after a hundred scrubblings. Without the effort of washing, even the smallest spot, such as a flyspeck, will not disappear. This is why the *Great Learning* advises: 'Illustrate illustrious virtue and renew it every day.'"¹⁴

Yen Yüan refuted the doctrine of the evilness of physical nature in another essay. "The philosopher Ch'eng," he wrote, "said 'Nature and the physical elements should not be divided into two. One person is good from boyhood; another person is bad from boyhood. The reason for their difference must be traceable to their physical elements.' Chu Hsi said: 'As long as there is heavenly order, there are physical elements. These two are inseparable. As far as reason is concerned, it cannot be evil. Evil must come from the physical elements.'

"Though both of these philosophers were intelligent and noble, they were contaminated by the Buddhist theory of the Six Desires,

and so indulged in double-talk. If the physical part is bad, reason is bad too. If reason is good, the physical part is good too. The physical part is under the control of reason, so how can we say that reason is good, and the physical part bad?

"Let me [Yen Yüan] illustrate by the example of the eye. The socket, the associated nerves, and the pupil belong to the physical constitution of the eye, while the power of vision and brightness are its nature. Does it make sense to say that the power of vision is for good things, whereas the physical constitution is for seeing evil things? Obviously not. The socket, the associated nerves, and the pupil, as well as the power of vision, are endowed by heaven. How can we suppose that one is essential and the other physical? The most we may assert is that the goodness of the nature of the eyes is the sense of vision, and that the goodness of the work of the eyes is seeing; while shortsightedness and farsightedness depend upon the capacity of the eyes. Neither the work nor the capacity may be blamed for evil. Farsightedness is good, but also shortsightedness is not evil. Ogling when a woman's beauty attracts one's eyes and one is bewildered by her, may be called bad; but in this case the cause of the attraction and bewilderment is neither essential nor physical nature. If evil is to be attributed to the physical parts, then a man without eyes would be much better, morally. Am I not correct in asserting that the theory of the evilness of physical nature is an effect of the Buddhist dogma of the Six Desires?"¹⁵

(2) *On Institutions*. In this book Yen Yüan tried to explain why the "well-field" system of land tenure and cultivation, feudalism, the choice of civil servants through competitive examinations, and compulsory military service, were beneficial to China. The defeat of his people by the Manchus was entirely due to China's military unpreparedness. He believed that if she was to be protected against foreign invasion, she must have her people well fed by giving each family a plot of ground under the "well-field" system. She must keep her military service up to the standard set during the feudal period, when every male adult was drafted and trained. She must maintain a school system for every boy and girl.

Yen Yüan's view concerning the "well-field" system and feudalism was similar to that of many Neo-Confucianists who always

hoped that these two institutions would some day be restored. Only Wang Fu-chih held the contrary view. He was outspokenly opposed to the restoration of either institution, saying that the difference in time has made it impossible for them to be reintroduced. Li Kung, Yen Yüan's own disciple, took issue with his master also on this matter. The disciple added a few supplementary remarks at the end of Yen Yüan's *On Institutions*, saying: "The result of the feudal system during the Spring and Autumn Period was so evident that one would be blind who did not see that the same fighting between the feudal lords would be repeated if the system were restored."¹⁶ In regard to the 'well-field' system, Li Kung's view was that when land was less densely populated, and when there was enough land for everyone the system might be put into practice. Otherwise, it would lead to a distribution of land in which the crops produced would not be sufficient for each family.

Discussion of the "well-field" system and feudalism was a favorite occupation of Chinese Neo-Confucianists. It was an attempt to idealise a state of human society which was supposed to have existed at an earlier period, but actually it made no valuable contribution to Chinese political life.

One unusual feature of our philosopher's political thought was his defense of Wang An-shih. This reformer, a statesman of the Sung Dynasty, was much criticized by the Neo-Confucianists. He was appreciated by very few, and to these few Yen Yüan belonged. Yen's reason for placing a high estimation on him was that he tried to put into practice a policy for fighting against the barbarians, and to this extent Wang was a man of action and therefore was to be praised.

(3) *On Humanity*. This book of Yen Yüan is a refutation of Buddhism aimed at converting not only Chinese but also Indian monks to Confucianism. It is a passionate appeal on behalf of China's orthodox views, and the language is even stronger than that of Han Yü. His book contained five appeals: (1) to the public, (2) to monks and Taoists, (3) to monks of Western countries, (4) to Chinese scholars who believed in Buddhism, and (5) to religious organizations. It is a document of propagandistic fervor and enthusiasm. And this is clear even from the preface where Yen Yüan said:

"Before the Ch'in and Han Dynasties there were only four professions in China: scholars, peasants, artisans, and tradesmen. We never heard about monks and nuns who had no need of normal human relations. If the old land system could have been continued—the system according to which each family owned one hundred *mou* of land, and five *mou* for its house—who would have been willing to leave his father, sons, brothers, and sisters, to follow the Buddhists, no matter how beautifully they preached, or how clever they were in their way? If the earlier educational institutions could have been continued, the people would have known the principles of righteousness, decency, filial duty, and brotherhood; and then, who would have wished to be without a father or a sovereign? Even though the *Sramanas* could preach beautifully and cleverly, who would have given up family life to live in isolation? It was because of starvation, lack of clothing, and internal political disorders, that the people forgot the right principles and surrendered themselves to heresy.

"The spell of this monastic life has cut people off from their line of descent, from their ten thousand ancestors . . . they became strangers to their parents, brothers, and spouses. They imagined that this was the kind of existence they wanted. But in fact they were lonely travellers, forced by the bandits to join their gangs. Those of a truly noble and benevolent heart deplored this situation, and tried to save those whom it was in their power to save.

"The Taoists flourished before Buddhism came to China. Men like Lao-tzu and Kuan Hsi of the Chou Dynasty, and men like Wen Ch'eng and Wu Li of the Han Dynasty, were also heretics, but still they lived within the framework of normal human relations. Later Taoists developed the art of breathing, sought the elixir of life, and thus they came very near to the way of living of the Buddhist monks. It is for this reason that I must appeal to them, too.

"In former dynasties, great scholars had such feeling of restraint that they would only answer when questioned, or refute when they noticed something wrong. Seldom did they write articles to convert the Buddhist monks. Ts'ao Tuan, to be sure, [*Philosophical Records of the Ming Scholars*, Book 44] was the author of a book entitled *A Candle for Night-walking*, but it did not have a wide circulation and very few people read it. I am a zealous man, so

when I see ignorant people succumb to perverted thoughts it is as if I myself suffered pain. I have therefore written these articles in the vernacular language in order to awaken people from their lethargy. Monks and Taoists who have listened to me have awakened and have been transformed, so that now they prefer starvation or a life of distress to living without a father or a sovereign; or prefer to die rather than live as a ghost knowing neither filial duty nor loyalty. Once they had jumped clear out of their pitfall, and come upon an open highway, or had turned away from the ranks of the unemployed to rejoin family and farm hands, how glad were they! . . . If such knowledge as this should spread from China to the foreign countries, those foreigners who have chosen to live outside the circle of human relations might be induced to come back and re-enter it . . . When Sakyamuni was born, his influence damaged not only his own land, but also China. Now a Yen Yüan is born in China, and his influence has not only converted Chinese monks, but has also spread to foreign countries, so that there is the possibility of the elimination of much evil, and of an enhancement of the procreative capabilities of mankind. Is this not a great blessing to the whole world?"¹⁷

(4) *On Learning*. It is in this book that Yen Yüan showed his courage in fighting Sung philosophy, especially that of Chu Hsi which had endured for many centuries. Yen was profoundly aware of the physical and military weakness of the Chinese from the Sung Dynasty onward and he placed the full responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the Sung philosophers, because they chose the contemplative life of Buddhism in preference to a life of activity and were absorbed in interminable discussions about human nature, mind, and other metaphysical nebulosities, contaminating the true spirit of Confucianism by an injection of Buddhist beliefs. Yen pointed out, for example, that in Confucius' time, the six arts—ceremonies, music, archery, charioteering, reading, and mathematics—were required subjects for study; but after the Sung period, they were completely given up in favor of mere book learning. The life of the Chinese scholar lost contact with realities when it became immersed in the work of commentary, textual criticism, exegesis, and other forms of exercise which involved only paper and the handling of the brush to the exclusion of manual labor and physi-

cal exercise. Having thus been concerted from Confucianism to Buddhism, which was the major preoccupation of the Sung scholars, is it any wonder, asks Yen Yüan, that the Chinese were so soundly defeated by the more vigorous Mongols and Manchus when they decided to invade China?

"Scholars since the Sung and Yüan Dynasties," Yen Yüan complained, "have become accustomed to a kind of life which makes them look and feel like women. Their hands are always in their sleeves, the principal interest of their lives is vague discussions about human nature and mind. When an emergency arises they prefer to die as they can offer no resistance. Death they consider as a supreme virtue and a prerogative of men of good quality."¹⁸

"Chu Hsi appreciated culture and despised the military . . . The consequences of this attitude are to be seen still today when men of high class feel that association with soldiers is beneath their rank. If a university graduate shoots an arrow, the people in his village will be greatly astonished. If a boy rides on horseback he will be scolded by his father and brother, who would consider him worthless. As long as such attitudes prevail, how can China help being weak?"¹⁹

Yen Yüan then advocated the learning of the Six Treasuries—metal, wood, water, fire, earth, and grain—or in other words the natural resources from which wealth is created, with the Three Objectives of moral rectitude, utilization of natural resources, and promotion of public welfare. "Besides the Six Treasuries and the Three Objectives, everything else is heresy."²⁰

His view of the development of Chinese history may best be seen in a letter he wrote to Lu Shih-i. "Since the Han Dynasty," he remarked, "learning has been identified with philological work, which is nothing more than a means to reveal the *tao* of the sages, and is not the *tao* itself. This was followed by the "Pure Talk" of the Chin Dynasty, which also was nothing but a means to reveal the *tao* of the sages, and was not the *tao* itself. When scholars indulged in this kind of emptiness, then the Three Objectives and the Six Treasuries of Yao and Shun, and the Six Virtues, and the Six Kinds of Conduct, and the Six Arts—all of which were aiming at putting life on a practical and positive basis—disappeared completely. As soon as Buddhism and the teachings of Lao-tzu gained

the ascendancy over the Chinese mind, they reduced the universe to the concept of "annihilation" and "void." Not only were the stars and planets, mountains and lakes, the entire animal and plant kingdoms superfluous, but also the very limbs and senses became a burden to the life of man . . . When the Sung Dynasty came, the sages who became consecrated in the Temple of Confucius, did no more than write commentaries and engage in pure talk. They believed that physical elements are the root of all evil . . . They differed little from the Buddhists who called the Six Desires the Six Thieves. Therefore, I regard the Sung philosophers as being a combination of Buddhism and Taoism, and as such they do not belong to the orthodox school of Confucius and the Duke of Chou.

"But the present generation regard the Sung scholars as being the Yao or the Shun, or the Duke of Chou, and the Confucius of today. When Han Yü denounced Buddhism he was nearly put to death. For how does one dare to denounce the Yao, the Shun, the Duke of Chou, and the Confucius of today? When Chu Chih-yu wrote books arguing against the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi, he was punished and exiled. For how does one dare to criticize the teachings or the character of the Sung philosophers? One who denounces as they did runs the danger of losing one's life. If I am afraid of losing my life, and if I do not oppose [the Sung philosophers], I shall simply be indifferent to the moral deterioration which goes on, shall make the people suffer from it, and thus fail to do my duty to the universe. My silence in making no attempt to save the people would be the same as the violence of a robber who drowns people. Both kinds of action are against conscience and contrary to reason."²¹

These passages show clearly that Yen Yüan was a bold and original thinker. He not only discouraged scholars from pure discussions of mind and human nature, but also dissuaded them from the philological and literary work of the Han period. His aim was simply to bring his people back to the grass-roots of life, to convince them that they should know more about the world of nature, about practical life, about manual labor, and that they should put virtue into practice and the actual business of life.

Yen Yüan's warnings were given when his people were defeated by the Mongols and Manchus. Later events like the Opium War

and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, exposed even more mercilessly the weakness of the Middle Kingdom. Physical weakness, dislike of military service, military unpreparedness, lack of practical knowledge, scholarly despise of manual labor—all these which Yen Yüan tried to replace by a vigorous assertion of manhood, became too obvious. It was only then that his teaching came into its own and that Yen Yüan was given the respect and admiration which had long been denied him.

Yen Yüan's books lay buried during the greater part of the Ch'ing Dynasty. In 1920 Hsü Shih-chang, then President of China, espoused and promoted his ideas as a remedy for China's ills. Ever since, our pragmatist has become the most popular philosopher in the land. There can be no doubt that he was one of the most far-sighted and courageous men ever to struggle against the Sung tradition. In this respect he was more radical than either Ku Yen-wu or Huang Tsung-hsi, neither of whom showed any disloyalty to that tradition. And he was more radical than Wang Fu-chih, for this philosopher though he was opposed to the speculative way of thinking substituted one of his own. Yen Yüan, on the other hand, attempted radically to destroy all that was merely intellectual and mental, and to build up a philosophy of the practical, of the dynamic, and of the useful. It was at least a valuable antidote for the Chinese, who ever since the Sung Dynasty have deplored physical labor in all its forms.

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3. J. Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1959, p. 156.
4. Yen Yüan, *Collected Works*, On Learning, Book 2, pp. 15-16.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
6. *Ibid.*, Book 3, pp. 7-8.
7. Li Kung, Liu's Tombstone.
8. Chung Ling, *Records of Yen Yüan's Words and Actions*, Book 2, p. 51.
9. Yen Yüan, *op. cit.*, *Correction of Chu Hsi's Commentary of the Four Books*, Book 1, p. 2, Book 2, p. 2.
10. Yen Yüan, *op. cit.*, On Learning, Book 3, pp. 8-9.
11. *Ibid.*, Book 2, p. 13.
12. Li Kung, *Collected Works*, Questions on My Commentary of Confucius' Analects, p. 8.
13. Yen Yüan, *op. cit.*, On Human Nature, Book 1, p. 3.
14. *Ibid.*, Book 1, p. 1.
15. Li Kung, *op. cit.*, Fairness, *Ping Shu*, Chapter 2, p. 1.
16. Yen Yüan, *op. cit.*, Preface to the Book, On Humanity, Book 1, p. 2.
17. Yen Yüan, *op. cit.*, On Learning, Book 1, p. 15.
18. *Ibid.*, Book 2, p. 4.
19. *Loc. cit.*
20. *Ibid.*, Letter to Lu Shih-i, Book 1, pp. 10-11.
21. *Loc. cit.*

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The "Return to Ch'eng-Chu" Movement: Chang Li-hsiang, Lu Shih-i, Chang Lieh, Lu Lung-chi, and Chang Po-hsing

Set in motion by the Tung-lin School, an anti-Wang Shou-jen campaign was waged in the field of Chinese philosophy all the way down through Ku Yen-wu, Wang Fu-chih, and Yen Yüan, each of whom tried to establish his own approach. This campaign was united in its opposition to Wang, but became disjointed in that the allies were never sure which of their number had the correct position.

Besides these three, there were others who attempted to turn the tide of the Wang School by proposing a return to the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi. This approach alone, they maintained, was in the right direction. As in the olden days, Confucius and Mencius were the authorities who kept people's minds in order, so in these later days, it was argued, people must take the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi as the rightful successors to those great sages. This so-called "Back to Ch'eng-Chu" movement was chiefly interested in strengthening the Line of Apostolic Succession from the Ch'engs and Chu Hsi to Confucius and Mencius, and so it did not stand for freedom and spontaneity of thought, but rather for conformity.

After the establishment of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Emperor K'ang-hsi asked Li Kuang-ti to re-edit the *Chu-tzu Ta-ch'üan* (Collected Works of Chu Hsi), and the *Hsing-ri Ching-i* (Essentials of Human Nature and Reason), a simplification of a Ming edition. Chu Hsi's tablet in the Confucian Temple, moreover, was moved up next to the Twelve Disciples. All this was a sign that the emperor favored the "Back to Ch'eng-Chu" movement. Chu's commentaries

had already been accepted as authoritative in the Ming Dynasty, and now this authority was re-confirmed under the Ch'ings.

Sponsorship of the return movement to the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi started with the Ming philosophers, Chang Li-hsiang and Lu Shih-i, and was continued under the Manchus by Lu Lung-chi and Chang Po-hsing, to the extent of labeling Wang Shou-jen a heretic. Lu Lung-chi won the place of first priority in T'ang Chien's *Ch'ing-ju Hsiieh-an* (Records of Ch'ing Confucian Scholars), and was complimented as the successor to Chu Hsi.

Before entering into the details of the lives and thoughts of the five individuals to be dealt with in this chapter, I shall quote from the preface of this work by T'ang Chien. "My book begins," he wrote, "with Lu Lung-chi, because I consider the handing over of the *tao* as of the first importance. When Lu Lung-chi refuted Wang Shou-jen, we knew that the philosophy of the latter was anomalous, and should not be mixed with the system of the Ch'engs and Chu. When Lu Lung-chi succeeded in living up to a rigorous standard, we knew that the Ch'eng-Chu philosophy was to be found nowhere except in the following four concepts: (1) investigation of things, (2) realization of knowledge, (3) making will true, and (4) rectification of mind. Through Lu Lung-chi's strong support of *tao* during an age of deterioration, we knew that the culture of mankind was not yet lost. The work which Chu Hsi did in the Sung Dynasty was the same as that which Lu Lung-chi did to-day."¹

Indeed, the hero of this preface labored with such effect that the Ch'eng-Chu school achieved recognition as the true exponent of Confucianism. In another preface in T'ang Chien's history, written by Shen Wei-ch'iao, we read: "The distinguished service rendered by the Ch'engs and Chu is equal to the distinguished service rendered by Confucius and Mencius. Our following the Ch'engs and Chu means that we follow Confucius and Mencius as the authorities."²

The heroes of the present chapter (as one may glean from its title) are: (1) Chang Li-hsiang, (2) Lu Shih-i, (3) Chang Lieh, (4) Lu Lung-chi, and (5) Chang Po-hsing, all of whom were assiduous pro-Ch'eng, pro-Chu workers. Let us now consider them individually.

I. Chang Li-hsiang was born in the thirty-ninth year of the reign Wan-li of the Ming Dynasty (1611), and died in the thirteenth year of K'ang-hsi (1674). Being interested in the science of sagehood, while still in his early thirties, he went to study under his fellow townsman, Liu Tsung-chou. But after a few years of reflection he discovered that his teacher's starting-point "vigilance in solitude" was nothing more than Wang Shou-jen's "making will true," so he turned away from Liu Tsung-chou and betook himself back to the Ch'engs and Chu. I may say that he was the founder of the "Return to Ch'eng-Chu" movement which became influential in the Ch'ing Dynasty.

He witnessed the collapse of the Ming Dynasty, and afterwards lived a retired life, teaching students and ploughing a few *mou* of land. Having personally observed the deleterious effects of the many philosophical conferences and political clubs at the end of the Ming period, he tried to avoid all of them. In the last paragraph I called him the founder of the "Return to Ch'eng-Chu" movement. He might, perhaps, more appropriately be dubbed a pioneer of that movement, for he originally made plain the guiding principles: (1) Repudiation of Wang Shou-jen under the charge of Buddhism; (2) Faithfulness to the two mottoes of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi: (a) "*Chü ching*" ("Keep the mind concentrated."), and (b) "*Ch'ung ri*" ("Study thoroughly the principles of things."); (3) Attentiveness to putting moral principles into practice in regard to one's own person, one's family, one's country, and the world; let the search for new theories of philosophy take second place.

Chang's experience of watching Wang Shou-jen's new idea of intuitive knowledge degenerate into mad Ch'anism convinced him that his watchword should be "Safety first!" So the adventurous period of the discovery of great novelties by Wang Shou-jen and his disciples passed away, to be succeeded by an era of prudence and cautiousness. Chang was a plodding man, who found it difficult to appreciate the brightness, alertness, and quick-wittedness of Wang Shou-jen. He called him arrogant and a deceiver. Besides attacking his moral character, he also criticized his philosophy of reason, saying:

"The essence of Wang Shou-jen's doctrine is that mind is pos-

session of heavenly laws. Since human nature is good, heavenly laws are in mind. However, a man's life is bound up with physical elements. He can become blinded by the cravings of desire, though to be sure, this blindness does not belong to human nature itself. Therefore, it is said: 'Men's minds are as different as their faces.' Confucius, when he was seventy, could follow the wishes of his mind without transgressing the right, which implies that mind is not heavenly reason. Confucius, accordingly, was fond of antiquities and earnest in searching for them. But how can an ordinary man, without study and without self-control, follow the doctrine that mind is reason? Even if there were no obscuring by desire, there would be bad habits; and even if there were no bad habits, there would be the [personal] differentials resulting from differences in physical endowment . . . As for reading books, one may say that an understanding of what happened yesterday may be changed into an understanding of what happens today, and an understanding of this year's events may be changed into an understanding of next year's events. But, on the other hand, is it possible to say that intuitive knowledge is non-existent, or that two kinds of intuitive knowledge exist, or that intuitive knowledge can be improved next year? Indeed, the theory that mind is reason, or that everybody in the street is a sage, is that an absurdity? Lo Ch'in-shun said: "There is no ready-made intuitive knowledge." This is quite right."³

Chang Li-hsiang, following in the footsteps of Chu Hsi, believed that knowledge is constituted dualistically: mind in the interior; the world in the exterior. Mind can acquire knowledge only by studying the external world. In this sense, Chang was undoubtedly a disciple of Chu Hsi. He went this dualistic way, repeatedly mentioning the two prongs of the fork as envisaged by the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi. "Firstly *chü ching*," he said, "and *ch'ung ri*. The former of these two expressions refers to keeping mind attentive inside, so that it is held intact. The latter refers to the need of studying thoroughly the principles of things in the world. Such a dualism, naturally, is the safest course, since it will fall into neither mentalism nor materialism."⁴

In a letter to Wu P'ou-chung, Chang wrote: "The fundamental remedy is indicated by the two ways: *chü ching* and *ch'ung ri*.

Master Ch'eng said: 'Hundreds of evils can be overcome by concentration of mind.' Chu Hsi said: 'The word *chü* means what is kept in mind. When a student knows how to concentrate his mind in devotion, all evil desires and dregs will disappear. Otherwise, there will be no self-control in himself; different kinds of desire will arise, and they will be hard to push away—just as in a partially demolished house, though bandits cannot crawl in on the eastern side because it is well-protected, they can come in on the western side, and they will be difficult to resist.' It was in connection with the expression *ch'ung ri* that Wang Shou-jen discovered intuitive knowledge. He intended to apply this novelty as a measure for interpreting the *Great Learning*, and he attacked Chu Hsi because the latter believed that the principles of things (e.g., a kind of grass or tree) must be studied, not from the inside, that is within mind; but on the outside, that is, by directing mind's attention to objects in the external world. Later generations followed Wang Shou-jen in this attack on Chu Hsi. They did not know that for things of importance, such as the relations between ruler and subject or father and son, and for things of less importance such as physical objects, natural principles prevail, which are established from the beginning without any artificiality. To be mixed with artificiality means no longer to be pure, or no more to possess heavenly reason. The alternatives are limited to two: either heavenly reason, or human desire. One or the other must be."⁵

Here, I must admit, it seems to me that Chinese philosophers did not classify and analyze the two questions clearly. What did they understand under the term "reason" or "principle"? Was it a law of nature, or a judgment of value? If it was the former, it should have been studied objectively, even if we grant the existence of transcendental or *a priori* forms of thought in knowledge. If it was the latter, it would have been connected with moral obligations involving human relations. As long as no clear-cut line of demarcation is established between knowledge and valuation, the so-called "thorough study of principles" will become hopelessly tangled in a labyrinth. The fact is that Chinese philosophers after the Sung Dynasty were caught in such a maze, and could not extricate themselves. But in justice to the philosophers of the Middle Kingdom, we must remember that although in the West

this line was drawn long ago, a conflict nonetheless between rationalists and empiricists, idealists and realists, has been going on, and still goes on. It may be that such differences of opinion, regardless of the existence or non-existence of lines of demarcation, are simply persistent problems of philosophy.

In a letter to Ho Shang-yin, Chang Li-hsiang wrote: "Chou Tun-i made the following formulation: 'To have tranquillity as the human standard' . . . Chang Tsai expressed the same idea: 'To know decency and to return to nature.' The Ch'eng brothers expressed the thought in many formulas: 'Mental concentration and righteousness should go together'; 'Keep mind, and realize knowledge'; and 'Unity of reason and manifoldness of manifestations.' Chu Hsi's formulation was *Chü ching* and *ch'ung ri*. *Chü ching* means to keep the mind at attention; *ch'ung ri* means to study principles thoroughly. *Chü ching* makes the interior [mind] straight; *ch'ung ri* adjusts one's self squarely with the requirements of the external world. But the fundamental nature of these two kinds of work is still the same. To study widely, to question carefully, to think deliberately, to analyse clearly—all belong to the effort to study principles thoroughly. When there is an attentive mind, there will be no negligence, no final failure, and no change from one thing to another. This is *ching* [concentration of mind]." ⁶

Chang repeated: "Such was the method Chu Hsi himself followed. By following him, we can be benefitted. It is like a door leading to a hall, and a hall leading to a bedroom." ⁷ So I say that Chang Li-hsiang was the founder, or at any rate a pioneer, of the "Back to Ch'eng-Chu" movement.

He also initiated a type of ethical formulation, instructing one as to proper conduct in regard to one's self, one's family, one's government, and the world. In a letter to Sung Erh-fu, he mentioned six items: "Any man who is interested in learning," he wrote, "should know that the task of self-control lies in not overlooking the least thing that is stirred up in mind. A man should (1) know his motive, i.e., the difference between right and wrong; should (2) know right principles by discussion and practice; should (3) control his temperament. The above three items have to do with concentration of mind in order to keep the internal straight. A man

should (4) have a proper manner; should (5) be careful in his language; and should (6) be prudent in action. These last three items have to do with righteousness in adjusting self squarely with other persons." ⁸

Ethical formulations of this kind became a favorite subject for philosophers of the Ch'eng-Chu school later on during the Ch'ing Dynasty. We have here no philosophy, but merely the drawing up of a list of rules for the direction of daily life.

II. Lu Shih-i shall be introduced by quoting some words of Chang Po-hsing. "I am," wrote Chang, "not sure whether Lu Shih-i was the only philosopher justly to be considered the successor of Chu Hsi. But, at any rate, he was internally equipped with the learning of a sage, and externally with the learning of a philosopher-king. He was the stronghold by which the orthodox school was protected." ⁹ Along with the author of this quotation, and Lu Lung-chi who will be discussed later, Lu Shih-i was one who remained faithful to the school of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi.

Born in Taichang Prefecture in Kiangsu Province in 1611, as a young man he devoted himself to the study of sagehood. When he was invited to join a political club he refused. For a while he had the intention of becoming a pupil of Liu Tsung-chou but later abandoned this idea. For a short time he was interested in military science, as his book *Pa-chen t'u* (Strategic Plan) to be found among his *Collected Works*, testifies. He kept a diary in which his daily self-reflections were recorded: what he did rightly or wrongly, what his motives were, etc.

His work entitled *Ssu-pien-lu* was begun at the age of twenty-seven. The breadth of its subject matter may be judged from the following list of contents: (1) Primary Learning, (2) Great Learning, (3) Establishing One's Own Purpose, (4) *Chü ching*, (5) Investigation of Things and Realization of Knowledge, (6) Making Will True and Rectification of Mind, (7) Personal Cultivation and Family Order, (8) Government and World Order, (9) Heavenly Order, (10) The Order of Mankind, (11) Different Schools of Confucianism, (12) Heterodox Schools, (13) Classics and History, (14) Books of the Different Philosophers.

These contents indicate that Lu Shih-i's interest was more varied than that of other Ming thinkers, who only concerned themselves

with the problems of mind and human nature. They also showed that he followed the line of Chu Hsi's knowledge-seeking.

Fifty-two of Lu's sixty-one years were spent under the Mings. Before the collapse of the dynasty he sent a proposal to the officials recommending that banditry be suppressed by able commanders and good district magistrates. But the government paid no attention to his proposal. After the collapse of the Mings, he built a pavilion surrounded by water, which he called *Fu-t'ing*, the *fu* meaning "a boat sailing abroad." This is an allusion to the words used by Confucius who expressed the idea of going abroad in a sailboat when he saw he would not have the opportunity of putting his *tao* into practice. Lu gave the name to his pavilion in order to show that he wished to live in seclusion and have nothing to do with the Manchu government. He devoted his life to study and writing, except on two occasions: once when he lectured at the Tung-lin Academy, and once when he lectured somewhere else. He died in the eleventh year of Emperor K'ang-hsi [1672].

Lu Shih-i's philosophical method was the same as that of Chang Li-hsiang: that is, it may be formulated in the four characters *chü-ching ch'ung-ri*. Said Lu: "The method by which I was benefitted was the four characters *chü-ching ch'ung-ri*: to keep mind concentrated is the starting-point; thorough study of principles is the road to improvement. These are the stepping stones on which one should tread, and by means of which one should aspire to *tao* at a high level. Thus one will not lose one's way, nor fall to the side. This is the method which all the sages used. When one has this key in hand, whether one stays at home or performs public service, whether one is silent or speaks, one will grasp the vital point and do the right thing."¹⁰

Lu was an exponent of conformity and authoritarianism, and this is clearly seen from his "Essay in Honor of Wu Pai-erh." "Discipline," he wrote, "should be practised according to the *Ta-hsüeh*, the nature of *tao* and *te* should be sought in the *Chung-yung* . . . The great service done by the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi was that they made these two books, the *Ta-hsüeh* and the *Chung-yung*, the fundamental texts, in order to interest students in the study of morality, and to reveal the climax reached by the sages and wise men. Now these two books have been read by

everybody, from the emperor down to ordinary people, as early as when one reaches the age of eight. Though people have only memorized them, and have not perhaps understood their real meaning—their sole purpose has been to use them to sit through the civil service examinations—still they begin to grasp their meaning later on, and many interpretations have arisen. That is why new schools have been established to give expression to these ideas. Indeed these schools have sprung up like mushrooms especially in the most recent period, when the schools tried to refute each other.

"However, the *tao* of the sages is like the sun and moon in heaven, or the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers on earth. Everyone having eyes and ears can see or hear them. Besides *yin* and *yang* there are no other forces; besides human nature there is no other nature; besides the *tao* of the sages there is no other *tao*. But if each man holds to his own theory, and raises his own flag, many schools will arise, and many more after a change of circumstances, so that many extreme views or even perversions will appear, making the people of later generations hate the philosophy of reason as if it were an enemy, just as people hate to eat after having once choked. Philosophers in this most recent period have been responsible for such happenings.

"There is indeed no other moral objective outside those mentioned in the *Ta-hsüeh*. The Two Emperors, the Three Kings, the Duke of Chou, and Confucius, all devoted themselves to this text, which is an introduction to moral discipline. It is astonishing that later generations, in trying to emulate the Two Emperors, the Three Kings, the Duke of Chou, and Confucius, have yet tried to go beyond them, and have even claimed to do better than they. They have attempted to diverge from them and to rebel against them. This is why philosophical sects have become diversified, and why the nature of *tao* has become confounded."¹¹

It is clear from this quotation that Lu Shih-i was more interested in encouraging conformity than free discussion. That is why he has been regarded as the leader of the Chu Hsi authoritarian school in the Ch'ing Dynasty. Lu stood for learning and knowledge-seeking, and regarded these as being more effective than meditation. He went so far as to write essays on astronomy, the calendar,

institutions, strategy, and river irrigation, because he believed that no philosopher should overlook the practical questions involved in these subjects. In this regard, Lu's thought followed more or less the same pattern as that of Ku Yen-wu, Huang Tsung-hsi, and Yen Yüan.

III. Chang Lieh wrote a book entitled *Wang Hsiieh Chih-i* (Doubtful Points Raised against the Theory of Wang Shou-jen). It was an attack on Wang Shou-jen though on purely intellectual grounds. The book consists only of four short chapters, but though rather flimsy in size, it has some very solid arguments. In each case he would present Wang's argument which was followed by a rebuttal or counter-argument.

Chang Lieh received the *chin-shih* degree in the ninth year of the reign of K'ang-hsi [1670]. Less than a decade later he became a member of the Hanlin Academy and an editor in the Bureau of Ming History. Here he turned out biographical chapters for the Ming history on emperors Hsiao-tsung and Wu-tsung, as well as studies on Liu Chien, Li Tung-yang, Wang Shou-jen, Ch'in Hung, Li Ch'eng, Liang Chin-hsüan, and Shih K'o-fa. Of these contributions he was proud, for he regarded them as fair and objective estimates of the personalities involved. He died in his sixty-fourth year.

To come back to the book on Wang Shou-jen, here are a few specimens of how it was written:

(A) ARGUMENT FROM WANG SHOU-JEN'S INSTRUCTION AND PRACTICE.

"[One of Wang's pupils remarked:] 'Chu Hsi meant to say that everything and every event has a definite principle. His theory was different from yours [Wang Shou-jen]. You maintain that the search for a definite principle [*ri*, reason] in things or events is like the search for the principle of righteousness on the outside. The highest good is the intrinsic quality of mind. When one's illustrious virtue is developed to the finest and in a monistic way, one will reach it. But the highest good cannot be separated from objects or events.'

CHANG LIEH'S REFUTATION.

"According to my understanding, the assertion 'Everything and every event has its principle' means the same as the assertion 'Each phenomenon submits to the law of nature.' Wang Shou-jen would have this assertion changed to mean that the law of nature is in mind. Are we justified in saying that Confucius and the author of this assertion believed that the principle of righteousness belongs to the field of external relations?

"Since we know that nothing lies outside mind, when we study phenomena we realize the faculties of mind to the utmost. Since we also know that no principle lies outside mind, when we study principles we again realize the faculties of mind to the utmost. But it is impossible for a sage to make a study of the principles of mind by appealing merely to mind. Mind is occupied by the senses. When motivated by desire it is human mind; when motivated by reason it is *tao*-mind. One's mind should be carefully chosen, and kept for a single purpose. I have never heard that mind is the same as reason. Thus, the Ch'eng brothers said: 'Human nature is reason [which means that in human nature, the four cardinal virtues, or in Western terminology, *a priori* forms, are innate].' One thinks correctly who conceives moral principles to be stored therein. Mencius said: 'The principles of righteousness are agreeable to my mind just as the flesh of grass and grain-fed animals is agreeable to my mouth.' If Wang Shou-jen's notion that mind is reason were right, could we insist that our mouth is the same as the flesh of the grass and grain-fed animals, or that our eyes are the same as the colors they see or our ears as the sounds they hear?

(B) ARGUMENT FROM WANG SHOU-JEN'S INSTRUCTION AND PRACTICE.

"In order to serve a father, one does not seek the principle of filial duty in the body of the father. In order to serve a ruler, one does not seek the principle of loyalty in the body of the ruler. To find the principles of filial duty and loyalty is the work of mind.

If one's mind is unselfish, it contains heavenly reason. To apply such a pure and unselfish mind to the work of serving a father is filial duty. To apply this mind to the work of serving a ruler is loyalty. To apply it to making friends and caring for people is honesty and benevolence. The sole task which needs to be done is to get rid of selfish desires and to keep what is rational.

CHANG LIEH'S REFUTATION.

"How can one get rid of selfish desires and keep what is rational without referring to specific cases involved? Without referring to actual cases how can one discover that mixture with desire is wrong? Without referring to actual cases how can one learn that reason is right? Unless one refers to phenomena or events I do not see that the task of getting rid of desires and keeping what is rational can be carried out.

"True, the principle of filial duty is not to be found in a father, nor is the principle of loyalty in a ruler. However, a son can only know the principle of filial duty when he has a father; a subject can only know the principle of loyalty when he serves under a ruler. The existence of a father is a pre-condition of a son's serving him according to the principle of filial duty. A person who is not a son will not act thus. The existence of a ruler is a pre-condition of subject's serving him according to the principle of loyalty. A person who is not a subject will not act thus. Objects which deserve filial duty and loyalty are a father and a king. The knower of filial duty and loyalty is mind. Therefore, it is said: 'No phenomenon and no event can lie outside of mind.' To seek the principle of filial duty in a father and to seek the principle of loyalty in a ruler means the same as to seek these virtues in mind. We have here, in other words, the *tao* in which agreement between outside and inside is embodied. Now according to Wang, these virtues should be sought in mind, not in a father or a king. Hence, the father and the king are left outside . . .

"When Chung Kung asked Confucius about *jen*, the Master replied: 'When you go out, you should behave as if you were receiving a guest; you should employ your people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice.' We never heard Confucius speak of

a mind unselfish and in conformity with heavenly reason. When Fan Ch'ih asked about *jen*, Confucius answered in terms of how he [Fan Ch'ih] should act in retirement, in management of business, and in intercourse with others. We never heard Confucius speak of a mind purely in conformity with heavenly reason and able to express itself earnestly, attentively, and loyally. When Yen Hui inquired about *jen*, Confucius advised him how to see, hear, speak, and move. We never heard him say anything about a mind completely in conformity with heavenly reason being incapable of doing anything against the principle of decency.

"I wonder why Wang Yang-ming talked as if mind itself were ready-made, and why he did not go into details. We know that scales are to weigh things; that rulers are to measure things. But we know, also, that things differ in weight and length, and that scales can give incorrect weights, and rulers incorrect lengths, so that we must be careful and make meticulous examinations in order to achieve accurate appraisals. How can we say that a weighing-machine, or a ruler is always right, and that things weighed and measured must conform to the one or the other? An analogous situation holds for mind. How can we say that mind is always right, and that phenomena need not be studied in order for us to find out the laws of nature? If so, a mind could never be fair and objective; but would ever fall into bias and subjectiveness.

(C) ARGUMENT FROM WANG SHOU-JEN'S INSTRUCTION AND PRACTICE.

"Somebody asked the meaning of the expression: 'investigation of things.' Wang answered: 'To investigate means to rectify; to change from wrong to right is the meaning of to investigate.' Again Wang said: 'Knowing is the intrinsic quality of mind. Knowing comes naturally to mind. When intuitive knowledge exercises its function in an unselfish way, and when it works under no obstacle, the situation will obtain what is described by Mencius in the words: *When the sense of commiseration is developed to the utmost, the spirit of jen will be more than can be applied.* An ordinary man's mind cannot be otherwise than selfish, and cannot but work under obstacles. He, therefore, must devote himself to the tasks

called realization of knowledge, and investigation of things, in order to conquer selfishness and to return to reason. Only then will intuitive knowledge work under no obstacle and be perfected. When knowledge is perfected, will is true.'

CHANG LIEH'S REFUTATION.

"To change from wrong to right is the function of making the will true. The advice that one should keep to reason is sound, but the questions 'What is reason?' and 'What is unreason?' need to be studied. Otherwise, one may take selfishness to be reason. For example, to give another a good silver piece is to do an honest deed; to know what is a good silver piece is an instance of knowledge. Nowadays silver is mixed with different alloys in a clever way so that one can hardly distinguish. Unless one applies a rigorous test one will not know which pieces of silver are pure. Where does the silver come from? How is it tested? If its fineness is 92% it may not be taken for 93%. If its fineness is 98% it may not be substituted for specimens 99% fine. If one's knowledge is as accurate as this, one may be counted upon to give another a good silver piece. Now, suppose that somebody insists that our eyes can see clearly by themselves, if only all obstacles are eliminated; indeed, then our vision will be perfect. The perfect sight of our eyes is all we need to give another a good silver piece. Such a point of view, it seems to me [Chang Lieh], is ridiculous. Or, let us turn to the physician's art. We find that to cure a disease is the true and good will of the doctor. To recognize the disease pertains to his knowledge. Since the symptoms of disease are complicated, and the beating of the pulse changes in various ways, remedies prescribed by physicians may be different, and formulas for compounding medicines may be good or bad. Then how can a physician give the right prescription without the experience of studying and examining patients? What kinds of disease are curable, what kinds incurable? Which formulas are so well attested that no first rate doctor will change them? Which drugs are so valuable that the best pharmacists cannot alter them? If a physician's knowledge is as profound as this, one may say that he is the ablest. However, according to Wang Shou-jen: 'Your eyes have good sight, so they see what a

disease is. Just keep away from any obstacle, then you will know how to cure a disease.' Is this not the talk of a dreamer? [Now, I, Chang Lieh, say that] to study the nature of silver on the basis of a piece of silver is the way to eliminate obstacles; and to study the nature of disease on the basis of an instance of disease is the way to eliminate obstacles. But they [Wang Shou-jen and his followers] do not pursue this method, though they still insist upon getting rid of obstacles. I do not understand how they can perfect their knowledge of silver or disease.

"They say merely that people should change from wrong to right, without requiring them to learn the laws of natural phenomena. [Wang Shou-jen and his followers] never ask the people specifically to find out what is wrong and right, or what is desire and reason, and the result is that everybody pretends to do right and to be rational, when as a matter of fact nobody is anything more than being self-conceited and self-willed.

(D) ARGUMENT FROM WANG SHOU-JEN'S INSTRUCTION AND PRACTICE.

"The Master said: 'When one has the desire to eat, one begins to know what food is. The desire to eat is will, and will is the beginning of action. Whether the taste of food is good or not is knowable only after one has put the food in one's mouth. How can one know the taste of food until one has tasted it? When one has the desire to travel, one begins to know roads. The desire to travel is will, and will is the beginning of action. Whether a road is safe or dangerous is knowable only after one has made a trip. How can one know the circumstances of a road until one has traveled it?'

CHANG LIEH'S REFUTATION.

"The question of knowing and acting may be approached in two ways: First, you must know the principles, and then you can put them into practice. This implies knowledge first, and action afterwards. This is the correct way. Second, the principles which you know will be more familiar to you, you will feel more intimate

towards them, if you have had personal experience of them. This implies action first, and knowledge afterwards. This way, also, is correct. Both views are right. There is no point in adhering to one in order to fight against the other.

"The desire to eat is to know food . . . True, one does not know taste until the food is in one's mouth. However, one must have some sort of knowledge of nourishment and poison, before one puts food in one's mouth. Otherwise one will be like Emperor Shen-nung, who tasted all drugs before prescribing them, and then one might swallow many kinds of poison and die. A child creeping along a road should not be permitted in his innocence to eat insects and dirty things. Rather a governess should direct him. This means that knowledge must come first, and that knowledge can only come after investigation of things has taken place.

"True, one does not know whether a road is safe or dangerous until one has travelled it. However, if one does not know [beforehand] how long the journey is to be, where a boat will be needed and where a horse, it may well happen that whereas one intended to go to the Province of Chihli, one will go southward instead; or whereas one intended to go to Shantung, one will go westward; or that when one needed a boat, there was no boat; and when one needed a horse, there was no horse. One may get into great trouble and not know what to do. One's regret for not knowing beforehand, and for not making preparations, will be too late. Master Wang talked so fluently and self-confidently that nobody dared argue with him. Yet what he said proved inexact when one examined it."¹²

From these remarks it is safe to conclude that Chang Lieh was a realist and empiricist. He acknowledged the existence of a world of phenomena, and he believed that the only way to know this world is by studying and experiencing it. He was on solid ground.

IV. Lu Lung-chi received the *chin-shih* degree in 1670. Five years later he was appointed magistrate of Chia-ting District in Kiangsu Province. Known as a man of integrity and straightforwardness, he suffered because of these very qualities: thus, when he wrote memorials about the evils of selling official posts, he was dismissed. When the emperor later wanted to give him another post, he had died (February 1693)!

Having witnessed the deterioration of the school of Wang Shou-jen at the end of the Ming Dynasty, Lu became convinced that diversification leads to confusion, and so he came out very much in favor of making Chu Hsi the only legitimate successor to Confucius and Mencius. In an essay entitled "The Tao Tradition," he wrote: "Without Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, Chang Tsai, and Shao Yung, the school of Confucius would not be so illustrious as it is; without Chu Hsi, the ideas of Chou, the Ch'engs, Chang, and Shao, would not be so illustrious as they are. The Han Dynasty made Confucius the source of moral and spiritual authority. What we should do today is to make Chu Hsi our authority. Chu Hsi was the man who made Chou, the Ch'engs, Chang, and Shao better known than they otherwise would be; he it was who handed down the *tao* of Confucius. To make Chu Hsi the authority is the same as to make Chou, the Ch'engs, Chang, and Shao the authority; and to make them the authority is the same as to make Confucius the authority. If we declare Confucius authoritative, then what is opposed to Confucius should be banned and not allowed to circulate. If we make Chu Hsi authoritative, then what is opposed to Chu Hsi should be prohibited and not permitted to spread."¹³

Lu's proposal has been put into practice long ago. Chu Hsi's Commentaries on the Classics became standard; from the end of the Ming Dynasty down to very recent times, they were essential for all who sat for the state examinations.

Lu's three well-known essays *On Learning* were written in the same mood as *The Tao Tradition*. He stressed the importance of banning Wang Shou-jen because of his work *Definite Views of Chu Hsi in his Later Life*, which in Lu's opinion was a deceptive attempt to identify Wang's opinions with those of Chu Hsi. A small resemblance to an orthodox school, Lu pointed out, may be used as a disguise for a heretical school. It is necessary to draw a clear-cut line between the orthodox and the heretical in order to prevent intermixture and confusion. It was Lu Lung-chi's mission to declare Chu Hsi the authority, just as in an earlier day it was Tung Chung-shu's mission to advise Emperor Wu-ti of the Han Dynasty to consecrate Confucius and to exclude all other schools.

V. Chang Po-hsing, like Lu Lung-chi, held the opinion that the Ch'eng-Chu School should be regarded as authoritative, and that

Lu Chiu-yüan and Wang Shou-jen should be banned. Chang received the *chin-shih* degree in 1685. Having done good service in preventing a rupture in a Yellow River dike, he was appointed superintendent of dike-repairs. A few years later, Emperor K'ang-hsi was on a tour of the south, and finding Chang to be a man of integrity made him governor of Fukien Province.

While serving as governor, Chang began the editing and printing of his collectanea: *Ch'eng-i-t'ang Ch'üan-shu*, which was done in honor of the Ch'eng-Chu School, and as a deliberate effort to ban Lu Chiu-yüan and Wang Shou-jen. The editing and printing of this great work was started in 1707 and completed a decade later. The task was undertaken in Fukien because that province was the birthplace of Chu Hsi. After the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, Tso Tsung-t'ang, then viceroy of Chekiang and Fukien provinces, worked over the collection, parts of which happened to have been destroyed, and thus a second edition was published.

The *Ch'eng-i-t'ang Ch'üan-shu*, comprising sixty-three titles, consists mostly of books by the five founding fathers of Sung philosophy, Chu Hsi himself, and Chu Hsi's disciples. The works of Lu Chiu-yüan, Chen Hsien-chang, and Wang Shou-jen are excluded, though certain authors who critically attacked Wang are represented, e.g., Ch'en Lan's *Hsüeh-p'u T'ung-pien* [Elucidation of Philosophical Bias] and Chang Lieh's *Wang Hsüeh Chih-i* [Doubtful Points Raised against the Theory of Wang Shou-jen]. Some titles, belonging to Chu-ko Liang, Ssu-ma Kuang et al, have nothing to do with philosophy, but were also included. The collection is very valuable for the study of the Ch'eng-Chu School.

After a stay of several years in Fukien Province, Chang Po-hsing was transferred to the governorship of Kiangsu Province in 1710. There he became involved in difficulties with the Manchu governor-general, Gali. Since each accused the other before the emperor, the case was examined by a commission headed by Chang P'eng-ko. K'ang-hsi retained full confidence in Chang, and called him to Peking in 1715 to take charge of the government granaries. In 1723 he was appointed President of the Board of Ceremonies by Emperor Yung-ch'eng. He died three years later. In 1878 his tablet was put in the Temple of Confucius.

Chang Po-hsing's contribution to the Ch'eng-Chu School lies

more in his emphasis on putting into practice the ideas of the Sung philosophers, and in his exposition of the theories, rules, and admonitions of that school, than in developing any new doctrines. His *Hsüeh-kuei Lei-pien* [A Collection of Study Rules Classified] is such a work. The first three books contain the rules and regulations governing the White Deer Grotto Academy and several other institutions of learning. Books 4 to 8 deal with reading; books 10 to 17 discuss the Sung philosophers' method of learning, spiritual nursing, concentration of mind, tranquillity, reflection, knowing and action, realization of knowledge, practical application of knowledge, mind-control, desire versus righteousness, and staying at home and going out for public service; book 18 treats of the different philosophers other than Confucianist; book 19 is on history, etc.; book 20, on admonitions; book 21, on rural contract; book 22 is a study schedule; book 23 concerns *tao* itself; book 24 is on the sages; book 25 studies the Confucian scholars; book 26 is on heterodox schools; book 27 deals with the examination system. This imposing encyclopaedic work is still useful as a reference book for source material, if one is interested in finding the opinions of Sung thinkers on these various subjects.

Out of such collections by Chang Po-hsing, the Confucianists of the Ch'ing Dynasty extracted material to be used for the guidance and direction of the theoretical and practical life. The inevitable result was that it left no room for free discussion; and what was expected was observance and conformity. There arose then a generation of "men living according to the rule and the square." Philosophers became mediocre and uncreative. By the time of the mid-Ch'ing Dynasty, Sung philosophy deteriorated into the art of writing maxims, aphorisms, and platitudes. Evidence of this state of affairs may be gleaned from Ch'en Hung-mou's *Wu-chung I-kuei* [Five Kinds of Moral Rules]. Thus, this school first established by Chang Li-hsiang to maintain the purity of the doctrines of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi as the sole orthodox representatives of Confucianism, sounded the death knell of all philosophical speculation in China.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The School of Philological and Investigatory Study and Tai Chen, the Philologist-Naturalist

In the Ch'ing Dynasty philosophy was no longer the center of interest that it had been in the Sung and Ming Dynasties. Reacting against the school of Wang Shou-jen, scholars turned away from philosophy altogether to seek something positive rather than speculative. The efforts of Ku Yen-wu, Huang Tsung-hsi, Wang Fuchih, and Yen Yüan to set speculative thought going along a new way did not have any effect on these scholars of the Ch'ing Dynasty. The positive science which took the place of philosophy, namely philology, was not what Ku Yen-wu and Yen Yüan had in mind. Nor did it have any relationship to Huang Tsung-hsi's attempts to revise Wang Shou-jen's doctrine. In fact, all free and spontaneous efforts to think philosophically fell flat. Nevertheless, the contribution of the Ch'ing scholars, even though it was not philosophical, was important if it be understood for what it was: philology as a substitute for philosophy. The two series of commentaries on the Classics of the Imperial Ch'ing Dynasty, *Huang Ch'ing Ching-chieh Cheng-pien*, and *Huang Ch'ing Ching-chieh Hsü-pien*, were the product of the academic labors of these scholars in the last three centuries. As I have already explained, the Ch'ing Dynasty, or Manchu government, was an alien rule, and had no sympathy for free philosophical discussion. But it was interested in keeping Chinese tradition alive. Consequently it re-edited the *Collected Works of Chu Hsi* and the *Essentials of Human Nature and Reason*. To be sure, a few high officials in the Ch'ing government, men like Li Kuang-ti who tried to reconcile Chu Hsi and

Wang Shou-jen, and Chang Po-hsing who was an out-and-out follower of Chu Hsi, attempted to be philosophical, but they did not succeed in creating a real philosophical atmosphere of the sort that had existed in the Sung and Ming periods.

In the Ch'ing Dynasty, philology, archaeology, studies of institutions, and many related subjects flourished, all of which were covered by the Chinese term "investigatory study." There is no need to point out, of course, that the development of Chinese history and language involved such a long period that thousands of scholars would not have sufficed to exhaust their study. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, in his *Outlines of Ch'ing Scholarship*, traces the evolution of these sciences.

I shall in the present chapter deal with Tai Chen, who played a leading role in Ch'ing philological scholarship. But first I must make a brief sketch of the School of Investigatory Study in general, and acquaint the reader with Tai's intellectual associations. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao divided the School of Investigatory Study into three periods: (1) the initial stage in which Ku Yen-wu, Hu Wei, and Yen Jo-chü were the pioneers; (2) the flourishing stage in which Tai Chen, Tuan Yü-ts'ai, Wang Nien-sun, and Wang Yin-chih made contributions; (3) the period of diversification in which many scholars devoted themselves to stressing the Modern Script texts of the Classics in opposition to the Old Script texts. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao also described Ch'ing scholarship as having carried the mission of freeing itself, first, from the school of Wang Shou-jen of the Ming Dynasty, whence it went back to the Ch'eng-Chu School of the Sung Dynasty; of freeing itself, second, from the Ch'eng-Chu School, whence it went further back to the T'ang and Han dynasties; of freeing itself, third, from Hsü and Cheng of the Eastern Han Dynasty, whence it went further back yet to the Western Han Dynasty; and finally of freeing itself from the authority of Confucius and Mencius.

Did the development of Ch'ing scholarship really proceed as programmatically as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao here represented? I rather doubt it. In some cases he may have been correct, but in other cases no definite chronological order was followed. However this is not an important question, so we shall not go into it.

What did Ch'ing scholarship contribute? Researches were made

and books published in the fields of classics study, philology, phonetics, institutions, both general and local history, geography, mathematics, epigraphy, textual criticism, and restoration of lost texts. Mention should be made in particular of the commentaries that were written on the Classics, after much assiduous labor. The two collections of commentaries already mentioned were important milestones in the progress of Ch'ing scholarship. Such commentaries were based upon genuine philological research, for Ch'ing scholars were meticulous in their interpretations of the meaning of each character, so that their explanations of words and sentences were much more nearly perfect than in any preceding dynasty. The Western reader may have a clearer picture of the tremendous amount of labor involved in compiling these commentaries if he only thinks for a moment how much research and scholarship were required in the determination of the authenticity of the texts attributed to Plato, done by all the commentators from Aristophanes of Byzantium down to Schleiermacher, K. F. Hermann, A. E. Taylor, and many others. The tremendous amount of commentary by these various philosophers and scholars was often larger than the Platonic dialogues themselves whose accuracy they sought to establish.

The investigatory study of the Ch'ing Dynasty began with Ku Yen-wu, Yen Jo-ch'ü, and their successors. Ku did not have in mind the least idea of sponsoring such a school under the Manchus, but his method of learning and his writing on phonetics inevitably led to this result. Yen Jo-ch'ü's *Shang-shu Ku-wen Shu-cheng* [Inquiry into the Authenticity of the Ancient Script Classic of History] sets an example for Ch'ing scholars of a rigorous technique for examining the authenticity of a text that had been doubted since the Han Dynasty, among others by Chu Hsi. This technique consisted in studying critically every sentence, even every character.

But textual criticism, in its early days of development, was something uncertain and indefinite. Thus Hui Tung could say that all that was necessary was to go back to the Han Dynasty and to be guided by the scholarship which then prevailed. The Han Dynasty, he thought, since it was nearer to the time of Confucius than the succeeding dynasties, must have been more accurate in its scholarship than the later periods, such as the Sung. Sung interpretations should therefore be abandoned. In other words, the

ideas that prevailed in the Han Dynasty were the true ideas. This method would have been all right except that occasionally Han commentators did not agree among themselves on the same book. Hui's method, therefore, led to contradictions of one sort and another, and had to be dropped. It was at this stage that Tai Chen appeared with a technique which was more reliable, and more refined than anything which existed before.

Tai attached no importance to whether a theory had its origin in the Han Dynasty or not. He used a purely philological technique. For example, he would not regard the interpretation of a character, or a sentence, as plausible unless he could show that it was applicable in many other instances and confirmed by them. It was only then that he would give a definite and final judgment. He called his method *shih shih chiu shih*, that is, "to find the right meaning as it should be, or as it is, in actuality." It is obvious that Tai's technique was a truly scientific one. He had the conception of a genuinely scientific philology, of a philology based upon the accumulation of both internal and external evidence.

Tai Chen was not merely a philologist. His writings extended to phonetics, archaeology, mathematics, engineering, astronomy, and many other subjects. His contributions to Chinese philology and archaeology were very great, because through his efforts and the work of his disciples, ancient books which previously had been difficult to understand became intelligible and readable. His philological and archaeological studies were of a kind that had been indulged in by hundreds of Chinese scholars since then, for they were so original and were based on a method which has enabled scholars to reach sound conclusions, and led to understanding a maximum number of old and rare works.

Tai Chen acknowledged also the importance of philosophy. Not entirely satisfied with his work in philology and archaeology, he wrote three books against Chu Hsi and the other Sung philosophers, and proposed a kind of naturalism as a substitute for the Philosophy of Reason.

Tai Chen was born in 1722 in Hsiu-ning District, Anhwei Province. While ten years of age, and studying the opening paragraph of the *Great Learning*, he surprised his teacher by asking: "How do we know that these are the words of Confucius, recorded by

Tseng-tzu?" The teacher answered: "Because such was the comment of Chu Hsi." The boy pursued: "When did Chu Hsi live?" The teacher replied: "In the Southern Sung Dynasty." The boy asked: "In what period did Confucius live?" The teacher replied: "In the Eastern Chou Dynasty." "How long a time," the boy inquired, "separated the Eastern Chou from the Southern Sung?" "About two thousand years," answered the teacher. "Then," asked the boy, "how could Chu Hsi know that the book recorded by Tseng-tzu consisted of the words of Confucius?"¹ The teacher was dumbfounded.

Tai Chen had so good a memory that he retained in his mind every sentence of all the commentaries on each Classic. What he liked most of all was the philological vocabulary of Hsü Shen of the Eastern Han Dynasty.

When still young, he went with his father, who was a tradesman, from his home town to Fukien Province, where he worked as a children's tutor. Then, in his twentieth year, he returned to Hsiuning to study under Chiang Yung, a classics scholar, who understood the three books on rites, and who also knew mathematics, music, phonetics, and historical geography. The youthful Tai could not help profit from studying under a master whose learning was so wide.

Nevertheless, Tai did not earn the Chinese equivalent of the A.B. until almost a decade later. At about this time his district was suffering from famine, and food prices soared; Tai was compelled to beg husks for his food. But his hardships did not prevent him from writing a commentary on Ch'ü Yuan's *Elegy*.

He was still so poor in his thirty-second year, that when he went to Peking he had no baggage at all and lodged at a hostelry under the management of a guildsman from his native district. But he took with him all his manuscripts, and called upon a classical and historical scholar named Ch'ien Ta-hsin, with whom he talked for a whole day. That gentleman was astonished by his genius, and recommended him to Ch'in Hui-tien who was then occupied with editing a comprehensive study of the Five Rites, i.e., rites of sacrificial offering, rites on festive occasions, rites proper to host and guest, rites for military circles, and rites for death and misfortune. The upshot of this recommendation was that Ch'in

invited Tai to live at his home and contribute to this study. A year later he was also invited by Wang An-kuo to be the tutor of his son, Wang Nien-sun. Association with such an elite circle enabled Tai to become acquainted with scholars like Chi Yün, Wang Ming-shen, Wang Chang, and Chu Yün.

Shortly after his introduction to this circle (1757), Tai left Peking for Yang-chou, where, during a four-years' sojourn, he became acquainted with the Han philologist, Hui Tung, already mentioned.

Tai won his *chü-jen* degree when he was forty years old. He had the good fortune, through the aid of Chu Yün, to gain access to the Library of the Hanlin Academy where he came to know many rare books of the *Yung-lo Ta-tien*—a situation from which arose the much argued point as to whether he plagiarized in his *Commentary on the Water Classic*.

In 1768 Tai was requested by the viceroy of Chihli Province, Fang Kuan-chen, to contribute articles about the rivers and canals of that area. The following year he went to Shansi Province to be editor of the local history of Fang-chou, and in 1773 he was appointed president of Chin-hua Academy. In this same year, when Tai had reached the age of fifty-one, Emperor Ch'ien-lung, who was appreciative of his *Commentary on the Water Classic*, honored him with an editorship in the Imperial Library.

Though Tai Chen won his first two academic degrees, he failed many times in the examination for the third and highest degree, the *chin-shih*. Despite this short-coming, he was allowed in 1775, through a special decree of the Emperor, to participate in the Palace Examination along with those who had their *chin-shih*. This was a great honor, for ordinarily men with a degree no higher than the *chü-jen* were not permitted to take part in this Palace Examination. As a result, Tai was made a member of the Hanlin Academy. After five years of hard work in the Imperial Library he died.

There can be no doubt that Tai Chen was one of the great scholars of his age. When still a youth he wrote books on mathematics, philology, rites, and on ancient engineering texts. Like a mathematician, he went into minute detail in every subject which he handled, such as the structure of a hall, the construction of a

wheel, or the length and width of a dress in olden days. He was what Chinese call "a man familiar with terms, objects, dimensions, and numbers."

However, Tai Chen was not only a mathematician and philologist, but a philosopher as well. I shall now describe (1) his approach to philosophy, and (2) his own philosophical beliefs.

(1) His approach to philosophy was through philology, or rather the foundations by which he approached philosophy were philological. He brought philology and philosophy so close together that the former became an introduction to the latter. "The culminating point," he wrote, "of the Classics is *tao*. *Tao* is expressed through sentences. Sentences are constructed of words. Thus, we must know words first. By knowing the words we shall know sentences. By knowing the sentences we shall know *tao*. These are successive steps."²

The approach to philosophy indicated here was first promulgated by Ku Yen-wu, whom I have called "the Baconian." According to Ku, the Philosophy of Reason began with the Sung Dynasty. Previously, the Philosophy of Reason had consisted in the study of the Classics, with which one cannot become familiar until one has spent long years of study. Ku added the significant words: "The study of the Classics must start with the knowledge of philology. The knowledge of philology must start with phonetics."³ Tai Chen's approach to philosophy was not original with him, but was borrowed from scholars at the end of the Ming Dynasty; he held it in common with many others, for it was widely spread during the Ch'ing period.

Tai wrote three books on philosophy: *Yüan Shan* (An Inquiry into the Concept of the Good), *Hsü-yen* (Prolegomena), and *Meng-tzu Tzu-i Shu-cheng* (A Commentary on the Word-meanings of the Book of Mencius). This last work contained his philosophical views, though one would hardly suspect it, for the title seems to indicate merely another commentary on a classic. Tai's choice of the title however was purposeful. He wanted to make plain that in his opinion the best introduction to philosophy was through philology. He avoided, in other words, a manner of philosophizing which was repulsive to readers in his day; consequently he presented his philosophy under the guise of philological study. But

I cannot help observing at this point that in Tai Chen's mind there was perhaps a confusion between words and concepts. When a word is coined, it is meant to be a designation for a particular thing which is individual and concrete, while a concept, such as man, animal, plant, or a physical object, is the product of conceptual thinking. When we come to philosophical principles, such as, for instance, when Kant said "knowledge begins with experience," then it is obvious they are understandable only as end products of the process of conceptualization. Tai's approach to philosophy via philology is, I am afraid, too narrow and does not entirely serve the needs of philosophical speculation.

His *Commentary on the Word-meanings of the Book of Mencius* consists of fifteen notes on the word "reason," four notes on the term *t'ien-tao* (the *tao* of heaven), thirteen notes on human nature, four notes on *tao*, and two notes on *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih* (the Four Cardinal Virtues frequently alluded to in the book), and a few more notes equally philological. The method, I do not deny, has its merits. It works for precision and exactness and to that extent it may be described as being truly positive and empirical. But as a philosophical system it has its limitations.

For example, the concept *ri*, with all its ramifications and implications, cannot be entirely explained on a philological basis. Tai Chen proceeds to explain *ri* as the texture or fibre of things, such as the markings in a piece of jade or the grain in wood. He is possibly correct in tracing back the word *ri* to an origin in this sense, for which it may have been coined in the first place; but when he goes on to assume that reason, or the rational principle, is observable as markings in a piece of jade, etc., he has oversimplified the case. The laws of nature, the principles of logic and ethics, cannot be visually conceived like the markings in jade and wood. These latter exist in the universe of external relations. Tai Chen's assumption comes near to that of the neo-realists, who hold that all relations are purely external, and that all other relations are illusions arising from man's misleading "egocentric predicament." But we can understand why Tai made such an approach. His wish was, of course, to refute the doctrine of the Sung and Ming philosophers that reason is innate in mind or human nature, that it is the *a priori* form of the understanding. The earlier think-

ers did not believe that etymological study of the word *ri*, however profound it might be, was adequate, because the concept presupposes a whole system of epistemology, and is reached only by following consistently a series of philosophical concepts. Philology and philosophy, according to these thinkers, are separate mental disciplines; while philology may be helpful to philosophical enquiry, it certainly cannot be philosophy itself.

Tai's book has a variety of new concepts, each of which he tried to develop consistently. In connection with his comment on *ri*, his remarks on the importance of intellect, or knowledge, are equally interesting. Since he believed that *ri* is like the fibre in a jade, observable from outside, he attached much significance to the role of the cognitive function of the mind. It was his belief that if one's knowledge were sufficiently thorough and empirical, one would know *ri*. He attacked the philosophers of the Sung and Ming Dynasties for being Buddhistic. They stressed only the work within the mind. Tai also denied that the will has anything to do with right judgment. His epistemological position was a reflection of his preoccupation with mathematics, phonetics, and the other exact sciences. This attitude led him to take a point of view which in a sense was rare among Chinese scholars. The high claims he made for intellect and knowledge are not unworthy of attention, but his further claim that our total philosophical perspective was the result of the philological bias is open to serious doubt. This point I am anxious to make clear, because even today in China scholars like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Hu Shih insist that a valid empirical or realistic approach to philosophy can be made only through the study of philology. If they would only draw the line between what is a philosophical concept and what is the original meaning of a word, they would realize that a conceptual system can be built without much regard for philology.

(2) So much for Tai Chen's philological approach to philosophy. Let us now come to his philosophy. But first let me comment on the dates of his philosophical treatises, *Yüan Shan* (An Inquiry into the Concept of the Good), *Hsü-yen* (Prolegomena), and the *Meng-tzu Tzu-i Shu-cheng* (A Commentary on the Word-meanings of the *Book of Mencius*). Tuan Yü-ts'ai gave mistaken dates for these three works, and as a consequence biographers of Tai Chen have per-

sisted in the error. This is really quite natural, for Tuan was an intimate disciple of Tai, and one takes for granted that his dates are reliable. But the fact is that the disciple made a bad guess in the case of the first book, and could not extricate himself in regard to the second and third. In 1766 he heard from his master about the recent completion of a work on the Philosophy of Reason, but he did not think to ask the title. Afterwards, when Tai Chen died, and Tuan was reading his *Commentary on the Word-meanings of the Book of Mencius*, he assumed that this was the work to which his master had referred, and he assigned it to 1766.

Although he felt the other two books, the *Inquiry into the Concept of the Good* and the *Prolegomena*, could not be dated accurately, he assigned them to 1753 or 1754 and to 1763 respectively. We know now, thanks to Chien Mu's *History of Chinese Thought for the Last Three Centuries*, that it was the *Inquiry* which was finished in 1766, and not the *Commentary*, as Tuan had mistakenly assumed. The date of the *Prolegomena* Chien has shown to be later than 1769, and not later than 1772, because the publisher, Ch'eng Yao-t'ien, put the sign for 1772 in it. Finally, the *Commentary*, according to Chien, was finished actually in 1777, since Tai twice referred to it after that date in letters to Tuan Yü-ts'ai and P'eng Shao-sheng.

The question of the correct dates of these three books is important because it is relevant to their author's attitude towards Sung philosophy. In what may be called the first or earliest period of his intellectual life, he was of the opinion that the strength of the Han scholars lay in their philological analysis of the Classics, while the expertness of the Sung scholars consisted in their decipherment of the philosophical meanings of the Classics. Thus in his first book, the *Inquiry into the Concept of the Good*, he as yet had raised no protest against the Sung scholars.

In his next book, the *Prolegomena*, however, he began to take an anti-Sung attitude. His feeling of repugnance towards the discussion of the relation between reason (or form) and matter, which had commenced with the Sung thinkers, now showed itself. But it is especially in his last work, the *Commentary on the Word-meanings of the Book of Mencius*, that his anti-Sung sentiments are most in evidence. Here he was even hostile towards the Ch'eng

brothers and Chu Hsi, charging that the philosophers of the Sung Dynasty mixed their Confucianism with Buddhism. His mission was to purify Sung Neo-Confucianism of this Buddhistic alloy, and to bring it back to the native naturalistic standpoint of original Confucianism, for he believed that his philological research had proved the original meaning of the Classics to have been naturalistic.

Who was the correct interpreter of Confucianism, the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi, or Tai Chen? This question is still debatable and the answer is difficult. Each had his own citations from Confucius and Mencius for his defense. I like to say that each had his own philosophical system and that each saw his own system in the doctrines of the two great masters. Perhaps the argument about authenticity and falsehood in Confucianism is futile. It may be one of those perennial philosophical discussions which go on forever without a conclusion's being reached.

Because Tai Chen was opposed to meditation in the Buddhist way, to the elimination of desire, and to the rigoristic interpretation of reason, he founded a school of naturalism. He regarded man as born with flesh, blood, respiration, and intellectual power. He thought that philosophy should begin with man exactly as he is; in other words, that philosophy should recognize that man is born with desires, that he seeks pleasure and wants to avoid pain, and that he gradually learns to choose the good through the improvement of his knowledge. On the basis of desire and knowledge, a system of good and evil can be founded. This was Tai Chen's ethics. For him, the notion that reason, or the Categorical Imperative, to the exclusion of emotions and desires, should be taken as the standard was too rigoristic and ascetic, and could lead to severity and cruelty. What I have said thus far is an abstract of his doctrine. Let me now be more specific.

Tai's first step was to bring *tao* down from a metaphysical level to a physical level. He said: "*Tao* means the endless changes or transformations among phenomena. *Tao* is to be found in the changes of phenomena and in the process of production and reproduction. At one time *yin*, at another time *yang*, these transformations go on endlessly. This is *tao*."⁴ Again he said, "Nature is based on the changes of phenomena and gives rise to the different

kinds of things. What is limited to what is apportioned, is called determination; what constitutes a thing's kind is nature. Each thing, and each human being, in accordance with nature, is endowed with a physique, and possesses intellectual powers, and reveals itself in its facial appearance and in its beauty and voice which make up its capacities."⁵ Tai's discussion of *tao* and nature was on a physical and naturalistic level.

His views about the relations among desire, emotion, and intellect are also of interest. "A being," he wrote, "which is endowed with blood, respiration, and intellect has desires. Desire is a characteristic of nature which expresses itself by way of like and dislike, in reaction to the stimulus of sounds, colors, tastes, and odors. It is from desire that emotion takes its course. Emotions, also characteristic of nature, express themselves as pleasantness or unpleasantness giving rise to joy, rage, sorrow, and happiness. Besides desires and emotions, a human being has also artistic feeling and intellect. These show themselves by means of approval or disapproval when distinctions are made between right and wrong, the beautiful and ugly. Production and reproduction owe their origin to desire. Sympathy and antipathy are begotten by emotion. These last two belong to the class of happenings which are natural . . . Ugliness and beauty owe their existence to artistic feeling . . . Rightness and wrongness owe their existence to the power of intellect, by which wisdom and sagehood are attained. These last two also belong to the class of happenings which are natural, but by refinement; moreover, they are relations of necessity."⁶ Having been a mathematician, Tai Chen understood the distinction between what is naturally so, and what is necessarily so. He did not go into the details of the distinction, but it is clear that for him that mathematical and ethical laws involve necessary relations, whereas merely natural phenomena belong to the realm of contingency, such as the sun's rising tomorrow, in the sense of Hume. Tai called all happenings in the field of desires and emotions "what is naturally so," and all happenings in the field of mathematics and ethics, which cannot conceivably be otherwise, "what is necessarily so."⁷ What is necessarily so is not contrary to what is naturally so; but rather is the culmination of the latter.

Tai Chen was consistent with his own premises in bringing the

speculation of philosophy down to earth, because according to him sense and intellect work together at the physical level. His own words are revealing: "Ears," he wrote, "listen distinctly to voices; eyes see colors clearly; noses know what smell is; mouths tell us tastes; mind discovers principles, discovers right and wrong . . . These are the capacities which a human being acquires from heaven. These capacities are the best evidence that human nature is good. Animals are not endowed with powers to discern the mean or to recognize what is correct, so they are unable to control themselves. They must live just as nature orders. Man, who possesses intellect, can fulfill the right . . ." ⁸

In his first book, *An Inquiry into the Concept of the Good*, Tai Chen discussed the traditional doctrine of *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih*, as the Four Cardinal Virtues in which goodness is embedded. But he attached most importance to the last of these, *chih*, because for him, as for Ku Yen-wu, that was the key to the sense of right and wrong. He gave top priority to the intellect. If it did not function to its full capacity, it was because there was the impediment of selfishness and bias. His view of the intellect reminds one of Socrates' love of knowledge. What Socrates called ignorance, Tai Chen called selfishness and prejudice.

Thus far we have been considering the first or earliest period of Tai Chen's philosophical development. He assigned an exceedingly important role to the intellect, but as yet he has not differed basically from the Sung thinkers, nor has he shown any hostility towards them.

In his second book, the *Prolegomena*, he raised three problems: First, the dualism of *ri* and *ch'i*; second, Mencius' doctrine that human nature is good versus Hsün-tzu's doctrine that human nature is evil; and third, the influence of Buddhism on Sung philosophy. The last of these led to his attack on Chu Hsi and his school.

The dualism of *ri* and *ch'i* is almost the Chinese equivalent of Plato's intelligible and sensible worlds, of Aristotle's form and matter, of Descartes' thinking substance and extended substance, and of Kant's noumenal and phenomenal realms. But Tai Chen had his own special views. For him, the world consists of the two forces of *yin* and *yang* and the five elements. These primordial factors create the manifoldness of men, animals, plants, and the

other physical objects. Man, however, has the ability to find an order among these phenomena of nature, an order called *tao* or *ri*, which remains constant in the midst of the universal flux. Thus, for Tai, there was no point in assuming the time-honored antithesis between *ri* and *ch'i*. He traced it back to the Buddhistic idea of *Prajna* or *Bodhi*, as over against *Samskrita*.

To the Sung philosophers' defense that *ri* and *ch'i* are only new names for the old words meaning "metaphysical" and "physical" in the *Book of Changes*, Tai had a prompt answer. Basing his opinion on philological research, he said that the interpretation of the Sung philosophers was mistaken. The words *hsing-erh-shang* which according to the Sung philosophers meant "metaphysical," Tai said meant "before taking shape," and had nothing to do with "metaphysical." Also the words *hsing-erh-hsia*, which the Sung philosophers took to mean "physical," Tai interpreted as "after taking shape," and had nothing to do with "physical."⁹

Who was correct, Tai Chen or the Sung philosophers? The distinction between physical and metaphysical prevailed in Chinese thought for many centuries, even before the advent of Buddhism. In the works of Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu there are evidences that the Chinese were already deeply interested in metaphysical questions. Tai Chen did not wish to admit the distinction between physical and metaphysical, because once it was recognized his physical interpretation of *ri* as like markings in stone or grain in lumber would have no validity. To him, the notion that *ri* is prior to *ch'i*, or that *ri* is an immaterial power creating the world, was repugnant. His naturalism was adamant.

The *Prolegomena* also contains a comparative study of Mencius' doctrine that human nature is good, as well as Hsün-tzu's contrary doctrine. In a certain sense Tai followed the latter philosopher, for one of his main theses was the refutation of Mencius' intuitive knowledge. Hsün-tzu insisted on betterment through study, or in Tai's terminology, through the improvement of the intellect. During the course of this comparative study, Tai also attacked the belief of the Sung philosophers that a distinction can be made between essential nature and physical nature. One of the original champions of this distinction, Chang Tsai, was regarded by Tai as having committed a great blunder in the history of Chinese phi-

losophy, because human nature cannot be dealt with separately from a physical basis of flesh, blood, and senses.

The last of the three problems which the *Prolegomena* treats concerns the infiltration of Buddhism into Sung philosophy. Tai quotes much from the Sung philosophers' own confessions about how deeply they were under the influence of Buddhism. He insists especially that their interpretation of *hsing* [human nature] as the storehouse of reason, and of *hsin* [mind] as the place where enlightenment occurs, was the same as the Buddhist teaching about *Bodhi* or *Prajna*. The Sung thinkers virtually made *hsing* and *hsin* into something mystical, without basis in flesh and blood. For Tai this point of view was identical with the Lao-tzu attitude towards *tao*, or the Buddhist conception of Supreme Wisdom.

Tai Chen thus carried on the hostility towards Neo-Confucianists of the Sung Dynasty which Yen Yüan had pioneered. It is quite possible that Tai received this slant at the hands of Yen's disciples who taught it to him and encouraged him in it.

So much for the second period of Tai Chen's intellectual development, as shown in his *Prolegomena*. We now come to the third and last period, characterized by his *Commentary on the Word-meanings of the Book of Mencius*. In this work he concentrated his attack on Chu Hsi's idea of *ri*. In the epilogue of the book he compared himself opposing Chu Hsi, to Mencius refuting Yang Chu and Mo Ti. He was in fact so disappointed with the Sung thinkers for mixing Buddhism with Confucianism that he would not hesitate to place them on the same level with those two heretical thinkers.

Tai's *Commentary* consists of discussions of the following words: (1) *ri* [reason], (2) *t'ien-tao* [the *tao* of heaven] (3) human nature, (4) capacity, (5) *tao*, (6) *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih*, (7) truth, and (8) weighing. It was written in the form of questions and answers, which show a thoroughly consistent and compact system of philosophy.

Tai Chen, let me repeat, was a believer in naturalism and opposed to rationalism. His main objective was to show that the attempt to separate the rational mind from its physical basis, and from desires and emotions, was a mistake; and that the failure to see reason, or principle, like markings on a stone, i.e., as external,

was also a mistake. "Reason," he wrote, "is not much more, nor much less, than what is claimed by emotion. If something is not in agreement with the emotions, it cannot be in agreement with reason. What I do to others should be considered by me as if it was done to myself: would I be satisfied if others did the same to me? What I blame in others, should be considered in the same way: Would I tolerate similar censure from others? When I can put my own position in the place of others, then I have found the principle of righteousness. *T'ien-ri* [heavenly reason] is the natural order. When my own motives can be measured in the light of the motives of others, then the standard of equity and fairness is established."¹⁰ For Tai Chen, reason was not something qualitatively different from emotion or desire, but represented only an order of refinement growing out of them.

In further substantiation of his doctrine, he quoted from the *Great Learning*. "When," he said, "the *Great Learning* discussed government and world peace, it stated certain fundamental principles: 'What a man dislikes in his superiors, let him not display in the treatment of his inferiors; what he dislikes in his inferiors, let him not display in the service of his superiors.' This applies to the relation between superiors and inferiors. 'If a man hate something in those ahead of him, let him not hold it when he precedes those behind him. And if a man hate something in those behind him, let him not hold it when he follows behind those who are ahead of him.' This applies to those who precede and follow. 'What he hates to receive from the right, let him not bestow on the left; what he hates to receive on the left, let him not bestow on the right.' This applies to those who are on the right or left. The words: 'what he dislikes,' and 'what he hates,' refer to motives, evolved from emotions which are common to all. Though the rational principle is not explicitly stated, it is implied. When one's own emotion is measured in the light of having been exchanged for the emotion of others, it will not be merely a capricious whim. Otherwise, if one talks in the name of reason, but without resting on a common emotional basis, one's words will refer not to a rational principle, but only to a private opinion. A subjective opinion can do nothing but injure people."¹¹

Tai Chen pursued his point further by advocating that a gen-

uinely rational principle lies even in desires. Let us read his own words: "Somebody said: 'Since the Sung Dynasty, the discussion about *ri* has hung on a hinge: when a motive does not stem from *ri*, it must stem from desire; when it does not stem from desire, it must stem from *ri*. The line of demarcation between *ri* and desire is also the line of distinction between great men and petty men. Now you [Tai Chen] have said that *ri* is not too much more, nor too much less, than what is claimed by emotion. If so, then *ri* lies in desires. Are you,' the inquirer after truth proceeded to ask, 'going to say that the idea of desirelessness is wrong?' Tai's answer was as follows: 'According to Mencius, the best method for nursing a mind is to reduce desires. In this advice he did not say that desires can be cut down to nothing. What one can do is to reduce them. As long as human life exists, one's first obligation is to give satisfaction to the needs of life. To satisfy one's own life by damaging the lives of others is not *jen*. To satisfy one's own life by damaging the lives of others, and by having no regard for them, is to act against *jen*. But even this step—damaging the lives of others—is to give satisfaction to one's own life. If one has no desire whatever to give satisfaction, one will not even take this step contrary to *jen*. When there is no desire in one to give satisfaction, one will be indifferent, and have no regard for man even when man's life is very poor and in a desperate condition. When one does not feel the need to satisfy one's own life, how can one feel the need to give satisfaction to the lives of others?' " ¹²

This passage reveals how tenaciously Tai Chen clung to the naturalistic position in his discussion of life. Truly, he was a pioneer of Chinese hedonism, or utilitarianism, for he abandoned the standpoint of reason, normally considered as the antithesis of desire. His meaning was that reason derives itself from the physical body, from desires and emotions. He was opposed to the teaching of the Sung philosophers that physical nature and essential nature are two prongs of a bifurcation, and to the doctrine, also characteristic of the Neo-Confucianists, that human nature is reason, because this placed reason on a higher level, and separated it from the physical basis. Let us examine now how he correlated the virtues *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih* with human emotions. This is what he said:

"With regard to the sense of commiseration, *jen*, there is no level, where anything is stored, higher than intellect. [The Sung philosophers put human nature on an even loftier level, where according to them the Four Virtues are kept, just as Kant in his system taught that there is a superior factor in knowledge called *a priori* forms of the understanding.] Actually, there is nothing else than the motive of preservation of life and shunning of death, and this is possessed by everybody. Each person has the same inclination to preserve life and escape death. So each pities the child about to fall into a well, and tries to save him. If one had no such feeling, how could one be concerned about the child's danger? The same may be said for other feelings than commiseration, such as shame, modesty, and approval and disapproval. If men had, for instance, no sexual desire after stimulation by external things, and if they devoted themselves only to quietness and oneness, how could they know what shame, modesty, and approval and disapproval are? In other words, the Four Virtues, *jen*, *i*, *li*, and *chih*, are nothing but the motive of preservation of life and shunning of death—nothing but sexual and other appetitive desires, which never fail to be felt in men's lives . . . Man is distinguished from the animals by his intellect, which enables him to prevent his conduct from going astray, and which constitutes his virtue."¹³

Tai's words sound much like Hobbes' theory that human appetites and desires are naturally directed either towards man's preservation of his life, or towards his heightening of it. Thus the satisfaction of the appetites and desires gives him pleasure. Tai was wholly out of sympathy with the Sung philosophers' teaching that rational regard for the common good is the foundation of the moral life.

Let us read more about this subject: "After his birth, a man possesses desires, emotions, and intellect, all of which are naturally based upon his flesh, blood, and mental processes. What satisfy his desires are sound, beauty, smell, and taste. To these he reacts with like or dislike. What is expressed in his emotions are joy, anger, sorrow and happiness. These may be classed under the rubrics pleasure and pain. What are differentiated by his intellect are ugliness, beauty, right, and wrong. These may be subsumed under approval and disapproval . . . When a man has a physical

body, he desires sounds, beauty, odors, and tastes. As a man, he stands in the sovereign-subject, father-son, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, and friendship relations. In the midst of these relations, he expresses himself through the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, and happiness. Besides desires and emotions a man has intellect by means of which he can satisfy and direct them. In this world, life hinges on the satisfaction of desires and the display of emotions."¹⁴

It is clear from these passages that Tai Chen gave a significant place not only to what modern psychologists call the "affective" side of life, but also to intellect and knowledge. He believed that the mistakes men make are the result of ignorance. When knowledge is improved, it is as if a light was given to illumine the way. "Thinking," he wrote, "is the function of mind. A being who has blood and breath, also has various sensitivities. It is as if there was a fire whose light shone differently in different places. When it shines, one will not go wrong. When it does not shine, one will go wrong. Not to go wrong is to agree with the principle of right. When the light is strong, it reaches far. In this case the right will exceed the wrong. But not only in relation to distance is light clear or unclear . . . When it is clear, a thing's form can be seen completely; when it is unclear, the thing's form cannot be seen completely. This is the opposite of right. What is contrary to right springs from ignorance. Only by learning can something be added to mend one's imperfection, and to improve one's knowledge. Thus, the so-called reason or rational principle is just what is clearly revealed under a brilliant illumination. Reason is discoverable nowhere save under a shining light. Man's cleverness, and his advance towards perfection, can be effected on the basis of his natural endowment."¹⁵

Tai's stress on intellect, or knowledge, is like modern Western man's emphatic assertion that betterment is possible only through advancement of knowledge. And at precisely this point Tai again parted company with the Sung philosophers, for they advocated a double way: first, improvement of learning; second, concentration of mind—a dualism which they had learned from the Buddhists, who taught them that man can go wrong in two ways: either along the path of intellect, or along that of will. Going astray

along the path of will can be prevented only by vigilance. This vigilance has been given many names: "concentration of mind," "making will true, or real," "devotion," "vigilance in solitude," etc., but all lead back to the same meaning: to take care lest any wrong motives arise in will and to prevent this occurrence. Tai Chen's intense interest in knowledge caused him to overlook the role of will. His preoccupation with mathematics—the field of knowledge *par excellence*—possibly was the reason for his thinking of error exclusively in intellectualistic terms, that is, as ignorance. Nevertheless he was aware that human kind suffers from selfishness stemming from desire, as well as from bias or prejudice originating in defects of intellect. In this phase of his thought, he came closest to appreciating the importance of will. But even here he supposed that selfishness was preceded by defect of intellect, so he relapsed again into intellectualism. No doubt, Tai's orientation was thoroughly modern in his stress on the significance of knowledge, and in his forgetting about volition, though, as a matter of fact, the one is no more important than the other. In this prejudice, indeed, he was even criticized by his own disciple, Ch'eng Yao-t'ien, who pointed out that his master had been too narrow in prescribing methods for getting rid of selfishness and bias, when the mistakes the human race has committed are so multitudinous. But regardless of such criticism, one cannot refuse Tai Chen a seat of honor in the history of Chinese philosophy, for he was the pioneer of naturalism or utilitarianism.

I should like to add a few concluding words about the influence of Tai Chen's thought. After his death, Hung Pang wrote a biography in his honor, in which he included a letter from Tai to P'eng Shao-sheng presenting the principles of his philosophy. When, however, Hung showed the draft of this biography to Chu Yün and the philosopher's son, neither of them would consent to the inclusion of the letter. Philosophy, they held, was not the best part of Tai's work. In their opinion, his accomplishments in philology and mathematics were sufficient to make him immortal, and there was no reason to extend the fields of his specialization to include philosophy. It would thus seem that Tai Chen's contemporaries esteemed his philosophy lightly. But it is fair to say that even though his thought had no effect on the Chinese mind of his own

day, it was possibly only because he lived ahead of his time. In 1922, the bicentenary of Tai Chen's birth, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao tried to revive his memory by writing about his work. Hu Shih did the same. Perhaps interest in Tai Chen's thought will come to life again when the need for a Chinese representative of naturalism or utilitarianism is felt.

The so-called Han Philological School, whether of the Hui Tung or the Tai Chen type, flourished mostly in the Eighteenth Century, i.e., during the reign of Ch'ien-lung [1736-1795]. The scholars were occupied with phonetics, commentary writing, words, and archaeology. Their efforts failed to satisfy the aspirations of the people, because if a nation has nothing to do but carry on philological and archaeological researches, it is bound to feel spiritually starved. Suppose a Western country had no religion, no politics, no philosophy, no business, and did nothing except study Egyptology! Would the academic circles in such a country feel spiritually at ease? This was the sort of discomfiture that occurred in China. Philology and archaeology were limited to assembling knowledge by special research in a narrow field—to sewing up holes in pockets, or collecting crumbs from the floor. It is no wonder that Han Philology naturally came to an end. Tai Chen's turning to philosophy meant the disintegration of the school. Those who followed in his footsteps, such men as Chiao Hsün, Ling T'ing-k'an, and Juan Yüan, attempted to explain philosophical terms like *hsing*, *hsin*, and *ming* [divine order] on the basis of philological research. They knew that the people could not get along without these terms, so they occupied themselves with elaborating their meaning under the disguise of propounding philological explanations. Evidently they had no confidence in their efforts, but they had to cover the field of philosophy somehow. Their sugar-coating did not prove to be an effective defense, for a reaction against the fashionable school of philology was in the offing.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Opposition to the School of Investigatory Study: Chang Hsüeh-Ch'eng and Fang Tung-Shu

In the preceding chapter we discussed how in the Eighteenth Century the School of Investigatory Study, through Hui Tung (1667-1758), Tai Chen (1722-1777), and many others, became the fashionable school in China. As it grew in importance, a shadow was cast on the Philosophy of Reason. But a reaction soon set in which was led by Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng (1738-1801), Fang Tung-shu (1772-1851), Yüan Mei (1716-1797), and Yao Nai (1733-1815), all of whom being younger contemporaries of Tai Chen, with the exception of Fang who was a much younger person.

In the present chapter I shall pay special attention to Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng, who started the opposition movement against the Philological School and was the first to work out a plan of campaign against the entrenched point of view; and to Fang Tung-shu, who more than two decades after Chang's death, and wholly independent of him, delivered a well-aimed and destructive blow at the Philological School, singling out Tai Chen as the man responsible for the misguided school of thought.

Before dealing with the lives and ideas of these two thinkers, let me make a few introductory remarks on the complex character of the cause of the downfall of the School of Investigatory Study. To anticipate the next chapter slightly, I must point out that early in the 19th century thinkers like Tseng Kuo-fan and T'ang Chien complained that the inquiries of the Philologists were too scattered, narrow, and concerned with petty details of scholarship to have anything of value to contribute to the moral and political better-

ment of the people. Tseng and his circle wished to assimilate philology into a larger philosophical framework. As the century advanced, contacts with Europe became more intimate. The new international situation required that China reappraise her outlook and think in comparative terms of East and West. Tai Chen's philological enquiries obviously were not adequate for the new challenge. However, the seeds of destruction of the school were contained within itself. These internal causes can be summarized under three headings: First, the Philologists approached the Classics always in the role of commentators. They never expounded a system of philosophy which would serve as a guiding principle for human life. They were always gathering, as their critics would say, academic "bread-crumbs." Second, the Philologists neglected even the Dynastic Histories which in order of succession came after the Classics, and were equally important for scholarly interest. Ch'ien Ta-hsin and Wang Ming-sheng were perhaps two solitary exceptions; for aside from their exegetical work on the Classics, they did some historical research. But their motive was curiosity, and there was no desire to apply their knowledge to carry out reforms in the times in which they lived. Third, they devoted their time to the study of characters of terms such as *tao*, or to objects such as jade. Their minds were so absorbed in these characters, terms, and objects that it became impossible for them to have any imaginative or original view of the universe. At best, they were artisans rather than artists.

Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng was born in Shao-hsing District, Chekiang Province. Speaking of himself, he wrote: "Before twenty I was rather dull. I could not read very much each day. My composition was full of grammatical errors. After twenty-one I reached maturity and became fond of reading all sorts of books. My understanding of the Classics was not so good as that of the histories. When I read historical writings, I could be sure where the strong and weak points in each lay."¹ Accordingly, Chang was known as an expert in history and literature. He became, indeed, the greatest historical critic China has produced.

Let us trace his life in its bare chronology. In 1764, when the local history of T'ien-men District was being compiled, he submitted ten proposals to the magistrate as to how it could best be

edited. In 1766-68 he began to study under a scholar named Chu Yün. In 1772 he commenced the writing of his celebrated *Wen-shih T'ung-i* (Principles of Literature and History). In 1773 he met Tai Chen in the office of Feng T'ing-ch'eng, circuit-intendent of Ning-po, and disagreed with him as to the proper method of editing a local history. In 1777-79 he was engaged in editing the local history of Yung-ch'ing District. When he was forty he succeeded, after seven failures, in winning the *chü-jen* degree. The following year he received the *chin-shih*. A little later he was appointed lecturer at Chin-chang Academy. In 1784-87 he was director of Lien-ch'ih Academy. In 1789 he finished three famous essays, "Inquiry into Tao," "Inquiry into Knowledge," and "Principles of the Classics," between April 11 and May 8. Most of his *magna opera* were written in the latter part of his life. In 1790 he was asked by Pi Yüan, viceroy of the Two Lake Provinces, Hunan and Hupeh, to edit the provincial gazetteer of Hupeh. He finished this work, but due to the antipathy of certain officials it was never published. In this same year he wrote his essay "Virtue of a Historian," in which he explained that a historian must have (1) judgment to make decisions, (2) ability to write in good style, and (3) scholarship to understand all the aspects of life. But he must also possess (4) historical virtue, a sound heart like a magistrate to deliver just and impartial verdicts. From 1800 onward, he so suffered from a disease of the eyes that he could no longer write, but undaunted he made his son his amanuensis. In this same year he wrote an Epilogue to Sun Hsing-yen's *Inquiry into Human Nature* in which he argued that the essence of philosophy consists in actual practice in life, and that a philological study of the words "human nature" would contribute nothing whatsoever to the value of philosophy. He died at the age of sixty-four.

Before proceeding to Chang Hsueh-ch'eng's system of thinking, I must say that the shadow of Tai Chen was a powerful factor in stimulating him to build his own doctrines. In a letter he wrote to Ch'ien Tai-hsin he said, "Being occupied with literature, history, and collation, I have hopes that a new doctrine may be discovered. Since my view differs from what prevails today, I do not wish to publicize it. So please do not show to others the essays which I have brought to you. The so-called fashionable beliefs in academic

circles today are biased and onesided. Influential persons have lent their support, and the clever and able have rushed to their aid. These fashionable beliefs have blinded the people to other points of view, and the ill-effects are being increasingly felt. Those of us who hold a brush in our hands should let some fresh air come into the schoolroom. We should put a stop to the academic excesses. Otherwise, what will be the use of learned writings? Scholars should oppose the wave of popularity. (But a fight against a wave of this sort is like a criminal standing under punishments imposed by judges.)

"In the T'ang period, Han Yü said: 'Buddhism and Lao-tzu were favored by high officials. How dare I fight them openly?' Thus, one may infer that Han Yü's *Inquiry into Tao* was not shown to the public. Even the author of the *Shih-chi*, Ssu-ma Ch'ien, said: 'It is better to keep my writings in a safe place on a mountain, and to let only those who know me see them.' This was because he was afraid of opposition or attacks from others . . ." ²

Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng's quotations from Han Yü and Ssu-ma Ch'ien were a veiled confession that he had no desire to expose himself to the hatred of a school all-powerful in his day, which was the philological movement launched by Tai Chen.

The basic thought in Chang's teaching is summarized in a neat formula which can be easily remembered, namely, "The Six Classics are histories." The point of this remark is that old books are the records of past experiences. Since all old books should be interpreted in this sense, then the Classics would automatically fall under the same category: they should not be regarded as having greater authority than other books. Chang was convinced that the principles of *tao* can be found in any book, regardless of its classification, be it a classic, a history, or a philosophical treatise. The assumption of the Philological School that *tao* is only to be found in the Classics is untenable, because there is no reason why *tao* should be restricted; it is to be found in old books as well as in modern books, and in books to be written and published in the future.

Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng's views on the relations between philology and philosophy are best explained by the following comments: "It is said," he wrote, "that a combination of characters makes a sen-

tence, and a combination of sentences gives an expression of ideas; and that, therefore, one who is ignorant of etymology [or philology] is incapable of understanding the Five Classics. However, let me say that in the course of two thousand years, though there were lacking definite interpretations of certain characters, the reading of the Classics has proceeded continuously. Since we are living in a period when the old interpretations of the words have been lost, it is natural that those with a bent for philology should make a special study of them. But the general ideas of the Classics are quite understandable apart from any expert knowledge of philology."³ In other words, philosophy has very little to do with philology.

"A commentator on a classic," Chang continued, "in trying to explain every word, may become involved in distortions regardless of how great a scholar he may be, as did Fu Sung and Cheng Yüan, because they had their prejudices. Any one of the Hundred Schools, by extracting isolated texts from the Classics in order to build a doctrine of its own and show its originality, could express subtle and fine views."⁴

"What was written in the Six Classics," he also said, "and the meaning of what was hidden, can be explained and elucidated by philologists. What was not written in the Classics, but what came to be known in later generations, can be pondered over and formulated by the people of a later age on the basis of a summary of the meaning of the Six Classics."⁵ That is, the principles of philosophy need not be exhausted by a philological study of the classical texts. As time goes on, ideas must be re-thought and re-explained. Ideas are living entities which have a direct bearing on the life of the times to which they apply.

On the other hand, Chang did not stand unqualifiedly on the side of Sung philosophy. In a letter to his son he wrote: "Since the Three Dynasties (the early legendary period), Sung scholars upheld the only philosophy which pointed out the right way to make the will true, to rectify mind, to sound government, and to work for world peace. Its weakness however lay in its endeavor to inquire into *tao* apart from learning, literature, and the realities of politico-economic life. If *tao* becomes the object of an isolated study, the result is the neglect of politico-economic life as well as

learning and literature. The Sung philosophers speculated about human nature and heaven without sufficient data. That is why scholars today feel reluctant to be associated with them. When this philosophy flourished, persons were not lacking who expounded its views. When it declined, men like the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi were condemned by later generations [e.g., by Tai Chen]. But a gentleman should strive by his studies to influence the academic world, not just follow fashion. There are weak points in Sung philosophy, to be sure. But one must admit that we suffer today from having forgotten this school."⁶ Thus, it is clear that while Chang opposed the Philologists, he was not entirely pro-Sung. He was sympathetic with a study of *tao* as being inherent in the world of reality, but he was not sympathetic with the study of *tao* when it is isolated from life or pursued for purely speculative interest.

Let me then summarize Chang's basic ideas. Besides his statement already mentioned, namely, that "*tao* cannot be dealt with separately from the physical world or from human life," two basic ideas were weapons by which Chang fought off the philological or investigatory school. His other idea was that synthetic principles are hidden in all beings, including institutions—the very entities which the Philologists ignored in their myopic concern with terms and objects. These synthetical principles exist in human life which goes on ceaselessly, not just in the Six Classics. That they are written in the Classics is, for Chang, a matter of historical documentation. The former of the two statements means, as I have said, that the Six Classics are merely records from the past. They are accordingly history in the same sense that the Twenty-four Dynastic Histories are history. Why then should they be considered more authoritative than other books? As past records they are no better, and no worse, than any other monument. The Six Classics, it is true, contain the salubrious advice of the sages, but they should not be regarded as the only repository of *tao*, because *tao* is coterminous with human life. As long as life changes with time, so does *tao*, which therefore cannot be the exclusive possession of the Six Classics.

Here is a passage from a letter Chang wrote to Chu Ts'ang-mei, which, I believe, makes his conception of *tao* unmistakably clear. "The Classics, or the Histories," he explained, "though dif-

ferent from each other in many ways, have the same aim: to elucidate *tao*. *Tao* need not be explained in terms of heaven, man, human nature, divine order, making will true, rectifying mind, ruling a country, or pacifying the world, as the Sung philosophers tried to do, who employed the special label of 'Philosophy of *Tao*' for their efforts. By *tao* I understand what is according to nature, and what has necessary relations worked out in literature, that is, in the productions of scholarship, regardless of their nature; whether partial or complete, simply or in a sophisticated way. In the *Book of Changes* are the words: 'What is metaphysical is *tao*; what is physical is a utensil or instrument.' *Tao* is inseparable from the utensil, and vice versa. It is like the sun and moon, which have remained unchangeable in the bright heavens from time immemorial. All things, including all forms of life, derive benefit from their rays. The light of the sun, shining upon things may be high or low, strong or weak, according as places and times differ. If one supposes that light is inseparable from matter [i.e., that *tao* is separable from the physical], I do not know how sunlight is constituted. From the shining, which may be high or low, strong or weak, the quantity of light is discoverable; but how can one, forgetting that the sun is the center of the solar system, say that sunlight is restricted to the areas which one can see? Of what use would be controversy about low and high, great and small, if one forgot the source of the sunlight?

"Thus we learn that every kind of scholarship, or all knowledge, whether its subject is vastly important or trivial, aims at elucidation of *tao*. If one separates scholarship from *tao*, and reserves the label of *tao* for *Tao*-scholarship, one implies that *tao* exists in isolation from the utensil. But scholarship can be based only on physical things, or utensils. In it lie concealed the laws of nature, or necessary relations. Utensils are finite in their equipment, so their uses are limited. But *tao*, being general in nature, may be applied as a universal concept. Therefore, a noble man tries to know *tao* through utensils, and he will attain thereby a comprehensive view of human life."⁷

We are now ready for Chang's *Inquiry into Tao*, which shows a much broader and more natural basis than Han Yü's *Yüan Tao*, the purpose of which was to attack Buddhism. Chang wrote, "The

great source of *tao* is heaven. Is it in the form of commands issued by heaven? It was unknowable before the creation of the universe. When man was born it came into existence, but did not yet manifest itself. When three men lived together in a house there had to be order, and this was *tao* though it was not yet obvious. When hundreds and thousands of men lived together, so that one house was not large enough to accommodate all of them but there had to be many different houses, the myriads of men were organized and various kinds of work were assigned to them. Then *tao* was fully developed and became clearly written. *Jen, i, chung* [loyalty], *hsiao* [filial duty], the institutions of punishment, governments, rites, and music had to be promoted and established. These were man-made, to meet compelling needs.

"After the birth of man, *tao* naturally took its place. Yet man might have been unconscious of it, for it did not manifest itself. When three men lived in a house, it was necessary that there should be rules about when to open and close doors during the day and night, about how food should be supplied by a cook, and about fuel and water. Since there was more than one person, a division of labor had to be arranged. Work was assigned to each to be done by turns. This arose from inevitable conditions under which equality, order, and the sense of justice became an issue. When one shifted one's responsibility to another and a quarrel arose, there had to be a senior who could act as judge. Then a hierarchy of senior and junior, high and low, developed. When a thousand men were divided into units and organized, it was necessary to appoint chiefs for each platoon, company, and brigade. Since society consisted of numerous persons, and since the number of kinds of problems to be dealt with was large, capable men were appointed to positions of responsibility. Those who had commanding personalities became popular leaders. This also arose from inevitable conditions. Thus there grew up a government in which a king ruled, and a cultural system in which a teacher played the teaching role. Institutions crystallized, such as geographical divisions, "well" fields, the feudal system, and schools. Evidently what is called *tao* is not a product of the cleverness of the sages, but issued from the natural conditions of mankind. It developed gradu-

ally and was an outgrowth of the laws of necessity. This is why I say that heaven is its source.”⁸

This remarkable passage clearly indicates that Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng's thought was constructed on a wider basis than Han Yü's. Chang's *tao* suggests laws of nature in the Western sense, because he did not conceive of it as the *tao* of the Duke of Chou or Confucius, but as having its origin in heaven itself. *Tao* is not a command given by the sages, but is a fulfillment of the practical needs of life growing naturally out of the conditions of living. If human institutions in later periods of history are more developed than the primitive arrangements of early times, it is because a river beginning from a tiny source discharges into the ocean as a torrential flow. Or it is because a tree beginning with a tiny seed grows into an overshadowing plant, casting shade and protecting persons from rain. It is the natural process of development taking place with the passing of time. Thus Chang's view of *tao* was evolutionary. His view of *tao* was neither ethical, like that of Han Yü, nor philosophical, like that of the Sung philosophers. It was natural, because for him *tao* is natural to the physical world and to human life. It is the order of nature, or in Chinese nomenclature, of heaven.

Thus Chang drew the conclusion that *tao* is not peculiar to the Classics. In this attitude he wielded a two-edged sword: on the one hand, against the school of Tai Chen, which stood for the supreme authority of the Six Classics; on the other hand, against the Sung Neo-Confucianists who made the same claim for the Classics, though in a different sense. Said Chang, “According to the *Book of Changes*, ‘What is metaphysical is *tao*; what is physical is utensils.’ *Tao* is inseparable from utensils, as a shadow is inseparable from an object. Later generations, worshipping Confucius, used the Six Classics as if *tao* could be found only in them.

“From my point of view, however, the Six Classics are nothing but utensils . . . Confucius edited the Six Classics in order to point to us a direction to the future, because *tao* is invisible while the Six Classics are written [in visible characters], so that these Classics may be regarded as utensils . . . By taking the visible utensils as a basis, one may infer the invisible *tao*. They [the

Classics] are laws and institutions of ancient periods, and furnish a foundation upon which one may avoid falling into the pit of trying to separate *tao* from the utensils. When Confucius edited the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, he told us that it is better to have human actions as data than to speculate about abstractions. In other words, Confucius did not wish to write books divorced from the facts of human relations and daily life . . . In later periods, when the rule of government and the doctrines of teachers became diversified and were taught by different men, government made laws and issued commands, while philosophers left their teachings in books for their descendants. This was, again, the result of inevitable conditions during the process of development. The various dynasties treasured Confucianism because the *tao* of the former sages could be found in it. However, it is a mistake to suppose that *tao* exists exclusively in the writings of the Confucianists, for it is inconceivable that it should exist separately from utensils, as if a shadow could exist apart from an object. Those who wish to inquire after *tao* by isolating it from human life are utterly ignorant of its nature!"⁹

Chang, it is clear, belonged to the school of reaction against mad Ch'anism which had been asserting itself since the end of the Ming period. He attached maximum importance to the physical universe. To support his position he often quoted Confucius' words: "It is better to have human actions as data than to speculate about abstractions."¹⁰

In another essay on Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yüan, intended as a reply to Tai Chen's denunciation of Chu Hsi, Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng attempted not only to defend Lu Chiu-yüan and Wang Yang-ming, but he also indicated that the controversy between the Ch'eng-Chu School and the Lu-Wang School was futile and could be decided only if one went back to the physical basis. Our philosopher expressed himself as follows: "The discussion of the principles of heaven, man, human nature, and divine order is to be found in the Classics, which, though they were the products of different writers, all had one background in common, namely, that *ri* [the principles dealt with] have physical data as their basis and are not empty talk about abstractions. When a Confucianist or teacher tries to elucidate principles for future generations, if he

has recourse to the physical world for data, no controversy between one school and another can possibly arise. Let me compare *ri* to water, and physical objects to utensils. Whether the utensil is big or small, deep or shallow, the quantity of water which can be poured into it will be no greater than its volume can hold. Now, suppose that those engaged in the pouring of water quarrel about how much they can pour, and about measuring it, but at the same time put away the utensils which are to hold the water. Is it not obvious that their polemic will last forever, because they leave the physical basis out of the picture?"¹¹

Though Chang stressed this physical basis, he also defended Wang Yang-ming's *liang-chih* [intuitive faculty]. He was sufficiently broad-minded to see that the sort of differences of opinion which obtained between the Ch'eng-Chu School and the Lu-Wang School were natural to philosophers, and should be tolerated rather than condemned.

I shall now explain in great detail the meaning of Chang's slogan: "The Six Classics are histories." Among the Classics, the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, in its very nature, is history. So also is the *Book of History*, which consists of the records of Yao, Shun, Yü, T'ang, Wen, and Wu. The *Book of Rites* is history in the sense that it deals with ancient institutions. But two classics: the *Book of Changes*, and the *Book of Poetry*, have nothing to do with history, so Chang's formula as applied to them deserves comment. His explanation as regards the former was that it is the first book to contain records of observations of phenomena made by the early sages. It may appear today as a philosophical treatise, but the truth is that it contains historical facts connected with fortune-telling. Then, as regards the *Book of Poetry*; it is, to be sure, a collection of literary pieces, but it also stimulated the imagination, and afterwards some of the later schools, such as the Diplomats and Traveling Scholars, who took their origin from it.

Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng left us three essays on the *Book of Changes*, three on the *Book of History*, two on the *Book of Poetry*, one on the *Book of Rites*, and three on the Classics in general, in which he sought to trace the source of Chinese knowledge from primitive society down to the Hundred Schools in the Contending States period. He assumed that at the former, state government and schol-

arship were united, whereas after Confucius they were divided. Due to this separation, various schools of philosophy came into existence. Chang's genetic account of knowledge is valuable, but one should not forget that it is historical analysis only.

Whenever I am asked whether Chang had a complete system of philosophy, my answer is "no!" Apart from his *Inquiry into Tao*, he never revealed any interest in heaven, human nature, or the relation between the metaphysical and the physical; consequently he never propounded a complete system of knowledge. But he may be appropriately regarded as a literary critic in the widest sense. Since he knew all the subjects of Chinese literature, the Classics, the Histories, local gazetteers, and *belles lettres*, in their historical perspective, he was able to provide us with historiographical and stylistic criticism of the different periods, written from an evolutionary point of view. His mind was occupied with the study of Chinese history, but he never wrote a philosophy of history like Hegel's work of that name, or Toynbee's *Study of History*. He concentrated on the style of historical writing. He opposed the compilation of history as a government project, in which the work would be divided among subordinates and supervised by a board of editors, for he believed that this procedure—collecting, arranging, and writing—too readily degenerates into routine, and leaves no room for an author's originality.

In general, Chinese historical works were composed in two ways: One was in the form of the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, according to which events were arranged in chronological order. Time sequence rather than causal relation was the fundamental principle. The other form, known as "Records and Biographies," was that used in the Dynastic Histories. Chapters about emperors were put first as having top priority, and were denominated "Records." Then came "Biographies" of ministers; finally, chapters about institutions, such as the calendar, economic life, government organization, rites, music, and literature. The *Spring and Autumn Annals*, of course, was the prototype for historical writing of the first form. It was later adopted by Ssu-ma Kuang, author of the *Tzu-chih Tung-chien*. I might add that it was only after China's contact with the West that she learned that other ways of writing history were possible, or even preferable. For instance, each event,

standing by itself, might be described from beginning to end, without the author's having recourse to division into periods. This method, indeed, was a third form of history-writing, introduced by Yüan Ch'ü, and rediscovered by our Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng, who esteemed it as the best historiographical method.

I shall not go into details about Chang's style of writing history, but I shall mention the titles of two of his essays: (1) "The Virtue of a Historian," already alluded to, and (2) "The Meaning of the Term History." In these, his views of the nature of good historical writing are fully explained.

For two decades Chang has been worshipped as a Chinese Ranke because he demanded of the historian thorough research in source material, excellent and objective judgment of men, movements, and events, and sharp and clear characterization in good literary style. It is a pity that he never wrote a general history of China. We can be certain that if he had he would have preferred the third form of historical composition mentioned above, in which every event is described from beginning to end as a story by itself.

As a literary and historical critic, Chang left to later generations many salutary pieces of advice. He repeated often the observation that a scholar should stand for individuality and originality. He condemned the habit of chasing after fashion and forgetting one's intellectual independence. He was explicit in recommending that a scholar should create a new academic atmosphere rather than succumb like a slave to the academic *status quo*.

Though Chang worked indefatigably, he remained unknown to his contemporaries. Even his family name was recorded incorrectly. His family name, Chang, written in Chinese means "chapter"; but Ch'ien Lin (1762-1826) transcribed it as Chang meaning "long-bow." The sound is the same, but the characters are different. What pathetic evidence this is of his obscurity!

His *General Principles of Literature and History*, and *Principles of Collation* were not printed until 1841, forty years after his death. It was only three decades ago that he was rediscovered by a Japanese sinologist and some Chinese scholars. I believe that in the years to come his theory and method in philosophy and historiography will enjoy greater prestige than they have in the past.

Now we come to the second representative of opposition to the

School of Investigatory Study: Fang Tung-shu. In an examination of the reaction against philology it is impossible to ignore him since he was even more bitter in his attack than Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng. His antagonism arose not so much from dislike of the research work of the Philologists as from hatred of their disdain for Chu Hsi, and their attempt to substitute Han Philology for Sung Philosophy.

Fang was born in T'ung-ch'eng District, Anhwei Province. He lived (1772-1851) during the heyday of the School of Han Philology. He was a student of Yao Nai, a Ch'ing Dynasty literary stylist. Afterwards, when Juan Yüan was viceroy of the Two Kwangs (Kwantung and Kwangsi), he was invited to assist in the editing of the provincial history, and while employed by this official he wrote the *Han-hsüeh Shang-tui* [Objections to Han Philology] (1824), a work afterwards extolled by Liang Ch'ü-ch'iao as peculiarly valuable because it challenged the Philologists when they were at the height of their prestige.

This book is worth our close attention. It was written in the form of a series of quotations from the Philologists, each followed by Fang's devastating criticism. Translations of a few of these passages should interest the reader, as they furnish a vivid picture of the standpoints of the two conflicting schools: Han Philology and Sung Philosophy. A portion of Fang's preface will serve to set the stage. "In recent years," he wrote, "the Han Philologists have become more prejudiced and narrow-minded. Their method has been to use broken, scattered, chiselled, and mistaken notes about terms and objects, learned from Han scholars. They have pushed their movement as if they were trying to force a wave to curve upwards in order to speed the flow of water. They have done their work gladly, clapping their hands and tucking up their sleeves. They have denounced openly the Sung philosophers, especially Chu Hsi. They have been ignorant of the necessity of system in the different kinds of knowledge, and of the need of the presence of a goal for life in *tao*. Yet they have jabbered and discussed for the purpose of self-satisfaction and of gaining fame for themselves. Let me [Fang Tung-shu] illustrate by an example. The Classics are good sprouts. The Han scholars were tillers who knew how to manage fields. They ploughed and removed weeds to let the sprouts

grow. The Sung philosophers collected the crop, ground it in mills, and cooked it as food, thus nourishing human life, building up bodies, and keeping the people active and healthy. Without tilling and weeding by the Han scholars, the Sung philosophers would have had no grain from which to make food. Without harvesting and grinding by the Sung philosophers, the grain might have remained useless in the fields, and the people might have been deprived of their life's nourishment. In our own day, however, the Philologists have taken withered plants and dried ears and have entertained the expectation of reviving them. At the same time, they have laughed at the grinders and food-manufacturers. These Philologists labor stubbornly under the opinion that their occupation with dead plants will contribute vastly to agriculture. The fact is, however, their withered plants and dried ears cannot possibly contribute even a few bowls of rice, and it is no wonder that teachers and pupils have suffered from starvation. This sort of doctrine leads the people to become fools. The expounders of the doctrine do not benefit from it themselves. In spite of being busy with the Classics, they know nothing about *tao*, and contribute nothing to practical life. They have maintained that theirs is the exhaustive way of dealing with the Classics. They have worked hard during their lifetime; yet at death they have left nothing to show for their efforts. Since their labors have all been confined to trying to find something on the outside, the result is that men's minds have gone chasing everywhere, and have become lost, and the masses have suffered from complete lack of understanding the fundamental principles of life. The Philologists have made much use of the name of the Duke of Chou and of Confucius, but they have been far removed from either of them. They know nothing of the Classics. Remembering the sayings of Chuang-tzu, I [Fang Tung-shu] became convinced that the world would have lapsed into chaos if Confucius had not lived. After perusing the works on the Classics by the Han and T'ang scholars, I became convinced that the world would have lapsed into chaos if the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi had not lived . . ."¹²

The field of the Han School [this school which existed in the Ch'ing Dynasty is not to be confused with the Han scholars themselves, mentioned above, who lived in the Han Dynasty] was phi-

logy, while that of the Sung School was philosophy. It is thus difficult to understand how two such utterly incommensurate disciplines could have quarrelled. Yet in China, strange as it may seem, philology as well as philosophy claimed to be the sole agent for the study of the *tao* of the sages. Each felt that it had a monopoly in the understanding of *tao*, and so friction between the two was unavoidable. In the Han Dynasty no such quarrel was possible. Perhaps it would be accurate to say that the hostilities occurred because philology invaded the territory of philosophy.

Before introducing the quotations of the philologists and Fang's replies, let me point out very briefly that his *Han-hsüeh Shang-tui* consisted of three books: One and two were collections of the philological quotations attacking the Sung philosophers' usage of terms like *tao*, *ri*, *tao-mind*, and human mind, together with Fang's refutations; and number three went further by showing that the philological approach to *tao* is untenable.

Let us then come to these quotations and Fang's rejoinders, which reveal the lively polemic between the entrenched School of Han Philology and Sung Neo-Confucianism.

"(1) *Mao Ch'i-ling's critical comment on the usage of the term tao*. He said: 'For many years the science of sagehood has not been illuminated. Formerly, the sages were occupied with *tao*, and through learning they advanced towards it. We have never heard of such a term as '*tao-science*' or '*tao-philosophy*.' In the Six Classics the words '*tao*' and '*hsüeh*' [science or philosophy] were separated, not combined; or if they were combined, it was only to form the expression '*hsüeh tao*' [study of *tao*]. However, from the Taoists, beginning with Yo-tzu and Lao-tzu, a collection of 78 works in 520 books has come down. Though in circulation, they were never sanctioned by the government. The Taoists transmitted their study privately to carry on their tradition. In their writings one finds biographies of Taoists who lived in monasteries. In the *Liang-shu Ching* it is said: 'When one's mind goes along with *ri* [reason], when it is in conformity with *tao*, what one works with is called the Philosophy of *Tao*, or Philosophy of Reason.' In the Sung Dynasty, Ch'en T'uan, a monk of Hua Shan Monastery . . . tried to develop this study, and he wrote a book entitled *Outline of Tao-Science*. Now it happened that Chou Tun-i, Shao Yung, and

the Ch'eng brothers were pupils of this man, and accordingly they allowed the Taoist religion to keep a place in the Confucian books. Likewise, in the Southern Sung Dynasty, Chu Hsi requested an editor in the Historiographical Bureau, Hung Mai, to write a biography of Ch'en T'uan as a great personality. Chou Tun-i and the Ch'eng brothers championed the cause of *tao*-philosophy. Thus it was that in the *History of the Sung Dynasty* a chapter on *tao*-science was inserted which was held to be the equivalent of Confucianism . . . So *tao*-science, which originally belonged to the Taoist sect, a religion starting in the Han Dynasty, was renewed by the monk of Hua Shan Monastery, and became, moreover, an object of devotion for scholars of the Sung Dynasty, who pursued it with intense earnestness. It is definitely certain that what was renewed had nothing to do with the science of sagehood.

"Fang Tung-shu's answer. For a long time persons skeptical of the Sung scholars have denounced them, alleging that they fell into the trap of Ch'anism. But Mao Ch'i-ling has accused them of usurping *tao*. Even opponents like Chiao Hung (1541-1620) and Yang Shen (1488-1559) expressed themselves less strongly than Mao Ch'i-ling. In my view, the study of *tao* should be the preoccupation of every scholar. The words '*tao hsiieh*,' as a label given by later generations, may have many meanings according to the context, so it cannot be explained in any one definite way. In primitive society where there was but a single ruler, what was ordered by government and what was taught by teachers were the same. This was also the knowledge which the tillers of the soil were required to have. But after the Chou Dynasty, *tao* was split up. Lao-tzu began to expound a theory of *tao*. He may have been right in his way, but he went to extremes. If we follow down through Chuang-tzu, Lieh-tzu, Yang-tzu, and Mo Ti, we meet with further diversifications and deviations. Then the fight took place between the orthodox and heretical schools . . . It was not only that Taoism was separated from Confucianism, but also that within Taoism different factions developed . . . After the Han Dynasty, when the term 'Taoist' was applied to one school only, the essential and comprehensive understanding of *tao* began to disappear forever.

"Only by the efforts of Tung Chung-shu, Han Yü, and in the Sung period the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi, was *tao* adequately

expounded on the basis of the Six Classics, and of Confucius and Mencius. Then, once again, the science of sagehood began to be revived.'"¹³

Fang went on to give citations from the Confucian Classics to show that the term *tao* means a road by which everyone must travel. It has nothing to do with *tao* in the Taoist sense. He also explained that the primary meaning of *tao* is natural order, and that the interpretation of the Han philologist Hsü Shen, according to whom it meant markings on a jade, was derivative. As regards the term "ri" [reason], Fang said that Tai Chen's definition of it as fibre in a beefsteak was correct to a certain extent, but that a deeper definition would equate it with natural order. He condemned Mao Ch'i-ling's mixture of *tao* in the Taoist sense with the same word in the Confucian sense of unchangeable truth; because by this confusion Mao had been able to infer that the philosophy of Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, Chang Tsai, and Chu Hsi was heretical.

"(2) *The attack of Huang Chen [a pupil of Chu Hsi] on the so-called Mind Tradition of Sixteen Words.*" This is connected with a quotation from the *Book of History*: "The human mind is dangerous, the *tao*-mind is subtle. Be proficient! Have unity! Hold to the proper mean!" In Chinese this passage is written in sixteen characters. Later discussions referred to it as the first treatment of the subject. It was, however, only to be found in the Old Script text of the *Book of History*, where it was criticized by the Philologists as a forgery, since they adhered to the New Script text. The purpose of their criticism was to remove the very foundation from under the feet of the Sung philosophers, to disarm them of their most effective weapon. Huang Chen, by accenting the last three sentences in the passage: "Be proficient! Have unity! Hold to the proper mean!" was able to interpret it as having nothing to do with mind. He said, "Modern scholars attended to the School of Mind, abandoned the meaning of this chapter as a whole, and concentrated on two terms: '*tao*-mind' and 'human mind.' Occasionally they even picked out the former term, forgetting the latter, and coined the slogan: 'Mind is *tao*, or reason.' Their mode of thinking led them into the trap of Ch'an Buddhism, far away from the tradition handed down from Yao and Shun."

Fang Tung-shu's answer. In replying to the philological allegation of forgery involved in this sixteen-word passage, and in summing up his conception of the value of his opponent's tracing back the terms "dangerous" and "subtle" to the writings of Hsün-tzu, Fang Tung-shu argued that granting it was a forgery, still the passage has intrinsic worth, and this should be taken into consideration. The Philologists believed only in what they saw written down in books, using this as evidence for their theories; so Fang accused them of forgetting all about mind.

"(3)*Tai Chen's criticism of the Sung philosophers' speculative way of thinking.* 'They call *ri* a science or a philosophy; they consider *tao* a tradition; they make mind a frame of reference; their exploration is uncharted; their examination vague. It is much better to go back to the texts of the Six Classics.'

Fang Tung-shu's answer. 'At first sight, the remarks above seem fairly sound. However, if one examines them carefully, one will find that Tai Chen's criticism is erroneous. When the Ch'eng brothers studied under Chou Tun-i, he advised them to go back to the Six Classics as part of their study. We must ask furthermore, what is the meaning of going back to the Classics? What can this signify other than to inquire into *tao*, to examine reason, to search for mind? Tai Chen has told us that there is no use in hunting for reason. Evidently, what he meant by going back to the Six Classics was to study terms, objects, institutions, phonetics, and etymology. Let me illustrate by an example. After a good farmer has ground grain and taken away the best, a poor fellow, coming to the spot, did not know what had previously happened and seeing the husks and chaff boasted loudly of what he had come into possession of. It is the same with the philologists. What was left for them was only husks and chaff. Chu Hsi said: 'In recent years, certain people have borrowed some seemingly plausible doctrines from Buddhism, passing them off as genuine Confucianism. Their method has been to condemn knowledge-seeking and book-learning, and thence they propose that the correct way to seek mind is to speculate. By a sudden awakening, an enlightenment of mind is attainable.' Obviously, the philological critics of Chu Hsi have taken their criticism from him, and turned it against him as a slanderous weapon . . .'"¹⁴

Fang proceeded, next, to prove that the method used by the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi in their inquiries into *tao* was never divorced from the Six Classics.

"(4) *Tai Chen's attack on the concept ri of the Sung philosophers*. He said: '*Ri*, according to the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi, is an entity endowed by heaven and stored in mind. This theory led later generations to believe that one's private opinion may be held as reason—which has caused great damage to the people. The Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi also advocated the theory of desirelessness, thus putting attainment of *ri* further away, and making the masses even more stubborn in clinging to their private opinions, which has increased the damage done to them . . .'

"*Fang Tung-shu's answer*. 'According to the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi, an opinion which is unselfish is in agreement with heavenly reason. This doctrine is noble, correct, and self-evident. I do not understand how a private opinion can claim to be reason, as Tai Chen has assumed. According to Tai the desires and sentiments of the people should be taken into consideration. But these desires and sentiments are individual and private. If an unselfish opinion, in agreement with heavenly reason, is unreliable, how can the desires and sentiments of individuals be as good as reason?' " 15

In the last book of the *Han-hsüeh Shang-tui*, Fang wielded his strongest weapon to push his Investigatory enemies into a corner. These persons had always held that knowledge of *tao* is attainable only through the study of words, and then of sentences. Their approach was analytico-philological. Since the Eastern Han Dynasty, however, Hsü Shen's *Shuo-wen* had been the standard reference book for the explanation of characters, and a pupil of Tai Chen, Tuan Yü-ts'ai, had re-examined and re-edited it, showing that his school attached the greatest importance to it. The philologists, indeed, even maintained that every correct explanation of a character should be referable to it. Thus *tao*, contained in the Classics, would be illuminated. Fang's weapon consisted in proving that Tai Chen and his disciples erred fifteen times in holding this point of view. I shall not list all fifteen allegations of error, but certainly a few of them are worth mentioning. Fang insisted that since Hsü Shen's book itself consisted of sentences quoted from the Classics for the purpose of elucidating characters, he ob-

viously recognized that characters are explicable only in terms of their positions in their contexts. But then how can the Philologists rationally hold that in isolated characters, too old to be any longer meaningful, no correct explanation can be found; and that for others alternative explanations are possible? This last was his most powerful weapon. If various interpretations exist for one character, who is to decide which is correct? The only way to solve the problem is to use reason, mind. Rationalists have always maintained that reason is the final court of appeal, and empiricists must admit that it is difficult to deny this. Just so, the Philologists also, who are a species of empiricists, must grant that reason is the final arbitrator. Before one proceeds to select a meaning from several possible alternatives one can only solve the question on the basis of reason.

On the whole, Fang Tung-shu fought with the Philologists bravely and exposed many of their weaknesses, though his work was not merely destructive criticism. He gave the minions of the Investigatory School, no doubt, a knockout blow. After his death, many of Tai Chen's own followers began to ponder over the limitations of Tai's doctrines. Men like Juan Yüen, Chiao Hsün, and Ling T'ing-k'an knew well that philology cannot monopolize all truth, so they started to discuss human nature, mind, and divine order under the cloak of philology. This was a sign that the school had begun to disintegrate from its own intrinsic defects.

In the beginning of the 19th Century, Tseng Kuo-fan, T'ang Chien, and many others strove to revive the Sung tradition. There was a movement of reconciliation between the Han and Sung Schools. However, the pressure of the Open Door Policy imposed upon China by the West was so overwhelming that revival of Sung philosophy and reconciliation between the Han and Sung Schools lacked conviction, and failed to be sufficiently active to renew China's spiritual life.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Tseng Kuo-Fan's Attempt at a Revival of Sung Philosophy and His Inventory of the Chinese Intellectual Heritage

The reign of Ch'ien-lung (1736-1795) achieved the peak of Manchu rule in China. During this period the power of the Chinese Empire was extended to Central Asia and to Burma and Annam. The wars which Ch'ien-lung waged included the suppression of the Sungars, the "pacification" of the Moslems in Sinkiang, the annihilation of the Chin-ch'uan rebels in Szechwan, and the subjugation of the Burmese and the Annamese. None of these campaigns was a victory in the sense of the word, for they made heavy drains on the imperial treasury, leading to financial manipulation and corruption which paved the way for the decline and fall of Manchu power.

However, within China itself Ch'ien-lung's reign preserved peace, so that scholars received encouragement from the government. Men like Tai Chen carried on their philological work and commentary without being disturbed. With the death of this vigorous emperor, religious riots, banditry, and foreign encroachments began to occur and China rapidly showed signs of weakness. It was then that scholars began to doubt whether they should continue their quiet philological researches, or do some other kind of work to arouse the people to more effective physical and spiritual preparation. Such was the situation at the turn of the 19th century. That was the time when Tseng Kuo-fan and his colleagues lived. They were convinced that it was essential to find a cure for the disease for which the philological labors of Tai Chen and his school were partly responsible.

Tseng Kuo-fan is well known as the commander-in-chief who succeeded in suppressing the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion of 1853-1864. But he was much more than a military leader. He was also a literary man, a poet, a Sung philosopher, and a philologist. During his military campaigns his essays and self-examination in accordance with the ideas of the Neo-Confucianists were never interrupted. It was around a coterie of philosophical friends, Lo Tse-nan, Liu Yung, Kuo Sung-tao, and many others that the anti-T'ai-p'ing Hunan army built itself. We may even say that Tseng owed his military success to his philosophical friends. Following Wang Shou-jen, he was the next, or second, Chinese philosopher to be a great military leader.

Let us first of all give a sketch of his life. It is interesting to note that he came from a family which through a period of five centuries had never won a literary degree. Even his father, after participating in examinations seventeen times, received his *Hsiu-tsai* (licentiate) degree only one year before the son did, i.e., in 1832.

After Tseng Kuo-fan received his licentiate (1833), he entered an academy to pursue advanced studies. His desk in the dormitory was near a window. It was related that a bad-tempered fellow-student once complained that Tseng obstructed the light reaching him, to which Tseng replied by asking him where he should move his desk. The fellow student told Tseng to move his desk near the bed. This Tseng did. The following year he won his *chü-jen* degree. When the ill-tempered fellow heard this he was angry, since in those days people believed that good luck was the result of *Feng-shui* (Wind and Rain), meaning the location of one's dwelling place including the position of one's desk. Tseng's winning the higher degree was interpreted as an instance of such good luck. The irascible student then exclaimed that Teng's good luck should have been his. Whereupon the other students reminded him that it was by his own wish that Tseng moved his desk, and that he had no reason to complain that he had been deprived of anything. Yet he continued to moan saying that it was because of the change that the good fortune was taken away from him. Among all the school-mates, Tseng alone did not condemn him, but was tolerant and

said nothing. This incident throws light on the youthful philosopher's character.

(1) *Tseng Kuo-fan's Career in Peking (1838-1852)*

Having received his *chü-jen*, Tseng went to Peking to take part in the metropolitan examination. He failed once, but on the second trial he won his *chin-shih* degree (1838). The next year he became a member of the Han-lin Academy, where he paid no attention to government affairs but attended exclusively to further study. From then on, his interest turned to literature, philosophy, philology and to whatever he wished to study, because there was no longer any need to be concerned with examinations. He was particularly fond of Han Yü's essays. He said that Yao Nai awakened his interest in literature.

In 1841, T'ang Chien, author of the *Record of Ch'ing Confucian Scholars* was transferred from his position of Commissioner of Finance in Nanking to the secretaryship of the Board of Rites of the Imperial Household. After meeting him, Tseng began to devote himself to the philosophy of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi. This does not mean that he became exclusively a pro-Sung philosopher, for he was, at the same time, also interested in philology and literature. In Tseng's eyes, an all-round scholar should embrace three disciplines: (1) principles and philosophy of righteousness; (2) investigatory studies such as philology, history, and the study of institutions; and (3) literature. These three disciplines were regarded by him as being equally important.

During the decade between 1841 and 1850, when Tseng spent most of his time in Peking, he was sent out once to act as examiner in Szechwan Province. In this ten year period he rose to the assistant-secretaryship of the Board of Public Works, and grew to regard himself as no longer a career-man, but as one who was responsible for state-affairs.

The Emperor Hsien-feng ascended the throne in 1851. Tseng, perceiving that the situation throughout the country was going from bad to worse, addressed a few memoranda to the new sovereign, offering advice. The best known of these is the one where

he said that his majesty had three good points in his character, and that they might lead to evil if they were not properly directed and controlled. The first good point of his majesty's character was his cautiousness and habit of deliberation. But these qualities might lead to pettiness and loss of vision. The vital things of government might be neglected, and only trivialities attended to. The second good point of his majesty's character was his delight in reading old books and taking the wise men of old as his models. But this habit might result in his citing ancient precedents as a cover for his own purposes. In connection with this delicate admonition Tseng also advised against publication of his majesty's *Collected Essays and Poems*. The third point of criticism hurt the emperor most, for it touched intimately upon his personality. His majesty, said Tseng, considered himself as being able to hold a position of aloofness and impartiality. But this attitude might lead to arrogance and disinterestedness in the bad sense of the word, i.e., to supercilious lack of interest in the things he ought to be interested in. For example, Tseng continued, his majesty had recently issued a decree in which he twice expressed himself as having in his hands the power to employ or dismiss people. It would have been better if he had shown appreciation of the value of relying upon public opinion in his choice of men. Otherwise, that is, if he keeps everything in his own hands, ministers will not dare to be straightforward or express their views with a sense of freedom. People then would prefer to keep silent rather than to speak out. If his majesty does not try to induce ministers to be frank, those who surround him will be only flatterers. Then when emergencies arise, no one of integrity or strength of character will be at hand to fill positions of heavy responsibility. At the end of this memorandum, Tseng pointed out the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, and showed how important it was for the emperor to have able men to share his responsibilities.

When this advice-giving memorial was submitted to Hsien-feng, many in government circles thought that it would incur imperial displeasure, and would lead perhaps to the doughty philosopher's punishment—to banishment, for instance, as Wang Shou-jen was banished to Kweichow. But the only reaction Tseng experienced was a few words of reproach saying that he was impractical and

stupid. Nevertheless, Hsien-feng accepted the warning against flattery and against being offended by straightforwardness. He replied to his critic that Tseng ought to understand that an emperor's work is difficult, and that a minister's work, likewise, is not easy. Hsien-feng's tolerance of Tseng's strongly worded document, and the question-answer interchange between the two, were regarded as auspicious.

In the first month of the following year (1852), Tseng was transferred to the post of First Assistant Secretary of the Board of Civil Service. In the sixth month he was sent out to Kiangsi Province as examiner. At about this time he asked to be allowed to pay a visit to his native place, and while en route received news of his mother's death, which of course, caused him to hasten his return. After the funeral, an order reached him from the emperor stating that in his capacity as Assistant Secretary he was authorized to raise an army of militia to fight the T'ai-p'ing rebels. Thus began Tseng's career as a military leader.

(2) *Tseng Kuo-fan's Military Campaigns (1853-64)*

It may be helpful for the reader's understanding of the background of our philosopher's military activities if I say a few words about the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion. Its leading spirit, Hung Hsiuch'uan, became devoted to Christianity after reading a tract about the Gospels. He started to propagate the new religion in his home town through an organization called the Society of God-worshippers, the members of which were his followers. Hung assumed the title Younger Brother of Jesus. Since the movement he initiated was religious, he came into conflict with the existing religions, which he condemned as idolatry. The Manchu government regarded him as subversive and as inciting disturbances. He in turn took up arms against the established authorities, and with the flush of victory after capturing a small city named Yung-an proclaimed the *T'ai-p'ing T'ien Kuo* (Celestial Dynasty of Universal Peace), and gave himself the title of *T'ien Wang* (Celestial King). With the fall of Yung-an, the T'ai-p'ing army, swollen by recruits, marched across Hunan to the Yangtze Valley, but failed to capture Ch'ang-sha, the provincial capital. Then, reaching the Yangtze at Yüeh-chou,

which was taken, it marched east along the river until it came to Nanking, in March 1853. Here Hung remained for eleven years as Emperor of the Celestial Kingdom.

Undoubtedly this easy victory of the T'ai-p'ing army was a great shock to the Manchu government. If, indeed, Hung had continued his march northward after the fall of Nanking, he might have brought an end to the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1854, fifty-seven years earlier than its actual collapse in 1911. At any rate, the government was sufficiently impressed by the gravity of the situation to authorize Tseng Kuo-fan to raise an army of militia to fight the T'ai-p'ings, for the Banner Troops of the Manchus were worthless. Tseng was at first reluctant to undertake the responsibility, but urged on by his friends he consented.

Under cover of drilling a militia to combat bandits, his actual work was to equip an army and flotilla for the Yangtze River. As mentioned before, he had the benefit of a group of philosophical friends who were reliable. Thus, it was a simple matter for him to choose officers to command brigades and divisions. After some considerable time he raised an army of 10,000 men, and acquired a flotilla of 300 gunboats and seven or eight hundred freighters, all ready for attack.

However, at the first battle fought at Yüeh-chou and Ching-chiang, Tseng was defeated because a storm drove away forty of his boats. Moreover, his troops were inexperienced. The disconsolate Commander-in-Chief tried twice to drown himself in the river, but each time his comrades saved him. Luckily his officers, T'a Ch'i-pu and P'eng Yü-lin, were more successful at Hsiang-t'an. There they triumphed over the T'ai-p'ings (May 1, 1854), counterbalancing Tseng's misfortune. This victory was considered the first one for the government forces, and the first defeat for the rebels since their triumphal march from Kwangsi Province to Nanking.

The Commander-in-Chief became more confident and set out to recapture Wu-ch'ang, capital of Hupeh Province, which had fallen to the Celestial King on June 24, 1854. Tseng's officers who won this victory were Lo Tse-nan and the aforementioned T'a Ch'i-pu. The enemy lost a thousand boats. This successful onslaught was important because thereafter the Upper Yangtze, west of Wu-ch'ang, was kept in the hands of the Manchu government, except

for eight months in 1855 when the city succumbed to the T'ai-p'ings for a third time.

Tseng's scheme now was to advance into Kiangsi and Anhwei provinces. But first he had to mop up the enemy along both banks of the Yangtze as far as Kiukiang, Kiangsi Province, on the southern bank of the river. A significant preliminary step was the Battle of Tien-chia-chen (December 1854), at which an iron chain of the T'ai-p'ings stretched across the river was broken, and 4,500 enemy boats were burned. The number of followers of the Celestial King later found dead was twenty or thirty thousand. But for the most part Tseng's army and flotilla floated down the river from Wu-ch'ang to Kiukiang with very little resistance. When they reached their destination, however, they encountered there, and at Hu-k'ou, trenches and small fortresses built by the enemy and rafts at the mouth of Po-yang Lake. When Tseng's flotilla entered the lake, it was pursued by the T'ai-p'ings who burned many boats, including the philosopher's own flagship which carried numerous official documents. Again the Commander-in-Chief felt ashamed and tried to sacrifice himself, this time by riding a horse into the thick of the fray hoping to be killed. Once again he was saved by his friends, for Lo Tse-nan and Liu Yung came to his rescue. While a part of Tseng's navy was bottled in the Po-yang Lake, he himself went to Nan-ch'ang where Lo Tse-nan's army was stationed. He remained in Kiangsi Province from January 1855 until February 1857, because the molestations of the T'ai-p'ings there and in Hupeh Province were so continuous that he could not get away. While in Nan-ch'ang he still commanded his army and flotilla, and on December 6, 1856, he sent Lo Tse-nan and Hu Lin-i to retake Wu-ch'ang. This was his most difficult and trying period, since his military strength was not adequate to the endless and ubiquitous skirmishing of the followers of the Celestial King.

When Tseng's father died in February of 1857, the filial son insisted on going back to his native town to mourn for three years. The Emperor recognized that his Commander-in-Chief was insistent on this point, so he granted permission on condition that Tseng resume his military responsibility when the emergency required. However, his officers-in-charge proved competent to carry out his plans, at least for a while, during his absence.

At this time, the most daring general of the T'ai-p'ings, Shih Ta-kai, broke from another leader of the Celestial Dynasty of Universal Peace, Wei Ch'ang-hui, who had killed Shih's whole family. The injured man naturally wanted revenge, and Hung Hsiu-ch'uan had Wei murdered, then presented his head to his daring general. But Shih felt uneasy in Nanking. He broke with the T'ai-p'ing government altogether and tried to build an independent kingdom in Szechwan Province. After marching the vast distance from east to west he reached his destination, only to be blocked by Lo Ping-chang, Governor General of Szechwan, and executed.

Tseng Kuo-fan was able to stay at home for more than a year just because this dissension was taking place in the T'ai-p'ing court. Eventually, however, the Emperor called upon him to resume his duties as Commander-in-Chief. He then mapped out a plan of campaign according to which the retaking of Anking was the first step. He also complained that his official status of secretary, staying in his own province to train an army of militia, was inadequate. It left him no army-headquarters, no powers to employ and dismiss civilian officers in the various localities, and no authority to raise funds to defray his military expenses. Since both the provinces of Szechwan and Chekiang were suffering from the T'ai-p'ing menace, the government issued orders to send him at one time to Szechwan, at another time to Chekiang. Tseng meanwhile persisted in the strategy already mentioned, of advancing to Anking for the sake of which he held fast to Wu-ch'ang and Kiukiang. At Anking his brother, Tseng Kuo-ch'uan, was already under attack. At last, Tseng Kuo-fan was appointed Chief Secretary of the Board of War, and concurrently Commander-in-Chief of the Front, and Governor-General of the river-provinces of Kiangsi, Anhwei, and Kiangsu. Thereafter, his policy was to keep Hupeh and Hunan provinces as his rear, to mop up bandits along the river, and to take Anking in order to advance towards Nanking. This plan of campaign he clung to stubbornly from 1858 until the fall of Nanking in 1864.

Tseng had his headquarters in Ch'i-men. He placed his best men in position of authority to carry out his strategy. Yang Tsai-fu and P'eng Yü-lin were in charge of the flotilla; his brother Tseng Kuo-ch'uan was responsible for the taking of Anking; Tso Tsung-tang was first made governor of Anhwei, and afterwards of Che-

kiang; and Li Hung-ch'ang was made governor of Kiangsu. These men were his intimate co-workers. They fought carefully and bravely in their several areas, and always in co-ordination with their commander-in-chief.

Anking was taken on September 5, 1861, after a siege of more than a year. This was a great victory for the philosopher-strategist, because the route to Nanking was now open.

Though for the first few years the T'ai-p'ing army's maneuvering seemed rapid and skillful, the territories under its control were never ruled well. When the capital of the Celestial Dynasty of Universal Peace was set up in Nanking, its chief work was to send armies to Wu-ch'ang, Kiukiang, and elsewhere, to molest Tseng Kuo-fan. It never succeeded in cutting off any revenue of the government, or in reducing man power. After 1856, because of the internal dissension involving Yang Hsiu-chen, Wei Ch'ang-hui, and Shih Ta-kai already referred to, the maneuvering power of the T'ai-p'ing army was much weakened. It lost more able men through internecine rivalries than on the battlefield. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's leaving the Nanking court was a result of rivalry with the brothers of the Celestial King, who were in control of everything in that city.

But in spite of internal strife at the T'ai-p'ing headquarters, several more years were required before Nanking was taken. From May 31, 1862, Tseng Kuo-ch'uan encamped at Yü-hua-tai, a hill under Nanking's nose. Making use of deep trenches and other protective devices, he not only defended his own position, but also gave heavy blows to the rebels until they closed the gates of their capital in lieu of reinforcement. Tseng Kuo-ch'uan suffered a bullet wound in the head, and his army sustained grave losses from pestilence. The Celestial King called Li Hsiu-ch'eng back from Soochow to relieve the city. But after forty-six days of continuous fighting Li was unable to impair Tseng Kuo-ch'uan's position. Notwithstanding the Commander-in-Chief's advice to retreat, his brother persisted in the siege. In 1863 the military situation became more favorable, since Tseng Kuo-ch'uan had taken advantage of all the strategical points Nanking had to offer, and had completely encircled the city. Chiefly because of the effectiveness of elaborate tunnels under the capital walls, Nanking finally fell on July 19, 1864, and the Celestial King committed suicide. A few months

earlier, Soochow had surrendered to Li Hung-ch'ang (December 5, 1853), and Hangchow had been recaptured by Tso Tsung-tang (April 1, 1864). Thus was completed the reconquest of all the territories lost to the ephemeral Celestial Dynasty of Universal Peace.

Chief credit for suppressing the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, of course, goes to Tseng Kuo-fan. He chose the right men, his planning was far-sighted, and his patience and perseverance were phenomenal. Besides all this, he showed remarkable astuteness in his waging of what nowadays is called psychological warfare. In other words, he had very little to say about the war as a means of maintaining the Confucian tradition, for the T'ai-p'ings were hostile to this tradition, burning down all Confucian temples in the territories which they occupied. Tseng also listed the burning of Buddhist and Taoist monasteries as war crimes of the rebels. Another phase of his psychological warfare was his writing of many popular songs to swing the masses to his side.

One more chapter remains to Tseng's military career. In March, 1865, he was transferred to Shantung Province, still as Commander-in-Chief, to quell an uprising of the Nien bandits. Meanwhile, Li Hung-ch'ang became his successor as Governor-General of the River Provinces. The philosopher-strategist was reluctant to take up another heavy military task, but not wishing to disobey an imperial order, he journeyed northward and made his headquarters at Hsü-chou, a place of strategical importance on the northern shore of the Yangtze Valley. Shortly afterwards he became ill and asked to be relieved. The reply was an order to return to Nanking and resume his post as Governor General of the River Provinces.

Tseng was subsequently transferred to the governor-generalship of Chihli Province, which meant a return to northern China. This gave him an opportunity to visit Peking, where he had an interview with the emperor toward the end of 1868. While in Peking he went to Liu-li-chang to browse among the old bookshops, an indication that his interest still lay in scholarship, but the call of duty had imposed military responsibilities upon him which he could not shirk.

As Governor General of Chihli, Tseng had to settle a few cases involving the Catholic Church and the French diplomatic mission.

He advised the Emperor not to believe rumors that Catholic missionaries took hearts out of Chinese bodies.

He was, no doubt, conservative, but at the same time he was liberal and enlightened. He acknowledged the superiority of Western science and technology, as will be described in more detail later. He and Li Hung-ch'ang started the building of the Kiang-nan Arsenal at Shanghai, where hundreds of Western books on natural science, mathematics, navigation, and gun-making were translated; and where ships were built and guns manufactured.

When Tseng was sixty he once again was sent back to Nanking to be Governor General of the River Provinces. He died about a year after his resumption of this office.

We now come to Tseng Kuo-fan's scholarly work. He was an extraordinary man. Besides his labors as a military strategist, he wrote literary and philosophical essays. In this respect he was like Wang Shou-jen, who did not let his military operations put a stop to his philosophical conferences.

As mentioned above, Tseng was influenced by Yao Nai, a literary stylist of the Ch'ing Dynasty, who imbued him with a keen appreciation of literature. But at the same time he did not ignore philosophy, for in his opinion scholarship was incomplete unless it covered three areas. Though I have already stated this doctrine of our philosopher, it bears repetition. To be complete, one's scholarship must embrace: (1) knowledge of the principles of righteousness (2) investigatory studies, e.g., philosophy; and (3) literature. These are of equal importance to the genuine scholar. I have not previously explained that Tseng regarded literature as a means of expressing *tao*, and writing as a means of elaborating it. Accordingly, he appreciated Han Yü and O-yang Hsiu, both of whom molded Chinese stylistically. He edited two books which may properly be called literary: anthologies of Chinese prose and poetry. So it is impossible to pigeonhole him as merely a philosopher, a philologist, or a writer of *belles-lettres*; he was all of these.

In his attitude towards Han philology Tseng was critical but not hostile. In his preface to the *Posthumous Works of Chu Shen-fu* he said: "During the reigns of Chia-ching and Tao-kuang, when the fashion of the last years of the reign of Ch'ien-lung was still followed, scholars devoted themselves to the study of scattered and

broken items. It was called study of terms and objects, or combing and cleaning words. Scholars would explain one or two words of a classic by an essay of a few thousand, or ten thousand, words. They would proceed very freely and elaborately, reaching no final goal. Their work was to show what they were able to do, and what others were unable to do. They even went further, changing the meaning of items like 'mind,' 'human nature,' 'jen,' and 'i,' by finding new substitutes. They organized themselves into a strongly coherent group. As a consequence the efforts of Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, Chang Tsai, and Chu Hsi were condemned. Those who supported Sung philosophy were exposed to ridicule and were criticized as being ignorant of sources, and as having been compelled by their ignorance and other shortcomings to seek escape in the speculative field of *ri* (reason) and *hsing* (human nature)."¹

Tseng had more to say on this subject in his Epilogue to T'ang Chien's *Records of Ch'ing Confucian Scholars*. "During the reigns of Ch'ien-lung and Chia-ching," he wrote, "scholars tried to show the wide range of their knowledge. Men like Hui Tung and Tai Chen were experts in philology. Their work was founded on the principle of the Prince of Ho-chien (Han Dynasty) that a scholar should seek right on the basis of actual data, and they called the Sung philosophers vague and speculative. However, we may ask, what is an actual datum? Does the word not mean 'thing'? What is right? Does the word not mean 'principle'? Then is not the formula 'to seek right on the basis of actual data' the same as Chu Hsi's formula 'to investigate principles on the basis of things'? If there is no difference between the fundamental ideas of these two schools, why should the Han philologists have created a new brand to advertise themselves? What they did was like slandering the sun and moon shining brightly in the heavens. The Han scholars advocated change, and this in itself was a prejudice."²

Tseng had still more to say. "Since the middle of the reign of Ch'ien-lung there has been a school called Han Philology. At first some scholars of wide knowledge studied terms and objects. They picked up what was lost and filled a gap. After a time they started to criticize the Sung philosophers. They went further and changed the meaning of such terms as 'mind,' 'human nature,' 'jen,' and 'i' in the books of Confucius and Mencius, for the purpose of disput-

ing Chu Hsi, or of posing difficult questions to him. On the one hand, those who have supported this position have not cared to examine it carefully. On the other hand, those who have opposed it have hated its exaggerations and arrogance, but have been blind to its strong points. Thus both sides are blameworthy. This situation is one which a discerning man should deplore."³

It is possible to draw the inference from these passages that Tseng was a pro-Sung scholar. In fact, however, he was not. He explained clearly that he took Sung philosophy as a guide, but that he did not disregard the value of Han philology. He was a broad-minded man who considered every part of human knowledge and art as necessary to a complete system of culture. The catholicity of his point of view is expressed most adequately in his essay; *Shen-chih Hua-hsiang Chi* (Remarks on Portraits of the Sages and Wise Men),⁴ written in 1859 while he was being harassed by the T'ai-p'ings in Kiangsi. In this work he selected thirty-two personages whom he regarded as having contributed fundamentally to the Chinese intellectual heritage, for each of which he appended a portrait provided, at his request, by his son Tseng Chi-tse. To each portrait also he affixed an explanatory note setting forth why he had selected the personage represented. Hence the title of the essay.

The thirty-two contributors to Chinese culture in Tseng Kuo-fan's list were:

- (1) King Wen, first elaborator of the *Book of Changes*.
- (2) The Duke of Chou, who consolidated the peace of the Chou Dynasty.
- (3) Confucius (551-479 B.C.), editor of the Six Classics.
- (4) Mencius (372-289 B.C.), successor to Confucius.
- (5) Tso Chiu-ming, author of the *Tso Chuan*, supposedly a commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals*.
- (6) Chuang-tzu (died about 275 B.C.) whose essays and allegories are the finest examples of Chinese imaginative thought.
- (7) Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-86 B.C.), author of the *Shih-chi*, a history of ancient China.
- (8) Pan Ku (A.D. 32-92), author of the *Han-shu* (History of the Han Dynasty).

- (9) Chu-Ko Liang (A.D. 181-234), great statesman who worked out a plan for Liu Pei, during the period of the Three Kingdoms of Wei, Shu (i.e., Szechwan), and Wu.
- (10) Lu Chih (A.D. 754-805), statesman of the T'ang Dynasty who served Emperor Yüan-tsung as financier.
- (11) Fan Chung-yen (A.D. 989-1052), statesman of the Sung Dynasty who served Emperor Jen-tsung.
- (12) Ssu-ma Kuang (A.D. 1019-1086), who served Emperor Jen-tsung; author of the *Tzu-chih T'ung-chien*, a history of China.
- (13) Chou Tun-i (A.D. 1017-1073), philosopher, author of the *Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate*.
- (14) The Ch'eng brothers: Ch'eng Hao (A.D. 1032-1085), and Ch'eng I (A.D. 1033-1107).
- (15) Chang Tsai (A.D. 1020-1077), author of the *Western Inscription*.
- (16) Chu Hsi (A.D. 1130-1200).
- (17) Han Yü (A.D. 768-824), a grand defender of the Confucian tradition against Buddhism.
- (18) Liu Tsung-yüan (A.D. 773-819), a distinguished prose-writer.
- (19) O-yang Hsiu (A.D. 1007-1072), same type of man as the preceding.
- (20) Tseng Kung (A.D. 1019-1083), same type of man as the preceding.
- (21) Li Po (A.D. 701-762), poet.
- (22) Tu Fu (A.D. 712-770), poet.
- (23) Su Shih (i.e., Su Tung-po), (A.D. 1036-1101), literary writer and poet.
- (24) Huang Ting-chien (A.D. 1045-1105), same type of man as preceding.
- (25) Hsü Shen, author of a philological vocabulary in the Later Han Dynasty.
- (26) Cheng Yüan (A.D. 127-200), commentator on the Classics.
- (27) Tu Yu (A.D. 735-812), author of the *T'ung T'ien* (Development of the Chinese Institutions.)
- (28) Ma Tuan-lin (*chin-shih* degree conferred in A.D. 647), author of the *T'ung Kao*, also about the development of Chinese institutions.
- (29) Ku Yen-wu (A.D. 1613-1682).

- (30) Ch'in Hui-t'ien (A.D. 1702-1764), author of the *Wu-li T'ung-kao* (Investigation of the Five Rites).
- (31) Yao Nai (A.D. 1731-1815), literary stylist who influenced Tseng Kuo-fan.
- (32) Wang Nien-sung (A.D. 1744-1832), philologist.

This list of personages whom Tseng regarded as having contributed fundamentally to Chinese cultural tradition is, in itself, evidence that he was neither a mere philologist nor a mere Sung philosopher. His interests embraced the whole of Chinese culture.

Tseng's thirty-two builders of Chinese culture may be classified or analyzed as follows:

- (I) The first series of four: King Wen, the Duke of Chou, and Confucius, were the originators of Chinese culture; Mencius was the successor to Confucius.
- (II) The second series of four: Tso Chiu-ming, Chuang-tzu, Ssu-ma Ch'ien, and Pan Ku, were creative stylists and historians who moulded Chinese writing.
- (III) The third series of four: Chu-ko Liang, Lu Chih, Fan Chung-yen, and Ssu-ma Kuang, were statesmen who shaped the destiny of their times.
- (IV) The fourth series of four (or five, if we count the Ch'eng brothers as two) were the founders of Sung Philosophy, or as I often call it in this book, Neo-Confucianism. Their work was an attempt to continue to build the Confucian tradition.
- (V) and (VI) The fifth and sixth series, totalling eight, were literary men and poets, in whom Tseng was deeply interested.
- (VII) and (VIII) The seventh and eighth series, totalling eight, were philologists and research students of Chinese institutions.

These last two categories (VII and VIII) require further explanation. The investigation by research students of the development of Chinese institutions was labeled in China *li*. It covered government and social institutions such as the family; also festivals,

mourning, and military rites. Tseng himself was devoted to this study, since it likewise had the name, "Study of How to Handle the World," or "Statesman's Science." *Li*, theoretically, was rooted in philosophy; its practical expression was in institutions. Thus it presents an analogy to that part of Hegel's doctrine of subjective and objective spirit which reached its synthesis in the *Philosophy of History*.

When Tseng drew up this list of the creators of Chinese civilization he unconsciously made an inventory of his people's social and intellectual heritage, which since the middle of the 19th century had been undergoing a significant change. It was from that time that the impact of Western civilization began to exert pressure which has never ceased, and which in all likelihood will continue for some time to come.

Tseng regarded the Sung philosophers of his fourth series as successors to Confucius and Mencius. Yet he also said that the commentaries of these Neo-Confucianists would have been more nearly perfect if they had been compiled in conjunction with the reference works of the Han philologists. In other words, the two schools should be considered complementary to each other, not incompatible. Neither onesidedly pro-Sung nor pro-Han, Tseng wished both sides to play their part in the total pattern of the Chinese cultural system.

I come now to Tseng's philosophical convictions. As we have seen, he was versatile. But his years of preoccupation with military campaigns prevented his building a philosophical system. Prior to his devotion to those arduous military duties, however, he wrote a letter to Liu Yung in which he explained, among other things, the first premise of his philosophical thought: "*i pen wan shu*" (one root, and diversification in ten thousand ways), or "*ri i fen shu*" (reason is one, but diversification is manifold). In Western terminology: "Unity of reality, and manifoldness of manifestations." This was the key to Sung philosophy. Tseng grasped it with one *coup d'oeil*.

But let us refer to his letter to Liu Yung. "My body," he wrote, "and thousands of other things are born in the universe. Their essences come from one and the same source. But its diversification is the result of putting forth branches in thousands of ways.

Showing filial piety to parents is different from showing human-heartedness to the people at large. Showing human-heartedness to the people at large is different from treating animals and things as fellows. A neighbor is different from a member of the family. Among relatives there are differences of grade, just as among wise men there are differences in intelligence, sometimes double, sometimes a thousandfold. Varieties are many. If one is ignorant of distinctions, showing human-heartedness promiscuously, this means that one is like Mo Ti, who believed in the theory of universal love. Or, if one is ignorant of distinctions, going to the extreme of enforcing righteousness with utter strictness, then one is like Yang Chu, who would not allow even a hair of his head to be taken for the benefit of other people. Excess in human-heartedness or in righteousness can have evil political consequences, and can create disturbances in the world grave enough to lead to animals' devouring human beings."⁵

In this passage Tseng was trying to say that the doctrine of Chang Tsai's *Western Inscription* about the various species growing out of the same root is true, so that the principle of universal brotherhood should be recognized. Philosophically speaking, one reality creates the world. Yet a man has his own parents, and parents have their own children. This branching out is multifarious. Accordingly, when we grasp the doctrine of one source and thousands of streams, it is natural for us to act as if there were a universal brotherhood, or one world. Yet there is no point in going to the extreme of universal love. On the other hand, though we know that various grades of difference among relatives obtain, if we have common sense we do not go to Yang Chu's extreme of egoism. In short, in the passage above, Tseng was trying to make plain that his premise "*ri i fen shu*" is important because it can have reference to men's dealing with all the vast variety of human relations.

Since the diversifications are numerous, the question of the "investigation of things" should be carefully studied. Indeed, the diversifications may well be literally innumerable, or numberless, in which case the "investigation of things" would be just as literally endless. However this may be, if the "investigation of things" were stopped, then the consideration about how to show human-hearted-

ness and righteousness properly would go astray. Tseng believed that the phenomena of the universe are multitudinous, and that the "investigation of things" should not be neglected for a single moment. But one should not make the mistake of supposing that he was talking about scientific study of phenomena, natural or otherwise. He was talking about phenomena as entities to be dealt with, and he meant that these should be carefully studied.

As I said previously, our strategist-philosopher never had leisure to construct an intellectual system. Nevertheless, his wide vision was coupled by extraordinarily deep insight. His *Four Reminders*, written one year before his death, shows him rather to be an eclectic, but his selection from the various schools proves the breadth and penetration of his thought. The *Four Reminders* deals with four principles: ⁶

- (1) "Vigilance in solitude makes the mind peaceful." This was the motto of Liu Tsung-chou, a follower of Wang Shou-jen.
- (2) "Concentration of mind makes the body strong." This was taken from the Ch'eng-Chu School, but Tseng interpreted it in an active sense—something he had learned from his military operations.
- (3) "Realization of human-heartedness (*ch'iu jen*, i.e., to take *jen* as the main objective in order to realize it) makes one more loved by others." This was a revival of Confucius' view. Since the Sung Dynasty, *jen* had been regarded as one of the Four Cardinal Virtues of human nature, and so was subsumed under them. But Tseng took it out from among these, and put it in a more conspicuous place.
- (4) "Hard work is approved by the spirits." This point had never been pronounced by the Sung philosophers, but in antiquity it was emphasized by Emperor Yü and Mo Ti, and in modern times by Yen Yüan, China's pragmatist.

The *Four Reminders*, written in 1871 by Tseng for himself and for the edification of his family, lends weight to the idea that he was not merely an advocate of Sung philosophy and Han philology, but that he also added some elements of his own. In certain respects his view is quite modern, especially point four which sounds like

the Communist slogan: "No work, no bread." Point two reminds one of a military instructor's call to attention! The *Four Reminders* is a combination of the views of the Wang Shou-jen School, and the Ch'eng-Chu School, and at the same time it is a reflection of his own personality as a Confucianist and military statesman. It represents the thought of a Chinese scholar and statesman who lived through the Opium War, and who had contact with Western science and technology. Thus, it should be of interest if I give the gist of the *Four Reminders*:

"(1) *Vigilance in solitude makes the mind peaceful.*

"In the work of self-cultivation the most difficult part is to take care of the mind. The mind knows what is right and what is wrong, but if you do not put into practice the doing of good and the clearing away of wrong, the result will be self-deception. Self-deception is something which other people cannot know, but which you know yourself. In the chapter 'Making Will True' in the *Great Learning*, the expression 'vigilance in solitude' is twice mentioned. If you like the good in the same way as you are pleased by the beautiful and disgusted with the ugly, you will certainly get rid of desires, and keep what is in agreement with heavenly reason. Thus you will realize what is called 'self-enjoyment' in the *Great Learning*, and 'apprehensiveness' and 'fearfulness' in the *Doctrine of the Mean*. What I have said above also covers Tseng-tzu's so-called 'self-examination' (*Mencius*, Book II, Part 1, Chapter 2), the words of Mencius being: 'No occasion for shame before heaven, and below no occasion to blush before men' (*Ibid.*, Book VII, Part 2, Chapter 20), 'The best way to nurse your mind is to reduce your desires' (*Ibid.*, Book VII, Part 2, Chapter 35). Therefore, when you are vigilant, you will have no remorse, you will be able to render an account to heaven and earth, and you will be responsible to the spirits. If nothing unsatisfactory can be found in your mind, it will be impossible for you to feel cowardice. As long as you do nothing shameful you will have peace of mind and self-satisfaction, and you will attain broad-mindedness. This is the first way to strengthen yourself and to increase your power of self-enjoyment."

At this point I should like to interrupt Tseng's text to remark that thus far he has adopted his main principles from the school

of Wang Shou-jen, though he does not mention the name of that master in his context, nor does he often allude to him explicitly in other contexts. At any rate, he shows himself to have attached importance to the motivation of will. Now to return to the text:

"(2) *Concentration of mind makes the body strong.*

"The expression 'concentration of mind' was used often by the Confucian school. Even in the Spring and Autumn period it occurred repeatedly. In the time of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi many thousands of words were written on it exclusively. Internally, the consequences which flowed from its practices were single-mindedness, quietude, purity, and oneness; externally, the consequences were orderliness, dignity, sternness, and austerity. Confucius said: 'When you go out, let it be as if you were to receive guests. When you give orders to others, let it be as if you were making sacrificial offerings. These gestures are those which occur in the midst of concentration of mind.' Master Ch'eng said: 'When those who exercise power, and those who are ruled, practise concentration of mind, the whole universe will be in order, and all things grow naturally. There will be no disharmony. Knowledge and wisdom are developed. People can serve heaven and God well. Thus, we see that concentration of mind is rife with values.'

"From my (Tseng Kuo-fan's) point of view, the immediate result of concentration of mind is a strong and active body, tight and firm muscles, because discipline and exercise give us strength, while looseness and comfort make us lazy. These are natural effects. Though we be aged or sick, when we are at a court reception, or a sacrificial offering, or on the battlefield, or meeting any other emergency, we will find ourselves alert and spirited. This is clear evidence of the strength issuing from concentration of mind. Regardless of whether we are by ourselves or in a group, or whether our work is important or trivial, if we attend to what we are doing with attention and respect, if we are never relaxed or negligent, we shall certainly gather more strength in ourselves."

Here, if I may again interrupt briefly the flow of the text, Tseng brought the Contemplative Way of concentration of mind into connection with active and practical life.

"(3) *Realization of human-heartedness makes one more loved by others.*

"At birth one is endowed with spirit or human nature by the principles of heaven, and one is furnished with a physique by the gift-giving physical elements. Whether it be myself, other people, or animals and things, all come from a single source. If one cares only for one's self without having love for other human beings, animals, or things, one's attitude is at variance with the singleness of the source. Those who are high officials, paid with handsome salaries, empowered to rule, are duty bound to save the masses from starvation and from falling into deplorable conditions. Those who read books, knowing history and right principles, have the obligation to educate the unawakened and ignorant. If they think only of themselves, failing to enlighten others, it is merely a sign that as exceedingly favored persons they owe a great debt to heaven. Confucius taught his disciples to seek *jen*, the essence of which is expressed in the words: 'He who likes to stand, should let others stand too; he who likes to advance, should let others advance too.' He who stands is the millionaire, equipped with everything, never needing to borrow from others. He who advances is the high official, appealing very effectively to the public—the voice on the lofty mountain audible everywhere. Everybody likes to stand; everybody likes to advance. But each person should extend this idea to enable others to stand and to advance also. Then society would be like a garden in the spring, where every kind of flower can grow.

"In relatively modern times, the one who understood how to seek *jen* was Chang Tsai, author of the *Western Inscription*. He considered human beings to be his brothers, and animals and things to be his fellow-beings. Thus, elevation of mankind is the moral obligation of all who understand service to heaven. He who carries out his duty can be a man. Otherwise he is a thief, robbing himself.

"If one's duty to mankind is so boundless, then even if one help all the people to stand and advance, one is not justified in regarding one's service as distinguished. If one never ceases rendering service to others, how can one not be loved by others?"

These words of Tseng, reminding us to establish ourselves and to help others, resemble our modern conceptions of citizenship and social leadership, and of the reconciliation of individual development with mutual aid.

"(4) *Hard work is approved by the spirits.*

"Everybody is fond of ease and hates work. This holds true of all men, whether high or low, clever or foolish, young or old, past or present. But if each day a person's clothes and food are equal to what he deals out and to the work he does, he will be complimented by his fellows, and blessed by the spirits. Why? Because such a man relies upon himself, or (in Chinese terminology) 'eats his own toil.' While a peasant or a woman weaver works for a whole year in order to have a few bushels of cereal or a few yards of cloth, the members of a rich family play and amuse themselves without being engaged in any occupation. Nevertheless they feed themselves well, rise late, and have so many attendants that it is as if their calls had a hundred echoes. This situation is contrary to justice and right, and is not approved by the spirits. How can it last for long?

"In ancient times, among the sage-emperors and wise prime ministers, T'ang arose at dawn; King Wen worked until sunset without cease; and the Duke of Chou made night succeed daylight, and sat up until sunrise. They all gave themselves up to work hard. In the chapter 'No Relaxation' (*Book of History*) are the words: 'Whoever works hard can prolong life. He who relaxes will die early.' There are many instances to prove this. For our own sake, we should practise craftsmanship, do physical exercise, seek knowledge by exertion, perform actions in the spirit of self-sacrifice. Thus keeping our minds, and deliberating under a sense of peril, we shall improve our intelligence and abilities. For the sake of the community, we should be sensitive to our obligations—acting as if, when another person starves or drowns, we ourselves are responsible. That is to say, when others suffer for lack of something, we should consider ourselves to be responsible. Emperor Yü, during his travels for flood-prevention, never once visited his own home even though he passed by it. Mo To, if he had occasion to save the people, would not hesitate to wear out his whole body from crown to heel. These are examples of frugal living and hard work for the sake of the masses. Hsün-tzu often mentioned the deeds of the Great Yü and Mo Ti, because their lives were models of frugality and arduous labor. Ever since the start of my military campaigns, I have seen that persons who were capable in some

one respect, or who were skilled in craftsmanship, if they labored under difficulties and were persevering, won appreciation; while others who lacked these qualifications suffered abandonment and starvation. Therefore, it is true that hard work can prolong one's life, and that comfort can cause one's early death. Hard work makes a man capable and gives him employment, while relaxation makes him lazy and idle. By working hard we can benefit the people and be blessed by the spirits. By relaxing we do no good to others, and our conduct does not meet with the approval of the spirits. Accordingly, the man of noble character embraces the principle of hard work in order to invoke divine favor."⁷

Tseng Kuo-fan was famous for his frugality. At no meal did he ever have more than one dish on his table. Do not his words, "If each day a person's clothes and food are equal to what he deals out and to the work he does . . . (etc.)," bring to mind the communist idea of "no work, no bread"?

Tseng's crowning philosophical conviction was that truth is the supreme principle which moves the universe and inspires man. Since the cosmos is created according to an unchangeable law, only truth can enlighten the human race. In 1842 he wrote to Ho Ch'ang-ling: "The reason why the universe keeps on going without ever stopping, why a nation can establish itself, why the virtues and services of wise men are great and immortal, is that all these are constituted of truth. It is said in the *Doctrine of the Mean*: 'Truth is the beginning and the end of all things. Without truth there would be nothing.'"⁸

At the conclusion of Tseng's military campaigns against the T'ai-p'ings, a temple was built in honor of the loyalists who died. On the monument he wrote the following essay: "In the *tao* of a man of noble character there is nothing greater than advocacy of loyalty and truth. When a country is on the point of falling into disorder, invariably one finds those on top as well as in the lower positions indulging themselves in the gratification of their selfish desires. They rival one another in fraud, trickery, and deceit. Comfort they reserve for themselves. Pain and risk they give to others. They devote themselves to avoiding danger and difficulty, and are unwilling to contribute one ounce of their strength to relieve their fellows. Only he who loves loyalty and truth can fumigate this

atmosphere. Only he who can place himself under self-control can extend his devotion to others; can get rid of hypocrisy and applaud what currently seems like foolhardiness; can throw himself into a pool of troubles without asking others to do the same; can even sacrifice his life as if he were gladly returning home. When the people behold what such a man does they begin to grow ashamed of their ignominious lives and of shirking responsibilities. How can my fellow-countrymen inspire one another to fight and suppress disturbances? By allowing truth and determination to prove their effectiveness.”⁹

Before assuming his post as Commander-in-Chief, Tseng had seen much of life among high officials who strove to be soft, docile, conciliatory, yielding, and harmless. The consequences of such behavior were irresponsibility, lack of initiative, and absence of straightforwardness. He lived in this climate and he disliked it because he came from Hunan, the province renowned for honesty, ruggedness, and frank talk. When the war ended he saw that these qualities were what the country needed, and he subsumed them under the general terms of truth and loyalty, paying them the highest compliment, as if they were the means by which China of the mid-nineteenth century could be saved. Undoubtedly, to be true to one's self and to others is the key to the general happiness of mankind.

Tseng saw how much the individual can do for the community, so he put heavy responsibility on the individual. He was not a hero-worshipper, but he believed that each individual can influence the moral atmosphere of a society, and he expressed this idea unambiguously in his *Yüan-ts'ai* (An Inquiry into the Rise of Talented Men, or Social Leadership). “Why,” he asked in this essay, “is the moral atmosphere sometimes healthy, sometimes unhealthy?” and he answered: “Because it can be changed by the direction of one or two individuals. When two individuals, or even one, strive for righteousness, the public follows in the direction of righteousness. When they or he are inclined towards profit-making, the public does likewise. When the people rush towards a goal, the mass-movement thus engendered is so strong that no force can stop it.

“After a country's strength has started to decline, the one or two

righteous individuals will most probably not be in the government service. What he, or they, has in mind will not be official policy. Hence, he or they will have to be content with writing and circulating it among the people in order to influence them. If the people are convinced and follow, the one or two righteous individuals may be able to build up a healthy environment. In this way talented men, or social leadership, will be created. If those who occupy high position in the government are devoid of convictions and powerless to influence the people, they will always defend themselves with the excuse that no social leadership is available. If they themselves are incapable, they are likely to put the blame for their failure on others. I maintain that the power to change the mentality of a society, and to find new leadership, belongs not only to government officials, but to anyone who is conscious of responsibility."¹⁰

In this essay Tseng has made a frank confession of faith. He was confident that a man, whether he be a private individual or an official, who was aware of the moral obligation to direct a society, could do wonders with his initiative. His own work in the battlefield and in academic circles was a demonstration of this faith, because he, a single individual, did in fact create a new era for a whole country.

Thus far I have been presenting Tseng Kuo-fan's discussion of philosophical problems at the human level. But Tseng was not only a Neo-Confucianist, he was also a convinced Taoist. He was convinced that an evaluation of human events could be made not only at the human level, but also in the vast perspective which seeks to see human life *sub-specie aeternitatis*, or at the cosmic level. What he meant is understandable if we realize that his thought was very much influenced by Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, the two great exponents of philosophical Taoism. Let us read his own words: "When I reflect quietly by myself, I find that the universe has passed through milliards of years, and that in the future it will continue to pass through an endless number of years. A human life, which lasts only a few decades, is only a brief moment. While the earth contains on its surface milliards of square miles, what a man can occupy for living and rest is only a bed, or at most a room. The writings of ancient and modern authors are numerous, but what one can read is only a single hair from the body of an ox. There are

different kinds of careers and a variety of first prizes, but what one can acquire is like a single kernel of grain from a great barn.

"When a man recognizes the long duration of the universe, and the shortness of his own life and experience, he should bear more patiently the difficulties and distresses which plague him now and then, and he should be willing to wait until the dust settles.

"When he recognizes the vastness of the planetary system and the smallness of his own abode, he should be more yielding in the competition for riches, career, and properties, and should prefer to lose.

"When he recognizes the boundless number and variety of books, he should not boast of what he knows, but rather he should be willing to listen to others, and he should adhere strictly to the good, applying it in the practices of his daily life.

"When he recognizes that the development of life is a continuous and endless process, he should perceive that what he can do by himself is exceedingly limited. Why should he be proud of his own accomplishments? Rather he should seek out those who are capable in order to co-operate with them. Then self-regard and selfishness will be eliminated."¹¹

The lofty sentiments I have just quoted are to be found in Tseng's diary, as an entry for 1862. He appreciated that all views measured in terms of human life are short-sighted, and that men require also a more philosophical perspective with the whole universe as the background. This is why he advised "to learn the reality of *tao* from Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu." This is the highest compliment he can pay them. He was what I should call a Taoist-Confucianist. This explains why he withdrew from a powerful official position and retired; why he disbanded his Hunan army at the end of his campaign; why he named his studio "Seeking for Deficiency." He understood that there is no full moon every day, and that a waning moon must come after a full one.

His mind was open to the teachings of many different schools. In his *Four Reminders* we saw, for instance, that he agreed with Mo Ti even though the latter suffered severe censure from Mencius. Tseng's life was lived under the influence of a variety of intellectual forces of the Chinese cultural system. This was why an inventory

of the Chinese heritage could come only from his writing. He saw good on all sides, because he was broad-minded, far-sighted, and tolerant.

In concluding this chapter let me say a few words about Tseng Kuo-fan's attitude towards the West. Compared to Japan, China was late in her 19th century readjustment to East-West relationships. Some believe that China at that time was handicapped by a lack of far-sighted statesmen. But if one turns to Tseng's biography, one will find that this was not so. Tseng lived through almost the whole of the century. He was interested in the Chinese cultural tradition. He was conservative, yet he was not blind to what could be absorbed from the outside. His policy of re-adaptation to the new world situation was enlightened and progressive. Though he never had the opportunity to visit the Occident, he knew indirectly about the Western school system, and about Western government, technology, and science. He was the first Chinese to lay the foundation for modernizing his homeland. As Commander-in-Chief in a war which lasted fifteen years, he understood well the use of gun and steamboat. In 1863 he heard from some of his staff members who were mathematicians and astronomers about Yung Wing, the first Chinese graduate of Yale University (1854). He sent for him to come to Anking, and entrusted him with \$450,000 to buy some machinery from the Putnam Machine Company in Fitchburg, Massachusetts. This machinery became the basis of the Kiang-nan Arsenal, the first gun-making factory in China. Tseng also accepted the proposal of Yung Wing to establish a technical school at the arsenal, which I myself joined in 1894. While I was there as a high school boy I read English and Science, and was once given a first prize consisting of books on the natural sciences, gun-making, and navigation. I learned that these were the products of the translation bureau at the arsenal, by which 170 scientific books were rendered into the Chinese language through the cooperation of Chinese and foreigners, one of whom was John Fryer, founder of the Asiatic Library of the University of California. Still a third proposal which Tseng accepted from Yung Wing was to send Chinese youths abroad to be educated. In 1872 the first such group arrived in the United States, and they have of course been followed from

that day until this by many thousands of others. Thus we see that our philosopher-strategist made three contributions to the modernization of the Middle Kingdom:

- (1) he started gun-making and ship-building;
- (2) he inaugurated a translation bureau for scientific books;
- (3) under his auspices young men were first sent abroad to study.

From what I have said thus far, one may gather the impression that Tseng's interest in the Occident was limited to technology and science. But this does not mean that he lacked appreciation of popular government-forms in the West. I cannot give any direct evidence for this, but we can at least assume he would have understood them if they had been explained to him as being based upon the spirit of love of the people. I can also give a sort of documentary evidence from a close friend of Tseng, Kuo Sung-tao, Minister to the Court of St. James in 1877. Kuo wrote in his reports to the government that the British Parliament was an organ representing the popular will, like the system of common deliberation and common decision in ancient China.

Finally, let me mention that Tseng Kuo-fan was the first Chinese father to ask his son, Tseng Chi-tse, to learn English and Western science, and that the son composed an essay in honor of his tutor on the occasion of the latter's death.

In all probability, if Tseng had not been fighting a war against the T'ai-p'ings for fifteen years, he might have introduced a reform in China similar to what Emperor Meiji did in Japan, and he might have become a Chinese Marquis Ito: for Tseng was an admirer of Occidental civilization. In contrast to a Mongol friend, Wo-jen, likewise a devotee of Sung Philosophy, Tseng appears as exceptionally liberal, progressive, and far-sighted—for the Mongol, in opposing the establishment of the Tung-wen Kuan (School of Western Language and Science), memorialized the throne that China's basic needs were not technical skill and clever contrivances, but an ethical code and rectification of mind. The fact is that there is no conflict or incompatibility between Neo-Confucianism and the Western *Weltanschauung* if both are understood as Tseng un-

derstood them. But the great mind and profound knowledge of a thinker like Tseng are required if East and West are to be brought together under the over-all roof of a single building. I agree with Yung Wing, who said: "Tseng Kuo-fan towered above his contemporaries even as Mount Everest rises above the surrounding heights of the Himalaya range, forever resting in undisturbed calmness and crowned with the purity of everlasting snow."¹²

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Chinese Thought Under the Impact of the West

With Tseng Kuo-fan the long period of Chinese cultural autonomy and homogeneity virtually came to an end. Those who came after him were very much under the influence of the West. My first intention was to conclude this book with him, but on second thought it occurred to me that the century between the Opium War and the establishment of the Communist regime—a testing period for Confucianism, full of change and transformation—should not be omitted. The present chapter is added as an explanation of why Marx-Lenin-Stalinism could be foisted upon China.

These last hundred years I shall call the Period of Spiritual Vacuum, because in the Chinese mind there remained no conviction by which scholars and masses could live, and for which they could fight. To speak frankly, Confucianism or Neo-Confucianism almost became moribund after having been the target of attack since the middle of the last century.

China's process of modernization is usually divided by historians into three periods:

(1) The period of new weapons, in which Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-ch'ang and others, played a role. They were the pioneers who acknowledged the superiority of Western scientific and technological knowledge.

(2) The period of political reform or revolution in which K'ang Yü-wei and Dr. Sun Yat-sen were the leaders, one for a constitutional monarchy, the other for a republic.

(3) The period of literary and ethical revolution, in which Dr. Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu (founder of the Chinese Communist Party) were the leaders. This three-fold division followed the un-

dermining of the Chinese tradition which became more and more pronounced as time went on. Already in the second period the monarchical system, usually attributed to Confucius, had been pulled down. But in the third period the family system, the low status of women, concubinage, etc., were denounced. The denouncers aimed at inaugurating a democracy based upon equality where women would enjoy equal status with men. Thus, Confucianism was attacked as being no longer fit for the social and political structure of a new age.

The reader must remember, however, that the term "Confucianism" as used in this context has nothing to do with the philosophical system of the same name in the previous chapters of this book, i.e., with the Philosophy of Reason. What the precursors of the new age attacked were social and political institutions believed to have grown out of Confucianism. It is true, of course, that the philosophical and social aspects of this age-old school were interconnected. But this is not to say they were even partially identical. To avoid the too easily slipped into error of confusing the one with the other is the reason why I am here treating Confucianism as a religion in K'ang Yü-wei's sense, and as a social pattern in Dr. Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu's sense. I shall deal with K'ang Yü-wei and his followers only in so far as their teachings impinge upon Confucianism. Their thought-systems, in themselves, will not be considered.

In all probability, these men would have been deeply taken aback to learn that their doctrines would produce the astonishing results of shaking Confucianism to its very foundations. K'ang thought of himself as a defender of the Confucian tradition. Placing him in the category of the anti-traditionalists would have seemed strange to him, and may indeed seem strange to some of my readers. The justification for this will appear later. If K'ang Yü-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao took this step unconsciously, Dr. Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu took it in full knowledge of what they were doing. They deliberately set up a program of democracy and social reconstruction away from the Confucian tradition. To be sure, they had no desire to impose the Soviet Communist system upon their country. This was especially remote from Dr. Hu's intention. Nevertheless, they created in the Chinese mind a spiritual vacuum.

The rush of ideas from the West into China had the force of a powerful tide. One would think that all this was to the good. Yet the Chinese who fought for liberation and democracy failed in their efforts. The reason becomes clear in part if we think in terms of an historical analogy. The whole process of China's adaptation to the Western *Lebensanschauung* was like the combined ages of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Napoleonic Wars in Europe—a period of transformation which took half a millennium. But the analogous change in China had to be accomplished in six decades. The conflicting currents she faced simultaneously were many: In the economic field there were capitalism, individualism, socialism, communism; in the political field, parliamentarianism, fascism, communism; the philosophical field covered dialectic materialism, idealism, pragmatism and other schools of thought; the religious field was divided between theism and atheism. All these questions were posed before the Chinese people with a sudden impact, and those who took part had to choose and declare their specific standpoints.

K'ang Yü-wei was the first man who saw the importance of overhauling religion. He broached the idea that since the Occidentals had brought Christianity to China, the Chinese should make a state-religion out of Confucianism in order to serve as an antidote. Though the Confucian Classics had been known for ages, and though the texts had furnished the basis for state examinations during many dynasties, K'ang regarded this as not enough. He wanted to interpret the Classics in a new way; he wanted to be a Chinese Martin Luther. This was his ambition, and this was the reason why he wrote three great books: the *Hsin-hsüeh Wei-ching K'ao* (Inquiry into the Forged Classics of the Wang Mang Period), the *K'ung-tzu Kai-chih K'ao* (Study of the Reform-idea of Confucius), and the *Ta-t'ung Shu* (On the Great Commonwealth). He aspired to be a Luther through whom Confucianism would be established as a state cult so that China would have a religion of her own similar to Christianity in European countries. Thus "Reformation" was the first item on the crowded agenda of Chinese modernization.

K'ang was at the same time enthusiastic about political reform of the type which took place during the Meiji period in Japan. At first he sent many memoranda to Emperor Kuang-hsü, but nobody paid any attention to him. However, after the Sino-Japanese War

of 1894, government officials, even Kuang-hsü himself, began to grow receptive to his ideas. But his plan to transform the Manchu Dynasty into a constitutional monarchy was short-lived. It died after the One Hundred Days in 1898. The emperor was made a prisoner by the empress dowager (obviously most of the Manchus were opposed to reform), K'ang fled from Peking to Singapore on a British ship, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who was also involved in the frustrated reform movement, was given facilities to escape to Japan. Then came the Boxer trouble, which proved the ignorance of the Manchu ruler; it also caused more Chinese than ever to become attached to the Republican camp of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. With the failure of the reform movement, the novel idea of a Republic of China emerged.

In 1911 the Republic of China was established through the co-operation of the Republicans and the Constitutionalists. A president, a legislature, and a cabinet were created as the organs of state. But, unfortunately, the members of the legislature were inexperienced in carrying on parliamentary and cabinet affairs, and the relation between the executive and legislature was not so smooth as it should have been. Moreover, Yuan Shih-k'ai, though he swore to be faithful to the Republic of China, tried to restore the monarchy. The defenders of the Republic overthrew him, only to see China fall into the hands of the war-lords. Then in 1917 the Russian Revolution occurred. The new Russia, through her nationalization of banking and industry, her publication of secret treaties, and her cancellation of concessions in China, became inspiring and attractive in the eyes of the Chinese. Dr. Sun Yat-sen became a collaborator of the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communist Party showed itself for the first time on the Chinese political stage. This collaboration brought many things never heard of before the First World War in China. For instance, before the Republicanism had had time to get its roots firmly planted in Chinese soil, the Chinese were confronted with novel ideas of proletariat dictatorship. Before Capitalism with its accompanying policy of *laissez-faire* had had time to be put into practice, the Chinese were in need of adapting themselves to the idea of nationalization and planned economy. We had to jump from the political thought of John Locke, J. J. Rousseau, and John Stuart Mill, into the morass of K. Marx and Lenin. Before the Western philosophy of Descartes, Locke,

Kant, and Hegel had had time to take root in Chinese soil, we had to switch to the dialectic materialism of Marx and Lenin.

Besides all this, from the Soviet point of view the Confucian tradition was feudalistic and hence worthy only of being discarded. The whole social order inherited from antiquity should be destroyed. Laborers and peasants should play the master role. Scholars and landowners should be relegated to the category disposed of by the clause "No work, no bread."

Such is a summary of the situation in China from the end of the last century to the Kuomintang and Communist collaboration. In Europe, as I have said, the transformation required almost half a millennium, stretching from Francis Bacon, Martin Luther, Napoleon, and Walpole to Karl Marx. In China, during less than six decades, K'ang Yü-wei tried to do the work of Martin Luther as well as that of Walpole and Gladstone in England, in addition to trying to convert an ancient monarchy to a constitutional basis; Dr. Sun Yat-sen strove to become a Chinese Napoleon, overthrowing the corrupt and tottering Ch'ing Dynasty; Dr. Hu Shih wished to sweep away the Confucian tradition just as Francis Bacon had got rid of Aristotelianism; and finally Ch'en Tu-hsiu, cooperating with the Russian Bolsheviks, posed as the Chinese Karl Marx. The efforts of all these people, crowded into a mere sixty years could not be otherwise than superficial. While K'ang wanted to make Confucianism a religion, even his own pupil, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao opposed him; Dr. Sun Yat-sen's republicanism was fought by K'ang; those standing for democracy and constitutionalism were attacked by authoritarians; those championing Kant met the resistance of materialists. There was no understanding of any of the different types of thinking. The result was incessant quarrelling. And out of that quarrel, the only people who emerged victorious were the Communists! Supported by the well-organised Comintern, they eventually succeeded in conquering the mainland, and made Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tungism the idols of the Chinese people.

The trials which the Chinese people had to go through were the most difficult that any people had to face. There were sudden changes from the old to the new, from one type of society to another, so that there was hardly any sense of stability or harmony. Even in countries like Great Britain, where ancient ideas and insti-

tutions such as Christianity, parliamentary government, cabinet responsibility, Oxford, and Cambridge are deeply rooted, it has not been found easy to face the challenge of Communism. How much more difficult it is for China to meet this unprecedented menace!

Let me restate my point succinctly. At a time when the vitality of China's hoary tradition was at its lowest, and before her newly adopted institutions had the opportunity to become entrenched, she lived under conditions which were peculiarly susceptible to evil. This is why I call the age after Tseng Kuo-fan's death the period of Spiritual Vacuum.

With this background, I now proceed to deal with those who tried to shape China's destiny: (1) K'ang Yü-wei, (2) T'an Ssu-t'ung, (3) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, (4) Hu Shih, (5) Ch'en Tu-hsiu, in so far as their ideas bear upon Confucianism or Neo-Confucianism.

(1) K'ang Yü-wei was born in 1858 in Nan-hai District, Kwangtung Province and died in 1927. He was a very far-sighted man and full of imagination. Living in the period of transition from Han philology to the impact of Western civilization, he learned much from the former but realised that his countrymen must regard the latter with a fresh outlook and reassess their social and intellectual heritage. He wrote three books which have been mentioned earlier: *Hsin-hsüeh Wei-ching K'ao* (Inquiry into the Forged Classics of the Wang Mang Period) 1891; *K'ung-tzu Kai-chih K'ao* (Study of the Reform-idea of Confucius) 1896; and *Ta-t'ung Shu* (On the Great Commonwealth) 1884-1902. His main objective was to make Confucius the center of the Chinese intellectual and social heritage, a religion-founder, and a reformer-statesman. By placing the Sage in this light, he conceived of himself as the Chinese Martin Luther.

At the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty the School of Han Philology was split into two branches: the School of the Modern Script, and the School of the Ancient Script. The classics written in this latter script had come to prevail (i.e., to enjoy government approval) towards the close of the Western Han Dynasty, when Wang Mang usurped the throne. Previous to that remote time, i.e., during the early days of the Western Han Dynasty, only the classics written in Modern Script had been known. Centuries later Hui Tung and Tai Chen did philological research with the Ancient Script texts as their basis, which was the method of Cheng Yüan and Hsü Shen.

The result was that by the turn of the 19th century the Han school developed to the point that only the texts of the Modern Script—the texts which were alleged to have actually existed at the beginning of the Western Han Dynasty—were considered to be the authentic works edited or written by Confucius. But the only text of pure Modern Script known to have been extant since Western Han times was Ho Hsiu's *Commentary on Kung Yang*, supposedly an explanatory work on Confucius' *Spring and Autumn Annals*. It was this book which initiated a split in the School of Han Philology into the Modern Script branch and the Ancient Script branch, because this *Commentary on Kung Yang* contained ideas not found in the classics other than the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. Some of the dubious ideas were: Evolution of the Three Periods of (1) Disorder, (2) Small Tranquillity, (3) Great Peace; the idea in the *Spring and Autumn Annals* that the kings of Lu were the real masters; and the idea that a reformer-king ascended the throne in Lu. The discussion of such topics was called by the Modern Script branch of the Han philological school discussions of "subtle theories and great principles," presenting clearly the duties of government. The preoccupation of this branch was completely different from that of the Ancient Script branch, whose only concern was with the study of scattered terms and objects. To the former group belonged Chuang Ts'un-Yü, Liu Feng-lu, and Wei Yüan. I have traced briefly the history of this Modern Script-Ancient Script controversy, because the research work carried out in the effort to resolve it formed the basis of K'ang Yü-wei's earliest work: the *Inquiry into the Forged Classics of the Wang Mang Period*, which Liang Ch'i-ch'ao compared to a hurricane in Chinese academic circles.

This work of K'ang presupposed the following assumptions:

(1) In the Western Han Period no Ancient Script texts were in existence. These so-called "Ancient Script" texts were fabrications of Liu Hsin, Imperial Librarian under Wang Mang.

(2) During the Burning of the Books by Ch'in Shih Huang, no damage was done to the Six Classics, the teaching of which was transmitted to later generations by the incumbents of fourteen professorial chairs who presented the classics in their entirety without any gaps.

(3) The characters which Confucius used in writing were the seal characters. The idea that there were two kinds of written characters, the so-called "Ancient" and "Modern" Script, is mistaken.

(4) Liu Hsin, Imperial Librarian, was a literary forger who added interpolations and made textual changes in ancient books, which ingeniously covered up his illicit contributions. In short, K'ang continued the efforts of Chuang Ts'un-yü and Liu Feng-lu, reverting to the Modern Script texts of the Western Han Dynasty. His motive in denouncing Liu Hsin as a forger was to rediscover the authentic Confucius whom he believed to have been buried by the Ancient Script school under a stack of texts. From his point of view, the study of terms and objects had begun to ebb; the time had come for guiding principles of a new outlook to be brought to light and substituted for the worn-out investigations of the advocates of the Ancient Script texts. For him, the "subtle theories and great principles" of Ho Hsiu's *Commentary on Kung Yang* were what needed elaboration.

This first book of K'ang Yü-wei created an immense sensation—comparable to the stir aroused by Strauss's *Life of Jesus* in Christian countries. In fact, it was prohibited under the Manchus as tending to discredit the Confucian Bible (for that is what the Six Classics were) and as likely to set up a process of disintegration. One may say truthfully that K'ang's book shook the Confucian tradition as effectively as the Higher Biblical Criticism of Strauss and Renan shook the Christian tradition in Europe.

K'ang's second book, the *K'ung-tzu Kai-chih K'ao* (Study of the Reform-idea of Confucius), was compared by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to the eruption of a volcano. In it our critic went back to the "Hundred Schools" whom he called "religion-founders," regardless of the nature of the doctrine they propounded. The book ended with the period of Emperor Wu-ti of the Han Dynasty, when the Confucian Classics were canonized.

K'ang's expression "religion-founder" was a genuine innovation not only in his own writing, but in Chinese writing in general. Prior to the appearance of the *K'ung-tzu Kai-chih K'ao* this concept never found expression in Chinese literature. It was a product of K'ang's discovery that Christianity played an immensely important role in European society. From his point of view, Lao-tzu, Mo Ti, the

Legalists, and many others, were all religion-founders. The concept so bemused him that he applied it to each and sundry of the Chinese thinkers, regardless of whether the doctrine they represented was truly religious or only philosophical. In tracing these various schools to their origin, he treated Confucianism as merely one among many. And in discussing their teachings he tried to show that each had an ideal of government—each setting up one or more emperors as an exemplar. Thus Confucius recommended Yao and Shun as the perfect rulers; Mo Ti recommended the Great Yü; Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu proposed the Yellow Emperor. As Liang Ch'i-ch'ao acutely observed in his *Outline of Ch'ing Scholarship*: "K'ang, on one hand, wanted to glorify Confucius as the founder of a religion; on the other hand, he reduced him to the level of other philosophers."¹ He destroyed the canonical position which the First Sage had occupied since the days of Emperor Wu-ti. He unconsciously worked to the disadvantage of his own purpose of elevating Confucius to the throne of religion-founder, by relieving him of a privileged position.

We come now to K'ang's third book, the *Ta-t'ung Shu* (On the Great Commonwealth). This work Liang Ch'i-ch'ao compared to an earthquake. Its title being an allusion to the chapter "Li Yün" of the *Li-ch'i*. I shall quote from that classic in order to orientate the reader: "When the great *tao* prevails, the whole world becomes a commonwealth. Men of virtue and ability are chosen; sincerity is practised; harmony with neighbors is cultivated. Thus, men do not love their parents only, not treat as children only as their own sons. Provision for the aged is secured until their death, also employment for the able-bodied, and the means of growing up for the young. Old bachelors, widows, orphans, childless men, and cripples are given compassion and security. Males have their work to do, and the females have their homes to go to. Articles of value are not carelessly thrown away; but neither are they kept for one's exclusive use. One exerts strength, but not exclusively for one's own advantage. In this way scheming disappears and finds no outlet. Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors do not show themselves. Outer doors remain open and are not shut. This is what is called the Great Commonwealth."²

These classical words stimulated K'ang to write his third book. "Men of virtue and ability are chosen" he interpreted as meaning democracy; "sincerity" and "harmony with neighbors," he regarded as an allusion to international co-operation; and "provisions for the aged and crippled" he saw as social security. And the recommendation that articles of value are not to be thrown away nor monopolized for one's own use, and that strength is exerted but not wholly for selfish purposes, he interpreted as communism and socialism. For him, the era when the Great Commonwealth is realized corresponded to Confucius' age of Great Peace.

Though K'ang was inspired to write his *Ta-t'ung Shu* by words borrowed from a Confucian classic, his method of exposition was based upon Buddhism. He began the work with a list of human miseries and sufferings, which is the orthodox and conventional start of an exposition on Buddhism. The relationship is even more obvious if we examine K'ang's words in detail. His list of human miseries follows: (1) birth and life, (2) natural disaster, (3) human relations, (4) human institutions, (5) maladjustment of human sentiments, (6) covetousness and admiration. Then, as a means of attaining future happiness, he advised the following program: (1) get rid of the institution of the national state; (2) get rid of class distinctions; (3) get rid of racial discrimination; (4) get rid of discrimination between male and female; (5) get rid of the institution of the family; (6) get rid of private ownership, and substitute public ownership for it, in the fields of agriculture, industry, and commerce; (7) get rid of the institution of nationalities, and substitute for it a division of the surface of the earth into areas one hundred degrees on the side, each with its local government, and all under a single global government.

Thus, K'ang worked out in his imagination a plan for a Great Commonwealth where there would be no national states, no families, and no private ownership. This organization, he thought, would result in the abolition of misery and war, and in universal happiness. The *Ta-t'ung Shu* was a Chinese counterpart of Plato's *Republic*, Thomas More's *Utopia*, and Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, in all of which books community of goods and general effort for the common welfare were advocated. But K'ang's work was

more than this. He also tried to prove that Confucius, in spite of being a religion-founder, was full of ideals which reached their ultimate development in the conception of the Great Commonwealth. Confucius was, in other words, the Jesus Christ of China, but in addition to this he had progressive ideals.

K'ang Yü-wei's main objective was to make out of China's First Sage the founder of a religion and a reformer-statesman. This is further borne out by K'ang's one and only memorial addressed to Emperor Kuang-hsü in June 1898. Here he suggested: (1) the suppression of polytheism and idolatry; (2) granting the people the right to worship heaven, a right which traditionally belonged to the emperor alone; (3) making Confucianism a state cult, establishing in each village and district a Confucian temple at which both men and women can worship—Confucius to be treated as the equal of heaven; (4) instituting that on each Sunday, at every Confucian temple, there be services, where some one learned in the Classics should be the preacher; from among the preachers, chief preachers were to be elected for the prefectures and provinces, from among the chief preachers, an archbishop, possibly, to be concurrently Chief Minister of the Board of Religion. Obviously, many of these ideas, such as Sunday services, Board of Religion, everybody being privileged to worship heaven, were adaptations of Christian institutions and practices in China.

Apart from this conviction that Confucius was a religion-founder, K'ang had original ideas about the First Sage as a philosopher. For example, he analyzed four items from the *Lun-yü*:

1. "To set the will towards the attainment of *tao*" involves:
 - (a) Investigation of things, which, for K'ang, meant breaking away from external temptations,
 - (b) Development of character and ruggedness,
 - (c) Clearing up of doubtful points,
 - (d) Vigilance in solitude.
2. "To build virtues as one's basic outlook" involves:
 - (a) Living in quietude,
 - (b) Keeping an unperturbed mind,
 - (c) Improving one's physical condition,
 - (d) Living in a decent and dignified manner.

3. "To make *jen* a conviction" involves:
 - (a) Practising filial duty and brotherly affection,
 - (b) Showing kindness and charity to others,
 - (c) Carrying on educational extension work and social services,
 - (d) Having the sense of universal brotherhood.
4. "To enjoy the liberal arts, covering all knowledge" involves:
 - (a) Studying the philosophy of righteousness and principles,
 - (b) Studying the science of how to handle world affairs,
 - (c) Making investigatory studies,
 - (d) Studying literature.

Of this item 4, K'ang made a further analysis. Under (a), he included (1) Confucianism, (2) Buddhism, and the various schools of philosophy in existence at the end of the Chou Dynasty, (3) Sung and Ming philosophy, (4) Western philosophy. Under (b), he included (1) principles of political science, (2) history of Chinese political development, (3) history of Western political development, (4) public administration, (5) sociology. Under (c), he included (1) the Chinese classics and historical writings, (2) history of Occidental countries, (3) geography, (4) mathematics, (5) natural sciences. Under (d), he listed: (1) Chinese literature, (2) foreign languages and literature.

If the reader suspects that he sees in this analysis of the four items from the Confucian *Analects* a curriculum, his suspicion is well founded, for it is, indeed, the program of courses offered at K'ang's *Wan-mu-ts'ao T'ang* Academy. What a difference there is between this list and that of Chu Hsi's White Deer Grotto Academy, or Tai Chen's Academy of Philological Study! This new curriculum represents the impact of Western civilization on K'ang Yü-wei.

His conviction of the importance of making a religion out of Confucianism was part of his reform-program. His pupil, Ch'en Huan-chang, author of the *Economic Principles of Confucius and His School*, organized an "Association for Confucianist Religion," carrying on propaganda in behalf of this cause.

After 1889, K'ang left China and went to live in Singapore; he also travelled three times round the world. Then he lost his reputa-

tion as a progressive thinker, and became known as a conservative. In his former phase, his place was taken by his pupil Liang Ch'ich'ao, a great liberal and promoter of Occidental thought in China. Liang was an entirely different type of man from his teacher. I shall deal with him later.

To return for a moment to K'ang, his plan of the Great Commonwealth was a texture of fanciful and vague ideas, the product of an imagination untrammelled by any restraint whether of theory or of policy. His notions of getting rid of national states, family, marriages, etc., show that a Chinese scholar's thoughts can run wild as any other scholar and go to extremes. In China, where the scholars often carry little actual political responsibility, they were inclined to be somewhat whimsical, trying to seek fame and honor by being original and creative at all costs.

I now come to the second creator of China's spiritual vacuum: T'an Ssu-t'ung. T'an was executed at the age of 34, after the *coup d'état* of 1898. He had been approached by members of the Japanese Embassy with the proposal that he accept their aid to escape Peking and flee to Japan, but his reply was that if there was no blood-letting there would be no reform; and so he willingly became a martyr of the One Hundred Days of Reform.

T'an's best known work was the *Jen-hsüeh* (Study of Jen) in which he showed himself to be a critic of Confucian traditions, especially in regard to the Three Kinds of Superiority and the Five Kinds of Human Relations. He was so disgusted with the political and social situation of his people that he condemned all of their inherited institutions. Chinese scholarship, monarchy, and ethical codes he called "shackles of bondage" which should be broken to pieces, and that included the examination system, career civil service, vulgar learning such as philology and literature, and conventional morality. He went so far as to include religions and the solar system. T'an's violently iconoclastic attitude is partially to be explained as the outcome of the impatience and despondency which obsessed many scholars, exhausted with waiting for reform from the time of the Opium War in 1840 until the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. In his attack on his people's ethical code he was the forerunner of Hu Shih, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and Mao Tse-tung. But to his

credit it must be admitted that his denunciation was a scholarly work of exposing age-old evils in an ancient tradition, and had no ulterior motive; nor did it have the backing of an international political agency like the Comintern.

T'an inveighed against absolute monarchy, patriarchal authority of the father over his children, power of the husband over his wife, and non-remarriage after the death of the first husband. Of the Five Human Relations he appreciated only the fifth: friendship, because friends are equal. He declared that there was no sense in talking about political reform unless the basis of the Five Human Relations was rethought. He saw clearly that Western democracy, industrialization, and family life depended upon the free development of the individual. He was particularly horrified by the Mongol and Manchu sovereignty in China, because Mongol and Manchu rulers were aliens as well as autocrats. His attack on the Manchus was a decade earlier than Dr. Sun Yat-sen's *T'ung-men Hui*, the revolutionary party organized in Tokyo in 1906.

T'an attached importance to the role of Christianity in Western social and political organization. He believed that Jesus Christ's teaching of love to all was better than Confucius' doctrine of the Five Human Relations, because the latter system resulted in a social hierarchy, while the former, in the West, produced a society founded on equality and freedom.

Influenced by K'ang, he wanted to reinterpret the First Sage on the basis of Three Stages or Periods: (1) Disorder, (2) Small Tranquillity, (3) Great Commonwealth. He regretted that part of Confucius' teaching had been lost through Hsün-tzu, who, although a follower of the Master, had left to later generations only social and political institutions fit for the Period of Small Tranquillity, and thus had transmitted only such concepts as absolute monarchy, theory of Three Superiorities, and book learning. The "subtle theories and great principles" of the Master had been lost since the Ch'in Dynasty (B.C. 221-207). K'ang's school entertained the interesting notion that the ideals of equality and freedom had once been in the possession of the Confucianists, but were buried by Hsün-tzu. This anti-Hsün-tzu movement was for the sake of rendering plausible the dream of the Great Commonwealth, which seemed

to fit well into the new age of international co-operation. T'an, like his teacher, cried for a Chinese Martin Luther who would revive the original and authentic Confucianism.

T'an's *Jen-hsüeh* as compared with K'ang's *Ta-t'ung Shu* was very sharp and critical of Chinese social institutions. He denounced them as they actually were in his day rather than as they might be in the future, which was K'ang's manner of attack. Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu did not far exceed him in critical zeal.

We now come to the third creator of China's spiritual vacuum: Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, pupil of K'ang Yü-wei, and prime mover in the One Hundred Days of Reform. After obtaining political asylum in Japan he became the chief moving force to switch the direction of the Chinese mind and open it to all kinds of ideas from the West, whether scientific, philosophical, social, or political. In China, his pen is recognized as having been the most prolific and influential in guiding the Chinese mind from conservatism to progress, even more so than Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary sword. Sometimes he collaborated with K'ang Yü-wei as a champion of constitutional monarchy. After the establishment of the Chinese Republic he declared himself loyal to the form of government it represented. Consequently he fought against Yüan Shih-k'ai's monarchical scheme in 1915, and against Chang Hsün's restoration of the Manchu emperor in 1918. Also in 1918 he sponsored China's declaration of war against Germany. He went to Europe as an observer of the Versailles Conference, and after returning to his homeland he spent the rest of his life writing and delivering lectures at universities.

Liang was a much soberer, more moderate, and in a certain sense more liberal man than either K'ang or T'an. In spite of having been a pupil of the former, he admitted that after his thirtieth year (1902) he no longer talked about the "forged classics" or the "reform-idea of Confucius." From that time on, he worked hard at introducing Western science, philosophy, and history to his fellow-countrymen. To restrict one's view to the Confucian perspective he believed to be worthless. And being a liberal, he believed that to set Confucius up as a religion-founder, or as having exclusive authority, was likewise of no value.

If I were to give details to Liang's literary activity I should

overstep the bounds of this book. So I shall limit myself to discussing his relationship to Confucianism, and this in two respects: (1) as a follower of K'ang; (2) as a rebel against K'ang's brand of Confucianism.

Shortly after he took up residence in Japan, Liang was invited by a philosophical society in Tokyo (1899) to give a lecture, "The Chinese Religious Revolution," or, "K'ang Yü-wei's Chinese Reformation." His championship of K'ang's point of view in his earlier intellectual stage was obvious in this lecture. He said that Confucius represented evolution, not conservatism; equality, not autocracy; universal good, not the good of a particular class; belief in the soul, not in the body only. That he could formulate this series of contrasts is a sign that he was very much under the sway of the Occident. He said that the school of Confucius was divided into two branches after the death of the Master: the Commonwealth branch, and the Small Tranquillity branch. The former of these sub-schools had Mencius as its spokesman; the latter, Hsün-tzu. Hsün-tzu's school disregarded what the chapter "*Li Yün*" had to say about the Great Commonwealth, which, the reader will recall, inspired K'ang to write his *Ta-t'ung Shu*. Instead, Hsün-tzu developed for posterity the concept of absolute monarchy. If there is any doubt of this, we need only recall that Ch'in Shih Huang's prime minister, Li Ssu, was a disciple of that philosopher. Also Hsün-tzu, by writing an essay entitled "Refutation of the Twelve Philosophers," became the forerunner of the canonization of the Confucian Classics, with the consequence that the writings of all other schools were eventually banned as heretical. Liang Ch'ich'ao, finally (in this pro-K'ang phase of his intellectual development) blamed all the commentarial and philological work which had occupied the attention of Chinese scholars since the Han Dynasty on Hsün-tzu, because Chinese scholars who commented on Confucianism were mostly his pupils.

After Liang had lived a few years in Japan he became dissatisfied with Kang's everlasting harping on Chinese institutions and scholarship under the name Confucius. With this dissatisfaction commenced his second stage of intellectual development, that of an anti-K'ang rebel. He wrote an essay entitled "Preservation of Confucianism as a Religion Will Not Lead to the Glorification of

Confucius," in which he abandoned reference to the First Sage, or his texts, as the final word of authority, and advocated consultation of one's own conscience, or mind, for information about what is right. In this essay Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was the first Chinese to declare that a man's conscience should be his ultimate arbiter. In his espousal of this doctrine we see in him the great liberal of modern China. Some of the things he said in this essay are worth quoting:

"The brightest era of Chinese scholarship, and simultaneously the age of the rise of many great thinkers, was the Contending States Period. Why was this so? It was a consequence of the freedom of conscience and thought which prevailed at that time. The Burning of the Books by Ch'in Shih Huang was the first shackle on Chinese intellectual activity, and the canonization of the Six Classics and the Expulsion of the Hundred Schools were the second shackle. Confucianism has been the authority since the Han Dynasty, and it has held sway for two thousand years. Since Han Wu-ti, the conventional Chinese way has been to consider certain schools as canonical while ignoring others. There has been also the fight between orthodox and heretical sects, and between the champions of the Modern and Ancient Script texts. In the philological field scholars have quarrelled about the schoolmasters who handed down books. In the philosophical field, where human nature and reason are the topics of discussion, scholars have been at odds about the Line of Apostolic Succession. Each person has insisted that he alone represents the true Confucius, and has accused others of being non-Confucianists. During the whole history of China, the spokesmen for Confucius at one time have been Tung Chung-shu and Ho Hsiu (Western Han Dynasty), at another time Cheng Yüan and Ma Yung (Eastern Han Dynasty); at one time Han Yü (T'ang Dynasty), at another time Ou-yang Hsiu (Sung Dynasty). Once Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi were regarded as the true representatives of Confucius; then again Lu Chiu-yüan and Wang Shou-jen were considered to be the valid interpreters. In the Ch'ing Dynasty Ku Yen-wu and Tai Chen took up controversial positions. Confucius has had so many representatives because the Chinese have been bound down to one pattern of thought and have not been permitted liberty of conscience, so that it has been quite impossible

for them to think independently. They have been like a group of monkeys fighting among themselves for a single fruit, or like a group of old maids scolding each other and coming to blows over a nickel. Ours has been a very miserable condition. It is the consequence of the efforts of persons trying to make a religion out of Confucianism.”³

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao stood for freedom of conscience. He advocated that any aspect of knowledge, or any feature of an institution, should be presented as a subject in itself, and not in the name of Confucius. He said: “Now those who worship Confucius are inclined to talk as if any new theory or institution of the present day were acceptable only for the sake of Confucius. They always exclaim, ‘The parliamentary system was known previously to Confucius!’ Thus those who approve of Western institutions do so not because the latter are in themselves good, and worthy of approval, but because they are alleged to be in agreement with the sayings of Confucius. This means that what appeals to the worshippers of Confucius is not truth itself, but agreement with Confucian doctrine. Suppose that they should fail to find confirmation which could be found in the Six Classics or Four Books, would they then abandon beliefs or institutions knowing them at the same time to be true and worthwhile? Or suppose that some Confucian books should confirm a point, while other books not consulted at the beginning should subsequently be found to contradict the preliminary evidence, would the worshippers of Confucius then have to reject what they originally accepted as good? If this were so, truth and objectivity would never have the opportunity to be appreciated by the Chinese mind. This is why I detest men who conceal the real nature of Western theories and institutions under the name of the Confucian Classics. They cling to a slavish mentality and try to make it grow.”⁴

In this remarkable passage Liang certainly spoke like Francis Bacon, who castigated blind acceptance of authority and tradition as the “Idol of the Theatre.” What Liang was aiming at was acceptance of valuable elements in Occidental culture, such as science, technology, and certain political institutions. Judgments of worth or worthlessness should be based upon observational data and scientific inference, not upon tradition. To compare him with

a 20th century scientist-statesman rather than with a Renaissance founder of Western science, let us glance at a few words in J. B. Conant's *Modern Science and Modern Man*: "The scientific way of thinking requires the habit of facing reality quite unprejudiced by any earlier conceptions. . . . The watchword is not what does the book say about this or that, but let us try to find out for ourselves."⁵ These sentences could have been written by Liang.

The essay "Preservation of Confucianism as a Religion Will Not Lead to the Glorification of Confucius" drew a boundary between Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and K'ang Yü-wei. Its author himself admitted, "Previously, I was a crusader for Confucianism as a religion. Now I am a rebel against this movement to transform Confucianism into a religion."⁶ Liang, indeed, was certain that Confucianism was indestructible precisely because it was *not* a religion. Its elasticity and ability to absorb other systems and to transform itself was the result of its never having been so exclusive as Christianity or Mohammedanism. Precisely because of its nature, there was no point in talking about means to preserve it. After the publication of this essay, Liang withdrew from the camp of K'ang. But he never attacked Confucianism as Hu Shih has done. Rather, he defended it for its moral teachings, as can be proved by an essay he wrote in 1915.

As China's great modern liberal, Liang advised his people to study Western science, philosophy, and political institutions, and to look upon Confucianism as objectively as possible. He wanted to make the Chinese mind free and accessible to all theories and concretely realized ideas. Thus, he is generally recognized as the pioneer who laid a solid foundation for the introduction into China of Occidental thought, and for the re-evaluation of Chinese tradition in the light of modern life. It is no exaggeration to say that without Liang the Chinese mind would not have been transformed as early as it was.

During this great liberal's asylum in Japan there was much controversy between Dr. Sun Yat-sen's radical wing revolutionary party and his own moderate wing about whether China should be changed into a republic or into a constitutional monarchy. The burning question was finally settled when China announced itself a republic in 1911. When Liang returned from Japan, he made a

declaration at the party headquarters of the Kuomintang that he would be loyal to the new government. Indeed, he had no desire to overthrow it by force once it had been established. He was affably received by the victors. Here again Liang differed from K'ang, whose monarchical sympathies remained so intense that he tried to replace the new republic by a restored Manchu Dynasty in 1918.

As China's great liberal, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao brought to the mind of his fellow-countrymen a much better understanding of the West in regard to science, philosophy, history, political institutions, economic life, finance, and even specific technical questions such as the monetary system of the gold standard. Occidental institutions which had seemed strange to the Chinese mind since the beginning of the 19th century began at last to take on the form of intelligibility and familiarity through his interpretations. They were no longer objectionable, but started to appear preferable. Liang stood for freedom of the individual and against the joint-family system and polygamy. He was, however, so busy with the political or constitutional aspect of government that he did not criticize the family system so vocally as did Hu Shih and others.

Let us go on to the next great contributor to China's spiritual vacuum:

Hu Shih. But first let us orientate ourselves again. After World War I, the slogan "Social reconstruction!" became inspiring and attractive. This was especially so when the Russian Revolution was carried to a successful issue. It began to look as if soldiers, workers, peasants, wives, and husbands were to have their relationships turned upside down. All this awoke enthusiasm in the Chinese mind. Social reconstruction or radical change must come first of all in China! In 1917, Hu Shih proposed a "literary revolution" which meant that *pai-hua* or the vernacular was to be used as a means of expression rather than the classical language.

Hu Shih is a pragmatist, of the school of John Dewey; in particular he is a student of experimentalism or instrumentalism. He condemns Confucianism as being contrary to the modern way of life.

He worked out eight principles on which the literary revolution was based; these included the abolition of writings which contain no substance, invalid complaints, allusions, age-worn phrases, sym-

metry in prose or rhyme in poetry, and imitation of ancient writers. He recommended the observance of grammar and the usage of colloquialism. Hu Shih wished by this means to simplify the Chinese language. He regards this literary revolution as the Chinese counterpart of the movement headed by Chaucer in England, or Martin Luther in Germany.

This is an overestimation. The philosophers in the Sung Dynasty and the novel writers in the Yuan Dynasty wrote their dialogues or dramas in the vernacular long before Hu Shih had any such idea. However the credit of applying its usage to the discussion of every subject must go to Hu Shih.

The "Literary Revolution" enjoyed a wide following among the Chinese during the transition period. It should be noted however that writers well-versed in the classical style can write the vernacular, though this is not true vice versa; e.g., Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, a well known classical writer before Hu Shih's time, could write the vernacular with ease. The essence of the change lies in the construction of the end of a sentence and in the form of asking a question. The written characters as substantives, verbs, and adjectives remain unchanged.

In China, Han and Sung scholarship rivaled each other in the interpretation of the Classics of Confucius. Hu Shih followed the philological method of the Han scholarship. Han scholarship, originating in the Han Dynasty, based its interpretation of the Confucian Classics upon a thorough analysis of the origin of each character while Sung scholarship employs principles of philosophy to be found in the Classics in its interpretation. The former method resembles that of the philological school in Europe.

The philosophy of the Sung School was handed down from the Sung Dynasty. Cheng Hao, Cheng I and Chu Hsi belonged to this school. The study of the universe, of human nature, and of the relationship between mind and desire are the major part of this philosophy. New interpretations of the Classics were approved by the emperors of the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties. They were used in state examination papers. The Han scholars were opposed to them and regarded this method as being pure speculation and vain talk. At the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty, K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and Chang Ping-ling were still versed in this method. Hu Shih,

whose forebears were Han scholars, recommended this philological method of Han scholarship as a scientific method.

A solution to the perennial problem of whether the Confucian Classics should be interpreted according to one school or the other is difficult to arrive at. Suffice it to say that too great an emphasis laid on the philological method results in a preoccupation with the books themselves and diverts attention from the meaning which is the proper object of a philosophical or scientific study.

Hu Shih's intensive study of century-old Chinese classics and philosophies is quite remarkable. His doctoral thesis "The Development of Logical Thought in Ancient China" contains valuable findings gathered from this study. He used the textual criticism method which he studied in the United States.

He did excellent work in investigating the origin of Zen Buddhism, where many legends were found to have been mixed in with the facts. He called attention to the literary value of novels, e.g., *Hung Lou Meng* (Dream of the Red Chamber), and *Shui Hu Chuan* (All Men are Brothers). He studied the lives of the authors and editors. By studying the many old editions sent to him, he showed, in the course of time, how additions or eliminations were made in the novels.

He encountered much difficulty in setting up a chronology of the birth dates of the great men of China. He had a controversy with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao regarding the birth dates of Lao-tzu, who, Hu Shih maintained, was the predecessor of Confucius.

In regard to the study of the Chinese histories and classics, using the textual criticism method to discover forged documents, Hu Shih aroused a spirit of skepticism among the Chinese intellectuals. That the ancient emperors Yao, Shun, and Yu ever lived was even questioned.

The Chinese classics and, to a certain extent, the histories, embody ethical principles and value judgments which form part of the Chinese tradition. Inasmuch as Hu Shih regarded them as merely source material for finding facts to the neglect of their ethical value and inasmuch as he aroused the spirit of skepticism, he was responsible for the creation of the spiritual vacuum in China before the conquest of the Chinese Communists.

Hu Shih advocated the study of science to an extreme degree.

In his Preface to a *Collection of Essays concerning the Polemics on Science and Weltanschauung*, he formulated ten rules for his "New Weltanschauung."⁷ Of these I quote three:

5. Biology, Physiology, and Psychology teach the people that man is another animal; the difference (from other animals) is one of degree, not in kind . . .
8. Biology and Sociology teach the people that morality and customs are changeable. Science discovers the cause for the changes.
9. The new knowledge of Physics and Chemistry teaches the people that matter is not dead, but living, not immovable but moving.

A polemic on *Weltanschauung*, with emphasis on moral value and free will, was engaged in by Hu Shih, V. K. Ting, and myself. When my lecture at Tsing Hua University on *Lebensanschauung* was published, I staunchly defended the course of philosophy and metaphysics. Hu Shih considered that my position was a threat to science and started the controversy. Hu Shih wrote "*The Philosophy of Tai Chen*." Tai Chen was a leading Chinese scholar of the Han School who was a utilitarian and naturalist. His interest in Tai's philosophy further manifested itself in the form of a condemnation of Neo-Confucianism of the Sung and Ming Dynasties.

Ethical principles, habits, and convictions are essential parts of a nation or a person's way of life. Obviously they cannot be formulated into scientific laws. Therefore I hope my readers will not disagree with me when I say that scientific *weltanschauung* is a concept which contradicts itself. Hu's scientific *weltanschauung* has much in common with that of the materialists and naturalists.

Hu's attitude towards Confucianism may be seen in his preface to Wu Yu's *Collection of Essays*, which he compares to a water-sprinkler that makes the dust settle. "Wu Yu," he writes, "is the street-cleaner of Chinese academic circles. He stands on a road which is not all within eyeshot. His eyes, mouth, nose, and neck are steeped in the dust of Confucian dregs and rubbish—a situation intolerable to him. Also intolerable to him is that many people collide with one another, blinded by this dust of Confucian dregs

and rubbish, so that their heads and feet get injured. Accordingly, he decides to become a street-cleaner and to sprinkle water on the road clogged with Confucian dust. Not only is he not paid for his efforts, but he is scolded by old scholars accustomed to swallowing Confucian dust. He is considered an impediment to traffic. He is sometimes stoned and prevented from sprinkling water by those who are fond of Confucian dust. Sometimes he feels tired; then when he sees his colleagues doing the same work on the other side of the road he is encouraged. He continues to bring water for sprinkling the long road from a well which very soon may be dry. This is the spirit of Wu Yu. He and Ch'en Tu-hsiu were two gallant generals who wrote many articles to expose Confucianism. . . . Both were of the opinion that Confucianism is not fit for the life of modern man." The last sentence of Hu Shih's preface is: "I introduce this hero, who pulls down the house of Confucius single-handed, for the young generation of China."⁸

My answer is an emphatic "No." Confucianism, as a philosophy and a standard of morality can be modernized. There is nothing in it which is not compatible with the idea of human dignity or rights in modern society.

As I have suggested previously, the long postponement of my country's modernization and her slowness in achieving a stable form of democratic government, has been responsible for the desperate mentality of many of my intellectual brethren. They place all blame on the traditional structure of Chinese society: her technological anachronisms and her political backwardness. When we come to Hu Shih's criticisms, we find the innermost recesses of the Chinese mind, the sanctum of her ethical convictions, deeply penetrated.

I come now to the last of the contributors to China's spiritual vacuum, Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Ch'en's standpoint can be best shown by his characterization of Western civilization. He attributed to it the following features: (1) it is individualistic, (2) it is warlike, (3) it pushes forward, never goes back, (4) it is international, (5) it is utilitarian, (6) it is scientific.⁹ These features, he was convinced, point out the direction in which China's modernization should go. At one time he wrote many articles in favor of the working class, and in 1921 he founded the Chinese Communist Party. He was, no doubt, an intellectual, but because of his radicalism he went much

further than Hu Shih. He died a democrat, his posthumous essays denouncing the Communist dictatorship, as Kautsky defended democracy against Lenin.

After Yüan Shih-k'ai's death, when China's first parliament was in session, somebody made the motion that in the constitution there should be a clause that the doctrine of Confucius should be declared the basic principle for personal cultivation of every citizen. The proposal did not establish Confucianism as the state religion because the members of parliament knew that Buddhists, Moham-medans, and Christians would oppose this. It went in a roundabout way restricting itself to recommending Confucianism as a moral teaching. This modest suggestion was vehemently attacked by Ch'en Tu-hsiu who wanted none of it in the Chinese Constitution. He expounded his views in an essay "The Doctrine of Confucius and Modern Life." He quoted a number of sayings from the Classics to show the incompatibility of Confucianism and modern life. The burden of his proof was (1) that according to the notions of the First Sage, the only good government is monarchy. But how can a teaching in which monarchy is worshipped be the guide for citizenship in a modern democracy? Then, (2) the conventional Confucianist family-system, which has dominated the Chinese people since time immemorial, imposes obedience on the son towards his parents, places the younger brother under the elder, and sub-ordinates the wife to her husband. How can such teaching be a guide for the development of individual personalities? And (3) according to Confucius, women should bow before men, women should do the household drudgery, and women should talk only in their inner chambers, never outside. How, asked Ch'en, can such doctrine be applied to a modern community where women can be suffragettes? (4) The *Li Chi* (Book of Rites) specifies that male and female should not sit and eat at the same table; male and female should not speak to each other without the intermediary of a matchmaker; male and female should not hand things to each other. If these restrictions were actually set by the First Sage, how can he be the guide in a community where social intercourse, even friendship, is free between men and women? The modern woman, furthermore has the right to work in an office or factory. How could women have careers under Confucian rules?

With all this evidence, Ch'en concluded that Confucianism is the product of feudalism and no longer adaptable to modern life. But he had other evidence which made Confucianism appear in even less favorable light. He quoted from the *Li Chi*: "The rules of propriety should not be extended to the commoners, the rules of punishments should not be applied to the lesser nobility,"¹⁰ as proof that the Classics are a remnant of an age when society was riddled with class-distinctions. Some of Ch'en's readers, after reading his essay, wrote to him that his refusal to have anything to do with Confucianism was too extreme, since the First Sage, after all, did give some sound advice at any rate in the field of ethics and philosophical theory. Why not listen to him? Ch'en answered: "Confucianism, the most influential factor in Chinese history, has made the Chinese mind uniform. This is the reason why I think it should be abolished." He went on to say: "After the Burning of the Books by Ch'in Shih Huang, the Hundred Schools of Philosophy disappeared, and the canonization of the Confucian Classics under Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty occurred. This resulted in reducing Chinese mentality to a dead uniformity. All this is to be imputed to Confucius. Suppose that during the period after the Ch'in and Han dynasties the Hundred Schools had not disappeared, or at least that the school of Mo Ti had remained extant, then the course of Chinese history might have been different from what it was. From today onward, if we do not undergo a radical change, if we continue to cling to Confucianism, which is a product of feudalism, if we continue to hope that some change will come in the future based upon our heritage of the past, I fear that we Chinese will not survive in the 20th century struggle for life."¹¹

It is perfectly obvious that Ch'en wished Confucianism to be abolished because its teachings were based upon the Three Superiorities. The Three Superiorities, let me repeat, were: (1) the superior position of the king; (2) the superior position of the father; (3) the superior position of the husband. To Ch'en, these Three Superiorities were nonsense, completely inapplicable to present day life where all individuals are free and equal.

After I have said so much about China's spiritual vacuum, generated by the intellectuals discussed in this chapter, I should explain in detail what I mean by "spiritual vacuum." This expres-

sion refers to the undermining of the old tradition; it refers also to the inadequacy of time for transplanted ideas and institutions to take root. Between the teeth of these pincers the Middle Kingdom was squeezed dry of all convictions, whether of East or West, and finally succumbed to Communism, which, at least, was sure of its ground and backing.

Let me explain a little more about the undermining of the old tradition. Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu seemed to say that Confucianism is the greatest hindrance to the modernization of China, because Confucianism is incompatible with the modern ideals of freedom and equality. Literally those two critics may be right, but from the practical and historical point of view their talk is academic jabber. Look at Japan! Look at her modernization: adoption of a constitutional form of government, building of an army and navy, industrialization, and scientific development—the whole marvelous process was carried out precisely on the basis of Confucianism. We know that not a few Japanese reformers were followers of Wang Shou-jen. When they came in contact with modern science they said that Confucianism is concerned with moral values and is not in conflict with science, since the latter is concerned solely with knowledge of nature. They were likewise unable to see any conflict between constitutionalism and loyalty to an emperor. In Japan the two *Lebensanschauungen* of East and West were soon brought together in working harmony, while in China they were treated as mutual enemies, one of which could survive only at the cost of death to the other. I believe that the Middle Kingdom's failure to adapt herself to the life of the modern world was not the fault of Confucianism, but was the fault of the ignorance of the Manchus, and the perfidy of Yüan Shih-k'ai, whose machinations led to quarrels and civil wars between the progressives and reactionaries. Absence of enlightened leadership and harmonious work at the helm of state during the Manchu period and afterwards when the republic was founded, was the main reason why China's modernization was postponed. But, as I have already said, the longer modernization was postponed, the more desperate the intellectuals became. They dug with feverish abandon into the deepest psychological strata of their race, and heaped all the blame on Confucius. They were oblivious of the sad truth that in undermining the

ancient tradition of their people they weakened the whole foundation upon which the House of China stood. The host of reforms which Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu proposed, such as freedom and equality for individuals, equal status for male and female, and freedom of choice in acquiring a spouse, could have been brought about by gradual changes in legal codes, industrialization, and general education; but the attempt to do so by denouncing the social customs and moral teachings inherited from Confucius was fatal. It would have been far better if they had offered constructive recommendations—how, for instance, to interpret Confucianism. The only effect of their denouncement was to cause the youth to run wild and join the Communists. Hu and Ch'en, in their inept attempts at reform, were successful in only one respect: they made their country an easy prey for the Communists. Let us take for granted, even, that Hu and Ch'en's attack on Confucianism was as inevitable as Francis Bacon's attacks on Aristotelianism. This may be so, but the fortunate possibility remains that in the Occident, where the free play of thought is allowed, Aristotelianism in its valuable phases has the chance to revive, whereas in China, under the dictatorship of the Communists, the worthwhile elements in Confucianism may come back again after a long period of being buried underground.

While Hu and Ch'en's intellectual criticism of the kind I have been describing went on, Chinese youth was emptied of all ideas of moral values, the cumulation of centuries of ethical instruction. But even worse than this, Chinese youth was puzzled by novel ideas; some from the side of capitalism and democracy, others from the side of communism and dictatorship. Here was the great opportunity for the Communists! Well-trained in Marx-Leninism and Stalinism, they were at least sure of their doctrine, no matter how ridiculous it is; and they were so well organized that they could fight as one man. Not only were they nationally organized, but they had international backing. The policies of the Chinese Communist Party were co-ordinated with Moscow and with Moscow's fellow-travelers in Washington, D.C., where they had been carefully planted. Stalin's talk in the American State Department's famed White Paper is good evidence of this. The Communist force became so powerful in post-World War II China that the Kuomin-

tang's army was defeated, and the government had to withdraw. Naturally the liberals encouraged this debacle by their doubting. It should be clear by now that a mental state of romanticism, fancy, confusion, and skepticism, is no match for Communism.

When I look back over the course of my country's thought development in the last few decades, it seems to me that men like K'ang Yü-wei, T'an Ssu-t'ung, Hu Shih, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu inspired Mao Tse-tung to realize how far adventures in ideas can go. What happened was not of their choosing, I suppose, but Mao nevertheless followed their example.

When I take a look at my country's intellectuals as a class, I see that they are enamored of originality, but are inadequately equipped with a sense of responsibility. Why? Because Chinese society is unlike its counterpart in the West where each individual, whether he be farmer, laborer, industrialist, banker, producer, or consumer, has his say, and where each can do as the other. Each has his stake in the business of government, so each can look after his own interests. In my country, on the other hand, the intelligentsia is the only class that can write articles and be listened to by the people at large. We Chinese live in a society where there is no balance of power between the different classes. The intellectuals are the leaders who make proposals for reform, as between free enterprise and public ownership, or between monarchy and a republic, or in the family system, or in marriage customs. Being the leaders, they limit their august contribution to mere proposing, without demeaning themselves to the point of having a practical interest in the affairs of a farmer, a laborer, an industrialist, or a banker. Their proposals are the result of studies and imagination, and have little relation to the actual interests of other classes.

Especially after Occidental education was introduced into the Middle Kingdom, the young men rushed to the colleges and universities; they read books in Western languages, and were enthusiastic about novel ideas. They paraded in public, or made other demonstrations, demanding changes in cabinet ministers, demanding war against the Japanese after the Mukden incident of September 18, 1932; they joined political parties, and showed their strength in the number of their enrollments as party members. In

fact, the intelligentsia held such an important place in my country that it became the keynote to Chinese public opinion.

China is a land which has known only revolution; gradual and orderly reform has not been heard of there. Men like K'ang Yü-wei, T'an Ssu-t'ung, Hu Shih, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu being children of the revolutionary process, made their reform proposals in a typical radical and thorough way, with no sense of responsibility commensurate with means available to them of moving step by step with moderation. Since all, whether living or dead, were writers and thinkers, they are entitled to write and think as they wish; but the consequences of their recommendations on the youth of my nation, on public opinion, and on the international situation, have been tremendous.

Without the support of the masses no leader can have influence on a political scale. This was shown by the so-called Reform of One Hundred Days in 1898. The Revolution of 1911 was backed by the T'ung Men Hui, by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's Constitutionalist Party, and by the student demonstration of 1918 in regard to resolutions of the Versailles Conference. All of this shows nothing more than the power of the intellectual class in national and international politics. The growth of the Communist Party in the last three decades may be explained in terms of the wild rush for new ideas and expectation of a miracle, a hope that has been burning for a long, long time.

In a society of so many unbalanced minds and so many unbalanced social forces as that of China, it was easy for such a party as the Communist to catch the public eye and rally its support by propaganda. That a party program is not necessarily a note promising to pay a debt, was, and still is, unknown to a people politically inexperienced.

The Communist conquest of China is a tragedy which has grown out of many causes. It is a result of maladjustment to ideas and institutions adopted from the West. It is a consequence of delay in modernization. It is the psychology of desperation after waiting a century for the peace and political stability which never came. Of all Chinese intellectuals, Mao Tse-tung is the greatest adventurer among ideas. He reached the climax of wild and imaginative

thinking and utopian experimentation of which his predecessors, the creators of China's spiritual vacuum whom I have discussed in this chapter, gave him stimulating examples.

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Conclusion: The Roots for a Revival of Confucian Philosophy

This book has given the story of the Neo-Confucian movement. Starting in the T'ang Dynasty, it blossomed in the Sung Dynasty, and reached its climax in Wang Shou-jen's system in the Ming Dynasty. After Wang Shou-jen, Neo-Confucian philosophy lingered on, but did not show the same vitality as it did in the earlier period.

The impact of the Western countries on China brought along with it a new civilization based on Christianity, science, technology, democracy, and nationalism. Its force completely shattered China's confidence in her own traditions; she became bewildered and did not know how to cope with the new situation. At first, measures were taken to introduce science and technology into China. The attempt did not prove effective, and so more radical attempts were made by the adoption of a republican form of government. Six years later, a proletarian dictatorship was established in Czarist Russia. It did not take long before China became involved in subversive activities which, coming from Soviet Russia towards the end of the First World War, achieved success at the end of World War II. And this is where we are at the present moment.

Marxism has now been proclaimed as the official doctrine in China. Marx-Lenin-Stalin-Maoism has become the guiding pattern of thought. The important question therefore arises: Will Confucian philosophy continue to live on in China? Or will Confucianism

or Neo-Confucianism be eradicated from China forever? My answer is: Confucianism will not, and cannot be uprooted from China. I shall state why I think so in this chapter.

There is no doubt that Confucian thought is suffering a setback. That however is a common phenomenon in the history of human thinking, and there is no reason to believe that it need be more than temporary. Very often such a decline is followed by a vigorous revival of its spirit and vitality. For example, Brahminism remained silent in India when Buddhism became the widely accepted religion, and then it was revived by Shankaracharya. Greek philosophy lost its influence as an effective way of thinking when Christianity prevailed. The period of the later Middle Ages and of the Renaissance, however, saw renewed interest in the works of Plato, Aristotle, and many other Greek and Latin writers. Confucianism itself had suffered a similar fate in the past. During the Han Dynasty, the study of the Confucian Classics was required of all Chinese scholars, but in the Chin Dynasty, and in the period of division of Northern and Southern China, the Confucian school of thought lost much of her prestige. This however was shortly followed by the revival of Confucianism by the Sung philosophers. When a school of thought possesses a value worthy of revival, such revival never fails. Thus I have not the slightest doubt that Confucianism has a future in Chinese thought.

I believe that a philosophy whose roots lie deep in the soil of the country in which it originated cannot be easily forgotten. There is a common saying among Western philosophers that "one is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian." This simply means that the thought patterns of these two philosophers do not disappear. Windelband, in his *History of Philosophy*, echoes the same thought:

"As with all developments of European culture, so with philosophy—the Greeks created it and the primitive structure due to their creative activity is still today an essential basis of the science."¹ If Greek philosophy is an essential basis of Western philosophy, it can be more truly said that Confucian philosophy is the essential basis of Chinese philosophy, now as well as in the future.

Before summarizing the fundamental concepts of Chinese philosophy, let me give a historical background to the origin of the differences arising from Confucius' own thinking. Among the dif-

ferent schools, those of Mencius and Hsün-tzu are of especial importance.

Confucius had a passion for knowledge; he was intellectually honest, admitting what he knew and what he did not know. He discussed problems with his many students regarding the rectification of name, which performs the same function as Socrates' definitions. Confucius believed in two sources of knowledge: one, studying the old classics, by continual practice; the other, attaining knowledge by one's power to think, discovering principles of the physical and moral world for oneself. Both are equally important as sources of knowledge.

Mencius and Hsün-tzu, his two most distinguished followers, are in absolute accord with this view of knowledge, but diverged from Confucius owing to their differences of emphasis. Mencius' starting point is "thinking"; he emphasized the power of mind. He believed that the potentialities of human goodness are imbedded in the mind. These potentialities can be trained by self-cultivation. This forms the basis for a well developed personality, which in turn leads to a well ordered community.

Hsün-tzu, on the other hand, starts from the world of facts with which one is confronted in daily life, such as licentiousness, quarrelling, fighting, robbery, and the other crimes. Therefore he concludes that human nature is bad. Mencius, in stressing what ought to be, is an idealist, while Hsün-tzu is an empiricist or a realist. They may be compared with the schools of Plato and Aristotle, and with the Rationalist and the Empiricist schools in modern European philosophy.

Among the fundamental ideas in Mencius' philosophy are: (1) thinking is the starting point; (2) the innate dispositions of mankind; (3) intuitive knowledge.

On the first of these ideas, Mencius has this to say: "The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by external things. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of fact it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These (the senses and mind) are what heaven has given to us. Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior

part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man.”² These words of Mencius remind us of what Plato says in the *Phaedo*: “What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge—is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? And thought is best, when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure—when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it, she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being”?³

The mind's intrinsic power is thinking, which is complete in itself; it itself is a lawgiver.

Regarding the innate dispositions of mankind Mencius says: “We may perceive that the feeling of commiseration is inherent in man, that the feeling of shame and dislike is inherent in man, that the feeling of modesty and complaisance is inherent in man, and that the feeling of approving and disapproving is inherent in man. The feeling of commiseration is the principle of benevolence. The feeling of shame and dislike is the principle of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the principle of propriety. The feeling of approving and disapproving is the principle of knowledge.”⁴

This has become the predominant theme of Chinese philosophy, on which a system of ethical theory and social order has been built. The Chinese conceive the good as the culmination of a teleological development of human life; these four dispositions are the cornerstones on which are built all forms of human institutions. The Western counterpart of these four dispositions is to be found in the modern theory of value-judgment. It must be pointed out that benevolence, righteousness, and propriety pertain to moral values, while knowledge pertains to theoretical knowledge, involving, as it does, the ability to distinguish between this and that, between black and white, the true and the false. Professor W. M. Urban has perhaps the best explanation for Mencius and the other Chinese philosophers who put knowledge, *chih*, next to the ethical values. He says: “The neo-Kantian axiologists point out the desire for truth and rationality, the demand for logical consistency is itself

a craving for what ought to be, and that here we are moved by an ideal and directed by a norm as surely as in the realms of ethical and aesthetic values.”⁵ This also explains why in China knowledge is not separated from or independent of ethics, as it is in the West since Aristotle’s *Organon*.

Regarding intuitive knowledge Mencius says: “The ability possessed by men without having been acquired by learning is their intuitive ability (*liang-nêng*), and the knowledge possessed by them without the exercise of thought is their intuitive knowledge (*liang-chih*). Children carried in the arms all know how to love their parents, and when they are grown up (a little) they all know how to respect their elder brothers. Filial affection for parent is (the working of) benevolence. Respect for elders is (the working of) righteousness. There is no other reason (for these feelings);—they belong to all under heaven.”⁶

That this intuitive theory is closely connected with the four dispositions is clear. In the chapter on the four dispositions, they are considered as integral parts of human nature, but it is not clear whether they possess any immediate insight. Mencius makes it clear in this chapter that besides discursive reasoning, the mind possesses a unique characteristic, that of a power for immediate perception into the nature of things.

This chapter laid the foundation of the intuitionism of Lu Chiu-yuan and Wang Shou-jen which we discussed earlier in the book.

Hsün-tzu, born about twenty years after Mencius’ death, took a contrary position. He built his system on a physical and visible basis like a true empiricist. He countermanded Mencius’ theory of the goodness of human nature by saying: “At birth a man is greedy; if he goes on to behave in conformity with greed there will be fighting and robbery, and the principle of decency and modesty before others is lost. At birth man is pugnacious, and in continuing to conform to it there is hatred and jealousy, and sympathy and consciousness are lost. From childhood the individual must be educated, and this education must be carried on by teachers, and this is the work of a government. Principles of righteousness and rules of decency are to make a man modest, cultured and decent. This is why I say that human nature is bad. His goodness is man-made. It can be likened to a carpenter working on a piece

of wood, which can only be made straight by the carpenter who planes it. A piece of metal can only be shaped by melting, grinding and sharpening. Because human nature is bad, it can nevertheless be brought on the right track by education, and under control by the rules of decency. Mencius said human nature is good, which is quite the contrary idea. His knowledge of human nature is imperfect. He does not make a distinction between what is nature and what is man-made."⁷

Hsün-tzu also denounces other aspects of Mencius' system, such as the four dispositions, intuitive knowledge and the self-sufficiency of mind. One must not conclude, however, that Hsun-tzu does not recognize that man is endowed with intellect. He stresses the use and development of intellect by which individuals gain discerning power. Through study the intellect acquires know-how. Hsun-tzu's empiricism, like that of Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, is based on sensations and impressions and the association of ideas.

Hsün-tzu asks: "How may things in the world be differentiated?" And his answer is: "They are differentiated by the senses . . . Shape and color are determined by the eyes. Loud or soft sounds and the musical notes are determined by the ears. Sweet, bitter, salty, plain, sour, or hot tastes are determined by the tongue. Fragrance or stench are determined by the nose. Pain or itch, hot or cold, light or heavy, are determined by the touch. Joy or anger, happiness or sorrow, like or dislike, are determined by the heart."⁸ By this Hsün-tzu means that sensation is the basis of knowledge. None of the senses operate alone in the *identification of things*—another phrase that Hsün-tzu uses often. Thus the existence of a table is established as a fact by touching the table and by seeing it at the same time. All things are differentiated and named according to this process of identification. Verification is further based on logical reasoning and on this identification process.

Hsün-tzu does not believe that there is a criterion in the mind which distinguishes right from wrong. He knows that as man is endowed with intellect, he can learn and practise. He uses the term "accumulation" to express that man learns by repetition or by the formation of a habit. He says: "Accumulation of dirt results in the formation of mountains; accumulation of water develops a sea; accumulation of days results in a year; accumulation of goodness

produces a man of perfection. By unceasing work and seeking, by accumulation, something high, something great, something perfect can be accomplished. A sage is nothing but the accumulation of good deeds."⁹

Hsün-tzu's main concern is the achievement of a harmonious society. As he does not believe in the inherent goodness of human nature, he emphasizes that external authority must be imposed in order to attain this harmony. He theorizes that this harmony is achieved by a proper balance between the needs of the people and the satisfaction of these needs. The way to apportion these is called *li*. "What is the origin of *li*? (he asks) A man has desires from the moment of birth. If he cannot get what he desires, he seeks means to satisfy them. If there is no just apportionment or assignment to meet the demands, there will be fighting, and fighting leads to disorder. Disorder leads to extinction. The old emperors detested disorder, so they created the rules of decency and righteousness as norms for apportionment. Then desires can be satisfied and demands can be met. Desires should not be allowed to be indulged to the extent that the supply of goods is exhausted; and supply of goods should not be so scarce that it cannot satisfy desires."¹⁰ Thus the origin of *li* is to keep a balance between supply and demand. The term *li* was in use long before Hsun-tzu, but he extended its meaning to include different aspects, such as manners, customs, education, art, ceremonies and even government institutions.

The trend of his time was to depart from such moral ideas as expressed in *jen* and *i*, and to resort to the enforcement of external rules.

In the intellectual and educational fields, Hsun-tzu recommended the reading of the Classics as guidance in opposition to Mencius' emphasis on the internal power of mind. He stresses the importance of reading the Classics in the following words: "The *Book of Li* tells us how to be respectful and reverential; the *Book of Music*, how to be harmonious; the *Book of Poetry and History*, how to acquire an extensive knowledge; the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, how to know the subtle ways of judging whether a person's action is right or wrong. All these cover the knowledge of the universe."¹¹

Hsün-tzu's many disciples, after reading the Classics, wrote commentaries on them thus perpetuating the Confucian tradition. During the Han and T'ang Dynasties scholars wrote commentaries on these commentaries. When the Neo-Confucian movement started, the Sung philosophers again wrote original commentaries on the Classics according to their own point of view.

The Sung or still later philosophers who came after Mencius and Hsun-tzu set up systems of their own, adopting what they agreed with from one another. For example, Chu Hsi follows Hsun-tzu in the emphasis on the intellect, knowledge-seeking, and the reading of the Classics, but ignores his view on the badness of human nature. Chu Hsi agrees with Mencius on the function of thinking by mind, but disagrees with him on the idea that *liang-chih* can replace knowledge-seeking.

Lu Chiu-Yuan and Wang Shou-jen sided with Mencius on the theory of the function of mind and intuitive knowledge. Wang elaborated on and supplemented Mencius' theory in his own way. Tai Chen's emphasis on desires and emotions as a part of human nature shows his sympathy for Hsun-tzu, yet he dared not declare his agreement with the theory of the badness of human nature. Indeed, on this he seemed to show his preference for Mencius by writing a commentary on Mencius' book "The Word-meaning of the Book of Mencius," in which however he brought in Hsun-tzu's ideas on desires and emotions.

Chinese philosophy has a unique place in the history of world philosophy. Because of her seclusion from other countries, her philosophy may be said to be unadulterated by alien elements. The Greeks, for example, had cultural relationships with the Middle East, and with India. Western countries in Europe such as Italy and Germany, England and France also had cultural exchanges.

The major contribution of a "foreign" philosophy or religion to China, is of course from India. This was not possible until major linguistic and philosophical barriers were first overcome. Then the Chinese made the Buddhistic teachings her own, creating different Buddhist sects by their own efforts and in their own way.

Fortunately for the development of Chinese philosophy, the spread of Buddhism in China actually served as a stimulus for a "return to Confucius." That was the starting point for the Neo-

Confucianist Movement, from T'ang Dynasty to the Ch'ing Dynasty, which this book has attempted to describe. By way of summary, I shall give a list of the major ideas of Chinese philosophy.

1. *Chih-shan* (The highest good)
2. *Tao* or *Ri* (Reason or Logos)
3. *Wu-tse* (Laws of Nature)
4. *Ri* versus *Ch'i* (matter and reason, or matter and form according to Aristotle)
5. *Ri-i-feng-shu* (One versus many, i.e., the unity of reason and the manifoldness of manifestation)
6. *Ch'ang*; *Pien* (Permanence and change)
7. *Hsing-shang*, *Hsing-hsia* (The metaphysical and the physical, the former being *tao*, the latter, vehicle)
8. *Wan wu mo pu yu tui* (Pairs of opposites always existing in things)
9. *Hsiang-fan* *Hsiang-cheng* (Contraries are complementary to each other, or antithesis passing into synthesis)
10. *Li*; *Min* (Necessity versus freedom, or determinism versus indeterminism)
11. *Pen-ti*; *Kung-fu* (Reality and function; no reality without function).

I shall add a few remarks to some of these concepts for clarification. The *Book of Changes* and the *Great Learning* contained the idea of the highest good. This is the first principle of the universe. The first hexagram of the *Book of Changes* is called "Chien," in which there are four kinds of property: 1. supremacy; 2. harmony; 3. prosperity; 4. perseverance. The universe, as supreme unity, is established on the basis of order, continuity, and expansion. This implies that the good exists in the entire universe—in physical nature as well as in human nature. We may analyze it in the same way we analyze the good in man. The *Great Learning* says: "What the *Great Learning* teaches is to illustrate the illustrious virtue, to renovate the people and to rest in the highest good."¹² This is the fundamental principle. The book then lists eight ways to attain this highest good: 1. rectification of mind; 2. making will true; 3. realization of knowledge; 4. investigation of

things. These four ways are to be applied to 1. self-cultivation, 2. family order, 3. rule of a country, and 4. peace of the world. This appears to be another version of Plato's *Philebus* which includes both the ideas of intellectual activity and the pleasant life.

Ri and *Ch'i*: One of the most controversial questions in the history of philosophy is: In the making of the universe, which came first, reason (spirit) or matter? Chang Tsai holds the view that *chi* comes first, but Chu Hsi as a dualist says that these two are inseparable. When asked to give a definite answer as to which comes first, Chu Hsi replied *ri*. In his explanation on the *Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate* he held the same view. Chu Hsi seems to assert that in investigating the make-up of the world, the two factors are on an equal footing, while in tracing the origin of world creation, Chu Hsi resembles Aristotle in saying that there is an unmoved Mover.

"One versus many" is another controversial question. The easy way out is to ignore the question altogether. Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen both see the origin of the universe in *ri*, though their reasons differ. Wang Shou-jen, as an idealist-monist, believes that *ri* is the core, and his system is based on the theory of the intelligibility of the world. Chu Hsi, a dualist, considers *ri* and *ch'i* as two fundamental concepts. He is more like Descartes who assumes that mind and space are two separate entities.

Chêng Hao, when he discovered that opposites—*yin* and *yang*, positive and negative—are always paired, maintained that one of a pair cannot stand alone. This according to him is the origin of the motion of the universe, and also the basis of change. We may say that this is the Chinese dialectical method.

Necessity and freedom: the Western theory of determinism and indeterminism is known in China as the theory of human effort and destiny. The Taoists, for example, believe in the almighty power of Nature, so mankind has no alternative other than to live under the law of necessity decreed by Heaven. However, the Confucian school thinks that man's ideal goals and virtues are realized through human effort. Freedom does not mean conflict with causality or exemption from law, but it is the realization of noble ideas.

Reality and function: During the latter part of Wang Shou-jen's

life, he sought assiduously for reality. As reality is something intangible, this school fell into the trap of the Ch'an School of Buddhism. The Tung-ling School was started as a reaction to this, and held that "there is no reality without function." This is to say, reality is not an absolute being beyond understanding. Reality and function are two variables which depend on each other, bearing a relationship similar to that which exists between form and matter, as maintained by Aristotle.

Many Western thinkers are under the impression that there are only a few schools of philosophy in China. This is not true; and the schools are just as diverse as those in the West. There are the Rationalist, the Empiricist, the Dualist, the Monist, the Intuitionist, the Utilitarian, the Pragmatist, and the Naturalist schools in China. Lastly, there is a school which ignores all spiritual values and believes in force and regimentation. This is the Legalist School which is an enemy of the Confucian School.

Several of the philosophers of the Confucian School built up systems of philosophy which are so comprehensive as to cover the entire universe, including ethics, logic, and metaphysics. Wang Fu-chih, in the seventeenth century, built a philosophical system of dynamic life and change quite similar to that of Henri Bergson, even though little or nothing was then known about the modern findings of biology and psychology.

There is, thus, in China, a vast treasury of philosophical thought rich in versatility and many-sidedness. Such a mine of thought, even if buried for a time, cannot be lost forever. It will be revived in the future.

I want to add a few remarks in regard to the relation of philosophy to the other activities of civilization. W. Windelband said: "For the conceptions arising from the religious and ethical and artistic life, from the life of the state and of society, force their way everywhere, side by side with the results won from scientific investigation, into the idea of the universe which the philosophy of metaphysical tendencies aims to frame, and the reason's valuations (*Wertbestimmungen*) and standards of judgment demand their place in that idea and more vigorously just in proportion as it is to become the basis for the practical significance of philosophy."¹³

If both the theoretical and practical aspects of reason can in-

fluence each other, it is no wonder that changes in weapons of defense and economic life must be accompanied by a change of outlook on science, individual, family, and government. People who came forward to bring about such a change in outlook were Paul Hsu Kuang-chi of the Ming Dynasty; Tseng Kuo-fan, K'ang Yu-wei, and Liang Chi-ch'ao at the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty; and Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu of recent decades.

Criticisms from the West are welcome, as they often show real insight into the problem. The following remarks from A. N. Whitehead, for instance, are a good reminder to the Chinese: "The comparative stagnation of Asiatic civilization after its brilliant development was due to the fact that it had exhausted its capital of ideas, the product of curiosity. Asia had no large schemes of abstract thought energizing in the minds of men and waiting to give a significance to their chance experiences. It remained in contemplation and the idea became static. This sheer contemplation of abstract ideas had stifled the anarchic curiosity producing novelty."¹⁴ Whitehead's remarks that the Chinese had lost the spirit of curiosity, and were lacking in logical accuracy and scientific research for many centuries are to the point, but I cannot agree with him when he says that Asia has no large schemes of abstract thought. Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen's philosophical systems alone are evidence against this statement.

Intellectual activity is indeed stereotyped in China by traditional habits of thought. This, in addition to a lack of stimulus from the outside, has brought about stagnation in China. We will recall that the only outside contacts China had were the introduction of Buddhism from India and Matteo Ricci's attempts to propagate the Catholic faith.

The challenge that faces China today is a renovation from within, and this involves the paramount question as to whether she should give up her traditions completely, or rely on her selective judgment to keep what is good and to discard what is superfluous so as to give room to what the West can supply.

In fact, such a reform movement is already underway in the Confucian philosophy with regard to its methodology, new approach, and a spirit of conciliation with the Western way of thinking. There are three qualities of Chinese thought which, I think,

are worth mentioning at this point. They are: 1. treating knowledge and morality with equal importance—in contrast with the Western view of attaching supreme importance to knowledge, so much so that knowledge is studied for its own sake; 2. keeping a sense of continuity by following a tradition that has been proved by time. This lends stability to the society. This is in direct opposition to the Western attitude described by C. A. Moore: “adventurousness, which seeks out or should seek all possible approaches, is well reflected in the almost infinite variety of systems in Western philosophy, and in the constant emergence of new philosophical possibility.”¹⁵ Indeed philosophers seem to find delight in pulling down one another. Western philosophy is rich in rivalries but lacking in peace and harmony which can only be attained by collective effort. 3. Placing comprehensiveness of understanding above originality which may result in one-sided thinking. *Chung-Yung* (The Book of the Golden Mean) says: “All things are nourished together without their injuring one another. The courses are pursued without any collision among them.”¹⁶ Opposite views thus may co-exist and work towards a harmonious whole.

A revival of Chinese philosophy will enable her to contribute the virtues inherent in this system of two thousand years which have been acquired in a unique manner. This, together with the Western richness of intellectual initiative and methodology, should lead to a new and larger understanding between the East and West. This is our ultimate goal, and for this purpose, I have thought it fit to attach a new appraisal of Chinese culture which serves as an appendix to this book.

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APPENDIX

A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture

The writing of this essay was initiated by Dr. Carsun Chang in the spring of 1957 after a talk with Professor Tang Chun-i about the many shortcomings in the methods which some Westerners used to tackle the study of Chinese academic work and the various deficiencies of their basic understanding of the Chinese cultural and political outlook. Thereupon Dr. Chang wrote professors Mou Tsung-san and Hsu Fo-kuan requesting them to publish jointly an article expressing their views. With their consent, Professor Tang, while still on a tour in the United States, drew up the first draft, which he sent to the two others in Taiwan. After several revisions back and forth the final form took shape.

The treatise was primarily intended as an aid to Western intellectuals in appreciating Chinese culture. But because it took considerable time for translation into English, and because in attempting to expunge some Western prejudices toward our culture we Chinese first had to attain a proper evaluation of the treatise through self-examination, we therefore had it published in the Chinese original simultaneously in the "Democratic Critique" and the "National Renaissance" in Taiwan, New Year issues of 1958.

The purpose of this publication has been a matter of prolonged consideration. We believe that the intrinsic value of the essay remains the same whether it is signed by one or by four authors. Our ideologies are not identical in all aspects, nor would those with the same general views be limited solely to us. The formation of a movement of thought must chiefly depend on interaction

among the thoughts of independent thinkers, followed by their individual expressions of similar ideas. Were a few adherents of any particular school to publicize their ideology, others would feel that it had nothing to do with them, thus obstructing its promulgation. On the other hand, we also believe that while our views may have coalesced into a common conviction we ought not withhold from the public what may be a witness to the truth and in that manner greatly diminish our hope of receiving much corroboration.

It is regretted that in order not to delay the publication too much we have not been able to approach for endorsement many of those who hold similar views. Nonetheless, we wish to emphasize that the views here delineated are not to be regarded as exclusively ours.

Signed by

Carsun Chang, Tang Chun-i, Mou Tsung-san, Hsu Fo-kuan

A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture

1. Introduction

In this declaration we propose to discuss our basic understanding of the past and present developments of Chinese culture, its outlook, and what we deem to be the correct approach to its study. We will also deal with what we expect of world civilization.

These problems have been under our close attention, as well as that of numerous other scholars and statesmen, for scores of years it is true; yet, we would not have penetrated them as we have were it not for the fact that several years ago China suffered from an unprecedented catastrophe which forced us into exile, and under such forlorn circumstances we were prompted to ponder upon many fundamental problems. Genuine wisdom is born of afflictions; only through suffering can our spirit transcend set

patterns of life and beliefs to examine thoroughly all the aspects of each problem. Scholars of other nationalities, like the Chinese scholars of old, have not had similar experiences and consequently are liable to numerous misunderstandings due to their limited points of view and may therefore not see what we have been able to discover.

We must promulgate our views because we sincerely believe that the problems of Chinese culture have their universal significance. Even setting aside the fact that China is one of the very few nations whose cultural history has not been disrupted for thousands of years or that the Chinese culture had elicited ample admiration in pre-eighteenth century Europe, in addition to its considerable contributions to mankind, there is still the problem of her immense population, which comprises one-fourth of that of the world. China's problem has long since become a world problem; and if the conscience of mankind will not permit the annihilation of the nearly six hundred million of her people, then it has to assume the unending burden of their destiny. We sincerely believe that the solution hinges on a genuine understanding of her culture, in both its actualities and its potentialities.

2. *Shortcomings of the Three Main Approaches to Sinology*

Sinology as a subject of international research has had a history of several hundred years, and China and her culture as a world issue have also attracted much attention during the last century. Yet, what is the essence of China's culture? What is the direction of its future development? What are its weaknesses? While few Chinese scholars desired to be prophets, most foreign scholars have been debarred from a deep, comprehensive understanding by their specific motives. There have been three main motives.

(1) Chinese thought was first introduced into the Western world some three hundred years ago by Jesuit missionaries, who had come to China to spread Christianity and incidentally scientific knowledge and technological skills. Part of their mission was to translate the ancient Chinese classics and the orthodox neo-Confucian works of the Sung (960-1278) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties. As their primary motive was religious, they expressed

strong objections to the Sung-Ming emphasis on rationalism and idealism. Typical of the latter category were the *Authentic Meaning of Catholicism* of Matteo Ricci and the *Commentary on Chinese Rationalism* of J. C. Anderson. Their presentation of Sung-Ming Confucianism to the European world was merely of an informative nature; they seemed unable to grasp the fundamental points. It is small wonder then that Confucianism was treated as resembling Western rationalism, naturalism, or even materialism. As a result it was often quoted by atheists and materialists as in accord with their own views. In our view, Sung-Ming Confucianism is more in line with Kantianism. That most Western idealists would not accept it was due chiefly to the misrepresentation by the early Jesuit missionaries in China, who in their religious zeal favored the Six Classics and orthodox Confucian teachings as opposed to the Sung-Ming school, as well as the Taoist and Buddhist philosophies.

(2) In the past century Western sinology received new impetus from the Chinese Open Door Policy following the Opium War and the Boxer Incident. This time the interest was derived mainly from curiosity about Chinese goods and literature, such as the Buddhist sculptures discovered by Sir Aurel Stein and Dr. Paul Pelliot in the Tun Huang Grottoes. The objects of this interest soon included fine arts, archaeology, geography, history of frontier development, history of East-West communications, and even the characteristics of the written and oral language, both ancient and modern. While valuable contributions have been made by these scholars, it cannot be denied that their intensive efforts in the unearthing, collecting, and transporting of the antiques were not aimed at a study of the cultural life and its sources and the possible development of the living nation. Such interest is analogous to that in the relics of ancient Egypt and Asia Minor. At the same time, most of the Chinese scholars were engaged in similar pursuits. While Ch'ing researchers stressed textual criticism and archaeological research, those of the Republic, adopting the academic methods of their predecessors, emphasized reappraisal of the ancient cultural works. With such support of both Chinese and Western authorities, this approach has become the standard methodology of sinology.

(3) Within the last decade or two, a new direction of research received impetus from interest in the modern history of China. The formation of the Bamboo Curtain aroused tremendous interest in the history of contemporary China. Many of the leading Western historians of contemporary China were once advisers to the Chinese government or foreign diplomats in the East. Their motive was primarily derived from their actual contact with the Chinese political or social institutions. This sort of realistic approach is just the opposite of the preceding one, and is perhaps more apt at focusing the world's attention on China as a living nation. However, this approach seeks the past through the present, while the attitude of the researcher towards the political situation varies with it. Under such circumstances, what he regards as the issues, the relevant facts, his hypotheses and conclusions, are all inevitably swayed by his personal feelings and subjective attitude.

To avoid such prejudices, one must follow the order of natural development of China's cultural history. Even more so, one must apprehend the true nature of Chinese culture and its historical changes in order to understand the significance of contemporary Chinese history, cultural and political, and China's future. If this is the approach to be followed, the researcher must first put aside his subjective views of the political situation, and formulate his problem and hypotheses in the perspective of the entire cultural history of China. This is not to deny the objective value of such subjective efforts as we have warned against, but on the other hand, such an approach has undeniably produced much misunderstanding.

It is now clear why we feel that we must propose a different approach and methodology; and, at the same time, present to our readers, as in this appeal, what we have gathered in our years of research, though it is still in a sketchy form, on the past, present, and future of Chinese civilization.

3. The New Approach: Appreciation through Understanding

First of all, we want to call upon all sinologues to affirm that China's culture is vibrantly alive; in the eyes of many Chinese as

well as Westerners, it has long been dead. Oswald Spengler, for example, was of the opinion that it was extinct after the Han Dynasty (204 B.C.-220 A.D.) In China, since the May 4 Movement of 1916, the vogue has been to collect the past achievements under a unifying name, but nevertheless to treat them as if fit only for the waste-paper basket, waiting to be re-arranged and filed away to be forgotten. The repeated failure of the recent national democratic movements, the reticence of nine-tenths of the people in front of the statues of Lenin and Stalin, and the exile of the remaining tenth to a lonely island and foreign lands—all these seem further to demonstrate objectively that the life of her culture is no more. Such a conception we entreat the readers to discard. China's friends were, it is true, frequently disappointed by the repeated failures of the national reconstruction programs. It is equally true that her culture is now diseased; but when a doctor treats a patient he must from the outset believe in his recovery.

One must not forget that culture is the objective expression of the spiritual life of mankind. In their researches, the students must not forget this and hence lack sympathy and reverence for the culture. Were it so, they would certainly not hope to prolong this spiritual life. They may regard such feelings as proper for the literary writer, political propagandist, or cultural philosopher, but not for the researcher. Herein lies the student's basic mistake. Such sundering of feelings and intellect would be the result of the most acute egotism on his part—that, neglecting the fact of culture as objective expression of the spirit of man, he admits no life in the object of his research outside himself. This is to ignore the difference between culture and natural science. In such application of empirical methods to culture and history, he is treating his material as mere fossils. Such an attitude is not merely morally frivolous, it is also a most un-objective approach. We can indeed say that without sympathy and respect there can be no real comprehension. What one experiences is mere appearance; one must dig beneath this appearance in order to communicate with the heart and soul of what lies hidden within it. Understanding is the light whereby a person may transcend his subjectivity; it is the light that guides the intellect into the souls of others. Without the intellect there can indeed be no understanding; on the other

hand, without sympathy there is inevitably much misunderstanding resulting from an attempt to explain the appearances by means of pre-conceptions or even phantasies.

4. *Meaning and Significance of the Doctrine of "Hsin-Hsin"*

Chinese culture arose out of the extension of primordial religious passion to ethico-moral principles and to daily living. For this reason, although its religious aspects have not been developed it is yet pervaded by such sentiments, and hence is quite different from occidental atheism. To comprehend this, it is necessary to discuss the doctrine of "hsin-hsin" (concentration of mind on an exhaustive study of the nature of the universe), which is a study of the basis of ethics and forms the nucleus of Chinese thought and is the source of all theories of the "conformity of heaven and man in virtue." Yet, this is precisely what is most neglected and misunderstood by sinologues.

Chinese Rationalism culminated during the Sung and Ming dynasties and perhaps represents the highest intellectual achievement since the pre-Chin era. In fact, the early Confucianists and Taoists had already regarded the cognizance of "hsin-hsin" as the foundation of their thinking. What the Ancient Script Edition of the *Book of History* calls the "sixteen-word message cultivating the mind" as handed down from the Three Emperors is doubtlessly unauthentic, yet the very fact that later scribes should have committed such a counterfeiting and that Sung-Ming Confucian scholars firmly upheld it as the fountain head of China's cultural development demonstrates their belief that "hsin-hsin" is the root of Chinese thought. That most Chinese and Western scholars now cannot appreciate this point of view is mainly due to the fact that throughout the three hundred years of the Ch'ing Dynasty the trend was to deprecate Sung-Ming Confucianism and to emphasize textual criticism, and consequently to avoid any discussion of "hsin-hsin." Towards the end of the Manchu regime, Western studies began to be introduced. At this time, what the Chinese admired of the Occident was its warships and firearms. Later it included its technology and political science. During the May 4 Movement of 1916, science and democracy became the vogue while many followed Yen Yüan and Tai Chen against the

Sung-Ming philosophers. Subsequently, Communism also taught opposition to "hsin-hsin." While Christianity urges man to admit and confess original sin, the traditional Chinese philosophy of "hsin-hsin" insisted that human nature is basically good. There is at least apparent disagreement between the two. Since the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty, only Buddhists have been chiefly concerned with "hsin-hsin," though many scholars, such as Chang Tai-yen, Kung Ting-an, and Kang Yu-wei's pupil T'an Ssu-t'ung, were all familiar with the sutras. However, the Buddhist doctrine of "hsin-hsin," with its emphasis on Nirvana and its penetrating insight, is quite different from, and as a result could not comprehend, the Confucian doctrine of "hsin-hsin." All this contributed to its neglect for several hundred years. At the same time, when the Jesuits brought Chinese thought into the West, they represented Sung-Ming philosophy as similar to Western rationalism, naturalism, or materialism. Consequently, it was welcomed by rationalists like Leibnitz and materialists like Holbach. Though Chu Hsi's essay "On Human Nature" and similar Sung-Ming fragments were later translated, nevertheless there was no appreciative study.

One of the main causes that has persisted to this day of the misinterpretation of Chinese Rationalism is its constant identification with the Western traditional doctrine of the rational soul, or with epistemological or metaphysical theories; whereas theologians accepting Sung-Ming Rationalism as a form of atheistic naturalism interpret "hsin-hsin" as the natural human heart and nature. To the present, the word "hsin" has been translated as "nature." This word "nature" carries a profound significance in the thoughts of Greek Stoicism, of modern Romanticist literature, and of Spinoza—a meaning that is not far from that given to it by Chinese philosophy. Unfortunately, since Christian thinkers pitched the supernatural against the natural, the word "nature" has progressively depreciated in its real meaning. As Western naturalism and materialism come into vogue, "human nature" is more and more related to instinctive desires and abilities. From this viewpoint, one tends to approach Sung-Ming Rationalism as something superficial rather than to try to interpret it in the light of deeper Western philosophical investigations of the inner spiritual life.

In our understanding, such lines of approach are fundamentally unsatisfactory. The so-called "scientific psychology" treats human behavior as an object of experimental study. Such is merely factual research, without any evaluation of the psychic activities. The doctrine of the rational soul, on the other hand, treats the human mind as an entity, stressing considerations of its formal qualities of unity, immortality, and self-existence. Epistemology is concerned with the cognition of external objects by the intellectual mind, and the possibility of intellectual knowledge, while metaphysics seeks to establish the ultimate reality of the universe. These are all very different from Confucian Rationalism which is the basis of the moral life; its depth varies with the profundity of actual practice. It is not first to set up some psychological standard or spiritual entity as the object of abstract investigation, or to explain the possibility of knowledge, which brings into existence this doctrine of "hsin-hsin." Of course, this doctrine does implicitly contain a metaphysics, but this metaphysics is more like Kant's "ethical" metaphysics. It serves as the basis for moral conduct, and in turn is testified to by this conduct.

Because of such characteristics, Chinese Rationalism cannot be properly understood by those who are not devoted to morality, or even those who though so devoted nonetheless merely follow the customs of a society or the precepts of a God. In other words, it does not permit one to study objectively an object and then from this object to determine one's moral obligations and attitude. Such a method may be applicable to a study of nature or society, perhaps even God, but not to the pursuit of one's personal practices or a study of "hsin-hsin" which must be apprehended through such practices. Practice arises out of understanding, and understanding is realized by practice. In this mutual dependence, the moral acts are oriented towards the outward while understanding is purely within oneself. If therefore the acts are extended to one's family, one's understanding correspondingly comprises the family; and if the acts are extended to the nation, to the entire universe, so too the understanding comes to comprise the nation and the entire universe. The two do and must progress in conjunction. For this reason, what appears to be obedience to social or legal regulations or to divine behests is in the understanding no more than

the fulfillment of "hsin-hsin." The human will in the application of moral principles is unlimited in its involvement, and accordingly the fulfillment of "hsin-hsin" is also unlimited. But the limitlessness of this "hsin-hsin" should not be discussed in the abstract, but must be treated only when one fulfills the moral obligations, when a multitude of things and events of concern to us exhibit themselves, thus to prove that we are really one with the universe; whence we see that "hsin-hsin" does commune with heaven. In that sense, whoever acts conscientiously and knows nature knows also heaven; whoever regulates his emotions serves also heaven. Human nature reflects the nature of heaven; the morality of man is also that of heaven. What man does to perfect his own nature is also what gives praise to the manifold manifestations of the universe. Because of this, the Sung-Ming Confucianists equate "hsin-ri" with heavenly reason, the human heart with the cosmic heart. All these express once more the idea of the oneness of heaven and man. From Confucius and Mencius to the Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianists there was always the understanding and acknowledgement that moral conduct and comprehension are closely connected and must progress together. In other words, to fulfill the moral principles in all activities the only way is to endeavor to the utmost according to "hsin-hsin." This is what was called the "conformity of heaven and man in virtue," and this is the traditional doctrine of "hsin-hsin." If we realize that this doctrine is the core of Chinese culture, then we must not allow the misunderstanding that Chinese culture limits itself to external relations between people, with neither inner spiritual life nor religious or metaphysical sentiment.

5. The Permanence of China's History and Culture

We can now proceed to the problem concerning how China's history and culture have lasted uninterruptedly for several thousand years. Only India has a comparable record, but in her case the people have entrusted their minds to an eternal world of religious faith, and consequently her culture lacks historical records. While temporally the cultural history of India has been long, the people

do not feel so in self-consciousness. China is the only such nation that still exists.

Why have China's history and culture endured? It cannot be explained away by Spengler's hypothesis that they have become stagnant since the Han Dynasty. The fact is that they did not stop progressing. Some say it is due chiefly to the people's emphasis on the maintenance of the concrete daily life, and not like the West, devoting much time to idealism and utopias. Others attribute it to conservatism, the performance of activities in accordance with habitual procedures so that the national vitality is preserved on account of frugality. Yet others have the opinion that the reason may be found in the importance traditionally attached to having a large number of offspring, because of which the nation survived numerous catastrophes. These explanations, and many others, cannot, no doubt, be dismissed as entirely trivial. Yet, holding that a nation's culture is the expression of its spiritual life, we believe that the answer is to be sought for in its ideologies.

The aspiration for the eternal took shape very early in Chinese thought. In ancient religious teaching there was the saying that the "decree of heaven is not immovable," in other words, that heaven, or God, is impartial, the decree falling on the virtuous. The Duke of Chou understood this impermanence from the examples of Hsia (2183-1752 B.C.) and Yin (1751-1111 B.C.), and hence incessantly admonished the people to preserve and prolong its socio-political heritage. For this very reason, the Chou dynasty lasted for some eight hundred years, the longest in Chinese history. The philosophical presentation of this concept is first found in the *Book of Changes*, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, and the writings of Laotzu. These might have been compiled during the period of the Warring States, when social and political conditions were most unstable. The later dynasties of Han, Tang, and Sung all lasted for centuries because of this desire to attain permanence, which also explains why China's entire civilization has endured.

Briefly speaking, this concept of seeking the permanent, as expounded in Taoism, is utilitarian, or "advancing by retreating." As Laotzu put it, "That heaven and earth are lasting is because they do not last for themselves." Also, "the sage keeps himself

behind and yet is in front; he forgets himself, and yet is preserved." It enjoins one to rise above subjective prejudices and extraneous exertions so as to preserve one's vitality in order to attain longevity. It also urges one to abate selfishness and desires, to embrace what is simple and natural, to attain the idea of the "void" so as to be quiescent, and to keep one's energy within limits in order to be able to come back to oneself constantly. This is the way to attain the origin of the vitality of life and at the same time to help preserve one's natural strength.

Confucianists also taught man to control this vitality. However, in this case the motive is initially the establishment of "li" between man and man. Following Chou's "Li Regulations," they compared the virtues of a superior man with the qualities of jade. The characteristics of jade are its polished appearance and its firmness and solidity inside. With moral strength, one can accumulate all the vital energy of life. This is similar to what the *Doctrine of the Mean* called the "strength of the South," which stressed "forbearance and gentleness in teaching others as even not to recompense for trespasses," thus preserving the vitality. Both of these point to the moral virtuousness a man should possess. This kind of virtuousness is able not only to preserve man's vitality within himself but also to manifest itself by penetrating through his body. That is, this virtuousness has also the function of keeping one in good health; as the saying goes, "Virtue nurtures the body." In Western ethical studies, discussion of morality is usually devoted to consideration of the regulations of human behavior, or the social or religious values of moral codes. Few writers have particularly stressed this thorough transformation of man's natural life by moral practices so that his attitudes and manners manifest his inner virtues and enrich and illuminate this life. On the other hand, it is precisely what traditional Confucianism has greatly emphasized. As pointed out above, Confucian virtuousness is rooted in "hsin-hsin," which, however, is identified with the heavenly reason and mind, so that man's very existence is contingent upon "hsin-hsin" through the immanence of the reason and mind of heaven.

With regard to the conservation of China's national life, the emphasis on having many offspring should not be interpreted as

a mere instinct of race preservation. Even during the Chou Dynasty, this emphasis was in self-consciousness motivated by the desire to perpetuate the ancestral lineage—a motivation which had religious, moral, and political connotations as well. Psychologically, this natural instinct is limited to the love between husband and wife and between parents and children. Man needs to rise above this natural tendency in order to acquire respect for the parents and ancestors from whom he receives his life, and with it the fear that he might not receive ceremonial worship should he give forth no issue. This gave rise to the desire to perpetuate one's life down to thousands of generations, and also to the saying that "there are three unfilial things; of them the worst is lack of posterity." The explanation is to be sought in the pervading conception that in its unfathomable vastness "hsin" ought to reach up to thousands of epochs that had passed and down to myriads of generations to come.

Similarly, the desire of the Chinese people to preserve their civilization should not be understood as mere conservatism. In early Confucian thought, it was already considered unrighteous to destroy another state or to terminate another man's ancestral lineage. Confucianists worked not only to keep intact the culture handed down by the Duke of Chou, but also to safeguard the varied traditions of the Hsia and Yin dynasties. The dictum in the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, "to revive the perished state and restore the broken family," applied to all states, and not only to Lu, the native land of Confucius. At the same time, the purpose of the sage's extensive travels was clearly that the entire world might embrace the ways of *tao*. Such is certainly neither provincial nor merely conservative. It is a fact that Confucius did advocate the sovereignty of Chou over the barbarian tribes and that later many of his followers did likewise; yet even in this there was the admonition "to treat the barbarians as Chinese should they adopt the Chinese way of life." To interpret this in accordance with Chinese Rationalism we must say that the measure of "hsin" is infinite, so that whatever alien cultural elements that were acceptable to "hsin" were tolerated and assimilated. By this concept China's culture was endowed with a magnanimity which is also an important reason for its long history. Also because of it, China

has been a most tolerant country as far as religions are concerned. Both the San-Wu incident of Buddhist history and the Boxer Uprising were political rather than cultural events.

It is now clear why we can never accept the explanation of the Chinese emphasis on the preservation of her culture by means of racial instinct or conservatism. The real reason behind the discrimination against the barbarian tribes was simply that objectively China's culture was more advanced than theirs. For the same reason, the cream of the cultures of other nations has always been received and preserved by the Chinese. This is corroborated by their persistence in affirming the value of Buddhism, Christianity, and other Western doctrines despite the Communist denial. How long will this preservation last? The answer must be that it may be millions of years; for "hsin" reaches up to thousands of epochs and down to myriads of generations to come.

The foregoing points are made to confront and rectify the various prevalent but inaccurate approaches to Chinese culture, and to point out some of the basic characteristics in which lies its positive value. That there are shortcomings in Chinese thought cannot be denied. What we must recognise here is that any culture should be considered in terms of the positive value of its basic ideologies. Shortcomings are observed only when the ideologies are extended and developed or when they encounter in their applications unfavorable obstructions. If with an individual we first ascertain his merits and thus come to respect him, and then determine his shortcomings so that as an expression of our regard we may try to remedy them, then how much more should we take this attitude towards a culture, which is an expression of the spiritual life of a people.

6. Science and the Development of Chinese Culture

We just asserted that the shortcomings of Chinese culture are revealed only when it is being further developed. This is to say that one must not evaluate it or direct its future course with reference to an external standard. Rather, one must first have ideals as the natural direction of progress. A program of such extension

is to include into consideration the ideals of other cultures. This does not disregard the intrinsic propensities of Chinese culture, but stresses the absorption of whatever is good. Merely to add the Western elements of science and technology to Chinese tradition is not a fruitful method. We therefore decide to search for ideals in our inner heart and to follow them.

According to our understanding, the direction of progress to be taken should extend the attainment of moral self-realization to the fields of politics, of knowledge, and of technology. In other words, China needs a genuine democratic reconstruction, and scientific and technological skills. For this reason, China must embrace the civilization of the world; for this will enable her national character to reach higher planes of perfection and her spiritual life to achieve a more comprehensive development.

China certainly lacks the modern democratic system and scientific and technological achievements of the West; yet, it is erroneous to think that her culture contains neither the seeds of democracy nor such tendencies, or that it is hostile to science and technology. Concerning the latter [the democratic tendencies are discussed in the following section] it is to be observed that ancient China clearly laid much emphasis on practical knowledge and skills. The legendary emperors were all inventors, while the Confucian school traditionally emphasized the notions of the "manifestation of *tao* in practical appliances," of "establishing virtues," of "exploiting utilities," and of "enriching livelihood." Astronomical, mathematical, and medical knowledge also flourished early. In fact, it is common knowledge that prior to the Eighteenth Century China was more advanced than the West in the manufacture of handicrafts and utensils as well as in farming techniques. If China still falls short of Western scientific accomplishments, it is because the scientific spirit of the West is beyond a purely pragmatic motive. This scientific spirit of the West originated in the Greek dictum of "knowledge for the sake of knowledge." This demands the suspension, at least temporarily, of all practical or moral activities, transcending evaluations, and moral judgment to permit the intellect on the one hand to observe each phenomenon objectively and on the other to pursue rational inferences by means of which

it may illuminate the laws of the universe and its categories of thought and logic. Such a spirit is precisely what was lacking in China's ancient philosophy so that theoretical science could not evolve, and the progress of her arts and technology was arrested. The privation of such a scientific spirit was the result chiefly of the obsession with the fulfillment of moral principles, which prevented any objective assessment of the world. There was no theoretical scientific knowledge to link together the inner moral cultivation, the "establishing of virtues," and the outward practical activities of tailoring nature to enrich life so as to prevent frustration of the outward expression of the moral subjectivity, and hence its dissolution in isolation. The danger was not recognised till the end of the Ming Dynasty, when Wang Fu-chih, Ku Yen-wu, Huang Tsung-hsi and others explicitly pointed out the necessity of an external expression and activity of "hsin-hsin" in order to escape a "suicidal shrinkage." Unfortunately, scholars of the succeeding Ch'ing Dynasty were, in their endeavor to overcome this weakness, mainly attracted to terms, objects, and texts so that internally they lost the intense moral comprehension of Sung-Ming Confucianism and externally they were unable to "establish virtues and to exploit utilities for a rich life," thus bringing about a worse stagnancy of China's cultural spirit. Followers of Yen Yuan and Tai Chen even down to the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty, attempted to achieve recovery through concern with water conservation and irrigation, agricultural development, medical research, and astronomical observations; but their efforts were destined to fail.

The Chinese people must therefore endeavor to achieve self-realization as intellectuals as well as moral beings. As we have demonstrated, this requires the temporary suspension of their moral consciousness in favor and in support of intellectual activities. Intellectual activities are as important as value assessment and moral practice. The intellect's mission must be developed, otherwise the people's moral self cannot get the benefit from their intellect. At the same time it is necessary to have a proper balance of the two elements. It is precisely this harmony between morality and intellect that is the supreme function of man.

7. *Democratic Reconstruction and the Development of Chinese Culture*

Apart from the aristocratic feudalism of the pre-Ch'in period (ended 222 B.C.), the sole form of government in China was monarchy, until 1911. In such a system the ultimate political powers lay in the ruler rather than the people; and because of this there arose many unsolved problems, such as the order of succession to the throne, the interim between two dynasties, and the status of the ministers. Under the hereditary system, if the ruler had both integrity and capability there was indeed political stability. Otherwise, as often was the case, there could be much conflict with the ministers, and the ruler might lapse into tyranny, or else ambitious relatives, favored eunuchs, or powerful ministers might throw the nation into chaos. Thus it was that China's political history is one of alternation of order and disorder. In order to break through this situation the only way is to establish a democratic government.

That China should have as yet failed to do so does not mean that her political development does not tend towards democracy, or that there is not the germ of democracy in the culture. Chinese monarchy was quite different from its Western counterpart, for Chinese political thought early identified popular will with the decree of Heaven. Whoever proclaimed himself ordained by Heaven to be the ruler must also respect and seriously consider the desires of the people. Accordingly it was provided that he should carefully weigh the admonitions of his ministers, high or low, and the petitions of his subjects, titled or vulgar, in order to unify the governing and governed. Furthermore, the impartial chronicles of the court historiographers and his posthumous titling by his ministers supplemented his scruples. Subsequent political development produced a sort of cabinet system for which the nation's intellectual elements were selected, political censureship, an examination system for government officials, and various other systems. These all serve to offset the monarch's power and to bridge the gap between the central government and the populace, although their effectiveness depended ultimately solely on the per-

sonal integrity of the monarch, since there was no fundamental law or constitution to check him. It is therefore clear that the limitations on the powers of the ruler must be transferred from the ministers to the people outside the governmental structure if they are to be effectual. Towards democracy, therefore, is the natural direction of development for Chinese political history.

The germ of democracy clearly was in both the Confucian and the Taoist schools of thought, which equally asserted that the ruler should always reign "through non-action" or "by virtue." No doubt, such was no more than setting forth an ideal conception of a monarch; but the Confucianists (from Mencius down to Huang Tsung-hsi) also championed the conception that the nation belonged not to one man but to the people of the nation and that government aims at the good of the people. It was for this that they paid such high tribute to the legendary emperors Yao and Shun. It was a weakness of their ideologies that they did not formulate theories of effective transfer of the throne to those of high moral integrity.

There is a more profound reason why the establishment of a democratic government is necessary for the development of China's culture and history. In the past, the monarch could, to be sure, reign with moral integrity and the people thus bathe in his morality. But the people would still be passive, and therefore unable to achieve moral self-realization. In such a case, the monarch could never really attain sagehood or achieve his own moral self-realization. To do so, the ruler must first make his position accessible to each and every one of those qualified for it, and in this way affirm political equality for all the citizens. It then follows that a constitution must be drawn up, in accordance with the popular will, to be the basis of the exercise by the people of their political rights. Only thus may the people all attain moral self-realization, since self-realization demands, politically, the freedom both to ascend to and to retire from official positions.

8. Our Understanding of China's Contemporary Political History

Those who doubt the possibility of establishing democracy in China usually draw their evidence from the history of the Republic.

The ambitious career of Yuan Shih-kai, the brief restoration of Manchu rule by Chang Hsün, the bitter struggle for supremacy by the warlords, the two decades of political "tutelage" by the Kuomintang, the seeming adoption of a constitution soon followed by Communist domination over the mainland—these all seem to suggest that China will never become a constitutional democracy. Indeed, some have even doubted if the people really wanted democracy at all.

We think that there is no doubt the Chinese people do aspire for a democratic government. Yuan had to fabricate some sort of "popular will" in support of his move, and even so his usurpation lasted only a few months. The political "tutelage," as conceived by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, was no more than a preparation for constitutional government. Only the Marxism of the Communists was ideologically opposed to Western democracy. Even in this case, the name of "people's rule" was given to its totalitarianism and the outcry of a "new democracy" first raised.

That constitutional democracy has not been realized despite the aspirations of the people has its sociological and ideological reasons. The success of the Revolution of 1911 was due mainly to the passion of nationalism aroused by the failure of the political reform movement towards the end of the Manchu regime. The chief aim of this surge of nationalism of the Han people was to purge the humiliation of three centuries of Manchu oppression. Although they had inklings of the notions of rights and sovereignty of the people, most of the Chinese, having no clear idea of what democracy meant, regarded the establishment of the new Republic as just another dynastic changeover. Furthermore, there were few religious, economic, cultural, or scientific organizations, and no class opposition. Unlike their Western counterparts the early members of the parliament were largely intellectuals who had little social experience and who hardly represented the interests of any organization or class. Such being the case, it was not unexpected that they were able neither to curb the imperialist adventure of Yuan nor to prevent Tsao Kun's rigging of the presidential election. The principle of democracy and the theory of representative government as promulgated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Liang Ch'ich'ao, the establishment of the "New Youth" weekly—these were

undoubtedly all in the interest of the new movement. But in his zeal, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, editor of "New Youth," urged the destruction of the traditional culture, making democracy no more than an import product from the West without root in Chinese culture. In the process, tradition was demolished while the new ideology failed to win much support. Subsequently, Ch'en turned his attention to economics, particularly the encroachment on China of Western imperialism and capitalism, and became a convert to Marxism. Even ardent proponents of the three People's Principles like Hu Han-ming and Liao Chung-kai upheld dialectical materialism; so that when, in 1924, the Kuomintang adopted the new policy of allying with Soviet Russia and tolerating Communism, it was mainly concerned with preparing for the Northern Expedition rather than attempting to solidify a democratic government. Dr. Sun himself did hold fast to the hope of establishing democracy by means of political tutelage. However, during the revolutionary years such a hope could hardly rise to prominence, whereas during the tutelage period it was all but completely replaced by party ambitions.

The length of the tutelage period (twenty years) may, of course, be ascribed to the unwillingness of the Kuomintang to relinquish lightly its political power. But objectively there are reasons too. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria during the thirties aroused much nationalistic zeal, which necessitated centralization of power. Once the Sino-Japanese War was started, it was unfeasible to effect any change in the government.

Nor can Communist dictatorship in the mainland, Ch'en Tu-hsiu's defection, or Communist and Fascist influences on the thought of many Kuomintang party members, be adduced as evidence of lack of popular aspiration for a democratic government. Communism did not originate in China. Introduced into the country by intellectuals who dwelled in attics in the various foreign settlements, it has spread so widely only because China did suffer greatly from the imperialism and capitalism of the West. Communist premises were never accepted or demanded by the spiritual life of the people. Furthermore, one must not overlook two important factors in the Communist rise to power. Firstly, Communist growth was nurtured on the people's nationalism through the

pretense of a united front in resisting Japanese invasion. Secondly, by lining up with the other democratic parties in urging the Kuomintang to restore political power to the people, the Communist party caused and took advantage of the latter's spiritual debilitation. From these it is clear that Communist success was initially the consequence of the democratic aspirations as well as the nationalism of the people.

There are five fundamental reasons why Communism as a guiding principle of Chinese culture and politics cannot last. (1) Marxist-Leninism denies the possibility of individualized human nature except insofar as it is determined by economics. In this attempt to annihilate all institutions of religion, art, literature, and morality, it is violating the common principles of all the world's higher civilizations. In particular, it presumes to truncate China's culture and history, both of which are deeply rooted in the doctrine of "hsin-hsin," as the basis of morality. (2) It denies the individuality and rights of each human being. (3) The natural course of Chinese cultural history points towards man's political, intellectual, and technological, as well as moral, self-realization. To do this his intellect must not be weighted down by dogmatic tenets. That is, freedom of thought and academic pursuit must be affirmed without qualification. (4) In striving for political self-realization, the Chinese cannot tolerate party dictatorship, just as they could not tolerate absolute monarchy. (5) In the Communist totalitarian system, there is no rule governing succession of leadership; so that on the death of a leader there are inevitably life-and-death struggles between the aspirants. This is a matter of certainty by the very nature of the governmental structure, which makes a person of differing opinions an enemy and which precludes the possibility of co-existence. To avoid such an unpleasant situation the only means is popular election in accordance with a fundamental constitution, making for peaceful transfer of political power.

In view of these reasons, Communist totalitarianism is doomed, despite various temporary industrial and technological achievements. After all, Marxist-Leninism has no positive basis in Chinese culture. It was accepted only because it denounced encroachments by imperialists and capitalists, and could in principle be used as a means to preserve national survival and independence.

The future development of Chinese politics cannot be precisely predicted, but it is certain that Marxist-Leninism will be discarded eventually and the spiritual life of the nation will press forward towards the establishment of a democratic government.

9. *What the West Can Learn from Oriental Thought*

The development of Western civilization is outlined by innumerable flashes of brilliancy as well as many crises. Such crises have their origin in man's inability to control his cultural products and inventions. Thus, perhaps the highest achievements of modern scientific technology is nuclear fission, and yet the biggest world problem now is precisely due to the fact that Western civilization is unable to control this nuclear fission. We cannot, of course, assert that oriental cultures can surmount such difficulties, but it is clear that the formation of a world civilization is contingent upon co-operation on a high plane among the various cultures of the world. What the Orient, in particular China, needs in preparation for this has been delineated. What, in our opinion, the West should learn from the East will now be set forth.

In the first place, the West needs the spirit and capacity of sensing the presence of what *is* at every particular moment, (*Tang-hsia-chi-shih*) and of giving up everything that can be had (*I-ch'ieh-fang-hsia*). The strength of the West's cultural spirit lies in its ability to push ahead indefinitely. However, there is no secure foundation underlying this feverish pursuit of progress. Along with this pursuit of progress there is a feeling of discontentment and of emptiness. In order to fill this emptiness, the individual and the nation constantly find new ways for progress and expansion. At the same time external obstructions and an internal exhaustion of energy cause the collapse of the individual and the nation. This is why the most powerful ancient Western nations collapsed and never did recover from their downfall. Chinese culture traces all values to "hsin-hsin," and in so doing achieves the capacity to "accept what is self-sufficient at the moment." Chinese thought has always regarded "retreat" as more fundamental than "advance." Complementing the characteristically Western push for progress,

this will provide a solid and secure foundation for Western civilization.

Moreover, as the West builds its culture on the activities of the intellect it is principally concerned with the formation of concepts. In thus attributing the essence of life to intellectual processes, it tends unwittingly to value human life in proportion to its conceptual content. Such a criterion is not without merit, but it overlooks the fact that concepts as such are separate and distinct from life. When human life is committed to certain clear-cut concepts, it can no longer enjoy and adapt itself. This is the prime cause of the West's difficulty in achieving communion with the East. Authentic communication is possible only if the participant parties present an "empty mind" ready to identify with one another. While concepts can be a means of communicating between those mutually sympathetic, they can also be the most obstinate obstacle to genuine communication. As such, they—consisting of premeditated plans and objectives, abstract ideals of human relations and values, forming our prejudices, passions, habitual notions, etc.—must all be suppressed. In Indian thought this is known as the "wisdom of emptiness" or "wisdom of liberation from worldliness." In Taoism it is called the wisdom of the "void" or "nothingness"; and in Chinese Buddhism it is known as the wisdom of "emptiness," "freedom from pre-conceptions, pre-determinations, obstinacy, or egoism," and "broad-mindedness." With such wisdom, everything is seen through as if transparent, so that though one still possesses concepts and ideals of thought one can readily disentangle oneself from them and not be limited and confined by them.

The second element the West can learn from the East is all-round and all-embracing understanding or wisdom. This Chuang-tzu called "spiritual understanding" or "meeting the object with the spirit." In Western science or philosophy, principles and universals are attained by intellect and are sharply enunciated and defined. They are abstract and cannot be applied to what is concrete, because the characteristics which are peculiar to each class, and which are inexhaustible, have been eliminated. Wisdom is needed to comprehend and to deal with all the unprecedented changes

of life. This wisdom does not operate by adhering to universals, but by submerging universals in order to observe the changing conditions and peculiarities. To a large extent universals are determined by particular classes of objects. Universals which are related to these objects can be stored in the mind and called upon to function when the case applies. On the other hand one needs to submerge universals in order to rise to a higher plane of comprehension. In this way one's mind and wisdom which are all embracing achieve what Chuang-tzu calls "spiritual understanding." Meng-tzu said: "What has passed is merged; what has been preserved goes to the spirit and revolves with the universe." The term "spiritual" in Chinese means "stretchability." In applying universals to the physical world, certain universals correspond to certain physical objects. In the event that there is no correspondence between universals and objects the mind feels frustrated. Should one possess an all-embracing wisdom, he would not feel thwarted.

This wisdom is similar to the dialectical method and to Bergson's "intuition." The dialectical method employs a new kind of universal to explain a concrete reality, e.g., Hegel's philosophy of history. Nonetheless, the method is limited in its scope. The characteristic of the all-embracing wisdom of the Chinese, on the other hand, is a comprehensive understanding of reality. Bergson's "intuition" is similar to this, but his "intuition" is merely a fundamental tenet of his philosophical theory and does not penetrate his entire outlook on reality. In the Chinese view of life this wisdom goes into its literature, art, philosophy, Ch'an Buddhism, and the dialogues of the Sung Confucianists; it also shapes the attitudes of the scholars in their daily lives. This is why the Chinese can feel a unity with the universe. They can adapt themselves to different changes without feeling frustration. The Western world is in great need of this wisdom if she intends to understand the nature of the different cultures and to have an authentic communication with them. In addition to their knowledge, technology, ideals, and God, they must above all search deeper for the source of life, the depth of personality and the common origin of human culture in order to arrive at a true unity with mankind.

The third point that the West can learn from the East is a feeling of mildness and compassion. The Westerner's loyalty to

ideals, his spirit of social services, and his warmth and love for others are indeed precious virtues, to which oriental counterparts cannot measure up. However, the highest affection between men is not zeal or love, for with these emotions is often mingled the will to power and its acquisitive instinct. To forestall such an adulteration, Western civilization principally relies on its religious emphasis on personal humility and on all merits ultimately coming from God. However, the name of God can be borrowed as a back-prop in the conviction that one's actions bear His sanction; or else one may even selfishly wish to possess Him, such as during a war to pray for victory. It is for this reason that Christianity also teaches forgiveness. But extreme forgiveness tends to become complete renunciation of the world. To avoid such a fault zeal and love must again be emphasized, thus forming a logical circle and leaving the intermingling of love and the will to dominate or to possess still an unresolved difficulty. The resolution lies in eradicating this will to dominate or possess, and this is possible only if love is accompanied by respect. In that case, if I feel that the source of my love for others is God's infinite love, then my respect for others is likewise boundless. As the Chinese put it, the good man "serves his parents like Heaven" and "employment of people is as important as the sacrificial services." Genuine respect for others is possible only if man is without qualifications considered as an end in himself; but with such a respect love expresses itself through *li* (etiquette), thereby becoming courteous and mild. In this way love is transformed into compassion. This is precisely the Buddhist doctrine of "the great compassion." Its difference from ordinary love lies in the fact that in ordinary love the lover's spiritual feeling flows towards others in the manner of "regarding others as one-self," and this may frequently be mingled with the desire to possess others. Compassion, on the other hand, is the sympathetic consonance between the life-spirit of one's own and another's authentic being. Here, there is also natural interflowing of true sympathy, which is partly directed outwards and partly inwards. The emotional flowback makes it possible to purge any desire to dominate or possess. In other words, to effect such a transformation of Western love, God must be identified with man's heart of hearts, manifesting Himself through our bodies as the direct com-

munication between the life-spirits of all authentic being, not merely as a transcendental being, the object of man's prayers.

Fourthly, the West can obtain from the East the wisdom of how to perpetuate its culture. Contemporary Western culture is, it is true, at its height of brilliance, yet many observers have been concerned with its future, whether it will perish like ancient Greece and Rome. Culture is the expression of a people's spiritual life, and by the laws of nature all expression drains the energy of life. If this energy is exhausted, perishing is inevitable. To preserve his spiritual life, man needs a depth formed by an historical awareness which reaches both into the past and into the future and this depth connects with the life-giving source of the cosmos. In the West, this life-giving source is called God. In their religious life, Westerners could have more or less come into contact with the source were it not that they relied on prayer and faith. As it is, God is an external transcendental being and man can only reflect on His eternity. Besides, through prayer and faith what approaches God is man's spirit in adoration, not his authentic being. Painstaking labor is needed to make possible an authentic being's contact with the life-giving source. Man must begin by seeing to it that all his external acts do not merely follow a natural course, but rather go against this natural course to return to the cosmic life-giving source, and only then to fulfill nature. By such exertions against the natural course, energy is diverted into communication with the cosmic life-giving source. From this point of view, the West's chief concern with speed and efficiency constitutes a great problem. While the former easy-going attitude of the Chinese is not a suitable remedy in many respects, yet the maximum rate of progress with which the West leads the world is not conducive to durability. There will come the day when the West will realize that without lasting history and culture, though there be an eternal God, man cannot live peacefully. The West needs to develop an historical awareness with which to tap the life-giving source. It will then come to appreciate the value of conservation of life-energy and the meaning of filial piety, and learn to fulfill the ancestral will in order to preserve and prolong its culture.

The fifth point the West can learn from the East is the attitude that "the whole world is like one family." Though there are many

nations now, mankind will eventually become one and undivided. Chinese thought has emphasized this attitude. Thus Motians advocate all-embracing love; Taoists urge forgetting the differences; Buddhists advise commiseration and love for all things; and Confucians teach universal kindness (*jen*). The Christian doctrine of love has much in common with the Confucian doctrine of universal kindness. However, Christianity insists that man is tainted by original sin and that salvation comes from God, from above. Confucians, on the other hand, generally believe that human nature is good and that man can attain sagehood and thence harmony in virtue with Heaven by his own efforts. We think it better to rely on both rather than just Christianity in working towards world union. This is because Christianity is an organized religion, with numerous sects which are difficult to harmonize. Furthermore, it has its doctrines of heaven and hell, so that Christian love really comes with a proviso, namely that "you accept my religion." The Confucian view, however, is that all men can achieve sagehood. It has no organization, and does not require worship of Confucius since any man can potentially become like him. Consequently, Confucianism does not conflict with any religion. It has a concept of Heaven and Earth, but has no hell for those of differing views. If indeed the world is to be united, the Confucian spirit certainly deserves emulation. The same attitude can be found in Buddhism and Brahmanism, which also deserve close study.

Our list is, of course, by no means exhaustive. What we have pointed out is that the West must also learn from the East if it is to carry out its task as the world's cultural leader. These things are certainly not entirely alien to Western culture. However, we would like to see their seeds bloom into full blossom.

10. *What We Expect from World Thought*

While the West can certainly learn from the East, we have also a few remarks to make concerning the intellectual development of China and of the world.

(1) The expansion of Western civilization has brought the peoples into close contact and unfortunately has also produced much friction. What needs to be done now is for each nation critically

to re-examine and re-evaluate its own culture, taking into consideration the future of mankind as a whole. In order to achieve co-existence of the various cultures and world peace, one must first, through a transcendental feeling that goes beyond philosophical and scientific research, attain an attitude of respect and sympathy towards other cultures, and thereby acquire genuine compassion and commiseration towards mankind in adversity. Without this feeling, one could not regard culture as the expression of the spiritual life or endeavor, in the spirit of "reviving the perished state and restoring the broken family," to preserve and develop what is of value in these cultures.

(2) In cultivating this feeling, it is evident that objective and scientific learning is inadequate. Man needs a different kind of learning, one that treats himself as a conscious, existential being. It is not theology; it cannot be the merely phenomenological study of ethics or mental hygiene. Rather it is a learning that applies understanding to conduct, by which one may transcend existence to attain spiritual enlightenment; it is what the Confucianists call the doctrine of "hsin-hsin." Its essence is, of course, not exclusive to China. India has it in the practice of yoga; European existentialism has also grasped it, especially in Kierkegaard's emphasis on becoming and being a Christian as against the externalia of church attendance and other acts of religiosity. Yet, because Western civilization was moulded by rationalistic Hellenism, legalistic Hebraism, and jurisprudential Romanism, such a learning has not been made its core. Without this capability to transcend existence and to attain spiritual enlightenment man cannot really espouse God, so that his religious faith cannot be shaken. Similarly he cannot support the metaphysical and the scientific worlds of his own creation, or the oppression of the individual by the social, political, and judicial institutions of his own invention. That this should be the case is because man has sought only objective knowledge of the universe, from which he derives his ideals; and these ideals he in turn objectivizes in the natural and the social world. The external culture thus accumulated consequently becomes alienated from man and his control. On the other hand, this new learning, which can change the universe, makes possible authentic control over man's own existence. This is what in China is called

"Establishing Man as the Ultimate." Only after this can man have unshakable faith, and control and utilize his production.

(3) The human existence as formed by "establishing Man as the Ultimate" is that of a moral being which, at the same time, attains a higher spiritual enlightenment; for this reason, it can truly embrace God, thereby attaining "harmony in virtue with Heaven." Hence, this human existence is simultaneously moral and religious existence. Such a man is, in politics, the genuine citizen of democracy, in epistemology one who stands over and above the physical world. Not being bound by his concepts, his intellectual knowledge does not contradict his spiritual apprehension.

Such should be the direction of the new movement. When this conception will be realized, we do not know. In any case, for China, the pressing problem is to consummate, in fulfillment of the propensity of her culture, her work of democratic, scientific and industrial reconstruction. For the West, there is the problem of self-examination as the leader of the world, in the spirit of "reviving the perished and restoring the broken," of the various cultures. The time has come for the world to co-operate in bearing the burden of human suffering, and to open a new road for humanity.

E R R A T A

The following pages should be numbered
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I. LIST OF CHINESE TERMS AND NAMES

An-ch'ing (Anking) 安慶	Chang Lieh 張烈
Association for Confucianist Religion 孔教會	Ch'ang-lo 常洛
Case of the Cudgel Blow 棍擊案	Chang-nan Academy 漳南書院
Case of the Red Pills 紅丸案	Chang No 張諾
Case of the Removal from the Palace 移宮案	Chang P'eng-ko 張鵬翮
Ch'an 禪	Chang P'iao 張璫
Chan Jo-shui 湛苔水	Ch'ang; Pien; 常; 變
Chang Ch'ai 張差	Chang Po-hsing 張伯行
Chang Chien 張璣	Ch'ang-sha 長沙
Chang Ch'iu 章邱	Chang Tai-yen 章太炎
Chang Chiu-ch'eng 張九成	Chang Tsai 張載
Chang Chū-cheng 張居正	Chang Yung 張永
Chang Chung 張忠	Chao Chen-chi 趙貞吉
Chang Hsien-chung 張獻忠	Chao-chou 韶州
Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng 章學誠	Chao K'uang-yin 趙匡胤
Chang Hsün 張勳	Chao Nan-hsing 趙南星
Chang K'en-t'ang 張肯堂	chên 貞
Chang Li-hsiang 張履祥	Chen-chiang 鎮江
	Ch'en Chiu-ch'uan 陳久川

Ch'en Hao 宸豪
 Ch'en Hsien-chang 陳獻章
 Ch'en Ming-te 陳明德
 Ch'en T'uan 陳搏
 Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀
 Ch'eng Hao 程灝
 Ch'eng-hua 成化
 Ch'eng I 程頤
 Cheng-jen Shu-yuan 證人書院
 Cheng Kuo-t'ai 鄭國泰
 Cheng-shih 正始
 Ch'eng Yao-tien 程瑤田
 Cheng Yüan 鄭玄
 ch'i (matter) 氣
 ch'i (utensil) 器
 Chi-an 吉安
 Chi Yun 紀昀
 Chia-ching 嘉靖
 Chia-ch'ing 嘉慶
 Chia-ting 嘉定
 Chiang-men 江門
 Chiang Yung 江永
 Chiao Hsün 焦循

Chiao Hung 焦竑
 Chieh 桀
 Ch'ien 乾
 Ch'ien Ch'ien-i 錢謙益
 Ch'ien-ch'ing Palace 乾清宮
 Ch'ien I-pen 錢一本
 Ch'ien Lin 錢林
 Ch'ien-lung 乾隆
 Ch'ien Mu 錢禔
 Ch'ien Ta-hsin 錢大昕
 Ch'ien Te-hung 錢德宏
 chih 智
 chih-shan 至善
 chih tao liao 知道
 Chin-chang Academy 清漳書院
 Chin-ch'uan 金川
 Chin-hua Academy 金華書院
 Ch'in Hui-tien 秦蕙田
 Ch'in Hung 秦竑
 Chin-shan 金山
 chin-shih 進士
 Ch'in Shih Huang-ti 秦始皇帝

Chin Ying 金英
 Ching-chiang 靖江
 ch'iung ri 窮理
 Chou 紂
 Chou Ju-teng 周汝登
 Chou Tun-i 周敦頤
 Chu Chih-yü 朱之瑜
 chü ching 居敬
 Chu Chiu-tso 朱九祚
 Chu Hsi 朱熹
 chü-jen 琴人
 Chu-ko Liang 諸葛亮
 Chu Pang-liang 朱邦良
 Chu Pen-ssu 朱本思
 Ch'ü Shih-ssu 瞿式耜
 Chu Shu 朱恕
 Chu Ts'ang-mei 朱滄湄
 Ch'ü Yuan 屈原
 Chu Yün 朱筠
 Ch'üan Tsu-wang 全祖望
 Chuang Ts'un-yu 莊存與
 Chuang-tzu 莊子
 chung 忠
 chung 中

Ch'ung-cheng 崇禎
 Chung Kung 仲弓
 Chusan 舟山
 culmination-cultivation 止修
 Duke Huan 桓公
 Emperor Kuang-wu 光武
 Empress Hsiao-ting 孝定后
 Fan Ch'ih 樊遲
 Fan Chung-yen 范仲淹
 Fan Hua 范曄
 Fang-chou 房州
 Fang Kuan-chen 方觀承
 Fang Shu-hsien 方叔賢
 Fang Ts'ung-che 方從哲
 Fang Tung-shu 方東樹
 Feng-shui 風水
 Feng Tao 馮道
 Feng T'ing-ch'eng 馮廷丞
 Four Existents 四有
 Four Non-existents 四無

fu 賦

Fu-chou 撫州

Fu Hsi 伏羲

Fu-shieh 後社

Fu Sheng 伏生

Fu-t'ing 浮亭

Fu Yueh 傳說

Gali 噶禮

Han Chên 韓愈

Han Hsien-ti 漢獻帝

Han Kao-tsu 漢高祖

Han To-sui 韓侂胄

Han Yü 韓愈

Hang-chow 杭州

Heaven Foun-
tain Bridge 天泉橋

heng 亨

Heng-shan 衡山

Heng-yang 衡陽

Ho Ch'ang-
ling 賀長齡

Ho Hsin-yin 何心隱

Ho Kun 何濬

Ho Shang-yin 何商隱

Hou Chi 后稷

hsi 習

Hsi Ho 羲和

Hsia Yü 夏漁

Hsiang-t'an 湘潭

Hsiang-fan,
Hsiang-cheng 相及, 相成

hsiao 孝

Hsiao Hui 蕭惠

Hsiao-shan 蕭山

Hsiao Shih-
chung 蕭時中

Hsieh Hsuan 薛瑄

Hsieh K'an 薛侃

Hsieh Liang-tso 謝良佐

Hsien-feng 咸豐

hsin (mind) 心

hsin (faithfulness) 信

Hsin-chien
(Count of) 新建伯

Hsin-hui 新會

hsing (nature) 性

hsing-erh-
shang 形而上

hsing-hsia 形下

Hsing-jen 行人

hsing-shang 形上

Hsiu-ning 休寧

hsiu-ts'ai 秀才

Hsü Ai 徐愛
 Hsü Chieh 徐階
 Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh 徐乾學
 Hsü-chou 徐州
 Hsü Erh-tou 徐爾斗
 Hsü Fo-kuan 徐佛觀
 Hsü Fu-yüan 許孚遠
 Hsü Hsien-shun 許顯純
 Hsü Kuang-ch'i, (Paul) 徐光啟
 Hsü Shen 許慎
 Hsü Shih-chang 徐世昌
 Hsü T'ai 許泰
 Hsü Yu 許由
 Hsü Yueh 徐樾
 Hsü Yung-chien 徐用檢
 hsüeh 學
 hsüeh tao 學道
 Hsün-tzu 荀子
 Hu Chü-jen 胡居仁
 Hu Han-ming 胡漢民
 Hu-k'ou 湖口
 Hu Lin-i 胡林翼
 Hu Shih 胡適

Hu Wei 胡渭
 Hua Shan Monastery 華山寺
 Huai-an 淮安
 Huang Chen 黃震
 Huang Kung-shao 黃公紹
 Huang Pai-chia 黃百家
 Huang Tao-chou 黃道周
 Huang Tsun-su 黃尊素
 Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲
 Huang Wen-kang 黃文剛
 Hui Tung 惠棟
 Hung Hsiu-chuan 洪秀全
 Hung Mai 洪邁
 Hung Pang 洪榜
 I 義
 i ch'ien fang hsia 一切放下
 i pen wan shu 一本萬殊
 I Yin 伊尹
 investigation of things 格物
 jen 仁
 Juan Ta-ch'eng 阮大成

Juan Yüan 阮元
 K'ai-feng 開封
 K'ang Hsi 康熙
 K'ang Yü-wei 康有為
 Kao Ching-yeh 高涇逸
 Kao P'an-lung 高攀龍
 Kao-tzu 告子
 Kao Yao 皋陶
 Keng Ting-hsiang 耿定向
 Keng Ting-li 耿定理
 Chiu-kiang (kiukiang) 九江
 K'o Shih 客氏
 Ku Hsien-ch'eng 顧憲成
 Ku Tung-ch'iao 顧東橋
 Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武
 Ku Yüan-ch'eng 顧允成
 Kuan Chung 管仲
 K'uang Chang 匡章
 Kuang-hsin 廣信
 Kuang-hsü 光緒
 Kuei-lin 桂林

Kuei Yü-kuang 歸有光
 K'un 坤
 K'un-shan 崑山
 Kung-ch'eng 鞏城
 Kung-fu 功夫
 Kung-sun Ch'ou 公孫丑
 Kung Ting-an 龔定菴
 Kuo Sung-tao 郭松濤
 Lao-tzu 老子
 li 利
 li (institutions) 禮
 Li Ch'eng 李成
 Li Chi 麗女臣
 Li Chih 李贄
 Li Chih-hsiu 李植秀
 Li Chih-tsao 李之藻
 Li Hung-chang 李鴻章
 Li Hsiu-ch'eng 李秀成
 Li K'o-shao 李可灼
 Li Kuang-ti 李光地
 Li Kung 李璫
 Li Meng-pai 李孟白
 Li; Ming 力; 命
 Li Po 李白

Li Shih 李實
 Li Ssu 李斯
 Li Ts'ai 李材
 Li Tung 李侗
 Li Tung-yang 李東陽
 Li Tzu-ch'eng 李自成
 Li Yung 李容
 Liang Ch'i-ch'iao 梁啟超
 liang-chih 良知
 Liang Chin-hsuan 梁金鉉
 liang-neng 良能
 Liao Chung-kai 廖仲凱
 Liao-tung 遼東
 Liao-yang 遼陽
 Lieh-tzu 列子
 Lien-ch'ih Academy 蓮池書院
 Ling T'ing-k'an 凌廷堪
 Liu Chin 劉瑾
 Liu Chien 劉健
 Liu-chung Hsien Kung 劉忠憲公
 Liu Feng-lu 劉建祜
 Liu Hsin 劉歆

Liu-li-chang 琉璃廠
 Liu Pei 劉備
 Liu Tsung-chou 柳宗周
 Liu Tsung-yüan 柳宗元
 Liu Yung 劉容
 Lo Ch'in-shun 羅欽順
 Lo Hung-hsien 羅洪先
 Lo Ju-fang 羅汝芳
 Lo Ping-chang 駱炳章
 Lo Tse-nan 羅澤南
 Lou Liang 婁諒
 Lu Chih 陸贄
 Lu Chiu-yüan 陸九淵
 Lu En 陸恩
 Lu Kuei-meng 陸龜蒙
 Lu Lung-chi 陸隴其
 Lu Shih-i 陸世儀
 Lung-wu 隆武
 Lu-ling 廬陵
 Lu Yuan-chin 陸元靜
 Lung-ch'ang District 龍場
 Ma Shih-ying 馬士英

Ma Yūan 馬援
 Mao Ch'i-ling 毛奇齡
 Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東
 ming 命
 Ming Cheng-tsu 明成祖
 Ming Hsi-tsung 明熹宗
 Ming Hsien-tsung 明憲宗
 Ming Kuang-tsung 明光宗
 Ming Yi-tsung 明毅宗
 Ming Shen-tsung 明神宗
 Ming Shih-tsung 明世宗
 Ming Ssu-tsung 明思宗
 Ming T'ai-tsu 明太祖
 Ming Wu-tsung 明武宗
 Ming Ying-tsung 明英宗
 Mo Ti 墨翟
 mou 畝
 Mou Chung-san 牟宗三
 Nan-an 南安
 Nan-ch'ang 南昌
 Nan-chen 南鎮
 Nan-hai 南海
 Nan-ning 南寧

Nan-yao 南岳
 Nieh Pao 聶豹
 Nien bandits 捻匪
 Ning-po 寧波
 Ou-yang Hsiu 歐陽修
 pa 霸
 pai 拜
 Pai-ch'üan 白泉
 Pai-hua 白話
 Pan Ku 班固
 P'an Lei 潘耒
 Pao Ssu 包如
 pen-t'i 本體
 P'eng Shao-sheng 彭紹升
 P'eng Yü-lin 彭玉麟
 Pi Yüan 畢沅
 P'ing-ho District 平和縣
 ping-hsü 丙戌
 Po I 伯夷
 Po-yang Lake 鄱陽湖
 Po-yeh 博野
 Prince Fu 福王
 Prince Kuei 桂王

Prince Lu 魯王
 Prince of Ho-chien 河間獻王
 Prince T'ang 唐王
 Princess Cheng Kuei 鄭貴妃
realization of liang-chih 致良知
 ri 理
 ri i fen shu 理-分殊
 San-wu Incident 三武之變
 shan 善
 Shao-hsing 紹興
 Shao Yung 邵雍
 Shen Chūeh 沈滄
 Shen Nung 神農
 Shen Wei-ch'iao 沈維喬
 Shen-yang 瀋陽
 Shih-ching 詩經
 Shih Chung-ming 是仲明
 Shih Heng 石亨
 Shih K'o-fa 史可法
 Shih Meng-lin 史孟麟
 shih shih chiu-shih 實事求是

Shih Ta-kai 石達開
 Shu Ch'i 叔齊
 Shun 舜
 Society of God-worshippers 拜天會
 Soochow 蘇州
 Ssu K'ung 司空
 Ssu-ma Ch'ien 司馬遷
 Ssu-ma Kuang 司馬光
 Ssu-ma Yen 司馬炎
 Ssu-t'ien 思田
 Su Shih 蘇軾
 Sun Ch'i-feng 孫奇逢
 Sun Shen-hsing 孫慎行
 Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙
 Sung Chen-tsung 宋真宗
 Sung Jen-tsung 宋仁宗
 T'a Ch'i-pu 塔齊布
 Tai-chang 太倉
 Tai Chen 戴震
 T'ai-chou 泰州
 T'ai-p'ing T'ien Kuo 太平天國
 Tai-shan 泰山
 T'an Ssu-t'ung 譚嗣同

Tang Chun-i 唐君毅
 tang hsia chi shih 當下即是
 Tao 道
tao hsüeh 道學
 Tao-kuang 道先
 T'ao Shih-ling 陶師齡
 T'ao Wang-ling 陶望齡
 Teng Hsien-o 鄧顯鶴
 Teng Ting-yu 鄧定宇
 t'i 體
 Tien-chia-chen 田家鎮
 T'ien Huang 天皇
 T'ien-men District 天門縣
 T'ien-t'ai Range 天台山
 t'ien-tao 天道
 Ts'ao Chiao 曹交
 Ts'ao Ch'in-ch'eng 曹欽程
 Ts'ao Fang 曹芳
 Tsao Kun 曹錕
 Ts'ao Pi 曹丕
 Ts'ao Ts'ao 曹操
 Tseng Chi-tse 曾紀澤

Tseng Kung 曾華
 Tseng Kuo-ch'uan 曾國荃
 Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩
 Tseng Tien 曾點
 Tseng-tzu 曾子
 Tsing Hua University 清華大學
 Tso Tsung-tang 左宗棠
 Tsou Shou-i 鄒守益
 Ts'ui Ch'eng-hsiu 崔呈秀
 Ts'ui Ching-yung 崔景榮
 Ts'ui Ying-yüan 崔景元
 Tu Fu 杜甫
 Tu Mou-chih 杜牧之
 Tuan Yü-ts'ai 段玉裁
 Tung Chung-shu 董仲舒
 T'ung-ch'eng District 桐城縣
 T'ung-chou 通州
 Tung lin 東林
 T'ung-men Hui 同盟會
 Tung-wen Kuan 同文館
 Tzu-hsia 子夏
 Tzu-kung 子貢
Tzu-ssu 子思

- Tzu-wen 子文
- ultimate of nothingness 無極
- unity of knowledge and action 知行合一
- Wan Chang 萬章
- Wan-li 萬歷
- Wan-mu-ts'ao T'ang Academy 萬木草堂書院
- wan wu mo pu yu tui 萬物莫不有對
- Wang An-kuo 王安國
- Wang An-shih 王安石
- Wang Chang 王昶
- Wang Chen 王振
- Wang Ch'i 王幾
- Wang Fa-ch'ien 王法乾
- Wang Fu-chih 王夫之
- Wang Hsi-chieh 王錫爵
- Wang Hua-ch'eng 王化澄
- Wang Ken 王艮
- Wang Mang 王莽
- Wang Ming-sheng 王鳴盛
- Wang Nien-sun 王念孫
- Wang Pi 王裴
- Wang Shou-jen 王守仁
- Wang Yin-chih 王引之
- Wang Ying-lin 王應麟
- Wei Ch'ang-huan 韋昌煥
- Wei Kuang-wei 魏廣微
- Wei Tsung-hsien 魏忠賢
- Wei Yuan 魏源
- Wen Ch'eng (Princess) 文成公主
- Wen T'ien-hsiang 文天祥
- Wen-tzu 文子
- White Deer Grotto Academy 白鹿洞書院
- Wo-jen 倭仁
- Wu-ch'ang 武昌
- Wu Chung-luan 吳鍾巖
- Wu-hsi 無錫
- Wu-i Mountain 武夷山
- Wu Kuang 務光
- Wu-t'ai Mountain 五台山
- wu-tsê 物則
- Wu Yü-pi 吳興弼
- Yang 陽

Yang Chien 楊簡

Yang-chou 揚州

Yang Chu 楊朱

Yang Hao 楊鎬

Yang Hsiu-chen 楊秀成

Yang Lien 楊連

Yang Shen 楊慎

Yang Shih 楊時

Yang T'ing-yun 楊廷筠

Yang-tzu 揚子江

Yao 堯

Yao Nai 姚鼐

Yeh-ta 俺答

Yen Chün 顏鈞

Yen Hui 顏回

Yen Jo-chü 閻若璩

Yen-men 雁門

Yen Yuan 顏元

yin 陰

Yo-tzu 鬻子

Yu-chiao 由校

Yu-hua-tai 雨化臺

Yü-yao 餘姚

Yüan 元

Yüan Ch'ü 袁樞

Yüan Hsien 原憲

Yüan Mei 袁枚

Yuan Shih-k'ai 袁世凱

yüeh 樂

Yüeh-chou 岳州

Yung-an 永安

Yung-ch'eng 雍正

Yung-ch'ing District 永清縣

Yung Wing 容闕

Zikawei 徐家匯

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Book of Chou

周書

Book of a Thousand Characters

千字文

Chan Jo-shui,

湛若水

A Comprehensive Study of 'Investigation of Things' for the Use of Emperors

帝王格物通

Diagram of Nature and Mind

心性圖說

Chang Hsueh-ch'eng

章字誠

General Principles of Literature and History

文史通義

"Inquiry into Knowledge"

原學

"Inquiry into Tao"

原道

"The Meaning of the Term History"

原史

"Principles of Collation"

校讎通義

"Virtue of a Historian"

史德

Chang Lieh,

張烈

Doubtful Points Raised against the Theory of Wang

Shou-jen 王學質疑

Chang Po-hsing,

張伯行

A Collection of Study Rules Classified

學規類編

Chang Tsai,

張載

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正蒙

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穆宗詩文集

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范曄後漢書

Great Collection of Commentaries on the Five Classics

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皇清經解正編

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黃宗羲

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明文彙

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易經

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舜之命禹

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康有為

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新學偽經考

Study of the Reform Idea of Confucius
孔子改制考

Ku Yen-wu,
顧炎武

Capitals in the Different Dynasties
歷代帝王宅京記

Chao Yu Chih
肇域志

Five Books on Phonetics
音字五書

Inscriptions in Metal and Stone
金石文字集

Record of Daily Knowing
日知錄

T'ien-hsia Chun-kuo Li-ping-shu
天下郡國利病書

Li Chih-tsao,
李之藻

Chih-fang Wai Chi
職方外志

Exposition of the Real Meaning of the Lord of Heaven
天主實義

Ming-li-t'an
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Yung Lo Ta-tien
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III. LIST OF JAPANESE NAMES AND BOOKS

Ando Shuyaka 安東守約	Matzushita 松下村塾 Sonjuku
Akashi Gensuke 明石源助	Miwa Jissai 三輪執齋
Asaku Tampaku 安積泊	Mommu Tenno 文武天皇
Bitatsu Tenno 敏達天皇	Muso Kokushi 夢窓國師
Fujiwara Seigwa 藤原惺窩	Nakae-to-ju 中江藤樹
Gen'e Hoin 玄慧法印	Neiissan 寧一山
Godaigo Tenno 後醍醐天皇	The Nihon-shoki 日本書紀
Hayashi Razan 林羅山	Ogyu Sorai 荻生徂徠
Inonye Tetsujiro 井上哲次郎	Okumura Noriteru 奥村德輝
Ito Hakubun 伊藤博文	Omi-seijin 近江聖人
Ito Jinsai 伊東仁齋	Oshio Chusai 大鹽中齋
Jinno Shoto-ki 神皇正統記	Oyake Juji 小宅重治
Keian 桂庵	Oyake Seijun 小宅生順
Keigo Ryogan 桂梧了庵	Sato Issai 佐藤一齋
The Kojiki 古事記	Satsuma 薩藩
Kokan Zenji 虎關禪師	Seigo Takamori 西郷隆盛
Kondo Sadashisa 近藤定久	Shihata Zingoro
Kumazawa Banzan 熊澤藩山	Shingaku 心學
Kusunoki Masashige 楠公	Shu Shingido 周信義堂

Shunjo 俊苧

Sukuma Shozan 佐久間象山

Tokugawa
Keyasu 德川家康

Tokugawa-ko 德川開基
Keiso Shichi 七十年紀念
Ju-nen Kinen

Tokugawa
Mistzukuni 德川源光圀

Tokugawa Tsunaeda 德川源綱條

Tokutomi Iichiro 德富猪一郎

Ujino
Wakiirasuke 應神天皇

Umayado 聖德太子

Yamaga Soko 山鹿素行

Yamagata,
Marquis 山縣有朋

Yoshida Shoin 吉田松蔭

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